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ABSTRACT
Low cost carriers have changed the competitive dynamics of the short-haul market
forever. They have revolutionised the way of doing business in aviation by adopting a
fresh approach on both strategic and operational issues. Simplicity has become their
universal principle over network airlines and subsequently they have achieved
substantial cost advantages which are passed onto the consumer as lower fares.
Network airlines have found it difficult to reshape their structural barriers and have
been slow to incorporate the components that low cost carriers deemed very
significant in impacting their operating margins. However, a restructuring of their
internal weaknesses should spur initiatives to design long-term strategies to address
those shortcomings. Network airlines rely on producing value-adding and consumer-
driven product differentiation beyond the basics of the low cost carrier product. To
further differentiate themselves network airlines need to focus on: customer
satisfaction; develop long term mutually beneficial relationships with both passengers
and corporations; collaborate with a wide range of bipartisan partners; retain
differentiated flight products that add value; and to incorporate strategies that other
network carriers deemed paradigmatic. Network carriers should resist reducing costs
associated with value-added services and need to become innovative in generating
alternative revenue streams.
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11 Chapter one: Introduction
1.1 Setting the scene
The airline industry is facing evolutionary change. Full service airlines have been the
world’s dominant airline business model for decades but they now stand at a critical
juncture as a new airline force is reshaping the competitive dynamics of the short-haul
market. Events, such as SARS, 9/11 and the Asian currency crisis, had a significant effect
on the operations of the full service carriers but, with time, the traffic on international
routes gradually recovered and profits returned. However, a far more serious threat was
unfolding in the short-haul market - it was becoming a permanent problem and was
causing major concern to airline managers across the world. Low cost carriers had re-
engineered the design of the traditional airline business model and were capturing
significant chunks of the short-haul air transport market worldwide. By March 2006, they
had secured 8% of the intra-Asian market, and 23% and 27% of the intra-European and
US domestic markets respectively. In other parts of the world, low cost carriers have also
being growing quickly: Gol gained 25% of the Brazilian market; Air Deccan claimed
10% in India; Virgin Blue acquired 30% in Australia; while Air Arabia had taken 6% of
the Intra Gulf market by 2006. OAG (December, 2006) calculated that the total number
of low cost carrier seats worldwide was up by 16% over the year 2005/06 and there
appears to be no stopping the continuous growth, year after year, of these budget carriers.
To reflect the speed at which these low cost carriers are growing, the number of European
routes served by low cost carriers in 2000 can be compared against the number of routes
served in 2006 and is shown below in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In 2000, the bulk of the
traffic was centred around Ireland and the UK, largely because Ryanair and easyJet had
set up their initial bases in this region. However, by 2006 the low cost carrier route
network had grown substantially as there were 48 low cost carriers operating out of 22
States in Europe and this resulted in an enormous increase in capacity (Eurocontrol 2006,
p17). This type of low cost carrier growth typifies what has occurred in the US and Asia.
Low cost carriers have also been synonymous with strong financial performance as many
of the best performing budget carriers had operating margins that were on average three
times that of the network airlines in 2005, and this has attracted investors, thereby
allowing these carriers to become well capitalised. This has allowed the low cost carriers
to plan for the future and retain their double digit annual growth rate by procuring large
orders for new aircraft. In Europe for example, Aviation Strategy (March 2005) declared
that the four leading low cost carriers, easyJet, Ryanair, Air Berlin and SkyEurope, had
over 330 narrow-body aircraft on firm order by early 2005, while the total narrow-body
order at European full service airlines stood at just 26.
2Figure 1. European Low Cost Carrier
route network in 2000
Figure 2. European Low Cost
Carrier route network in 2006
Source: CAA, 2006
Analysis by the Boston Consulting Group (2004) revealed that that the low cost carriers
around the world had taken up to 60% of the passenger growth from the legacy airlines,
which explains why these carriers have experienced such low annual passenger growth
year after year. However, the major concern pertaining to network carriers was the
number of passengers switching to low cost carriers. In its 2000 air traffic forecasts for
the UK, the Department of the Environment Transport and Regions (DETR) made the
assumption that 30% of the passengers carried by the no-frills carriers would be
diverted from existing airlines and that the remainder would be stimulated (DETR,
2000). A study, conducted in 2002 by the European Low Fares Airline Association
(ELFAA) concluded that approximately 60% of the traffic was stimulated, while the
remaining 40% was substitute traffic (ELFAA, 2002; CAA, 2006). A later study by
Hapag-Lloyd Express (2004, p30) indicated that 59% of passengers travelling on
budget carriers were new passengers1 and confirmed the earlier analysis by stating that
a further 37% were switching from the network airlines to the budget carriers. In the
US, the problem was even more acute, because by 2005 an average of around 63% of
all passengers travelling on US Majors could also have taken a low cost carrier and that
this is steadily rising with each passing year and this was very threatening as large
Majors such as United and American Airlines for example were generating a large
amount of their revenues from the domestic market (Ito and Lee, 2003; Lee, 2007). In
Malaysia, the national flag carrier became the first major casualty of low cost carriers
as it structured a landmark deal with Air Asia whereby the carrier would take over the
majority of its domestic routes.
Several academics, including Hansson et al. 2002, Tretheway, 2004 and Taneja, (2004,
p32), have all emphasised that the traditional business model of the legacy carriers is
broken and that there must be a structural shift in airline strategy if traditional airlines
1 These new passengers are comprised of the following: 71% would otherwise not have travelled; 15%
would have travelled by car; 6% would have travelled by rail; 8% others.
3are to compete successfully with the low cost carriers. McKinsey Consulting have
estimated that the potential profits of Europe’s traditional network airlines are
estimated to fall by around $2.5 billion per year by 2010 if their current strategies
which challenge the low cost carrier threat remain unchanged. Similarly, the potential
revenues of the US majors will decrease by $6.4 billion per annum if American
incumbents maintain their current strategies (McKinsey Quarterly, 2005 p5).
Harrington et al. (2005) stressed that full service airlines must evolve or risk extinction.
Surprisingly, few academics have outlined what strategies would prove effective to
counter the low cost carrier threat. Franke (2004), a noted airline consultant and
academic, stressed that the network airlines urgently needed a new business strategy
and identified three areas that required restructuring. They included: reducing the
complexity at hubs; simplifying the customer interface; and providing greater
differentiation for premium passengers. Flenskov (2005, p114) stressed that
incumbents must offer a competitive product to each segmented passenger market.
Auerbach and Delfmann (2005) stated that network airlines should remain consistent
by retaining their traditional full service frills approach, which would be the key
prerequisite to achieving sustainable competitiveness in the future. Doganis (2005)
outlined that network airlines should implement the following: cut the domestic and
short-haul routes where load factors and yields are heavily undermined by the no-frills
carriers; integrate more and consolidate with alliance partners, which would strengthen
schedules and reduce capacity; focus on increasing their frequencies on short-haul
markets; continue operating into primary airports; cut costs significantly in order to
reduce the cost advantage of the no-frills carriers; strengthen the brand; and offer
passengers differentiated services that would enable them to charge higher fares and
maintain passenger loyalty. Doganis (2006, p269) also postulated that smaller and
medium sized network airlines should feed the short-haul traffic into the hubs of the
established long-haul operators and theorized that small to medium sized airlines could
become subsidiaries of large network carriers or even merge with them. Franke (2007)
reiterated that legacy network carriers needed to cut costs, adopt more flexible pricing
models and segment the customer base, and stressed that innovation will be the
winning formula to regain profitability and competitive advantage. Clearly there was a
need to find winning strategies that would prove effective against low cost carriers.
The full service airlines transported 1.5 billion passengers in 2006, which represents over
80% of the world’s RPKs, and are an important component in the air transport chain
(Airline Business, August 2007). Full service airlines have a large number of advantages
over low cost carriers and a continued erosion of their market share would force this
business model to further retreat and become extinct - which would have an enormous
impact of the industry. The full service airline is a valuable commodity to both the
economy and passenger for the following reasons:
4 The network airlines operate hub and spoke operations - this allows a number of cities
to be linked through a central hub, and each additional spoke that is added magnifies
the linkage benefits and through services. By combining point-to-point traffic with
transfer traffic at a central hub, airlines are able to offer a wider variety of
destinations to consumers with higher frequencies than a point-to-point operation.
Network carriers, through their collaboration with alliances, offer passengers a
‘seamless’ travel experience which allows both passengers and baggage to transfer
between carriers as if the passenger was travelling on the same airline. The members
of the Star Alliance, for example, served a total of 873 destinations in 2006, while
passengers travelling on a low cost carrier are restricted to destinations within its
network. Intercontinental connections are not available on low cost carriers, yet
interconnectivity is an important constituent for passengers. Mason and Alamdari
(2007) used a Delphi study to indicate that 82% of the responses indicated that
networks will be the principal component of intercontinental travel. SITA (2005)
indicated that 300 million interline tickets were produced in 2004. Studies have
shown that around 30% of all intra-EU passengers had tickets that accommodated
interlining, and a further 10% had a fully flexible interline ticket in 2001 (DG
Competition Consultation Paper, 2001).
 Consumers have the opportunity to travel to any city in the world as long-haul travel
remains a unique component of full service airlines - over 75% of the RPKs of British
Airways, KLM, Air France, Lufthansa and Swiss come from long-haul operations. In
contrast, Dobruszkes (2006) stated that 70% of Europe’s low-cost flights are less than
1000 km.
 Full service carriers have segmented the cabin into business and leisure offerings both
in short and long haul markets. Network carriers remain strongly favoured by the
business travelling community - research by Alamdari and Mason (2006) pointed out
that less than 10% of corporate trips, for example, are booked with low cost carriers,
and the majority of the corporations do not use them. Network carriers provide a
plethora of supplementary flight products aimed at the business traveller that include
lounges, flexible interchange tickets, baggage allowance, frequent flyer points, seat
comfort, etc.
 Freight is an important component of industrialisation and economic growth as the
World Bank (2002) indicated that air cargo, trade and GDP have a direct relationship.
Thus, in the new speedy logistic era, nations with good air cargo capability have a
competitive trade and development advantage over those without such capability. In
Asia for example, the strong growth in inter-regional trade has been supported by the
5boom in airfreight as major Asian airports account for 35% of Asia’s total
international trade by volume, but more than 40% by value (Senguttuvan, 2006). In
the UK, freight accounted for 20% of all Britain’s exports by value in 2000 (DETR,
2000). However, freight is not carried on low cost carriers as it is not an integral part
of its business model. IATA projects that air freight will become a $60 billion
business in 2007 (Air Cargo World, 2006), while Boeing estimates that 60% of this
value is transported in the bellyholds of full service airlines (Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group, 2000/01).
 The low cost carriers are noted for their poor customer service, and a survey on
16,000 travellers conducted by Carlson Marketing Group in 2003 confirmed that
easyJet and Ryanair had the industry’s poorest customer relations (Travel Trade
Gazette, 2003).
 The IATA Corporate Survey (2004, p87) listed several reasons why passengers
disliked travelling on low cost carriers, and these include: no frequent flyer programs;
inconvenient flight schedules; bad airport location; and seat comfort.
 Passenger surveys conducted by O’Connell and Williams (2005, 2006) listed that
passengers choose full service airlines because of a mixture of the following
attributes: schedule, reliability, quality, connections, fare, frequent flyer programs,
service and comfort, while passengers choose low cost carriers primarily because of
their low fare offerings. This wide mix of flight attributes offered by the full service
airlines creates value for the passenger.
1.2 Scope, Originality and Aims of the Research
Network airlines have two major problems when competing with low cost carriers:
firstly, they need to restructure their internal mechanisms to develop more effective
strategies, and secondly, network airlines need to re-examine the requirements of
passengers who are travelling in the short-haul market as the difference between the
flight product characteristics had become noticeably unsynchronised.
Strategies were urgently needed as the voice from industry was loud and clear; low cost
carriers are a major threat to the full service airline business model. The following
quotes outline the urgency of the problem.
 Martin George (2003), director of marketing at British Airways stated that ‘British
Airways very existence in the short haul market depends on finding solutions and
fast to the threat of low cost airlines’.
6 The CEO of SAS summed it up for many airlines by stating ‘Yet another
restructuring plan is being finalised for our short-haul operation and low cost
carriers are now one of our greatest challenges’ Barrie (2003).
 Robert Milton, Chief Executive Officer of Air Canada stated that ‘It appears that
the only successful airlines today are the original low-cost carriers or restructured
mainline carriers’. (Velocci 2003).
 Michael O’Leary, Chief Executive Officer, Ryanair stated that ‘Nobody, but
nobody will match our airfares and if they do, we’ll simply lower ours straight
away’ (Calder 2002)
 Ray Webster, Chief Executive Officer, easyJet stated that ‘In ten years time, all
intra-European traffic will be on low cost airlines’ (Flight International 2002)
It is somewhat surprising that academics generally have not addressed the issue of how
incumbents should respond to the low cost carrier threat. Authors, such as Morrell
(2002), Williams (2002, 1993) and Holloway (2003), have largely avoided the area,
while Lawton (2002) only discussed the strategies of low cost carriers. Hanlon (1999)
echoed what the majority of academics were proposing by suggesting that network
carriers should develop strong hub and spoke systems, implement marketing loyalty
schemes, focus upon their core competencies, outsource non-core functions, such as
information technology, and reduce costs. These strategies collectively should then
strengthen the competitive position of an incumbent. Holloway (1998) authored a book,
entitled ‘A strategic management perspective on an industry in transition’, which
preceded the low cost carrier threat, while his later book, ‘Airlines: Managing to make
money’, discussed competitive strategy but failed to address the issue of how
incumbents could strategically challenge the low cost carriers (Holloway, 2002).
Similarly, Shaw (2004) only dedicated a small proportion of his book entitled ‘Airline
Marketing and Management’ to the general strategies of airlines, while Flouris and
Oswald (2006) gave an excellent in-depth analysis of general airline strategy but, once
again, gave no insight into how incumbents could reshape their strategies in order to
compete successfully with low cost carriers. Work by Taneja (2002, 2003 and 2005)
largely discussed the general trend of the industry and did not disclose any new
strategies, while his 2002 book edition stressed that network airlines needed to adopt
new technologies. Apart from Aviation Strategy, a monthly intelligence report that
provides some insights into the response of the network carriers to low cost carriers,
there was an evident gap in the academic literature concerning what strategies network
airlines deemed effective in combating the low cost carriers.
Numerous authors have cited multiple reasons why passengers choose a particular
airline, and this is a major challenge facing airlines today as passengers demand a
multitude of different attributes - it is impossible to be all things to everyone [at the
same time]. At the same time, there is an increasing amount of literature on the need for
airlines to better understand their customers. Academics, such as Parasuraman et al.
(1985), found that there was a gap between a passenger’s expectations and perceptions.
7Holloway (2002, p230) stated that airlines must bridge the gap between a passenger’s
expectations and actual delivery. Gilbert and Wong (2003) and Aaker et al. (2003)
argued that airlines must accurately perceive what passengers want and expect. Park et
al. (2004) confirmed that airlines need to understand their customers and determine
what their passengers expect from the service. The McKinsey group also reiterated that
airlines must gain a better understanding of their customers (McKinsey Quarterly, 2005
p6). Taneja (2005) stressed that airlines must start prioritising their passengers’ needs.
However, there has not been any published work previously conducted on determining
if an airline’s view of the requirements of passengers matched the requirements of
passengers, or on measuring the amount that each airline has mismatched the
requirements of its passengers - and this was another significant gap in the literature.
Also, there had not been any published work conducted on the cross-price elasticity of
airline passengers between a low cost carrier and a full service airline, which would
measure what proportion of passengers would most likely switch over to another carrier
due to a change in the fare. This would assist network airlines in determining the price
sensitivity of passengers and which flight products they would be willing to substitute
as a result of the fare change - which was another void in the literature.
Aims of the Research
 To uncover the key factors which have been responsible for the continued growth
and success of low cost carriers, and to assess their impact on the full service airline
business model.
 To obtain insights into the perceptions of passengers to a change in fare between
low cost carriers and full service airlines, while determining which flight products
are most important to passengers travelling on each type of carrier.
 To measure the strategic capability of full service airlines in responding to low cost
carriers and to ascertain the former’s understanding of the requirements of
passengers.
1.3 Fundamentals underpinning the choice of Methodology and
Analysis
Philosophical assumptions underpin the research process, which dispose researchers
towards different paradigms and methodologies (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The two
research areas that have received most attention in literature can be broadly labelled as
positivist and phenomenological (Reichardt and Cook, 1979). The most commonly used
terms to differentiate these paradigms with respect to their associated methods and
techniques, are quantitative and qualitative respectively, with quantitative methods being
8based on the positivist paradigm while qualitative methods are built on a
phenomenological worldview (Creswell, 2003; Firestone, 1987).
Research methods are the data collection techniques which refer to the specific, fact-
finding procedures that yield information about the research phenomenon. The meaning
of data and the measures through which data are captured are also influenced by
theoretical frameworks relating in some way to the research questions. These
measurement theories should not bias the test for or against one explanatory theory over
its rival. Research methodologies can range from an objective, scientific (quantitative)
research style to the subjective, interpretive, more constructive (qualitative) style. Data
collection methods typically associated with (but not limited to) qualitative
methodologies include: interviews and questionnaires; diary methods; case studies;
observation and participant observation (fieldwork); and the researcher’s impressions and
reactions to observed phenomena. The objective of quantitative research is to develop
and employ mathematical and econometric modelling, theories and hypotheses pertaining
to scientific and business entities. Quantitative methods can be applied to questionnaires
in order to determine their statistical significance and correlation.
To fulfil the first aim (listed above) of the research thesis, an analysis of the secondary
data was conducted which involved the summary, collation and/or synthesis of existing
research. This was derived by an extensive review of the academic literature.
To fulfil the second aim of the research thesis, which was to ‘obtain insights into the
perceptions of passengers towards low cost carriers and full service airlines’, the author
chose a questionnaire methodology similar to researchers who undertook similar types
of studies into the perception of passengers, and include Park, 2007; Park et al. 2006;
Fourie and Lubbe, 2006; Gilbert and Wong 2003; and Mason, 2001. This is a clear way
of extracting information from passengers, as the questions target specific areas of
interest to the researcher. The methodology of using face-to-face interviews with
passengers was discarded as it is a time consuming process which would have negatively
impacted on the volume of respondents. Quantitative methods were then carried out to
determine the correlation of flight products for both leisure and business class passengers
who were travelling on full service and low cost airlines. The point at which passengers
begin to substitute the various flight products was also measured against a fare change,
and this was quantitatively accessed via a statistical process called the Spearman rank
coefficient.
To fulfil the third aim of the research thesis, which was to ‘measure the strategic
capability of full service airlines in responding to low cost carriers and to ascertain the
former’s understanding of the requirements of passengers’, the author accessed five types
of methodologies which are listed below. Each one will be discussed in-turn to provide
an explanation as to why each one was either considered or discarded.
9 Delphi Study
 Focus Groups
 Case Studies
 Interviews with Airline Staff
 Surveys
Delphi Study
The Delphi method is a social research technique which has the aim of obtaining a
reliable group opinion from a panel of independent experts who answer questionnaires in
two or more rounds with controlled opinion feedback. It was first developed for the field
of technological forecasting in the US in the early 1960’s by Norman Dalkey (Rand
Corporation) and Olaf Helmer (Institute for the Future). Today, it is considered a useful
method for eliciting and aggregating expert opinion whenever there is a lack of viable or
practical statistical techniques (Armstrong, 2001; Armstrong, 2006). It can be defined as
a medium-term qualitative forecasting method that is based on building a consensus
amongst a group of experts. A Delphi type-study enables an exchange of information
amongst anonymous experts (no expert knows which other experts are going to be
consulted) and this reduces the pressure to conform to the perceived views of industry
peers. In the first round, each expert is expected to provide an answer to each question -
and also a justification for their answer along with any assumptions made. The research
team then distils the answers and feeds-back a summary of the responses and
justifications with the entire group. In the second round, the experts react to the
information gathered during the earlier round, which allows the forecast to be fine-tuned.
It enables the experts to reach a consensus or convergence of thoughts on a subject
(Rowe and Write, 1999; Landeta, 2006; Green et al. 2007). A number of researchers have
applied this technique to the airline industry, as Mason and Alamdari (2007), for
example, asked the opinions of industry experts about the future trends of EU network
carriers, low cost carriers and consumer behaviour. Cooper et al. (1995) also used the
Delphi approach to analyse the implication of privatising Latin American carriers in the
future. However, the objectives of this thesis were very specific, and seeking a
methodology to determine the dynamics between full service airlines and low cost
carriers in the future was outside the scope of the research. In addition, the literature had
hypothesised several scenarios of the direction of full service airlines and how they
should respond to low cost carriers, and these were discussed extensively in the literature
review.
Focus Group
Focus Groups are interactive discussion groups used for: generating knowledge and
hypotheses; exploring opinions; exploring attitudes and attributes; evaluating commercial
decision making; and identifying and pretesting questionnaire items (Fern, 1982). A
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moderator (usually the researcher) conducts a one-to-two hour in-depth interview,
commonly with a group of between 6–12 participants drawn from a target population of
experts (Krueger, 1988, p27; Krueger and Casey, 2000). The moderator attempts to create
a highly synergistic environment in which participants openly share their perceptions,
build on each others’ ideas, and jointly develop new insights (Calder, 1977). Academic
researchers also make regular use of the focus group technique. In fact, focus groups now
appear in more than 100 academic articles each year as researchers use them as both a
primary and supplemental method of research (Morgan, 1997). Numerous researchers
such as Hill et al. (2007) and Beck et al. (2006), for example, have used the Focus Group methodology in order
to collect the participants’ perceptions on a specific subject area. The Focus Group
method of inquiry has found increasing favour in all areas of research as Durgee (1987)
used the methodology to study consumer needs and preferences, which had a similar
analogy to the requirements of passengers.
A survey, entitled ‘Impact of Low Cost Carriers’, was conducted throughout the world
with full service airlines with the cooperation of IATA2, and this survey is outlined in
Appendix VII. The questionnaire was developed after a number of Focus Group
discussions took place between the author and IATA over several months in 2005.
Between 8 and 10 IATA delegates gathered in a conference room - their average
experience was around 10 years, many of them had worked for full service airlines and
were well aware of the threat posed by low cost carriers, and all welcomed the urgency
of the research. The researcher participated via telephone on four occasions with these
delegates and the discussions lasted on average around one hour and centred around
constructing specific questions which would extract maximum information from full
service airlines. IATA included its own specific questions (i.e. questions 2, 3 and 6)
which were to be used as intelligence gathering data and excluded the researcher from
the use of this information. The Focus Group devised a total of 35 closed strategy
questions based on a five point likert scale arrangement (i.e. not at all, not very, some,
some-what, extremely) in order that the results would yield a more precise and valid
response from each surveyed airline. An additional 3 open-ended questions (i.e.
questions 7, 8 and 9) were incorporated which allowed the full service airlines to add
additional information that was not captured by the earlier questions.
An important decision made as a result of the overall collaboration of the Focus Group
was to change the structure of question 5 – the ‘Air Travellers Choice’. In the original
passenger surveys conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India, passengers ranked the
most important reason for choosing to travel with a particular airline in ascending order
(e.g. 1, 2, 3, etc.). However, the dialog within the Focus Group restructured this
2 IATA has over 270 members from more than 140 nations, whose main objective is to assist airlines to
achieve lawful competition and uniformity in prices. The author conducts regular short airline courses on
IATA’s behalf throughout the world and it was through this collaboration that IATA agreed to sanction
this survey.
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question as a five-point likert scale arrangement so that the results would yield a more
precise and valid response from each surveyed airline. The analysis involved with
linking both types of scales is discussed in detail in Chapter 10.
Case Studies
A case study is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994, p13). The case study is an ideal method when
a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed (Feagin et al. 1991). Eisenhardt (1989)
concluded that case study research has three strengths in the building of theories: (i) its
likelihood of generating novel theories, (ii) the testability of its emergent theories or
hypotheses, and (iii) the likelihood of empirical validation of resultant theories. There are
numerous case studies associated with the airline industry as authors such as Barrett
(2006) and Chan (2006) provided a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data,
analyzing information, and reporting the results. As a result, the researcher may gain a
sharpened understanding of events and what areas pose challenges for the future.
The researcher used this methodology in chapter 5 to synopsise the strategies used by
Aer Lingus to compete with Ryanair. The incumbent was cited several times by
academics and industry executives alike as having restructured itself the most in order to
compete with low cost carriers, and the case study would give an account of the re-
organisational benchmarks that it achieved. The realignment of Aer Lingus’ strategies
could be used as a blueprint for other incumbents.
Interviews with Airline Staff
Interviews cover a wide variety of formats, but generally are designed as personal
meetings between an interviewer and respondent(s). Interviews are a quantitative
research method commonly employed in survey research, but are often criticized for their
high propensity to encourage interviewer and respondent bias. Interviews represent a
targeted method of collecting data and are often insightful - providing perceived causal
inferences. The type of interviews range from unstructured, semi-structured, to
completely structured in format. The completely structured interview comprises of a
verbal survey with fixed response options. On the other end of the scale, the ‘depth’
interview is an unstructured and personal interview in which a single respondent is
probed by a highly skilled interviewer to uncover underlying motivations, beliefs,
attitudes and feelings on a topic (Breech 2002).
The aviation literature is replete with interview methodologies. Miles and Mangold
(2005) and Barrett (2004), for example, conducted interviews with Airline CEOs of
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Southwest and Ryanair respectively, and this type of methodology generated deeper
insights into decision making strategies. A prominent monthly magazine, entitled Airline
Business, conducts a monthly interview with a top level representative of the industry in
order to extrapolate past, present and future directions. The researcher of this thesis
interviewed the following personnel in order to get a clearer view of the competitive
dynamics between full service and low cost carriers and uncover the thoughts of key
decision makers who could provide further insights into competitive responses and airline
business strategy.
 Berger, B. – Route Network Director at Ryanair
 Coleman, M. - Strategy Director at Aer Lingus
 Fernandes, T. - CEO of Air Asia, Malaysia
 Forbes, B. – Marketing Director at Emirates
 Griffiths, M. – Commerical Officer at British Airways
 Joyce, A. - CEO of JetStar, Australia (by phone)
 Kumar, S. - Commercial Directror of Air Sahara, India
 Kuruvila, J. - Chief Revenue Officer of Air Deccan, India (by phone)
 Saw, T. – Marketing Vice President of Malaysia Airlines
 Sheety, G. - Vice President of Marketing at Jet Airways. India
 Singh, K. – Strategy Director at Singapore Airlines
 Yassin-Knan, K. - Strategy Director at Malaysia Airlines
The information gathered from these interviews was used in the Focus Groups to
structure the questionnaire.
Surveys
Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993, p77) defined a survey as a ‘means for gathering
information about the characteristics, actions or opinions of a large group of people’,
while Salant and Dillman (1994, p. 2) stated that surveys can also be used to assess
needs, evaluate demand and examine impact. Survey research is a quantitative method,
requiring standardised information from and/or about the subjects being studied.
Tourangeau et al (2000) state that a questionnaire is the best method to elicit sensitive
information, while at the same time it provides respondents with an opportunity to
approve or disapprove with the status-quo of an organisation’s strategies.
A combination of the literature review of marketing (Chapter 6), strategic management
(Chapter 7), Focus Groups, Case Studies and Interviews with Airline Staff structured
and calibrated the questionnaire for this research thesis. The difficulties in acquiring
satisfactory responses from surveys is well documented in literature, and the difficultly in
persuading the relevant personnel to co-operate once contacted, has become increasingly
difficult (Groves & Couper, 1998; De Heer, 1999; Groves et al., 2002). To overcome this
difficulty and to ensure that high ranking airline managers (i.e. Senior Managers or Vice
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Presidents) participated, the survey was administered in conjunction with the
International Air Transport Association (IATA). It also ensured the relevance and
credibility of the responses harnessed the collective wisdom and experiences of the senior
executives. Schnell (2005) stated that 60.1% of airline managers are leaders of their
departments and report regularly to the Vice President or CEO. This empowers them with
company-wide knowledge as they attend regular meeting with peers from other
departments and have transparency within the entire spectrum of the airline. Schnell
(2005) also states that the average airline manager has worked 17.1 years in the industry
and 9 years at the current carrier, and that airline managers’ answers are expected to
reasonably correspond to the actual situation that the carrier is facing. IATA has over 270
member airlines whose flights account for 94% of all international scheduled air traffic.
The operational objective of the organisation is to ensure that members’ aircraft can
operate safely, securely, efficiently and economically - under clearly defined rules and
works towards these objectives by implementing standardisation processes. IATA
represents the interests of the airlines and is highly regarded in the industry. The author is
a certified instructor with IATA and has conducted numerous short courses on areas such
as: airline distribution; airline strategy; airline marketing; and airline management with
around 20 different airlines throughout the world on behalf of the organisation, and it was
through this collaboration that IATA agreed to sanction the survey. The IATA link was
pivotal as it ensured the participation of senior strategy directors and a good response
rate. Researchers such as Yu and Cooper (1983) and Martin et al. (1989), found that the
response rate to surveys increased dramatically by around 33% to 39% with
personalisation.
Levy and Lemeshow (1999, p7) stated that a pilot survey must first be conducted to test
both the instrument and the survey procedures before the actual survey is conducted.
According to Oppenheim (1966, p26), some questions need as many as eight revisions
before producing satisfactory results. The piloting of the survey was two-fold: firstly, the
focus group (i.e. IATA) administered the ‘prototype’ questionnaire among its own
employees and with three undisclosed full service airlines with which the organisation
closely works; secondly, the author piloted the same questionnaire with a group of airline
strategy directors who undertook a 3-day IATA airline strategy course in Singapore,
which was conducted by the author. Careful analysis is needed when constructing a
questionnaire in order to formulate items which avoid ambiguity and return data of the
required scope. The Focus Group, in conjunction with the researcher, then constructed
the finalised version of the survey, which would allow the responses to be dimensionally
measured via likert scales. It was administered to 150 top airlines (in terms of revenues
earned) and the responses were dimensionally measured via likert scales in order to
correlate differences between each carrier. The survey itself contained the distinguished
‘IATA’ label and it was attached as a web-enabled survey, whereby respondents would
click on the link activating the questionnaire.
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1.4 Research Objectives and Methodology
The hypothesis tested here is that full service airlines can mount a formidable challenge
to the low cost carriers but this is dependent on their strategic capability and on their
ability to meet the requirements of their leisure and business passengers. The aims of
the research are broken down into three specific objectives which provided focus to the
research. In each case the methodology adopted is outlined below.
i) To extensively examine the principle drivers that have enabled the low cost
carriers to be successful and to identify the problems that they have been causing
for full service airlines.
Methodology
This research was conducted through an extensive review of the existing literature
which was extracted from journals, books, intelligence reports, conference proceedings,
airline annual reports, equity research reports such as ABM AMRO, etc.
ii) To assess the number of passengers who would switch between a low cost
carrier and a full service airline as a result of a fare change (in discrete increments
of 10%, 20%, 30% and those who would not switch) and to identify which flight
products would become substituted or retained when passenger switch airlines as
a result of a fare change.
Methodology
Two questionnaires targeted passengers travelling on each type of airline. The surveys
were conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India where over 1,250 responses were
gathered. The thrust here was to understand the decisions made by passengers who
were journeying on low cost carriers and full service airlines. Answers were sought to
the following questions: ‘Were one particular group of passengers (leisure or business)
favouring a particular type of carrier?’; ‘How many flights had passengers taken on
other carrier types?’; ‘What would persuade passengers travelling on low cost carriers
to switch to full service airlines?’; and ‘Was there a difference in passenger opinion
between the flight product rankings of low cost and network airlines?’. The results of
this were published in two academic papers in the Journal of Air Transport
Management.
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iii) To investigate the level of importance that each network carrier placed on a
particular strategy, while determining the level of difficulty associated with
implementing their strategies. The degree of correlation between the requirements
of passengers and the airlines’ view of the requirements of passengers was also
analysed.
Methodology
A detailed questionnaire was designed from literature review of the marketing chapter
(i.e. chapter 6) and from literature review from the strategic management chapter (i.e.
chapter 7). Figure 46 shows an integrated framework of strategic management
principles and strategic marketing concepts which form the core components to the
questionnaire. It accesses the strategic capability of full service airlines and their ability
to gain competitive advantage over low cost carriers. The questionnaire also sought to
determine if the ranking of flight products determined from passenger surveys
(objective 2 above) correlated with the airline management’s perception of flight
product rankings. It also measures the level of correlation between an airline’s strategic
capability and its understanding of the requirements of passengers. The questionnaire
was administered to the world’s top 150 airlines (in terms of revenues earned) in
collaboration with IATA, and a total of 41 responses were received. The support of
IATA was essential to ensure that the senior strategy directors took responsibility for
the contents of the questionnaire, and it would also ensure the relevance and credibility
of the responses.
1.5 Thesis layout
Chapter 2 reviews the overall airline industry in terms of: its growth pattern; financial
performance; cyclical trends; yield deterioration and overcapacity which have
significantly impacted its profitability; and its underperforming position in the air
transport value chain. It then delves deeper into the different types of airline models,
which include full service airlines, regional carriers, low cost carriers and charter
airlines, and examines the performance of each of these carrier types in terms of:
financial performance; traffic; load factor; yield; and market capitalisation. It concludes
by looking at the traffic forecasts for the next two decades and what regions of the
world will experience the most growth.
Chapter 3 examines the regulatory environment of the US, European and Asian
markets. It shows the operating environment of the pre-deregulated market and
compares it to what transpired after deregulation. In the US, carriers could enter any
market and compete on the basis of price, which was a new dimension, while in Europe
deregulation opened up cross-border and domestic markets (including [cabotage]) and
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removed national ownership restrictions. One of the noteable changes that occurred
after deregulation was the prolific growth of low cost carriers, which quickly took
advantage of the newly liberalised market. The chapter then discusses the fragmented
regulatory process in Asia, as Australia and New Zealand established an open skies
policy while other Asian countries retained a system of restrictive bilateral agreements
- however, the rise of low cost carriers in the region occured against a background of an
increasingly liberal attitude towards traffic rights.
Chapter 4 analyses the impact of the low cost carrier growth on the network airlines in
the US, Europe and Asia. It shows the imminent dangers facing network carriers as an
increasing proportion of their domestic and short-haul markets are being attacked by
budget carriers, and outlines the hazards ahead as low cost carriers have secured much
of the production capacity from aircraft manufacturers for short-haul aircraft. Fare data
was collected from network and low cost carriers from around the world over a three-
year period in order to determine the level of response from network airlines and
measure their ability to reduce fares. The core differences that divide the two airline
business models are then examined extensively - they include: flight product
characteristics; legacy costs of the network airlines; unit cost differences; network
orientation (hub and spoke versus point-to-point); and ancillary revenues.
Chapter 5 comprises a case study of Aer Lingus which was widely perceived to be the
carrier that most effectively responded to low cost carriers, and was also singled out
because it operated in tandem from its domiciled base in Dublin with Ryanair, the
world’s most aggressive low cost carrier. Parts of Aer Lingus’ strategy could provide a
framework for other network airlines to respond to budget carriers as it was further
down the learning curve. The chapter shows how management restructured the carrier
but retained core differentiating features and imitated facets of the low cost carrier
model that strategically fitted with its own business plan.
Chapter 6 contains a detailed literature review of airline marketing. It extrapolates the
core marketing principles of Philip Kotler (one of the world’s most respected marketing
academics) and combines these principles with airline marketing literature to provide
an integrated marketing framework. It shows that modern marketing is particularly
geared to the customer - he/she has become concentric to all marketing endeavours as
relationships, value and satisfaction have become the building block of the airline
marketing department. The chapter further explores the marketing strategies that
impact a passengers’ decision to book with a full service airline and uncovers ways to
retain its customers. This chapter extrapolates the core points of the marketing
literature which provided part 1 of a framework of questions that was administered to
airline executives in conjunction with IATA.
Chapter 7 adopts a strategic management perspective in discussing alternative solutions
for traditional carriers to compete effectively with low cost carriers. Emphasis is given
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to the design of a structural analytical framework in which complex inter-relationships
can be analysed. This comprises the following strategic components: cost leadership
and product differentiation; collaboration with other carriers; strengths and weaknesses;
Porter’s theory of competitive rivalry; key aspects of airline strategic marketing; and
enhancement of a business’ structural position via possession of a capable management
team and by diversification outside an airline’s core competency. This chapter
extrapolates the core points of the strategic management literature, which provided part
2 of a framework of questions that was administered to airline executives in
conjunction with IATA. This overall framework provided the ‘blueprint’ for a
questionnaire that would assess the incumbents’ capabilities in competing with low
cost carriers.
The empirical part of the thesis is composed of two parts. The first part is based on a
passenger questionnaire that gathered information on the perceptions of passengers of
both network and low cost carriers, while a second questionnaire was aimed at strategy
directors working at network airlines and measured their strategic capability in
responding to low cost carriers. Chapters 8 and 9 detail the results of the passenger
surveys that were conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India. They highlight the key
findings, such as passenger characteristics, journey purpose, connections and fares.
They then centre on an in-depth study of the factors that influence carrier choice and
the ranking order of flight products for both leisure and business passengers. These
chapters conclude with an analysis of cross-price elasticity which measures the
sensitivity of passengers to a change in fare, and also its substitution effect on
passengers’ flight products.
Chapter 10 discusses the results of the IATA survey undertaken as part of the empirical
validation of this thesis. Each incumbent’s strategic capability was measured by
assessing the level of importance that a network airline placed on a list of strategies and
by probing the level of difficulty that each carrier encountered when implementing its
strategies. The responses to the passenger surveys from Chapter 8 and 9 were used to
investigate if the airline’s perception of passenger requirements synchronised with the
airline’s view of passengers’ requirements.
Chapter 11 discusses and summarises the output and conclusions from the research. It
uses the thesis findings to flag the important strategies that would allow network
airlines to significantly challenge the low cost carriers and also highlights their
difficulties in implementing such strategies. In addition, it outlines the limitations of the
study and makes recommendations for further academic research into the area.
18
2 Chapter 2: Evolution and Structural
Characteristics of the Airline Industry
2.1 The growth and financial state of the airline industry
This chapter sets the scene of the dynamics that currently exist within the airline industry.
It begins by discussing the factors that are triggering airline growth and interprets why
the industry is cyclical in nature. It then analyses the important elements that are
negatively the profitability of the industry such as decling yields, overcapacity issues, etc.
Within this turmoil, the chapter shows that full service airlines are the weakest
performing airline group when compared to low cost carriers, regional carriers and
charters. The chapter concludes by showing the traffic potential that will become
apparent by 2023 and how low cost carriers are better positioned to capture a sizable
chunk of this traffic surge.
2.1.1 The growth of the airline industry
To gain an insight into the airline industry’s prospects and problems one must look at the
market environment and the financial forces that shape the industry. In 2006 the global
industry was operating 82,000 flights and offered 9.5 million seats daily (AOG,
September 2006). Button (2004, p9) indicated that the industry presently carried 1.6
billion in 2003, it is responsible for almost 4 million jobs, had a turnover of $260 billion,
used 18,000 aircraft, and served a 15 million kilometre network involving 10,000 airports
while air cargo traffic added over 130 billion revenue tonne-kilometres. Air transport has
enormously benefited economic growth and prosperity, contributing around US$ 880
billion a year to world GDP, representing 2.4% of global GDP. If you include air
transport’s catalytic impact, the contribution to GDP is US$ 2,960 billion, equivalent to
8% of world GDP (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2004). At a micro level, the
growth of European air transport since 1995 has boosted European Union GDP by 4
percent. The expected growth to 2025 will boost GDP of the 25 European Union nations
by a further 1.8 percent3. According to the Boeing Current Market Outlook (2006)4
world air traffic grew by 2.5 times at an annual rate of 4.8 percent during the period
1985-2005. Alderigh and Cento (2004) stated that in the last 50 years the European
airline industry had faced only one annual decrease in traffic which was in 1991.
3 The Economic Catalytic Effects of Air Transport in Europe,” Eurocontrol Experimental Centre,
Bretigny sur Orge Cedex, 2005.
4 www.boeing.com/nosearch/exec_pres/CMO.pdf
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Figure 3 shows the five-fold growth in air travel from 1970 to 2004 measured in Revenue
Passenger-Kilometres (RPK): this is a standard air traffic demand statistic defined as the
product of the total number of passengers b the actual distance flown. This growth was
largely because of deregulation, low entry barriers, strengthening global economies,
falling fares, tourism development, overseas holidaying, and increased international trade
that sparked business travel and airlines worldwide reacted by adding enormous amounts
of capacity. Nonetheless, this growth pattern has not evolved in a stable uninterrupted
way. The average growth rate between 1971 and 1979 was 11.5% p.a. followed by 5.8%
for the period 1980-1990 and 6.2% between 1991 and 2000. From the 1970s to the
present day, there has been a number of glitches to the growth of air traffic such as the oil
crises of the 1970s and late 1980s, the Gulf war in the early 1990s, SARS, 9/11 and the
present Iraq war but air traffic is highly resilient in that it quickly recovers from such
cataclysms.
Figure 3 Air Transport Demand (RPKs, Trillions)
Source: IATA, ATA
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Dennis (2002) stated that economic growth has historically been a key determinant of
travel demand and it continues to play an important role in many forecasting models. The
traditional ‘rule of thumb’ measure for general air transport markets is that the GDP
multiplier is around 2 - this assumes that demand will grow or decline twice as fast as any
change in GDP (Doganis, 2002). Examining the IATA data on passenger traffic since the
1970s reveals that the GDP multiple has been in the range of 1.5-2.2. Chin and Tay
(2001) produced a regression model which indicated that air traffic growth rates are
positively associated with GDP growth rates. In addition, strong economies increase
business travel. The World Travel and Tourism Council estimated the business travel
market to be worth $387.1 billion in 2001 (Euromonitor International, 2002). Increasing
globalisation and market integration creates the need to travel between customers and
suppliers and among the different locations of an enterprise. UK companies alone are
spending £15 billion a year on business travel (The Sunday Times, January 2006). Air
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travel continues to be the preferred method of travel among business travellers, with
around three-quarters of business people travelling by air (Euromonitor International,
2002).
According to a report by Simos (2006) in the Journal of Business Forecasting, the volume
of world trade is estimated to have increased by 7 percent in 2005. The baseline forecast
anticipates that the growth rate of global trade for 2006 will be estimated at around 7.8
percent. This optimism is further supported by air cargo statistics. According to Boeing,
annual growth in air cargo demand exceeded growth in passenger traffic for most years in
the 1980s and 1990s and some years even recorded double digit growth. The outlook is
also good as air cargo is expected to rise by 6.1% p.a. compared to 4.9% growth for
passenger traffic over the next twenty years (Conway, 2006).
Air travel is also intrinsically related to tourism mainly in terms of international flows,
but also for domestic movements in larger countries. According to the World Travel and
Tourism Council (2004), world travel and tourism was estimated to generate $5,490
billion worth of economic activity (total demand) in 2004. The tourism ratio (which
shows the percentage of demand attributed to tourism over total industry supply) of air
transportation should exceed 90% by the new millennium (Smith, 1998). In most
developed countries, holiday travel is by far the largest type of travel (Graham, 2006).
Furthermore Mintel (2004) found that UK holidaymakers for example are 70% more
likely to take short breaks than they were 5 years previously. Shaw and Callum (2006)
indicated that UK residents presently spend 250% more of their personal income on air
travel than they did a decade ago. Goetz and Graham (2004) and Papatheodorou (2002)
argued that globalisation and liberalisation has significantly contributed to the growth in
air transport.
2.1.2 The cyclicality and financial state of the Airline Industry
Besides the healthy passenger traffic growth over time, the aviation industry is also long
known for its cyclical nature as it is highly exposed to economics, politics, wars, diseases
and natural catastrophes. The cycle of boom followed by recession has become familiar
across the world. Hätty and Hollmeir (2003) confirmed that air transport is cyclical in
nature and that demand for it is synchronised with economic cycles. Nonetheless, the
airline industry has created its own cycles that overlay the economic cycles, often
producing an even greater adverse effect. Gallagher (1995) showed that since the mid-
1960s the US airline industry has experienced five major cycles.
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Figure 4 Economic Activity and Airline Demand Cycles
Source: IATA, Sentance (2005)
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Figure 4 and Figure 5 show different aspects of the cyclical nature of the airline industry
from the 1970s to date. The former encapsulates the fact although GDP and passenger
traffic move in parallel, the fluctuations in airline demand are far more pronounced. The
latter focuses on financial performance and shows a pendulum like motion of profitable
and loss making swings that are getting larger, as the profits in the mid 1990s were
greater than those in the 1980s and the losses in the new millennium were greater than
those in early 1990s. Morrell (2002) pointed out that the operating margin of the world’s
scheduled airlines only exceeded 5% twice in the 1980s and three times in the 1990s.
Chin and Tay (2001) who extensively studied the cyclicality of the airline industry over
the last 35 years pointed out that the downturns have been getting more pronounced while
the upturns are becoming weaker. However, airlines have corrected the cyclical nature of
load factors largely through effective yield management systems. In fact, Doganis (2001)
stated that cost reduction has become a continuous and long term necessity for financial
success. Network carriers have had to restructure their outdated cost structures and adopt
some of the cost efficiencies of the no-frills carriers, which are currently the best
performing airlines.5
5 Differences between alternative airline business models are discussed extensively in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5 World Airline Financial Results (1980 – 2004)
Source: ICAO
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Note: The difference between operating and net results is largely the interest paid on bank loans
(subtracted from any monies received from interest on bank deposits).
In the three years leading up to the end of 1992, the world’s scheduled airlines made
losses of $11.5 billion, which is greater than the accumulated net profit generated by the
airline industry from its inception (Harkes, 1993). European governments injected
subsidies totalling $12.1 billion from 1991 to 1995 to keep flag carriers financially
solvent (Smit, 1997). Airlines expanded their networks by adding new destinations and
service frequency in order to gain market share while not focusing on costs as these were
counterbalanced by charging higher fares. This was followed by a period (1995-2000) of
profitability fuelled by strong economic growth, high employment, larger disposable
incomes, the dot.com boom and global stability through the absence of terrorism and
wars. The global airline industry had a net profit in this period of $37.6 billion, however
it was short lived, as in 2001 a severe economic downturn occurred resulting in a
complete erosion of airline profitability. The industry had a net loss of $12.6 billion in
2001 alone, representing one-third of what the industry gained from 1995-2000. It lost
$11.5 billion and $6.5 billion in 2002 and 2003 respectively, with the loss reducing to
around $5 billion in 2004. Further exacerbating the profitability issue is the fact that the
breakeven load factor for IATA international scheduled airlines rose by 4.7% from 1998
to 2003. The cumulative net losses for the industry over the period 2001 – 2005 totalled
$43.6 billion.
Skinner et al (1999) recommended a dynamic approach to managing the cycles of the
airline industry and suggested that an aggressive management of operating leverage, fleet
capacity, yield, etc would reduce the amplitude of the cycles. Gillen and Lall (2004) and
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Franke (2004) claimed that the low-cost model can cope better with recessions and the
associated changes in demand than the traditional models.
2.1.3 Financial implications for Incumbents following 9/11, the Iraq
War and SARS and their rippling effect through the industry
Ito and Lee (2005) argued that no industry has suffered greater economic damage from
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than the US airline industry. An industrial
survey by Kemp and Dwyer (2003) questioned 50 international airlines about their
mission statements and found that profit was only mentioned by just 24 carriers while the
majority expressed the view that survival was on the top of their agenda. The effects of
the attacks had a rippling effect worldwide. Kilroy (2001) stated that worldwide
commercial passenger traffic fell by approximately 18 per cent from 10th September to
10th October, 2001. Prior to the terrorist attacks, the US airline industry was already in a
weakened condition due to reduced demand, rising labour costs and high debt service
costs (United States House of Representatives, 2002). Golaszewski (2003) estimated that
carrier losses in the US would have been about $2.8 billion (pre-tax income) in 2001
before the impact of September 11. However, the US airline industry began 2001 after 24
consecutive profitable quarters, including net profits in 2000 totalling almost $3 billion.
The impact of the 9/11 event on the US airline industry was substantial. The terrorist
attacks pushed the industry into financial crisis after air travel dropped 20% over the
September–December 2001 period compared to the same four months in 2000. Looney
(2002) reported that after the attacks, the consensus forecast for the US real GDP growth
was immediately downgraded by 0.5 per cent for 2001 and 1.2 per cent for 2002. This
implied that US traffic levels should have fallen by around 1% for 2001 and 2.4% for
2002. However, it was much worse than forecasted. According to Air Transport
Association (ATA) data reported by the DOT Inspector General, the number of business
travellers declined 26 percent from December 2001 through December 20026. Net losses
totalled $8 billion for 20017. Indeed, these losses would have been significantly higher
had the Congress not quickly passed the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act
in September 2001, which provided $5 billion in emergency assistance to the airlines. By
2002, the US Airline’s industry debt stood at over $100 billion with 11 of the 12
passenger airlines rated as “junk bonds” by Standard & Poor’s, while only Southwest
remained “investment grade8”. Meanwhile, Southwest had a market capitalization of
$10.7 billion, which was twice the value of the other carriers combined. According to
6 GAO report 04-836 Airlines Financial Condition accessed at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04836.pdf
7 Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Policy and Plans, Aviation Industry Overview, FY 2000
and Aviation Industry Overview, FY 2001.
8 Subcommittee on aviation hearing on the financial condition of the airline industry, accessed at
www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/06-03-04/06-03-04memo.html
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Aviation Strategy (June 2004) each of the legacy US-based carriers would take more than
30 years to pay off its debts and leases at the then current rate of cash generation.
Golaszewski (2003) stated that between February 2001 and February 2002 the US Majors
as a group reduced capacity by 16%, while Doganis (2006, p10) reported that the low-
cost carriers’ traffic grew by 26% from 2001 to 2003. During the period 2000-2003, US
legacy airlines’ revenues were down by 25%, while low cost carriers had increased
passenger revenues of over 12% (US GAO Report, 2004). By 2004, the US majors
(including profits from Southwest and JetBlue) reported a net loss of $9.0 billion (ATA,
2005). This represented the fourth consecutive year of losses and it brought the
cumulative 2001–2004 losses to $32.3 billion. The US full service airlines have not yet
recovered despite enormous restructuring programs that were largely made in chapter 11
bankruptcy arrangements9. Table 1 below shows the number of US based airlines that
entered bankruptcy protection (Chapter 11) after the 9/11 events. In December 2005,
following the entering into Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection of Independence Air, in
excess of 50% of capacity in the United States was provided by airlines in bankruptcy10.
Table 1 US based Airlines that entered chapter 11 since 9/11
Airline Date Airline Date
TWA1 October 2001 ATA October 2004
Vanguard July 2002 Aloha December 2004
US Airways August 2002 Delta September 2005
United December 2002 Comair September 2005
Hawaii March 2003 Northwest September 2005
Great Plains January 2004 Mesaba October 2005
Atlas Air January 2004 Independence Air 2 November 2005
US Airways September 2004 Florida Coastal Air February 2006
1 TWA declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy (for the 3rd time) the day after it was acquired by American Airlines
2 Ceased operations on 5th January 2006
Note US Airways entered bankruptcy on two occasions, the first in August 2002 and again in September 2004
Source: Air Transport Association
In Europe, the results were also devastating. The third quarter of 2001 contained only 19
days of post September 11th performance and in that time the AEA affiliated carriers
made losses of US$234m. This compared to a US$857m profit in Q3 2000 – a decline of
US$1.1 billion. The results for the final quarter were even worse. AEA airlines lost a
9 “Chapter 11 is a chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code which governs the process of reorganization
under the bankruptcy laws of the United States. (The Bankruptcy Code itself is Title 11 of the United States
Code; therefore reorganization under bankruptcy is covered by Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States
Code.) In contrast, Chapter 7 governs the process of a liquidation bankruptcy”
10 Beyond Open Skies. Airline Business, December 2005.
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record US$1.4bn, almost five times that recorded for the final quarter of 2000 (DG
TREN, 2001). By early 2002 the European association of full service airlines had a
breakeven load factor (ratio of unit costs to unit yields) of 69%, while their actual load
factor was only 66%. This load factor inequality signalled that the airlines’ costs were too
high and that the market was experiencing severe overcapacity. For the industry to thrive,
the breakeven load factor had to come down, perhaps to the levels around 65% where
they found themselves in the late 1990s. The Iraq war began in March 2003 and the AEA
(2004) reported that in 2003 European traffic levels fell by 15% in Europe, 10% on the
North Atlantic and around 12% between Europe and Asia. Low cost carrier traffic
however was unaffected during this period. Later that summer SARS emerged in Asia.
Europe’s Far East traffic declined by 23.1% and the loss of passenger revenue amounted
to US$ 900 million. These losses came close to the corresponding figures for the North
Atlantic market in the six months following 9/11, with traffic declining by 25.5%
resulting in $1.3 billion of lost revenue (AEA, 2004). 2003 saw the 5th consecutive yearly
deficit for AEA airlines, with an operating loss of US$ 1.5 billion. The low cost carriers
were again unaffected and some airlines such as British Airways etched out a profit of
around $1 billion, despite the unfavourable conditions facing incumbents that year. By
2004 the AEA member airlines were beginning to return to pre 9/11 levels as total
scheduled passenger numbers increased 4.9% to 307 million. The largest increases
however were in the regions which suffered the greatest downturn in 2003 and there was
no significant increase in passenger numbers in the intra-European market, suggesting
that the incumbents were not focusing their attention on the increasing threat posed by the
low cost carriers. After five consecutive years of heavy losses, AEA airlines posted an
aggregate operating profit in 2004 of US$ 417 million (AEA, 2005).
In Asia another crisis emerged that had a direct impact on travel and tourism to the
region. The crisis in 1997-98 that started in Thailand was rapidly transmitted to
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea, and its impact was echoed throughout
the Asian Economy. Park (2005) explained that the crisis caused chaos in financial
markets, which resulted in an exodus of foreign capital and was responsible for the
resulting high interest rates. The 17 members of the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines
(AAPA) had a combined loss of $1.2 billion for 1997/98 (Orient Aviation, December
2000/January 2001), while American and European airlines were profitable during this
period. The region was not affected by the events of 9/11 as badly as its counterparts in
the US and Europe. However, a new endemic was emerging in Asia that would again
transform the fortunes and forecasts for Asian carriers. SARS, began to take effect in mid
2003. The AAPA member airlines witnessed their RPKs (billions) drop by 50% from
2000 levels, resulting in losses of around $750 million in 2002 (Herdman, 2005). Cathay
Pacific for example typically carries 30,000 passengers each day but SARS had reduced
its daily number to 10,000. It had cancelled 42% of its schedule and was losing $3
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million a day (ATI, April, 2003). Traffic is resilient however and recovered quickly such
that by 2004 the consolidated AAPA group members had an operating profit of $3.9
billion, while net income had reached $3.5 billion (AAPA, 2005). Some airlines, such as
JAL and Malaysia Airlines however, continued to experience financial difficulties, but
overall the 17 member airlines had an operating margin of 3.6% for 2005 and had profits
totalling around $4 billion.
2.2 Important factors that are impacting the profitability of
incumbent airlines
2.2.1 Declining Yields and Overcapacity issues
Numerous authors such as Doganis (2006, p16), Taneja (2005, p113) and Holloway
(2004, p175) point out that falling yields and overcapacity exacerbated by the
proliferation of low cost carriers were significantly impacting the profitability of full
service airlines.
Figure 7 below shows that in real terms the average yield of the world’s airlines for both
passenger and cargo fell by around 40% from 1990 to 2003. Williams (1994) indicates
that fares in the United States dropped by around 15% after the first few years following
deregulation. In the U.S. for example, the average coach fare for a 1,000 mile journey fell
14.7% from 2000 to 2002 (Gittell, 2003 p9). The most dramatic falls have been on routes
affected by the launch of low cost airlines. Gillen and Lall (2003) argued that high yield
passengers travelling first and business class essentially account for most if not all the
profits in the up-cycles. Mason (2006) indicates that the revenue contribution made by
this group of travellers had dramatically increased from 26.2% in 1992 to almost 33% in
2000. However, by 2002 the higher yield passengers began down grading to economy
cabins and consequently their revenues fell to 28%, while yield in the leisure cabin fell by
around a third. Real yield is forecasted to fall at an average of 0.9% per annum for the
next ten years11. Operating in an environment where average fare is continuously falling
will suppress future profit levels.
11 http://www.avitas.com/index.jsp
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Figure 7. The Decline of Yield 1990 - 2003 Figure 8 Cyclical Overcapacity
Problems 1990 - 2002
Source: ICAO
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Figure 8 above shows that there were around 800 aircraft delivered in 1991 which
represented the peak of a previous cycle. The industry then experienced a cyclical
downturn due primarily to the first Gulf War, which resulted in very few aircraft being
ordered during the years 1991 to 1994. Thereafter the global airline industry began
returning to profitability and in 1996 the industry ordered in excess of 900 aircraft. This
was followed by orders for more than 1200 in 1997 and more than 1400 in 1998. The
aircraft orders ensured sufficient capacity for future growth. Aircraft orders peaked at
1,430 aircraft in 1998 and 1,600 aircraft in 2000 with the Asian downturn constraining
growth in 1999. The aircraft supply chain has a 3 year cycle, from ordering to final
delivery. From 1999 – 2001 there were almost 3,250 aircraft delivered, with 1,200 in
2001 alone and this surplus capacity was added when the industry began experiencing
unprecedented demand falls, resulting from the collapse of the dot.com industry,
terrorism and pending wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which began destabilising the airline
industry. Holloway (1998) argued that management have consistently ordered aircraft
during periods of high economic growth followed by delivery in the course of the
subsequent downturn. Chin and Tay (2001) confirm that airlines take delivery of aircraft
at the crest of an economic cycle and shortly thereafter there is an imminent downturn
whereby capacity has to be significantly reduced. Morrell (2002, p10) stated that the
number of parked aircraft doubled to around 1,000 in the year following the Gulf war,
just as traffic declined and deliveries accelerated. In the author’s own experiences of
travelling to the world’s airlines on behalf of AACO and IATA, airline directors never
take account of the cyclicality of the industry and the high cost of the asset when the
industry is on the crest of a strong economic cycle. Emirates and Ryanair for example are
some of the few airlines who purchased large quantities of aircraft immediately after 9/11
taking advantage of the manufacturers’ available production capacity and discounted
prices. The industry has currently repeated the historical pattern as airlines have just
moved into positive earnings and in 2005 the world’s airlines ordered a record 2,000
aircraft and a further 500 in the first half of 2006. When this enormous capacity begins
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arriving and if the economy slows or terrorism escalates then the downward cycle in
aviation may repeat itself. In addition the poor profitability of the industry is also linked
to the escalation of fuel prices12, excessive competition, high labour costs13 and the
failure of EU airlines to use state aid to restructure effectively (e.g. Sabena).
2.2.2 Airlines reap the lowest returns in the aviation value chain
The air transport value chain provides further evidence that the airline industry has one of
the lowest returns in the industry while its aviation suppliers reap the highest returns.
Airlines, to adopt Porter’s terminology, can be seen as being at the end of a chain of
vertical linkages that supply the ultimate air transport service. The poor profit margins of
the airline industry are very much apparent in Figure 9 below when it is peered against
the other industries that supply it. The airlines are the worst performing of any of the
individual sectors in the air transport chain with the majority of the service providers
making double the margins, with GDSs making five times. The year proceeding 9/11
produced heavy losses for the global airline industry, indicating that this would have a
cascading ripple throughout the industry. Doganis (2002, p5) confirms that even in
cyclical downturns the suppliers of aviation goods still outperform airlines by a big
margin.
Figure 9. The Air Transport Value Chain (2001/02)
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12 According to the ATA, jet fuel rose from $18 per barrel in 1998 to over $70 in 2005.
13 United Airlines pilots were awarded a 35% pay increase in 2000. Similarly America West gave its pilots a
11% pay increase. In the EU, pilots at Alitalia represent 13.6% of staff but account for 29% of its staff costs.
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A small number of suppliers control the majority of the aviation market, with for example
two catering suppliers (LSG Sky Chefs and Gate Gourmet) controlling 40% of their
market while BAA control the majority of London’s airports. The limited number of
suppliers causes almost a quasi-monopoly situation with suppliers being in a position to
leverage high prices. Button (2004, p75) stated that competition efficiency is premised on
the fact that other services providing inputs or buying the product are also operating in
competitive environments. These dominant positions in the market lead to serious vertical
distortions in the overall air transport sector. Because of BAA’s finite supply capacity,
DETR (2000) researched that if all UK airports increased airport charges by 50%, it
would only result in a 7.5% reduction in total demand. These companies enjoy a
competitive advantage, as a result of differential market power, which enables them to
control prices and earn monopoly rents.
It is important that airlines must hone their negotiating skills in order to reduce the high
operating margins enjoyed by suppliers. Fisher and Ury (1991) stated that negotiation is
the most effective means to increase profitability. Ryanair is noted for its exhaustive
negotiating skills for extracting discounts. Fan (2005) confirmed this strategy by stating
that Cornwall’s Newquay airport discounted its landing charge to the extent that it forced
the airport into a £0.75 million debt. The incumbent airlines must negotiate more
effectively and especially those carriers that are members of an alliance should use their
critical mass and act as a collective group when bargaining. Bissessur and Alamdari
(1998) indicated that significant cost reductions could be achieved if airlines worked
together and used the synergies of joint purchasing.
2001 was one of the worst years on record in aviation, yet Pilling and O’Toole (2002)
indicated that the net profit margin for the 50 leading airport groups in that year was 11
per cent, even though Pels (2000) found that most European airports were inefficient.
For the same period the top 50 major airlines recorded an average margin of – 4 per cent,
clearly showing the disparity between carriers and one of their most important air service
suppliers. Graham (2001, p58) stated that European aeronautical revenues (revenues
collected from landing and passenger charges) decreased by only 3.3 per cent over an 18
year period. Table 2 below confirms the disparity between the world’s largest airports
and airlines as measured by turnover for the financial year 2002/03. Fraport, the German
airport operator had a margin of 16%, while Lufthansa, Europe’s only airline in the top
five, recorded a negative margin of - 1.9%. Thus network airlines have not been
successful at reducing the divide between them and the service providers. IATA has been
lobbying airports on behalf on the airline community to reduce landing charges, which
has proven to be successful in certain airports like Narita but the industry needs its
suppliers to work more closely with airlines.
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Table 2 Airport and Airline comparison - Turnover and Margin for 2002/03
Top 5 Airports Top 5 Airlines
Turnover
($billions)
Operating
Margin (%)
Turnover
($billions)
Operating
Margin (%)
BAA 2.95 31% American 17.29 -19.0%
FraPort 1.80 16% JAL 17.24 0.5%
Aena (Spanish) 1.59 12% Lufthansa 16.12 -1.9%
New York 1.52 19% United 14.28 -23.0%
AdP (Paris) 1.32 9% Delta 13.30 -11.0%
Source: ATI, Airline Business, JAL
Figure 10 below goes outside the airline industry and compares the profit margins of US
industry generally to that of US airlines and the results confirm the difficulty for the latter
in generating profits and the poor returns. For example the six largest US airlines
(American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways) had total revenues of
more than $600 billion between 1992 and 2000, while their combined net income over
that period was only $13.5 billion compared to Microsoft’s net income of $9 billion for
2000 alone. US industry in general is not as exposed to the regular cyclical downturns
that occur in the airline industry. New approaches to the existing airline business model
must be initiated to reduce the high cost base and generate other revenue streams that will
contribute to the overall financial performance.
Figure 10 US Airline and General Industry - Comparison
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2.3 Financial Performance Present and Future
Airlines face challenging, dynamic market environments that in the short term are
extremely sensitive to the world economic and political situation. Events such as 9/11,
the SARS outbreak and the poor economic conditions of the early 2000s have seen an
overall stagnation and reduction of traffic during the period 2001–2003, although some
market sectors have performed better. Historically, airlines have made very low margins.
The increasing challenge from low-cost carriers has permanently changed the dynamics
of airline competition and presented management with a paradigm change in the short
haul market. Table 3 below shows that profitability is not uniform across the industry
with losses at the US majors at almost $11 billion for 2005. Ito and Lee (2005) found that
9/11 resulted in a transitory, negative demand shock of more than 30%, in addition to an
ongoing negative demand shift of approximately 7.4% that could not be explained by
cyclical, seasonal or other factors. Moreover, they estimated that this structural demand
shock accounts for over 90% of the current weakness in domestic airline demand relative
to its pre-September 11 peak level. The largest improvement is forecasted by IATA for
this region by 2007 when positive financial returns are expected. This transformation will
come about due to the synergies gained from cost cutting and will also be due to capacity
reductions, which will increase pricing power and operating profitability. The US
domestic market is under intense competition from low cost carriers and another well
capitalised carrier, Virgin America is currently pending entry. Also adding to the
competition equation is the additional capacity coming on stream from last year’s record
aircraft orders which will further accelerate the decline of yield. However, global
economies are steadily growing and this will impact premium traffic and will benefit the
network airlines with extensive long-haul exposure.
In the Asia Pacific region, the 17 member airlines of AAPA (Association of Asia Pacific
Airlines) carry around 500 million passengers each year, a figure that grew by 10% in
2005. Forecasts indicate that the region will become the world’s best performing aviation
market. The Chinese market is driving the region’s market forces, as it is home to 22% of
the world’s population and has had an economic growth rate of 7% for the last 14 years.
Its annual growth rate of 16% in both domestic and international air traffic is the world’s
highest with over 100 million passengers and 2.5 million tonnes of cargo carried in 2004
alone (Commission of the European Communities, 2005).
Europe is forecast to become the world’s second most profitable region. According to the
European Commission’s spring economic forecasts, economic growth in the EU is
projected to rebound in 2006 to 2.3% and continue till 2007, up from 1.6% in 2005. The
main impulses stem from a robust increase in investment, continued strong world growth
and an improved outlook in Germany (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2006). The
Association of European Airlines (2005) forecasted that there will be a 6.5% per annum
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increase in passenger traffic for the next few years. It also established that there was
substantial growth in traffic to and from the 10 EU accession countries, with airline
members registering a year-on-year growth of 15.4%, with double-digit (and even triple-
digit) growth in all markets except Slovenia and Cyprus. Lobbenberg et al. (May, 2003)
argued that there exists ‘plenty of untapped growth in Eastern Europe’.
The Middle East and Latin America are the other emerging aviation regions. The Gulf
carriers of the Middle East are currently leading the world in aircraft orders with $60
billion having been invested by just three airlines with $27 billion ordered in 2005 alone
(O’Connell, 2006). Governments have also committed a further $30 billion for
aeronautical infrastructural developments that will enable the region to become a global
competitor within the next decade and equal its peers in the United States, Asia and
Europe. Going into 2006, the Gulf based airlines have 36% more long-haul seats capacity
on order than the European and Asian airlines combined (O’Connell 2006). The Latin
American International Air Transport Association (AITAL) has 21 member airlines
which carry around 66 million passengers a year, similar to the number uplifted by the
Middle East based airlines. Its members generate around $12 billion each year with their
550 aircraft. A large part of the capacity is used for domestic and intra-regional
operations, which registered an impressive a growth rate of 15% year-on-year (AITAL,
2005). The regions two largest incumbents, Varig and Aerolineas Argentinas encountered
severe financial problems and have significantly reduced their fleet size while Flint
(2006) points out that Copa, Gol, LAN and TAM are the regions main performing
airlines.
Table 3 Airline Industry Net Profits $ billions
Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007
Global -5.7 -6 -2.2 7.2
Regions
North America -10.0 -10.8 -5.4 1.1
Europe 1.1 1.8 1.4 2.1
Asia Pacific 3.4 2.9 2.0 3.1
Middle East 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5
Latin America 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
Africa -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 0.0
Markets
Domestic (US) only -9.4 -10 -5.5 0.9
International
(IATA members only)
2.9 2.7 2.1 5.1
Other 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.2
Source: ICAO data to 2004, IATA World Air Transport Statistics Forecasts 2005-2007
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Overall for 2005, IATA preliminary results show that its 189 member scheduled airlines
achieved an aggregate operating profit of approximately $4.3 billion, up 30% over 2004.
Passenger revenue growth was particularly strong as it rose by 11% to $325 billion. The
continuing losses of the United States based airlines however has created an overall net
loss of around $6 billion for the global industry, but that is forecasted to change by 2007
with predicted profits of $7.2 billion.
2.4 A comparison of the financial results, passengers carried
and market capitalisation of the various airline types
There are four main airline groups notably Full Service Airlines, Low Cost Carriers,
Regional and Charter airlines. Each airline has a different structural model that is
unique. Full Service Airlines are legacy in nature as they were set up by governments
as far back as the 1930s, however due to bureaucrarcy, competition and deregulation,
many have now transitioned to become private airlines and continue to be the flag
carrier. These carriers divide their aircraft cabins into first, business and economy
classes, while cargo remains an important part of the airline business model. A core
competency of full service airlines is their network which facilates the seamless
movement of passengers from both their own network and from the networks of other
carriers through a central hub. A low cost carrier is often referred to as a ‘no-frills
airline’ or a ‘low fare airline’. These carriers operate on a very different operating
platform than that of scheduled airlines as they enshrine the concept of ‘low cost’ into
their organisational culture and offer low fares in exchange for eliminating many of
the traditional passenger services. The fleet type generally differentiates the regional
airlines from the other types of airline business models as they operate aircraft that
generally have less than 90 seats, where the aircraft are composed of a mix of turbo-
prop and regional jets. Regional airlines normally serve a dual role by feeding
passenger traffic into the hubs of incumbents and by operating on low-density routes
that were unprofitable for the network carriers. Charter Airlines generally do not
operate to a set timetabled schedule as they focus primarily on vacationing traffic.
These airlines usually offer flights as part of a holiday package that also includes
transfers and hotels, most of which provided by vertically integrated tour operators.
Economies of scale derived from the integrated holiday package cross subsidies the
operating economics of operating the aircraft.
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2.4.1 The diversity of full service airlines, low cost carriers, regionals
and charter airlines
Historically, full service carriers represented the majority of airlines and it was only in
later years that airlines began to differentiate and focus on market niches. Charter airlines
for example focused on vacationing traffic, while low cost carriers concentrated on price
sensitive passengers and regional airlines served outlying communities in more rural
areas. Many of the full service carriers already had their own short-haul feeder airlines
such as Aer Lingus Commuter, Japan Air Commuter, United Express, etc and this
provided some protection from new entrants and short-haul competitors. However, the
low cost carriers and regional airlines in particular were beginning to impact on the
operations and financial results of the full service carriers. They grew very quickly and
were increasingly encroaching on the incumbents’ market shares. The low cost, charter
and regional airlines also began to evolve by changing their structural characteristics (i.e.
flight operations, marketing, flight products offerings, etc), thereby further challenging
the incumbents. In recent years there have been very few full service airlines launched,
which is an indication that investors are no longer interested in this sector but are
attracted by the other business models, such as low cost carriers and regional airlines.
Table 4 below outlines the different types of airline business models that have been
formed since 2002. It outlines the wide diversity of new entrant airlines that are posing an
increasing threat to the network carriers. An imminent threat to the network carriers are
the long-haul all business class airlines and the long-haul low cost carriers, which have
only recently commenced operations. These new operators have directly challenged the
network carriers’ last remaining niche that had set them apart from competitors. The all-
business class airlines such as MaxJet are offering in-flight products that are comparable
to the likes of British Airways but at greatly reduced prices, while the likes of Zoom are
flying from seven Canadian cities to five British cities which has also impacted British
Airways. These new entrants are impacting the business and economy class markets of
full service airlines as passengers become attracted by the cheaper fares and switch to the
inexpensive competitors.
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Table 4. Different types of full service airlines, low cost carriers, charter and
regional airlines that have been formed in recent years.
 Full service airlines such as Etihad in Abu Dhabi and Kingfisher in India
 Low cost carriers within full service carriers, such as Ted (UAL), Atlas Blue
(Royal Air Maroc) and JetStar (Qantas)
 Low cost carriers such as Air Deccan in India and Air Arabia in Sharjah
 Low cost carriers that are offering superior frills such as live TV and flights
products such as 32’ seat pitch comparable to the full service airlines (JetBlue)
 Traditional airlines rebranded as low cost carriers like Aer Lingus & America
West
 Long-haul low cost carriers such as Zoom in Canada, Oasis Hong Kong Airlines
and Australian Airlines
 All business class airlines such as Eos, Silverjet and MaxJet connecting the UK to
the USA
 Regional airlines such as Lagun Air in Spain
 Regional airlines which have been converted to low cost carriers, such as FlyBe
and Norwegian Airlines
 Independent charter airlines such as Air Finland, USA 3000 and Flyjet in the UK
 Niche charter airline such as Air Bourbon that links Paris to the Island of
Reunion1
1 Air Bourbon began operations in June 2003 and was liquidated in November 2004
2.4.2 The financial performance of full service airlines, low cost
carriers, regional airlines and charters
Airline revenues and operating margins vary considerably when comparing low cost
carriers, full service airlines charter carriers and regionals. Comparisons between airlines’
revenues are available from a number of sources that include the International Air
Transport Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Air
Transport Association (ATA), Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA), Association
of European Airlines (AEA) and the UK Civil Aviation Authority. In addition to
published statistics, a number of reports providing ‘benchmark’ statistics and
comparisons of airline performance have been produced (such as Mason et al., 2000;
Morrell et al., 2000; Feng and Wang, 2000; Doganis, 2002; Transport Research
Laboratory, 2002).
Table 5 below clearly demonstrates that low cost carriers and regional airlines all
generate high operating margins while the opposite occurs for the full service airlines.
The operating margins of the low cost carriers in 2005 were on average three times that
of the network airlines. Smit (1997) states that operating margins are an excellent way of
comparing the financial performances of airlines. The operating margin indicates how
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much an airline makes from each dollar of sales before interest and tax. Full service
airlines return less that $0.02 for every dollar in sales, while other airline business models
such as low cost carriers return $0.06 for every dollar earned. Regional airlines however
generate the highest return of 7.7%. For benchmark purposes Nokia phones had an
operating margin of 13.6% for 2005, Caterpillar 17.2%, while IBM had a margin of
12.8%.
Table 5 Top 150 airline groups financial summary by type – 2005
Airline Group Revenues
$billion
Change from
2004
Operating
Result $billion
Operating
Margin
Full Service
Airlines
351.9 10.6% 5.5 1.8%
Low Cost Carriers 23.8 20.4% 1.3 6.1%
Regional Airlines 9.9 24.6% 0.7 7.7%
Charter Carriers 5.6 17.2% 0.9 3.0%
Total 439.9 11.7% 10.3 2.5%
Source: Airline Business, August 2006
Alamdari and Fagan (2005) measured the correlation between low cost carriers and
operating margins using the Spearman’s rank (rs). They achieved a correlation coefficient
r2 = 0.809, indicating that there is strong correlation between low cost carriers and high
operating margins. The authors applied the theory of linear regression coefficient they
found that operating margins became reduced when low cost carriers added extra frills
and flight products. JetBlue’s recent financial results have confirmed this experience as
their 2005 operating margins were 2.8% as opposed to Southwest’s 9.6%. The table
above shows that the full service airlines generated almost $352 billion in revenues for
2005, while the low cost carriers generated 14.7 times less but were much more efficient
in generating higher margins. The network airlines are facing excessive competition,
overcapacity, falling yields and are saddled by a high cost structure. These characteristics
are largely accountable for the industry’s shortfall in generating profits. The industry has
never earned a real rate of return on its investors’ capital in its 60+ years of existence.
Taneja (2002) argues that airlines must stop going after profitless growth. The
competitive pressure within the airline industry to maintain and exceed the expectations
of good service, reliable schedule, low fares, etc have become increasingly difficult for
incumbents.
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2.4.3 Traffic, load factor and yield of full service airlines, low cost
carriers, charter and regional airlines.
Table 6 below compares the passenger traffic, load factors and yields of full service
airlines, low cost carriers, charter and regional airlines for the year 2005. The low cost
airlines account for a relatively small proportion of global Revenue Passenger
Kilometres, representing less than 10%. However, they are attracting a lot more
passengers than the network airlines with their traffic growing by almost 20% in 2004/05.
OAG (September 2006) estimated that the capacity on low cost carriers has more than
doubled in just four years. This high growth is causing alarm for the network carriers as
they were only able to experience passenger growth of 5% in 2004/05. In addition the
yield of the full service carriers was only 18% higher than the low cost carriers and 29%
higher than the charter airlines. Another concern is the growth of regional traffic and the
high yields that regional airlines are generating. The latter accounted for 3.4% of the
world’s RPKs in 2005 which is significant. Incumbents are faced with difficult
challenges as they already encounter high labour costs, strong unions, pension deficits,
low productivity, stagnant traffic and compete in an environment where low cost carriers
have cost levels that are 30-40% (per seat-kilometre) lower. A list of the world’s top 25
airlines by operating profit and operating margin for 2005 are shown in Appendix 1.
Table 6 Top 200 passenger airlines by airline type - 2005
Airline
Type
Passengers
Carried
(Millions)
Change
2004/05
Pax Traffic
RPKs
(Millions)
Share of
RPKs
(%)
Load
Factor
(%)
Yield
US$
c/RPK
Network 1,534 5.0% 3,235,993 82.0% 75.0% 8.88
Low Cost 278 19.6% 352,220 8.9% 77.4% 7.22
Charter 78 1.3% 225,462 5.7% 82.7% 6.29
Regional 176 17.5% 133,794 3.4% 69.7% 12.26
Source: Airline Business, August 2006
2.4.4 Market Capitalisation of Incumbents and low cost carriers
Figure 11 below shows the market valuations of Asian, European and American
network airlines from early 2001 to mid 2005. The Asian airlines have maintained
their valuations throughout, even though there were declines for 9/11 and SARs.
However, the US airlines have been devalued by around two-thirds during the period
2001 to mid 2005. They carried an enormous amount of debt, had high costs, faced
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excessive competition and had been unable to generate any profits over that period,
which have all contributed to their shrinking valuations. Meanwhile the European
airlines stand roughly in between the US and Asian groups. They have also been slow
to recover from the downcycle and were beginning to encounter the onslaught of low
cost carriers which caused a downward effect on revenues and investor confidence.
Figure 11 Airline Valuations 2001 - 2005
Table 7 below gives the market capitalisation breakdown of airlines across three
continents for 2004. Southwest, for example, has double the capitalisation of the ATA
member airlines yet produces only one-twelfth of their revenues; as a result the respective
ratio is 1.571 compared to only 0.058 for the network carriers. Similarly, Ryanair’s
capitalisation is one-fourth that of the entire group of European incumbents that are listed
on stock markets, yet it only generates one-thirtieth of the incumbents revenues. Clearly
investment in the air transport sector is now favouring the low cost carriers. Research has
found that once low cost carriers launch successful IPOs and trade on international stock
markets they are less likely to exit as investors are particularly encouraged by the high
margins (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch and
Mahmood, 1995). Porter (1985) stated that a firm can achieve competitive advantage in a
market only if it can create more economic value than its competitors. Incumbents are
finding it difficult to attract investment, which will have a knock on effect in areas such
as aircraft procurement, pension funding, in-flight product development, etc. If they are
unable to stimulate investment they will become increasingly under-capitalised and will
find it more difficult to compete with the low cost carriers who are well funded and may
very well diversify their business models further by entering the long-haul market similar
to what JetStar is currently planning.
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Table 7 Market Capitalisation of Global Airlines (December 2004)
Region Carriers Market Capitalisation
US$ billions (1)
Revenue
US$ billions (2)
Ratio
(1)/(2)
ATA (9*) 5 85 0.058
Southwest 11 7 1.571USA
JetBlue 2 1 2.000
AEA (10*) 24 69 0.347
easyJet 2 2 1.000Europe
Ryanair 6 2 3.000
AAPA (12*) 42 65 0.646
Virgin Blue 2 1 2.000Asia Pacific
Air Asia 1 0.1 10.000
* Indicates the number of airlines that are represented on a stock market.
Source: Airclaims, Bloomberg, easyJet, Ryanair, Air Asia, Virgin Blue, ATI and AAPA
2.5 Passenger Forecasts
2.5.1 Passenger growth prospects for 2004 - 2023
Each year the world’s aircraft manufacturers produce a 10 year forecast of the global air
transport market and then extrapolate that forecast further to produce a 20-year forecast.
The IMF has forecast that the GDP growth rate for ten years 2004–2013 will be 3.2% and
have estimated that it will be at 3.1% for the years 2004-202314. Asia Pacific is expected
to lead the world’s growth. The Boeing Current Market Outlook (2006) indicated that
most markets are expecting to at least double their passenger traffic base by 2025.
However, the Airbus Global Market Forecast for 2004 – 2023 appears to be the most
comprehensive forecast. It incorporates low cost traffic stimulation and diversion from
network carriers. It also takes account of the new markets that low cost carriers are
expected to develop and even forecasts increased frequencies on existing routes. In
addition, it also includes the pace of liberalisation in developing countries together with
structural constraints of congestion and environment and its results are given below in
Figure 12. It gives two sets of forecasts; one to 2013 and the second till 2023. It shows
that the North American market will encounter the world’s slowest traffic growth while
the European market will grow to 5.8% per annum during the period 2004-2013, as the
new Eastern European countries become more integrated with the European Union, in
turn providing more opportunity for the low cost airlines. Beyond this period Airbus
forecasts a slightly slower growth rate. The Asian market is forecast to grow by 6.7% per
14 http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
40
annum till 2013 and then slow to 5.3% per annum for the next ten years. Lawton (2005)
pointed out that 500 million people live within 3 hours of hubs such as Kuala Lumpur
and Bangkok, while Ionides (2004) declared that the majority of the population has not
yet flown. The region has experienced a boom in low cost carriers recently and the
region’s primary airports such as Singapore and Kuala Lumpur have reacted to this
strong growth by establishing low cost terminals. Clearly this is a very innovative and
forward thinking approach. However, the Airbus forecast points out that the Middle East
will become the world’s fastest growing region registering 10.7% growth per annum till
2013. A study by O’Connell (2006) confirmed this research as the region has ordered a
total of 234 widebody aircraft in the last few years. In addition, over $26 billion will be
invested in the region’s airports to support the growth of airline traffic over the next
decade. Airlines such as Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad will feed 6th freedom long-
haul traffic15 through their respective hubs as evidenced by the fact that around 53% of
the traffic between India and the UK is connecting via airports in the Gulf. Africa and
Latin America are both forecasted to grow by 5.3% per annum over the next 10 years.
Figure 12 Regional air traffic growth from 2004 - 2013 and 2014 - 2023.
Source: Airbus Global Market Forecast 2004 - 2023
In Africa, the Yamoussoukro declaration signed in 2000 was aimed at inaugurating an
Open Skies policy which would remove bilateral constraints and boost intra-regional
traffic. Traffic is expected to grow by 5.3% per annum till 2013. In Latin America, Lan
Chile has began franchising to Ecuador, Argentina and Peru while Gol, South America’s
15 This refers to the right of an airline to carry passengers between two third countries through its home basis,
e.g. Qatar Airways carrying people between London and Melbourne with a stop-over in Doha.
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fasting growing low cost carrier plans to operate 60 737s by the end of 2006 and have
began to operate cross border flights. It had one of the highest operating margins in the
world in 2005 of over 23%. Most of the region's carriers are already privatized and the
Latin American governments have taken the initial steps toward liberalisation. Airbus
forecasts that South America will encounter the same growth rate as that of Africa.
2.5.2 The growth potential of under-performing aviation markets
and the opportunity for low cost carriers
The potential for future growth in air travel is enormous as it becomes more affordable
for consumers. Many of the world’s population in third world countries have not yet
flown. Asia is now set to become the next frontier in aviation development. According to
the Airbus Global Market Forecast (2004-2023), both China and India are set to become
the world’s largest consumer markets within the next 25 years, with a combined
purchasing power five times greater than that of the United States today. According to the
Worldwide Tourism Organization, as many as 100 million Chinese tourists will travel
internationally by 2020. Boeing Current Market Outlook (2006) shows that the Chinese
market will become the strongest growing air transport market in the world, growing its
passenger base five-fold. Emerging markets such as China have reduced their trading
barriers and their technological platforms are now similar to other industrialised nations.
Honglin (2006) stated that foreign investment in Chinese industry grew to $53 billion in
2003, which justifies the strong air traffic growth forecasted for the region. Airline
Business (August, 2006) reported that China Southern and China Eastern had recorded
the world’s highest passenger growth rates in 2005, increasing by 56.4% and 37.2%
respectively.
Figure 13 below shows the propensity to fly and is based on the GDP/per Capita of each
country. In mature air transport markets, such as the United States, GDP growth is a key
driver behind the growth of passenger traffic, however demand for air travel is
increasingly being driven by ticket price and consumer confidence. The US GDP/Capita
figure is one of the highest in the world at $32,857, its citizens enjoying a combination of
high wages and low air fares resulting in an air travel propensity of 3.9 trips per person
per year; the highest in the world. However, Europe is quickly catching up as economies
continue to strengthen and numerous low cost carriers have entered the marketplace. In
addition, ten new countries (Cyprus, the Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the EU in May 2004. These
countries have added 105 million people to the current 15 EU member States. Airfinance
Journal (2003) explained that €1.04 billion will be made available annually to the
accession countries to upgrade their transportation infrastructure such that it is up to
European standards. Hungary has already used its portion of the funds to upgrade
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Budapest airport. The World Tourism Organisation included both Poland and Hungary in
their ‘Top-15 inbound tourism destinations’. Lobbenberg et al. (2003) argued that ‘plenty
of untapped growth remains in Eastern Europe’. In Asia regulatory barriers are set to fall.
Asian carriers currently circumnavigate the regulatory barriers via franchise partnerships.
They are currently strengthening their brands and purchasing large chunks of production
capacity from aircraft manufacturers and will be well positioned when deregulation
finally arrives. According to Airbus (2004) there will be 10 cities in the Asia Pacific
region that will have more than 20 million inhabitants by 2020.
Figure 13 Propensity for air travel
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Source: ICAO
The rest of the world however lags behind the powerhouses of the US, Europe and Asia.
Africa, for example, had the world’s second highest passenger growth after the Middle
East at 10.1% in 2005 (IATA, 2006). Evidence of the continent’s growing economic
activity and evolving air transport market is marked by the recent purchase by Kenya
Airways of four Boeing 777s and six 787s and Ethiopian Airlines’ procurement of ten
787s (ATI, March 2006; ATI, April 2005). Such countries had experienced catastrophic
events such as famine and extreme poverty a decade earlier. Similarly Brazil, Latin
America's largest airline market, has an immature air transport market as there are only
1.8 domestic flights taken per 1000 people each year (Citigroup Research, 2006). Gol has
ordered 87 Boeing 737-800s and the region’s air transport market is set to change
dramatically. A large proportion of other third world countries also have an immature
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aviation base and recent aircraft orders by airlines in China, India, Indonesia, etc. are set
to change the dynamics of air travel and significantly grow airline traffic.
2.6 Concluding Comments
Air traffic has shown a five fold increase over the last four decades. In spite of strong
cyclicality and extraordinary adverse effects (such as terrorist attacks), the industry has
shown resilience and will continue to grow and expand worldwide. The low cost carriers
will produce the next paradigm shift in air transport growth as travellers in undeveloped
countries begin to switch from buses and ferries to aircraft as witnessed in Europe when
carriers such as Ryanair entered markets. These growing air travel markets will be further
fuelled by strengthening economies whose citizens will enjoy higher disposable incomes.
However the equation of continued passenger growth is not correlated to increased
profitability for airlines, in fact the opposite happens. Airline profitability remains a
major problem for today’s incumbent airlines. Incumbents worldwide have found it
extremely difficult to generate profits and most years they report very poor financial
returns. Multiple problems have been identified as the root-causes for this profit shortfall
with the most acute difficulties being cited as high operating costs, structural constraints
(e.g. unions), declining yields, overcapacity and the increasing threat from low cost
carriers. The highly publicised Stern Report (2006) seems to pose another direct threat to
the airline industry in terms of preparing the scene for the imposition of environmental
taxation and the introduction of a market for trade in emissions. The industry is in a
constant state of flux.
The major airlines in the United States have all been in bankruptcy at one time or another
and 50% of their capacity today remains in chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. This region
remains in severe financial distress and is responsible for the overall global profit
shortfall reported by IATA and ICAO. The low cost carrier is outperforming the
incumbent in terms of market capitalisation, passenger growth and profitability. The
average ratio for the market capitalisation/revenue of European incumbents for example
is 0.3:3 when compared to Ryanair, while North American incumbents perform far worse
when compared to low cost carriers there. The incumbents may very well face a shortage
of funds, which may undermine their future sustainability. Most investors today show a
preference for low fare rather than for traditional airlines. The number of passengers
choosing to travel on low cost carriers globally has grown four-fold when compared to
full service carriers in the last year, while their operating margins are three-times that of
the traditional airlines. It is very difficult to think of the airline sector operating without
the traditional airline especially in long-haul travel and the evidence is beginning to
mount to their survivability in the short-haul market. Clearly the incumbent is facing
unprecedented challenges and solutions are urgently required.
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3 Chapter 3: Airline Deregulation and the
Emergence of Low Cost Carriers
This chapter analyses the process of airline deregulation and liberalisation in the US,
Europe and Asia. It is followed by a discussion on the emergence of low cost airlines.
sector. Relaxation of the constraints in civil aviation regimes have been gradually
introduced since the late 1970s involving both domestic and international markets;
they have resulted in a fundamental shift in airline economics and have subsequently
created the necessary business environment for the growth of low cost carriers from
the mid 1990s to date.
3.1 US Deregulation Policy
In the early days, the US Government finalised the approval on all aviation issues and
airlines were highly constrained in what they could do. In the US, Congress regulated
the industry through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which was established in
1938. It controlled decisions on important activities such as fares, route entry,
capacity, flight products and mergers. The CAB attempted to strengthen weaker
carriers by giving them access to lucrative routes. Between 1950 and 1974, the CAB
received 79 airline applications but none were granted and it refused to award new
routes to existing carriers (Shina, 2001). The CAB traditionally prohibited price
reductions by requiring that carriers charge equal fares for equal distances. Thus, it
became difficult for carriers to lower fares in densely trafficked markets, leading to
inefficiencies. In addition, airlines were not free to withdraw from certain routes
regardless of the commercial implications. Meanwhile, carriers operating in the
‘liberalised’ states of California, Texas and Florida were offering very competitive
services at fares below the prevailing rates in the rest of the US. California based
airlines, such as Air California and Pacific Southwest, sold tickets for less than half
those sold by the CAB certified airlines. Traffic on the Los Angeles to San Francisco
market grew from 1.5 million passengers in 1960 to 3.2 million in 1965. Similarly,
traffic in secondary markets such as Fresno to Los Angeles grew by 72% within
twelve months (Bailey et al., 1985).
Graham (2003) pointed out that those airlines that were not regulated by CAB were
performing much better than those operating under CAB regulations. Carriers such as
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) and Southwest were more efficient and enlarged the
markets they entered due to the low fares, as they attracted more passengers than the
regulated high fare carriers (Oum et al., 1991). Regulators allowed airlines to
45
purchase larger aircraft predicting that the economies of scale resulting from the lower
seat mile costs would allow fare levels to fall. However, this did not occur and load
factors fell due to the increased capacity.
Economists, such as Straszheim (1969), began to question the limitations of
regulation and argued the benefits of freer competition in air transport. Leading
reformists, such as Levine (1965) and Jordan (1970), reported the efficiency achieved
in the deregulated Californian market. Keeler (1972) concluded that regulation diluted
any profits derived from the CAB’s fare system due to excess capacity, while Douglas
and Millar (1974) built a competition model that showed more efficiency in terms of
capacity control if fares were not regulated. DeVany (1975) however, reported that
regulation was actually in the consumer interest as fares were set close to the output
maximizing level. Keeler (1978) in a later study reported that CAB’s regulation was
costing passengers $2.7 billion in excess charges per year. They all supported policy
actions that would facilitate freer market competition by reforming outdated
constraints. The early regulated airlines constantly lobbied for subsidies, which
impeded economic development and above all, failed to boost economic growth. The
protectionist approach by the CAB resulted in inefficient and uncompetitively run
businesses.
The CAB (1975) concluded that the consequences of the regulatory legislation
resulted in key anti-competitive issues, such as the exclusion of new airlines from
long-haul trunk markets, protection of inefficient carriers, encouragement of high
labour costs and little price competition. If the regulations were relaxed, a more
competitive environment would emerge and provide enormous benefits to the
consumer in the form of lower fares through innovative pricing and greater product
differentiation. Economists, such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises,
emphasised ‘laissez faire’ arguing that competition can take the place of government
regulation in a more efficient way. Thus, serving the consumer better in the long run
by allowing firms to gain flexibility, restructure costs, improve productivity and
compete in open markets without any government limitations and constraints.
The underlying premise of airline deregulation was that competition among airlines
would replace government regulation in determining fare and service offerings. A
deregulation act proposed a gradual relaxation of the CAB’s regulation of the
industry, with fare and route authority to be phased out over a four-year period.
The major provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act (Bailey et al., 1985)
i) To establish the freedom of any carrier fulfilling safety requirements to enter
markets and for any carrier to exit a market
ii) To establish the freedom to compete on the basis of price, by abolishing any
price regulation
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iii) To provide for a ten-year Essential Air Service Program to ensure air service
to small communities, with local service subsidies to be phased out within six
years.
CAB’s authority was eliminated gradually with regard to economic regulation,
according to the following schedule (Dempsey and Goetz, 1992).
i) Dormant route authority and then all authority over routes would cease by
1981
ii) Limited fare authority until 198316
iii) Limitation of merger approval17
The Board ceased operations on January 1st 1985 and its remaining functions moved
to the Department of Transportation which is still in-place today.
3.1.1 Market development following Deregulation in the US
The early years of airline deregulation were characterized by periods of intense
competition among the major established airlines, as well as by competition from
new-entrant carriers and from carriers formerly confined to intrastate markets18.
Between 1985 and 1992, two major19 US airlines (Eastern and Pan Am) had ceased
operations and three more major airlines (Continental, America West and TWA) were
being reorganised under bankruptcy protection, while six other carriers had been
merged into the majors. Other important airlines that were involved in acquisitions or
takeovers included large carriers such as Frontier, Republic, Ozark, Western and
Piedmont. Still other mergers involved the acquisition of carriers that had been
pursuing a low-fare strategy similar to Southwest’s, such as People Express, Air Cal
and Pacific Southwest. Research by Kim and Singal (1993) found that the industry
consolidation that had occurred through these mergers contributed to higher fares and
an increase in market power.
In the years between the onset of airline deregulation in 1978 and the wave of mergers
beginning in 1985, most of deregulation’s benefits to consumers came in the form of
improved service and lower fares created by competition from new entrants and the
major incumbent network carriers (Morrison and Winston, 1986). The ability to serve
16 Air Carriers could reduce their fares by 50% without CAB’s approval and raise fares by up to 5% per
year in competitive markets.
17 CAB could only approve mergers if the anti-competitive results were less than the transportation
need and no-less anticompetitive alternative was available.
18 For accounts of competition during the early years of deregulation and of the initial wave of new-
entrant airlines, see John R. Meyer and Clinton V. Oster, Jr., Editors, Airline Deregulation: The Early
Experience, John Wiley and Sons, Boston.
19 A major airline is categorised by the fact that it generates over $1 billion in annual operating
revenues.
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new and growing markets, to fashion more extensive route networks and to charge
low fares had been severely constrained by regulation. As the constraints on airline
operations were lifted by deregulation, carriers quickly exercised their new route and
fare freedoms.
Deregulation brought innovations in technology that enabled the development of
sophisticated yield management systems. Such systems allow airlines to quickly
change the mix of high and low fares relative to the load factor on a given flight.
However, one of the principle barriers that initially prohibited freer competition was
the control of the Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) by the major incumbent
airlines. United owned Apollo while American Airlines owned Sabre and these
systems showed an architectural bias to the host airline when travel agents booked an
airline ticket. This helped the top five airlines to increase their share of the US
domestic market from 61% in 1987 to 72% by 199120. By 1998 it still had not moved
by much, as 67% of the market was still controlled by the top five airlines21. Viscusi
et al. (1998) argued that one of the unanticipated developments after deregulation has
been the widespread adoption of the hub-and-spoke system, which has drastically
changed route structures. During the first ten years of deregulation, the major airlines
shifted dramatically from point-to-point linear route systems to hub-and-spoke
alternatives, which provided superior network connectivity and so wider market
coverage.
By the late 1990s, the major airlines’ domestic route networks had become fairly
stable and were built around hub airports typically dominated by a single carrier.
These hub-based networks established geographic areas in which each major network
airline has substantial presence and market power. Borenstein (1992) and Evans and
Kessides (1993) both stated that there was a large increase in number of hub-and-
spoke systems following deregulation, allowing carriers to offer online service
between a greater number of city pairs. Consolidated traffic at the hub provided the
synergies to establish multiple long-haul routes. This provided competition in long-
haul markets. The low cost carriers largely remained with simplified point-to-point
networks, serving primary and outlying secondary airports, giving the traveller a
cheaper alternative travel option. This provided competition in short-haul markets.
Nonetheless, in many of the markets not served by low-fare carriers, the benefits of
deregulation have been eroding. Studies by Borenstein (1989), Levine (1987) and
Morison and Winston (1987) found that fares on routes to and from hub cities have
indeed risen above the industry average. In 1990, the US General Accounting Office
20 US GAO (1992), p30-31.
21 US TRB Special Report 225, p1-3.
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examined trends and services at 15 concentrated22 airports and compared them with
trends at 38 less concentrated airfields, and concluded that the yields (average fare per
mile) increased more at the concentrated airports and that fares charged by the
dominant carriers tended to rise as their aggregate airport enplanement share
increased (Belobaba and Van Acker, 1994). However, studies on the industry overall
have demonstrated that fares actually decreased overall. Of all the studies that have
examined the economic effects of airline deregulation, the most widely quoted has
been a Brookings Institution study published in 1986. The authors Stephen Morrison
and Clifford Winston alleged that as a result of airline deregulation there has been at
least a $6 billion (in 1977 dollar terms) annual improvement in the welfare of
travellers (Winston,1992; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992, p281). Other authors have
established that fares had been reduced by around 15-20% as a result of deregulation
(Call and Keller, 1985; Button, 1991).
Williams (2002) argues that competition is the major driver of current change. In the
US today, 85 percent of airline passengers have a choice of two or more carriers,
compared with only two-thirds in 1978 (ATA, 2006). It has altered the way in which
airline markets are supplied. For the most part in the past 20 years where there has
been effective competition, fares have been low and service has been responsive to
consumer needs (Bailey et al., 1985; Meyer et al., 1987; Morrisson and Winston,
1995; Goetz and Graham, 2004). Button and Taylor (2000) concluded that
deregulation grew US traffic from 93.4 million passengers in 1993 to 126.1
passengers in 1998 mostly as a result of the continued degradation of air fares.
The deregulation of the US domestic airline industry in 1978 was the precursor of
similar moves by most other developed economies in Europe (beginning 1988–1997),
Canada (beginning in 1984), Australia (1990) and New Zealand (1986).23 The
argument was that the industry was mature and capable of surviving under open
market conditions subject to the forces of competition rather than under economic
regulation.24 Williams (2002, p4) pointed out that around 30 countries around the
world began to deregulate their domestic air transport markets. Williams also stated
that Europe had an arcane system of exchanging air traffic rights on a bilateral basis
and the process needed reform.
22 An airport was considered concentrated if it was one of the 75 busiest (based on enplanements) and
one carrier accounted for at least 60 percent of an airport’s enplanements or two carriers together
accounted for at least 85 percent of enplanements (GAO/RCED-90-102).
23 Canada's deregulation did not occur till 1987. Australia and New Zealand signed an open skies
agreement in 2000, which created a single Australia–New Zealand air market, including the right of
cabotage. Canada and the US signed an open skies agreement in December 2005.
24 In contrast to deregulation within domestic borders, international aviation has been slower to
introduce liberalisation. Consequently the degree of regulation varies across routes, fares, capacity, and
other aspects of airline operations depending upon the countries involved. The US–German,
Netherlands and Korea bilaterals are very liberal. In some cases, however, most notably in Australasia
and Europe, there have been regional air trade pacts, which have deregulated markets between and
within countries.
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3.1.2 Liberalisation of Aviation in Europe
Starting in the 1960s, the charter airlines in Europe and North America escaped the
price levels fixed by IATA. This allowed them to operate in a Laissez Faire type
environment. Williams (2002, p87) claims that charter airlines accounted for about
30% of Europe’s Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) and transported around 80%
of European passengers on holiday packages, even up to the late 1990s. These airlines
usually offer flights as part of a holiday package that also includes transfers and
hotels, most of which provided by vertically integrated tour operators. The integrated
package produces sizable economies of scale for the airline which in turn allows it to
charge low fares. Doganis (1991) explains that charter airlines can sell seats at one-
third the price charged by their scheduled airline competitors, while Williams (2001)
shows that the charter airlines’ operating costs are half those of Europe’s full service
carriers.
Meanwhile, the full service European scheduled carriers complained of the inroads
which cheap and unregulated charter services were making into their potential traffic
and profits. The network airlines campaigned for stricter controls while at the same
time the public and the tourism industry were pressing for deregulation as the charters
were the only airlines that were offering lower fares. Barrett (1997) referred to a 1985
ICAO survey which stated that European air fares had traditionally been the highest in
the world. On short intra-European routes, the fares were 26% higher than the world
average. The high fares charged by European airlines were absorbed by a combination
of low productivity and high costs rather than being reflected in high profits.
Europe’s Single European Act of 1986 sought to eliminate barriers in intra-European
competition without lowering barriers to competition from non-EU airlines. Three
deregulation packages, agreed by the European Council of Ministers in 1987, 1990
and 1992 fully deregulated European air transport. Following the single European Act
to unite the European Community by the end of 1992, the rules on licensing of air
carriers within the European Union were set out in the Council Regulation Acts25. The
first two rounds of intra-EU liberalisation26, which came into effect in 1987 and 1990,
allowed European airlines to offer lower fares and to match the prices charged by
European charter airlines. They also allowed routes to be served by more than one
airline from a single country (double or even multiple designation) and loosened the
market-sharing bilateral arrangements among EU nations. In 1992, 90 per cent of
domestic European routes and 96% of the cross-border EU-routes were operated on a
25 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2407/92 of 23 July 1992, on licensing of air carriers 1992. O.J.L 240.
26 The terms “deregulation” and “liberalisation” may be used interchangeably. Nonetheless, it is usual
to refer to deregulation in domestic markets (e.g. the US market) and liberalisation in international ones
(e.g. across the EU member states).
50
duopoly basis27, a further change in the legislation would surely change Europe’s
competition policy.
Deregulation was introduced in a time-phased manner through three packages but it
was the ‘Third Package28’ under the constitution entitled Council Regulation 2409/92
that effectively removed all remaining government-imposed restrictions regarding
designation, market access and capacity. In effect it liberalised the licensing of
carriers, the routes they fly and the prices they can impose. It also opened up cross-
border and domestic markets (including cabotage29) and removed national ownership
restrictions. The European Commission had also taken measures to ensure that the
‘competition rules’ that apply to other industries also apply to airlines. Doganis (2001,
p67) described the three areas that were primary targets, namely cartels and restrictive
agreements, monopolies and mergers, and state aid/subsidies. These restrictions were
rigidly introduced. These three packages, agreed by the European Council of
Ministers, fully deregulated the European air transport sector. The provisions are
listed below.
1) Licensing of air carriers: Council Regulation 2407/92
This states that members shall permit any EU carrier holding an operating license
granted pursuant to the regulation to exercise traffic rights within the EU.
2) Market access: Council Regulation 2408/92 on access for community air
carriers to intra-community air routes
Under this regulation, access to routes between member states is unrestricted. Most
importantly, any airline holding a valid air operators’ certificate in the EU cannot be
prevented from operating any other route within the EU, including flights wholly
within another country. On accession, the new member states will therefore have all
the ‘Air Freedoms’, including unrestricted access to cabotage routes.
3) Fares and rates for all air services: Council Regulation 2409/92
The basic effect of this regulation is freedom for EU carriers to set fares for
scheduled, chartered and cargo services. Fares are not subject to any controls under
the regulation.
27 CAA: The Single Aviation Market: The First Five Years, CAP 685, 1998, p190.
28 Note that although the third package effectively created a totally ‘open skies’ agreement within the
European Union, services outside the European Union are still governed by bilateral air service
agreements.
29 Cabotage occurs when domestic services operated in one EU Member State by a carrier licensed in
another Member State. EU Member States were not obliged until 1 April 1997 to open their domestic
markets to free competition from all EU-licensed carriers, although airlines were entitled to operate
consecutive cabotage services as extensions to services to or from their own state provided that no
more than 50% of the capacity was made available on the cabotage sector.
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Table 8 below compares the key features such as market access, designation, capacity
and tariffs prior to deregulation, to the changes that occurred to each of these features
after the three packages had been implemented. It is evident in comparing the two
columns in Table 8 that the open-market bilaterals cleared away many of the earlier
constraints on market access, designation, capacity and tariffs.
Table 8. A comparision of the pre-deregulation and post-deregulation changes in
the European market
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
Only to points specified Open route access – airlines can flyon any route between two states
Very limited Fifth Freedoms sometimes granted
Market
Access
Charter rights secured under 1956 ECAC agreement*
Generally single – but double/
multiple in some bilaterals MultipleDesignation Airlines must be under substantial ownership and effective control
of nationals of designating state
Capacity Shared 50:50 No capacity control
Tariffs Double approval Double approval
* European Civil Aviation Conference Agreement opened up traffic rights for charter services within the EU.
Source: Doganis (2006, p36)
Williams (2002) stated that Europe became the world’s first truly deregulated region.
Other regions throughout the world may follow Europe’s example of staged phases
which gives the deregulation process time to evolve and airlines the chance to adjust
their strategies in order to accommodate for the change and not to be faced by the
sudden transition to liberalised skies.
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3.1.3 Why deregulation was urgently required from a European
context
Deregulation paved the way for low cost carriers to enter markets where high fares
had prevailed. It aimed to liberalise air travel within the EU and challenge the cartel
of flag-carrying national airlines, such as British Airways, Air France and Lufthansa.
These three major airlines controlled 40% of the available passenger-kilometres on
scheduled intra-European flights through bilateral agreements. Kangis and O’Reilly
(2003) stated that competition was relatively benign or nonexistent prior to
deregulation because barriers to entry were so high and competitors were relatively
weak. Governments also refused to grant operating and/or route licences, in essence
an effective strategy to protect the national carriers. Liberalisation slowly changed as
new operators entered unrestricted markets and began to challenge the flag carriers
with their high cost bases and inefficient operating practices. Table 9 (i) below
reproduces an analysis of eleven routes from London in the period 1980-1985
conducted by the UK CAA. It is noted that traffic on the Dublin – London route grew
by only 2.5% over the period 1980-1985, while fares increased by 72.6%. By contrast,
traffic on London to Frankfurt route grew by 40% over the same period while fares
also increased significantly by 43%. The supply restrictions in bilateral air agreements
meant that passengers were pushed into higher fare categories at times of peak
demand. In 1986, unemployment in Ireland stood at 17.6%, the highest in Europe and
many trips to neighbouring countries were by ferry as air travel was deemed
excessively expensive. The charter market between the UK and Ireland stood at just
1% in the period 1980 – 1985 and travellers were forced to take a flag carrier if they
needed to travel by air. Barrett (1997) stated that strong public opinion pushed the
Irish Government towards deregulation in spite of the strong protectionist stance in
both the Courts and the Government. In a European context, one of the first major
routes to experience deregulation was Dublin to London. In 1986, eleven years prior
to full deregulation, the Irish Government issued an operating licence to a second
airline called Ryanair, granting them rights to operate on the Dublin to London Luton
route.
The deregulation of the Dublin to London route was a major success and was looked
upon in Europe as a very positive indicator for further deregulation. Barrett (1997)
reported that the Dublin-London Luton service began on 23 May 1986 at a fare of
IRL£99 return unrestricted, while the fare charged by British Airways and Aer Lingus
that operated from Dublin to Heathrow was IRL£208. Threatened by this action, the
incumbents matched the fare the following day. Fares from Cork and Shannon have
fallen even more from the highs of IRL£240 in the 1980s.
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Table 9 (i) Fare increases and Passenger growth 1980 - 1985
London to: Passenger Numbers
1985 (000s)
Load Factor
1985 (%)
Fare Increase
1980-1985 (%)
Passenger Growth
1980-1985 (%)
Glasgow 1080.8 62.6 31.9 40.4
Edinburgh 1033.9 62.7 31.9 58.3
Belfast 895.3 60.8 40.9 30.7
Manchester 869.1 59.8 45.5 41.9
Aberdeen 460.3 64.6 29.2 34.5
Newcastle 313.2 58.0 38.8 18.4
Paris 2438.3 73.9 63.2 17.1
Amsterdam 1312.0 70.8 38.5 24.1
Dublin 994.3 75.2 72.6 2.8
Frankfurt 977.4 70.6 43.2 40.1
Brussels 719.0 61.7 43.6 20.4
Average 65.5 43.7 29.9
Source: Competition on the main Domestic Routes, UK CAA Paper 87005 (1987)
In the first full year of deregulation passenger numbers on the Dublin-London route
were up 92%. CAA data from 1985 to1994 showed the impact that deregulation had
on the Ireland-UK market. It produced a shift in passenger growth as shown below in
Table 9 (ii). The once stagnating market from 1980 to 1985 became the fastest
growing European market over the years 1985-1994, with a growth of 184%. This
was 1.95 times the growth rate on air trips to France, 2.16 times the growth rate to the
Netherlands and 2.62 times the growth rate to Germany. Within the UK it has been
estimated that no-frills airlines and their low fares stimulated 1.24 million new airline
trips in 2002, almost a 60% increase (Williams et al., 2003).
Table 9 (ii) UK to major European Countries - Passenger Growth 1985-1994
UK to: Passengers 1994
(000)
Growth 1985-1994
(%)
Spain 17,645 85
France 7,261 94
Germany 6,169 70
Ireland 5,126 184
Greece 4,963 73
Italy 4,188 62
Holland 4,013 80
Switzerland 2,647 31
Portugal 2,692 63
Source: Civil Aviation Authority
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Ryanair and other new market entrants availed of deregulation to open new routes to
Cork, Shannon, Knock, Kerry, Waterford and Galway, the deregulated Ireland–UK
air market growing larger than the markets serving far larger populations than Ireland
such as the UK routes to Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Deregulation had also stimulated economic activity as a Green Paper30 report on
Aviation Policy published by the Irish Government in 1994 estimated that airline
deregulation had benefited the economy very significantly. The report established that
there had been a 60% increase in number of visitors who contributed valuable
exchequer receipts of IRL£560 million annually and it forecasted that an additional
25,000 jobs in tourism would be created over the next ten years. Deregulation had
transformed a stagnant tourism industry that registered just 2 million visitors per year
to becoming the fastest growing tourism sector in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2001).
Barrett (1997) and Morrell (1998) agreed that traffic grew as a result of liberalisation
and the new competition entering the market, particularly from low price challengers.
This view is supported by the EU’s 2000 annual report on the European air travel
industry, where it is argued that: ‘It may be the case that the low cost carriers are
helping to keep the intra-European passenger forecasts higher than would perhaps be
expected for a mature market’.
3.2 Deregulation in Asia
Although Asia has been the fastest growing air travel market in the world during the
last two decades, air transport deregulation and liberalisation in the region has been
slower than in North America and Europe. Countries in Asia are more diverse
politically, economically and culturally than those in North America and Europe, with
each of them differing in their approach to deregulation. Some countries have strong
economies and successful well-established national airlines, while the opposite occurs
for other countries within Asia. Some have been strong advocates of liberalisation
such as Singapore and New Zealand, the two countries with the smallest populations
in this region. Other countries have allowed a second designated carrier to fly
international routes in order to meet the rapidly rising demand and act as a
competitive benchmark for the flag carrier. This has been the case in several
countries, such as Australia (Ansett), Hong Kong (Dragonair), Indonesia (Merpati),
Japan (All Nippon Airlines), Korea (Asiana), Philippines (Cebu Pacific), Taiwan
(Mandarin Airlines) and Thailand (Bangkok Airways). Whereas in Malaysia the
government did not allow a second designated network carrier and also refused to
issue a new carrier called Air Asia with a new Air Operating Certificate (AOC).
30 Government of Ireland, 1994. Green paper on Tourism Policy, Government Publications, Dublin.
55
Subsequently this forced Air Asia to inherit an existing one with liabilities of $10.5
million dollars (O’Connell and Williams 2005). Williams (2002) stated that the Civil
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) consolidated ten carriers under its direct
control into three groups (Air China, China Eastern and China Southern) to strengthen
China’s national carriers.
Asia has a doubled edged regulatory system whereby its long haul routes to the US
have very liberal open skies agreements but for intra-Asian services the skies are
closed. In regulatory terms, the Asian aviation market differs significantly from that in
Europe and North America. Airlines operating cross-border services in the Asia
Pacific region are subject to international Air Services Agreements (ASAs), which
specify the designated airlines, permitted routes, frequencies and capacities. A low
cost airline in the United States is able to launch a route where it identifies a market
opportunity without the need to consider traffic rights. A similar airline in Asia needs
to wait for the negotiation of bilateral agreements and is likely to face counter-
lobbying by the incumbent national carrier. Generally the ASAs are more restrictive
in this region and governments can use them as a tool to protect their national carriers.
The agreements determine whether a market is monopolistic, duopolistic,
oligopolistic or strongly competitive, and so directly affect airlines and consumers.
Many regulatory barriers still remain, for example Valuair, was forced into a late
cancellation of its inaugural flight from Singapore to Jakarta in May 2004 over the
issue of traffic rights and it was a reminder that market access cannot be taken for
granted (ATI, May 2004). Similarly, Air Asia’s Indonesian associate airline AWAIR
was forced to cancel its planned inaugural international service between Jakarta and
Singapore after it failed to secure final regulatory approval (ATI, January 2005). The
Hong Kong government for example used to follow the policy of ‘one route for one
airline’. This benefited its national flag carrier, Cathay Pacific, for a long time.
However the complex and restrictive bilaterals existing between Asian countries may
help protect flag carriers in the short run, but they may hurt Asian carriers in the long
run, by encouraging incumbents to be inefficient and allowing major foreign carriers
to exploit the Asian market (Oum and Yu, 2000). Governments have been slow to
release their grip on Asia’s airlines and it is perhaps the high level of government
ownership that most distinguishes the region’s airline market. There are only eight
airlines in the Asia Pacific region that are majority privately owned. They include All
Nippon Airlines, Asiana, Cathay Pacific, EVA, Korean Airlines, Japan Airlines,
Philippines and Qantas. Tony Ryan and Karmit Singh, founder of Ryanair and CEO
of SATS (Singapore Airport Terminal Services) respectively, indicate that the biggest
challenge facing the region is its inadequate deregulation policies, bilateral
fragmentation and government involvement (O’Connell and Ionides, 2004).
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Asia’s regulatory process was slow to change because a large percentage of the traffic
carried by the 17 AAPA31 (Association of Asia Pacific Airlines) member airlines is
domestic. In 2005 for example, over 61% of AAPAs 440 million passengers travelled
within the boundaries of their own countries (Herdmann, 2006). Similarly, China’s
domestic passengers represent 83% of its total traffic of 138 million. Around 60% of
AAPA’s international traffic is carried on intra-Asian routes and the remainder to
Europe and the United States (AAPA, 2005). Consequently a large proportion of their
revenue is derived from the region. Korean Airlines for example has about 60% of its
revenue emanating from Korea and Southeast Asia; 12% from Japan and 8% from
China (Centre for Aviation Pacific Aviation, September/October 2003). In order to
protect these markets airlines did not push their respective governments to enter a
deregulated intra-Asian market, as open markets would allow cabotage thus
threatening their domestic markets. It would also have allowed existing carriers to
increase frequencies and at the same time permit new entrants that would impact
yields, load factors and profits. Low cost carriers such as Southwest and Ryanair were
formed before deregulation and they grew rapidly afterwards. It may well be that the
Asian carriers wish to remain regulated in order to offset the low cost carrier threat.
Nevertheless, liberalisation initiatives continue to be taken at the regional, sub-
regional and bilateral levels. Notably, the agreement among ASEAN32 member
countries to establish a regional trade pact known as the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA), which provided a platform for these countries to cooperate. The AFTA
framework also enabled member countries to make progress on sub-regional
initiatives. For example, a joint agreement was signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand in 1994 to promote development of air transport in ASEAN's northern
growth triangle. ASEAN subsequently agreed in 1996 to liberalise air transport on a
sub-regional basis with an ultimate goal of creating open skies within Southeast Asia.
These initiatives were taken just prior to the Asian economic crisis and conditions
were not conducive for airlines wanting to pioneer new markets. Nevertheless,
ASEAN continues to make progress and is working towards a staged and progressive
implementation of open sky arrangements (Forsyth et al., 2004). The Asia Pacific
Economic Forum (APEC) also has an agenda to promote free and open trade and
investment. In 1997, its Transport Ministers adopted a list of eight areas where
liberalisation of air transport could be pursued, including air carrier ownership and
control, tariffs, air freight, multiple designation, charters, alliances and market access.
Several members of APEC also signed the Multilateral Agreement on the
31 Air New Zealand, All Nippon Airways, Asiana Airlines, Cathay Pacific Airways, China Airlines,
Dragonair, EVA Air, Garuda Indonesia, Japan Airlines, Korean Air, Malaysia Airlines, Philippine
Airlines, Qantas Airways, Royal Brunei Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways International and
Vietnam Airlines.
32 Member countries include; Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Liberalisation of International Air Transportation (MALIAT) in December 2001,
whereby the members agree to exchange open skies policies with all other parties.
Australia and New Zealand have set the foundation for deregulation as they have
established a Single Aviation Market and subsequently an open skies agreement.
Australia even allows 100% foreign ownership of its domestic operators, a pioneering
move in deregulation (Chang and Williams, 2004). Hooper (2005) reports that
Singapore has raised the possibility of an open skies air services agreement with
China; it is also engaged in discussions about liberalising trade, including aviation
services, with India. Singapore and Australia also have agreed to work towards an
open skies agreement once the airline industry stabilises signalling that the road to
deregulation is slowing moving forwards and towards an open intra-Asian aviation
market. Singapore’s newspaper, The Straits Times (2004), recorded that the Prime
Minister of Singapore argued that low-cost carriers were the catalyst for deregulation
in Asia and were putting pressure on governments to remove capacity constraints.
IATA has suggested that the framework for complete open skies within the region
will be in place by 2015 (Sritama, 2004).
OAG (April, 2006) provides evidence that the region is beginning to liberalise and
expand its boundaries, as it declared that there were nearly 460,000 flights within the
Asia-Pacific region in April 2006, nearly 95,000 more than in April 2003. Another
important point is the fact that the potential in Asia is huge as there are over 235 cities
with populations exceeding 500,000, of which 130 exceed one million – one third of
the world’s cities of that size. Few are linked by international air services, or even
have international service of any kind. Yet many of them have fully serviceable
airports (Centre for Aviation Pacific Aviation, September/October 2003). There is a
large opportunity for Asia to significantly grow its traffic base as a recent study
completed by InterVISTAS-ga2 Consulting, Inc. entitled ‘The Economic Impact of
Air Service Liberalisation’ found that the liberalisation of air services between
countries has seen a 12–35 percent growth in air travel, significantly greater than
during the years preceding liberalisation. In a number of situations, growth exceeded
50 percent, and in some cases reached almost 100 percent of the pre-liberalisation
rates (Boeing current market outlook, 2006).
Table 10 below gives an indication of the liberalised agreements that have been
forged and may pave the way forward for the Asia Pacific region to become
deregulated in the future.
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Table 10 Recent trends in Asia’s Regulatory Agreements
China/Singapore
China/Australia
China granted 5th freedom traffic rights to Singapore Airlines,
making it the first foreign carrier to be granted rights beyond
China.
In 2004 China also granted 5th freedom traffic rights to
Australia for cargo purposes.
Australia/Singapore Australia and Singapore removed all capacity restrictions on
the services between & beyond, excluding Australia-US routes.
Australia/India Doubled the passenger capacity to 4,500 seats/week and
initiated an open freight agreement with unlimited capacity
Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines
Signed the BIMP East ASEAN Growth Area intra-regional
agreement in 1999 aimed at liberalising air services between
the signatory states.
Brunei, Singapore,
Thailand
Signed the Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services plurilateral
(open to any ASEAN state) agreement in 2004.
ASEAN/Open
Skies Plan
ASEAN is working towards an open skies area between
member countries by 2010.
Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand
Signed the IMT Growth Triangle agreement in 1999 aimed at
liberalising air services between the signatory states.
Singapore/Sri Lanka Open Skies agreement permitted unlimited passenger and
cargo services between both countries.
Cambodia/Laos/Myanmar
/Vietnam
Signed the multilateral CLMV agreement (first in 1998 and
formally in 2003) aimed at liberalising air services within the
Mekong region.
Thailand Foreign ownership cap for domestic airlines to be increased
from 30% to 49%.
Source: ATI, Orient Aviation, Centre for Aviation Pacific Aviation, Association of Asia
Pacific Airlines (AAPA), O’Connell (2005), Lyle (2006).
3.2.1 Airline Deregulation in India
India is classified as belonging to the Asian continent but in many ways is an entirely
different market and home to one-sixth of the world’s population. The Government
of India created Indian Airlines in 1953 by nationalising eight domestic operators.
The airline was to be solely responsible for all operations within the country, while its
sister Air India was to be the designated carrier for all international services. In 1992
the government took the first step to open up the domestic market and allow private
carriers to operate domestic flights under the Air Transport Operator (ATO) licence.
There was a rush for licences as players like East West Airlines and Jet Airways got
off the ground with high-profile launches. Soon, about 40 companies from all manner
of backgrounds applied for ATO licences. Williams (2002, p74) stated that six air taxi
operators, Archana, Damania33, East-West, Jet Airways, ModilLuft and NEPC
Airlines had scheduled airline status conferred upon them. By 1995, these private
carriers had a 35% share of the overall domestic market, with Indian Airlines
33 Damania was renamed Skyline NEPC in 1996 and is now trading as Air Sahara.
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accounting for the rest. However, these start-up carriers had to comply with the traffic
allocation rules, whereby they were required to allocate some capacity on unprofitable
regional routes in Northeast India. As expected, few survived the experience and
today only Jet Airways and Air Sahara remain.
Taneja (2004) strongly contended that India’s tight regulatory control has held back
its national airlines and the economic development of the country. Saraswati (2001)
strongly argued that airline competition was restricted in order to protect the state
enterprises, even though their service quality was inferior in comparison to that
offered by the private carriers. He also revealed that political and bureaucratic hurdles
made management ineffective on critical decisions, particularly on operations, finance
and staffing. Hooper (1998) argued that the government’s stance on foreign
ownership and its painfully slow decision-making process has made it difficult for
India’s state airlines to pursue optimal financial structures. The tight regulations and
closed aviation market had completely halted aircraft procurement for Air India and
Indian Airlines, with each having to wait ten years after submitting applications
before approval was granted. Due to a capacity shortfall, Air India in 2000 could only
serve 19 out of a possible 96 international destinations (Aviation Strategy, 2001).
Ionides (2003) pointed out that a study by the CII National Committee on Civil
Aviation found that domestic fares were 23-30% higher than international fares for a
comparable distance.
Lack of investment, excessive taxation, indecision about the ownership of state-
owned carriers and a very restrictive regulatory system have all seriously impacted
India’s economic reforms. The resultant economic loss has been considerable.
Raguraman (1998) and Saraswati (2001) both emphasised that a more liberal and
competitive regime in India’s aviation market was urgently required. In early 2003,
the Ministry of Civil Aviation commissioned its cabinet secretary, Naresh Chandra, to
prepare a road map for the civil aviation sector that would provide the basis for a new
national civil aviation policy which opened up India’s skies. The aim was to deliver
fast track reforms.
The Key Recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Report are as follows:
 Foreign equity investment in both domestic and international scheduled air
transport services should be further liberalized from 40% to 49%.
 Phased liberalisation of the international air transport sector should be
implemented. The initial phase would allow private airlines the right to provide
international air services. A second phase would envision India actively pursuing
the objective of complete liberalisation of the international air transport sector
through (a) seeking more liberal bilateral agreements and (b) enhancing access to
wider markets by joining a regional grouping of countries in a plurilateral
agreement.
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 Charter services should be further liberalised by relaxing the restrictions
pertaining to frequency and foreign ownership. A mix of foreign and Indian
passengers should be allowed on domestic tourist circuits.
 Requirements on fleet size and equity capital should be removed to enable easier
entry into the aviation sector.
 Immediate measures should be introduced to reduce the system costs of the civil
aviation sector, including the right for airlines to source fuel from the supplier of
their choice.
 Airport charges should be brought down to rates comparable with neighbouring
South East Asia states and Gulf countries.
 Aviation related taxes, such as Inland Travel Tax, Foreign Travel Tax and
Passenger Service Fees, should be replaced with a single lower ad valorem sector
specific rate, at 5% of the airfare.
 The restriction that green field airports should not be constructed within 150
kilometres of an existing airport should be abolished.
 Essential air services on routes that are strategically important but commercially
unviable should be provided with subsidy support.
 Privatisation of the national carriers through a consortium of domestic financial
institutions and foreign institutional investors should take place. Privatisation of
the airports should also occur.
 With increasing privatisation and the potential abuse of monopoly power by
airport operators, the responsibility of ensuring appropriate levels of regulation
should be vested with the proposed Aviation Economic Regulatory Authority
(AERA).
 Safety regulation of the Air Traffic Control Corporation should be under the
control of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. In order to contain any
potential abuse of monopoly power, it should also be regulated by AERA.
 Segments of airports and ATC services, which have natural monopoly or common
user/carrier characteristics, should be subject to independent economic regulation
by the proposed AERA.
Source: http://civilaviation.nic.in/moca/nccommittereport.pdf
3.3 The Emergence and Growth of Low Cost Carriers
It is rather difficult to provide an accurate definition of what a ‘low cost carrier’ is.
Some people may even prefer to use alternative terms such as “no-frill airline” or ‘low
fare airline’. Still, there is a good perception in both the industry and the public of
what a low cost carrier is. As discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, this is a new
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airline business model, which introduced a fresh approach in both strategic and
operational issues. Low cost carriers innovated in terms of setting their fares based on
single rather than return journeys using simple yet powerful yield management
techniques. They engage in direct selling (predominantly through the Internet) saving
on Global Distribution System (GDS) fees and travel agent commission charges. They
generate substantial economies of density (i.e. low unit costs per passenger) through
high load factors in a single-class, dense-seat cabin configuration. Low cost carriers
generally do not offer any “frills” such as in-flight catering or entertainment and
generate a good share of their revenue from the sale of ancillary products and
services. They fly to and from regional airports (which not only charge lower fees
than main airports but may be even willing to offer subsidies in the context of
regional development) offering point-to-point services, thus avoiding complicated
online and interline operations in congested hub airports. They put large orders of the
same aircraft type to increase ex ante bargaining power and reduce ex post unit
maintenance and training costs. These carriers enshrined the concept of ‘low cost’ in
their very organisational culture aiming at reducing labour costs and achieving the
highest possible staff and equipment productivity.
3.3.1 The US Experience
The low cost model origins began within the liberalised states of Texas and California
some twenty years before deregulation. In the early days, Southwest operated in the
Dallas-Houston-San Antonio triangle where the state of Texas controlled entry but not
fares. It was not until 1978, under the US Deregulation Act that airlines were allowed
to enter the previously restricted inter-state domestic markets and to set fares related
to what the market could bear. Southwest had therefore, a substantial, advantage as a
result of having experience with differential pricing, specifically ‘off-peak’ and ‘peak-
pricing’. Southwest also had substantial experience of low fare operations, while the
competition were beginning to shift their strategy from service-competition to fare-
competition after 1978. Deregulation produced a swift change in the economic
regulatory environment of airlines. The US airline industry completely changed as it
required carriers to focus’ on pricing, product differentiation, network configuration,
service and marketing (code sharing, alliances, etc) (Chou, 1993; Debbage, 1993;
Fleming, 1991; Goetz and Sutton, 1997; Sorenson, 1991). Maldutis (1992) indicated
that Southwest had around 3.3% of the US domestic market by 1982, while the four
largest incumbents namely Eastern, Delta, United and American had 12.7%, 12.2%,
11.8% and 10.0% respectively. From 1979 to 1985 a large number of new airlines
entered the market and began to compete with major established scheduled carriers.
Gudmundsson and Kranenburg (2002) stated that 114 airlines entered the US market
between 1979 and 1994 (yet none remained by 1999). This included some high profile
airlines such as People’s Express, Pacific Southwest, New York Air, Jet America and
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Midway Airlines. Capacity more than doubled to 8.9 billion RPKs from 1980 to 1994.
Demsey (1990) indicated that deregulation brought about a period of destructive
competition, which was bad for consumers and the industry in general. The explosion
of new entrants posed a serious threat to the existing incumbents as the new entrants
had low unit costs and could undercut the existing fare levels. In response a number of
the major airlines introduced their own low cost subsidiary airlines such as Delta
Express, Continental Lite and Shuttle by United Airlines. These were the first
examples of ‘airlines within airlines’ and were later dissolved and reintegrated back
into their associated legacy carrier. The main problems were that they inherited high
costs from their parent companies and restrictive working practices under union
agreements. The failure of so many of the new entrants and the withdrawal of the
incumbent subsidiaries created an opportunity for some of the emerging low cost
carriers to capture additional market share. Consequently Southwest, ValuJet, Reno
Air and Morris Air (the latter was taken over by Southwest) all gathered strength.
Southwest has traditionally captured market share by offering low prices for less
differentiated travel services. The entry of a low cost carrier like Southwest into a
market had two effects on the overall market. Firstly, a market diversion effect where
air travellers switched from high-fare established route carriers to take advantage of
lower fares. Secondly, a market creation effect, where low prices induced more
travellers into using air transportation either for the first time and/or instead of other
modes, especially those in the short-haul markets (i.e., less than 1,500 miles of stage
length). Numerous authors such as Windle and Dresner (1995), Windle et al. (1996),
Gittell (2003), Flouris and Walker (2005) have described that there is a paradigm shift
in the traditional marketplace when a low cost carrier enters. The result is two-fold as
there is a decrease in average air fares coupled with an increase in enplanements and
the result has become synonymous with the term “The Southwest Effect”. The
Avmark Aviation Economist (1993) confirmed the analogy as its research highlighted
that traffic had increased by 143%, while at the same time average fares dropped by
around 26% when Southwest entered 20 new markets. By 1993 the US Department of
Transport labelled Southwest the dominant domestic airline because of the effect it
was beginning to have on the rest of the industry (Bennett and Craun, 1993). The
same authors also found that Southwest was the dominant airline in the top 48-states,
which accounted for one-third of domestic passengers and was price leader for more
than 60% of the most dense markets under 500 miles. In the Californian market for
example, it controlled 42% of the market with United Airlines in second place holding
37%, even though United had a hub at San Francisco (Office of Aviation Analysis,
1993). By this time Southwest had competed with American Airlines in more than
40% of its domestic markets, whilst nearly two-thirds of Delta’s domestic RPMs were
in competition with low cost carriers (AMR Corporation, 1994). Colehan (1995)
studied the entry effect that Southwest Airlines had on selected West Coast markets
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and Table 11 below clearly shows that low cost carriers triggered enormous passenger
growth as a result of reducing fares.
Table 11 Southwest’s effect on selected West Coast Markets
(Quarterly Passenger Traffic, 1993 data)
From To Traffic prior to
Southwest entry
Traffic Stimulated
by Southwest
% Change
Passengers
Fare
Reduction
LAS BUR 81,210 214,610 164% -35%
LAS LAX 126,560 250,200 98% -28%
LAS ONT 35,980 98,620 174% -47%
LAS RNO 44,490 129,350 191% -69%
OAK BUR 64,220 268,840 319% -35%
OAK ONT 37,790 109,350 189% -55%
OAK SAN 61,300 138,380 126% -26%
Source: Colehan (1995) US DOT form 41
Note: The abbreviations are listed as follows: LAS (Las Vegas), LAX (Los Angeles), BUR
(Burbank), ONT (Ontario), RNO (Reno), OAK (Oakland), SAN (San Diego).
Colehan (1995) stated that before Southwest entered the Oakland-Burbank route, it
was the 179th largest market in the United States. However, after Southwest began
operating the route it soared to the 25th largest passenger market in less than a year. In
another example, Southwest’s entry onto the Chicago-Louisville route, resulted in that
market tripling its number of passengers 30 days after the carrier entered. Windle et
al. (1996) reported that studies conducted on the impact of low cost carriers on
communities revealed that where low cost services operated, fares are reduced, not
only on the specific city pair, but also on neighbouring city pairs. Calder (2002)
explained that at any one time over 50 communities are reported to be trying to
persuade Southwest to introduce services to their regions. Evidence as to why so
many communities wanted Southwest to enter their markets is provided by Vowles
(2000), who examined a regional market in New England. He stated that the average
fare had dropped by over 25% at Baltimore, Providence and Manchester, one year
after Southwest entered these markets. Cassotis (2005) confirmed that the fare
reduction had aroused the interest of local citizens, as only 200,000 used Providence
and Manchester airports prior to low cost carrier entry; however, traffic rose thereafter
to over 5.5 million from the years 1995 to 2000. Similarly, Florida used to be one of
the most expensive destinations in the US, however when Southwest, AirTran,
JetBlue, Delta Express and MetroJet entered the sunshine state, it became one of the
lowest priced destinations in the US (Al-Kiyumi, 2001). The Transport Research
Board (1999) analysed routes which Southwest entered between 1990 and 1998 and
found that on average, fares fell by 54%.
By the early 1990s, the legacy network carriers included American, Continental,
Delta, Eastern, Northwest, TWA, United, and USAir, which accounted for around
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90% of the total market share of revenue passenger miles. Around the same time the
low cost carriers only served 78 of the largest city pairs, however that quickly
changed. Between 1998 and 2003, low-cost airlines increased their presence in the
5,000 largest city pair markets raising the number of markets served from 1,594 in
1998 to 2,304 in 2003. The low cost carriers were now impacting the domestic
markets and by 2004, the incumbents’ market share had dropped to 74.8%. Southwest
Airlines was the low cost leader and controlled the majority of the low cost market,
capturing over 16% by 2004. Figure 14 below shows the continued growth of low
cost carriers in the US domestic market.
Figure 14 Market share of low cost carriers 1990 - 2004
LCCs ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04
Air Tran1 - - - - 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.1
ATA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.8
Frontier - - - - - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9
JetBlue - - - - - - - - - - 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.1
Southwest 7.0 8.2 9.6 11.3 12.7 13.6 14.1 13.8 13.8 14.3 14.9 16.2 15.8 15.9 16.1
Other
LCCs
- - 0.2 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2
Total 7.1 8.3 9.9 13.6 16.4 18.5 19.1 18.2 18.6 19.5 20.6 22.9 23.7 24.2 25.2
1Values for AirTran and ValuJet combined. Source: U.S. DOT DB1A Database, 1990-2004.
The seven legacy and seven low-cost airlines accounted for 90 percent of all domestic
airline industry seat capacity in 200334. The continued growth of the low fare sector
however is severely threatening the incumbent short-haul market as the number of
passengers who travelled on low cost carriers increased from 79.8 million in 1998 to
117.1 million in 200335. Cassotis (2005), Vice President of SH&E, declared that US
low cost market penetration was 29% in 2005. de Neufville (2004) added that it is
‘not a real stretch for the low cost US market to expand to 50% in the next 20 years’.
Southwest is now the largest U.S. domestic passenger carrier, with more aircraft than
any of the major carriers, serving 60 cities nationwide. There is now a substantial
overlap between the routes served by low cost carriers and the legacy network
carriers. At least 70 percent of the city-pair markets served by the legacy network
carriers are now served by at least one low cost carrier. This means that they are
dictating the fares on most routes.
The new millennium presented un-chartered challenges for the US legacy carriers as
economic downturns, terrorism, high fuel prices, low yields and low cost carrier
competition impacted, as a result of which they had to reorganise their business
34 The legacy airlines included Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US
Airways. The low-cost airlines were AirTran, America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and
Spirit.
35 GAO-04-836 Airlines Financial Condition.
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enterprises. They cut operating expenses by $12.7 billion between October 2001 and
December 2003, while at the same time reducing seat capacity by 12.6% (DOT Form
41 data). The low-cost carriers used legacy airlines retrenchment as an opportunity to
expand and the seven low-cost carriers increased seat capacity by 26.1% during the
same period that legacy airlines cut capacity. JetBlue, the newcomer to the low cost
carrier scene also expanded its route structure and added multiple frequencies to its
existing schedule increasing its seat capacity by a compound annual growth rate of
54.1% from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, the legacy carriers reduced their capacity by a
further 4%, while the low cost carriers increased theirs by 10.3%36.
The capacity of the low cost carriers continues to grow worldwide as they accounted
for 61% of the narrow body orders in 2003, amounting to 385 aircraft (Centre for Asia
Pacific Aviation, 2004). Like all other parts of the world, the US low cost carriers are
proceeding to order multiple numbers of aircraft, while the incumbents have been
unable to do so because of their distressed financial condition. Air Tran for example,
ordered 50 B737s and 6 B717s signalling plans to grow by 25% annually for the next
few years. Similarly, JetBlue expanded capacity by up to 60% in 2004 signing for 100
regional Embraer jets on top of the 65 orders for A320s. Southwest exercised its
options for 79 737-700s in April 2006, while at the same time holding additional
options of 116 more -700s, with delivery positions available from 2008 through to
2012 (ATI, April 2006). By 2008, around 37% of the US fleet will belong to the low
cost carriers and they will receive 52% of all aircraft deliveries destined for the North
American market (ACAS Database).
3.3.2 The Emergence of Low Cost Airlines in Europe
Prior to deregulation, the vast majority of international European routes had only two
carriers as a result of restrictive bilateral agreements. In 1992, 90% of domestic
European routes were run on a monopoly basis and on cross-border EU-routes, 96%
were operated on a duopoly basis37. As a result of deregulation, the balance of power
in European air transport has shifted from the governments towards the airlines.
The ending of institutional monopolies acted as an incentive to new airlines to enter
the market. Numerous authors such as Graham, 1998; Mason et al. 2000; Mason,
2001; Ison, 2000; Doganis 2001; Williams 2002; Pender and Baum, 2002; Lawton
2002 and Button 2004 have all confirmed that deregulation has been the underlying
36 Legacy Airlines capacity adjustment in 2005: US Airways (-8%), Northwest (-8%), Delta (-5%),
United (-3%), Continental (5%) Low Cost Carriers: America West (1%), Southwest (8%), Air Tran
(23%), JetBlue (27%) all sourced from US DOT (2005) Transport Series.
37 CAA: The Single Aviation Market: The First Five Years, 1998, p190.
66
reason for the growth and expansion of Europe’s low cost carriers. These had been
developing since 1995 when European liberalisation began to free up the conditions
for route entry and the fares charged. Airlines such as easyJet and Ryanair began to
establish themselves in the low fare sector. It took time for the low cost carriers to get
recognised as their model differed significantly from that of the full service airlines as
they did not serve primary airports38 and did not have interline passengers, etc. By
2000, Williams and Chang (2002) confirmed that the incumbents still controlled the
majority of Europe’s traffic, as the top six out of fourteen incumbents accounted for
64% of traffic. However, around this time Ryanair and easyJet were gathering
strength and beginning to expand rapidly. A 1998 study conducted by the UK Civil
Aviation Authority described the emergence in the 1990s of a ‘third way’ in European
aviation. It emphasised that this new type of airline brought together the costs of
charter airlines and the convenience of scheduled carriers (CAA, 1998 p125). This led
to a major shift in the industry, offering new travel opportunities to consumers as well
as threatening the high-fare/high-cost operating structures of incumbent operators. It
was found that the European market produced even more of an opportunity than that
in the US as outlined below.
i) There were a large number of charter carriers operating on short-haul European
routes (there is very little charter business in the US as vacation travel takes place on
scheduled airlines).
ii) Fares on both aircraft and trains within Europe were very expensive.
iii) High density cities are closer together in Europe than they are in the US.
iv) Southwest had been successfully growing passenger numbers and profits since
1970 and it was clear that this model could be successfully replicated in Europe.
Internationally, Skytrain operated on the transatlantic market as early as 1977 and it
demonstrated that European passengers were eager to travel on airlines that offered
reduced frills but cheap fares.
38 For example, Ryanair served Stockholm’s secondary airport Skavsta situated 100 kms away from the
city centre, while Paris’ Beauvais is 80 kms from the city centre.
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Figure 15. Weekly low cost carrier summer capacity 1995 – 2004
Source: AEA (2004)
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Figure 15 above shows the growth of European low cost carriers in the past few years,
reflecting a shift in consumers preferences towards cheap air travel to short and
medium-haul destinations and away from holiday packages. From 1998 onwards, low
cost outbound holiday air travel from the UK began to grow faster than the air charter
business. This was prompted by strong route expansion programmes and the merger
synergies created when easyJet took over GO and Ryanair acquired Buzz. Rising
passenger demand was stimulated by heavy advertising campaigns39 and easy online
booking access. Operating profits rose from €67.8 million for Ryanair in 1998/99 to
€163 million in 2001/02, while easyJet’s rose from £8.3 million to £69.6 million over
the same period. Both airlines experienced the classical passenger growth and margin
growth trends of first movers in a new market. The growth rate of Europe’s low cost
carriers has been high, with a compound average growth rate (in terms of RPKs) of
46% between 1995 and 2004. Low cost carriers have changed people’s leisure and
travel habits, opened up direct services between European Union (EU) city pairs that
were not available through the legacy airlines, forced established airlines and tour
operators to change their business models, popularised regional airports by breathing
life into otherwise under utilized airports and changed forever the dynamics of the
industry. Liberalisation’s third package effectively created an open skies policy that
included cabotage, which opened up markets to competition from airlines of other
member states. It also allowed new airlines to be established provided they fulfilled
39 In 1998 easyJet spent £2.65 per passenger on advertising, while BA spent £0.72 (Mason et al. 2000).
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all the requirements of Council Regulation EEC No 2407/92 on the Licensing of Air
Carriers.
Table 12. Top 10 growth carriers, seat capacity 2002 – 2004
Airline 2002 2003 2004 2004 v 2002 CAGR
Germanwings 360,810 2,927,668 4,043,444 1020% 234%
Norwegian 447,224 238,684 3,162,612 605% 165%
Germania 330,624 902,811 1,837,500 455% 135%
Sterling 587,601 1,632,804 2,106,083 258% 89%
Bmibaby 1,925,924 6,556,967 6,777,264 252% 87%
VolareWeb 2,062,307 4,105,393 5,793,189 181% 67%
easyJet 12,892,872 23,354,613 31,592,084 145% 56%
Air Berlin 4,046,573 8,871,544 9,831,056 149% 56%
Ryanair 16,298,326 27,222,262 32,349,902 98% 41%
Blue1 1,055,559 1,351,576 1,908,767 81% 35%
Source: Analysis from OAG Max. CAGR stands for Cumulative Annual Growth Rate.
Table 12 above shows that Ryanair and easyJet dominate Europe’s low cost carrier
market. The sum of all the other low cost carrier capacity just equals that of Ryanair
or easyJet. This highlights the competitive advantage of these dominant carriers,
which offer an average of 3.2 times more capacity than their nearest rival Air Berlin.
They will continue to outpace all other competitors and retain firm leadership as
Ryanair ordered 126 Boeing 737-800s in 2005/06 and easyJet 140 A319s in 2003/05.
Nevertheless, several newcomers to the industry have experienced high growth.
Germanwings for example, only launched operations in October 2002 and has had a
compounded annual growth rate of 234%. Similarly, Norwegian which also only
launched operations in late 2002 had a growth rate of 165%. In comparison, IATA’s
annual average growth rate for 2004 was 5.6%.
Table 13 below shows that the UK had Europe’s largest concentration of low cost
carriers, which is no surprise given that both Ryanair and easyJet have several bases
in the UK. However, certain markets such as Belgium appear to be getting saturated
as outlined by its low cost carrier growth of only 5% from 2002 to 2004. Other
markets such as the UK and Ireland also appear to be slowing and McKinsey (2005)
confirmed that cities such as Brussels, Dublin, Cologne and Stockholm have reached
saturation point.
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Table 13. Departing Seat Capacity by Country, low cost carriers 2002 - 2004
2002 2003 2004 2004 v
2003
CAGR
UK 26,676,210 38,335,445 44,528,195 16% 29%
Germany 8,233,518 15,951,648 19,235,443 21% 53%
Spain 5,732,709 10,291,315 14,948,363 45% 61%
Italy 4,581,315 9,378,384 12,817,978 37% 67%
France 2,939,494 5,900,752 8,706,242 47% 72%
Ireland 3,303,424 4,726,489 5,464,620 16% 29%
Norway 1,058,789 3,480,393 4,047,661 16% 95%
Netherlands 2,640,879 3,292,766 3,945,263 20% 22%
Switzerland 1,380,337 2,356,084 3,048,727 29% 49%
Belgium 2,455,547 3,047,813 2,732,176 -11% 5%
Sweden 877,722 2,030,246 2,604,830 28% 72%
Portugal 1,130,734 1,494,219 1,850,781 24% 28%
Austria 273,273 849,196 1,667,181 96% 147%
Denmark 567,596 1,041,813 1,415,097 36% 58%
Czech
Republic
260,911 515,036 1,309,245 154% 124%
Finland 534,915 754,967 1,150,588 52% 46%
Greece 492,704 842,006 1,072,968 27% 48%
Poland - - 907,473 - -
Hungary - 43,584 743,575 1606% -
Slovakia 59,733 129,048 305,409 136% 126%
Cyprus 18,211 131,336 268,683 104% 284%
Malta 6,950 9,550 12,240 28% 41%
Source: Analysis from OAG Max
Research suggests however, that there is still room for more growth as almost 40
million Britons vacationed abroad in 2003, with 27.6 million travelling on air
inclusive tours (CAA 2004), of which 25.9 million choose a holiday in one of the top
seven Mediterranean destinations, i.e. Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus
and Turkey (ABTA 2003). Mintel (2004) found that UK holidaymakers are 70% more
likely to take short breaks than they were 5 years previously. The study showed that
44% of UK employees will take two short breaks a year, 32% will take three and
nearly a quarter will take four or more. This growth in short breaks has been fuelled
by the availability of low fares to popular leisure and city break destinations. In the
German market, 43.8 million people took a holiday trip abroad in 2002. Koutoulas
(2006) researched that 52% of these vacationed in the Mediterranean and used
packaged tour operators. This opens another market for the low cost carriers which
can replace tour operators by offering dynamic packaging. By March 2006, OAG
(2006) showed that the number of low cost carrier flights in the German market had
increased by around 2,000 (352,000 seats) compared to March 2005. This indicates
that low cost carriers are replacing the German charters serving the Mediterranean as
they did in the UK (see Williams, 2001). Mintel (June, 2005) research also pointed
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out that 65% of consumers reported that they would always take a regular airline
when going long haul but would consider a no-frills airline for travel within Europe.
Finally, we should also consider the rising demand for air travel stemming from
second home owners abroad. Thanks to the low cost carriers, the accessibility of
many destinations in Spain and France has dramatically improved in both time and
monetary terms. As a result, a significant number of relatively affluent Britons and
Germans have decided to buy property abroad, as they can now afford to visit them on
a very regular basis. This new type of derived demand for airline services is relatively
price inelastic as consumers are effectively locked-in due to the location of their asset
(i.e. real estate property abroad). In the future, these travellers may constitute a key
element of demand for low cost carriers in Europe. Ironically perhaps, this is also an
argument against the democratisation of air travel presumably brought by low cost
carriers: a recent survey by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (2006) has shown that
the socio-economic profile of travellers today is not significantly different compared
to ten years ago in Britain, i.e. low cost carriers may have made life easier for the
middle class but not necessarily for the low-income earners. On the other hand,
however, there is little doubt that low cost carriers may have a positive impact on
regional development in terms of accessibility improvement and income generation.
3.3.3 The Emergence of Low Cost Airlines in Asia
Asia has a population of 3.8 billion people and the flying time between Asian cities is
within 3 to 4 hours. Harbison (2005) stated that the Asia-Pacific region had 235 cities
each with more than half a million people and only a tiny minority of these cities had
international air services, showing that the potential for growth is enormous. The first
countries to experience full deregulation of their markets were Australia and New
Zealand. The Australian market was a duopoly with Ansett and Qantas as the main
competitors while Impulse a smaller airline operated on Australia’s eastern seaboard
trunk routes with B717s. Low cost carrier Virgin Blue, an offshoot of the Virgin
group entered the market in mid 2000. A series of events then transpired that allowed
the carrier to grow rapidly in a short time. Ansett collapsed in September 2001 and
Anderson (2006) states that Ansett had 35 per cent of Australia’s domestic market
when it went into receivership. Around the same time Impulse was acquired by
Qantas and absorbed into the QantasLink group of subsidiary airlines. This opened
the market considerably with Forsyth (2003) claiming that Virgin Blue captured more
than 30% of the domestic market. In 2002, in response to low cost competition,
Qantas introduced its own low cost subsidiary Jetstar and it carried almost 6 million
passengers in 2005. Both airlines then began to look beyond their domestic markets.
Virgin Blue expanded its operations to New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu through a
separate Virgin subsidiary known as Pacific Blue, while Jetstar set up a hub in
Singapore and commenced short-haul operations to Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam,
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while at the same time launching a trans-Tasman service (ATI, April 2006). Kissling
(1998) stated that New Zealand was at the forefront of deregulation because a low
cost carrier called Kiwi Airlines had been operating on the Trans-Tasman as early as
1985. Air New Zealand responded by launching its own low cost subsidiary Freedom
Air. The excess competition between the incumbents and Freedom Air forced Kiwi
Airlines out of business (Wilson, 1996). Freedom Air expanded its fleet to 11 A320s
and operated on secondary routes between New Zealand and four Australian east
coast cities. It grew capacity by 54% and replaced Air New Zealand on the leisure
focused services linking Brisbane with Wellington and Christchurch (Centre of Asia
Pacific Aviation, July 2004).
Nonetheless, most of the Asian countries had deregulated their own domestic markets
and there were signs that the region was slowly beginning to integrate its fragmented
regulatory environment. Following Japanese deregulation in the 1990s, Skymark
started operations with six B767s, however it is transitioning to eleven B737-800s and
modelling itself more like Southwest. A second carrier called Air Do soon followed.
In the late 1990s, Japan Airlines set up a subsidiary called JAL Express, in response
to the rising competition from the domestic start-ups. It commenced operations and
served around a dozen domestic destinations using eight B737-400s. Moreover, and
as a result of deregulation and the institutional abolition of barriers to market entry
and exit, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission concluded in 2002 that ‘the
implementation of the proposed integration plan [between JAL and JAS] would not
constitute a substantial restraint of competition within the area of domestic air
transport services’ (JFTC, 2002).
Another Asian market that substantially grew its domestic market was Indonesia
where passenger numbers have grown from 6 million in 1998 to 30 million in 2006.
Lion Air, Indonesia’s largest low cost carrier has captured 30% of the domestic
market (Association of Asia Pacific Airlines, August 2006). Its pace of growth will
challenge all other carriers in the region as it ordered 60 B737-900ERs which will
allow it to connect intra-Asian cities up to 5 hours away (ATI, July 2006). Hooper
(2005) stated that there is plenty of potential for such additional capacity because
there are 3 cities within 5-hours flight time from Jakarta that contain more than 5
million people and up to 26 cities with such populations from Bangkok and 32 such
cities from Manila. In Malaysia, the highest profile low cost carrier emerged in late
2001 called Air Asia, with a mission to make flying affordable. It quickly established
hubs across Malaysia at Kuala Lumpur, Senai and Johor Bahru and by 2004 had 30%
of the domestic market (O’Connell and Williams 2005). It became highly innovative
in overcoming the region’s regulatory barriers as it pioneered a cross-border joint-
venture in Indonesia where it is operating out of three cities, namely Jakarta, Surabaya
and Bangdung. Similarly, it expanded to Thailand where 49% of its equity is owned
by the nation’s prime minister and serves the major Thai cities. By 2006, Air Asia had
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ordered 100 A320 aircraft and holds a further 30 options. Air Asia indicated that
further capacity could be added to its three markets (i.e. Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia). ATI (July 2006) quoted the airline as saying ‘All three markets are doing
very well and we potentially see that these markets are more than capable of taking
60-70 aircraft each.’ Thailand’s skies quickly became another competitive
battleground. The entry of Air Asia into Thailand’s already crowded domestic market
prompted Thai Airways International to form its own low-cost joint venture, Nok Air.
By 2004, Thailand’s low cost carriers had gained 16% of the domestic market (Tris
Rating Company 2004). Traffic growth at Bangkok airport had been growing at the
rate of around 21.3% year-on-year, however 2004/05 saw traffic surge to 179%
primarily because of the increasing number of low cost carriers serving the Thai
capital. There is a huge potential for growth within Thailand as only around seven
million people travelled by air in 2004 out of a population of 65 million, but forecasts
suggest that it will grow by 3 million passengers by 2005 (Bangkok Post 2004, cited
in Chong 2004). Table 14 below gives an outline of the demographics of the various
Asian countries, their changing regulatory environment and their potential for the
growth of low cost carriers. See O’Connell and Ionides (2004) for the list of low cost
carriers in Asia.
Table 14 Potential for low cost carriers in Asia (March 2005)
Country Population
(million)
GDP
per
Capita
(US$)
Regulatory
Barriers
to Entry
ASEAN
Flights *
%
(Hub Airport)
No of
LCCs
Potential for
LCC
emergence
and growth
Singapore 4.2 25,200 Low 36.2 3 High
Malaysia 23.5 8,800 Medium 60.3 1 High
Indonesia 238.5 3,100 High 82.3 3 Medium
Thailand 65.0 7,000 High/Medium 48.2 2 Medium
Philippines 86.5 4,600 High/Medium 59.1 1 Medium
Laos 6.2 1,800 High 92.6 - Low
Cambodia 13.3 1,600 High 87.1 - Low
Vietnam 83.2 2,300 High 58.8 - Low
Myanmar 43.0 1,700 High 94.2 - Low
India 1,100.0 3,300 High/Medium n/a >14 Medium/Low
Japan 127.5 31,500 Medium n/a 3 High
S. Korea 48.9 20,400 Medium n/a - Medium
Hong Kong 6.9 32,900 Low n/a - Medium
China 1,300.0 6,800 Medium/High n/a - Medium
Taiwan 20.3 25,300 Low n/a - Low
Australia 20.3 31,900 Low n/a 2 Saturated
New
Zealand
4.1 25,200 Low n/a 2 Saturated
Source: CIA World fact book, Forsyth et al (2004), Asian Development Bank (2004), ATI
*Note: ASEAN flights only include those countries that are affiliated to the chartered
agreement.
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There are countries within Asia such as the ASEAN members that have established a
joint-signatory on economic co-operation, which will reduce the barriers of aviation.
The benefits of such an agreement encouraged 3.1 million Malaysian residents, 2.4
million Indonesians and 1.8 million residents of Thailand to travel to other ASEAN
countries in 2001 (Hooper, 2005). Until late 2003, Asian based low cost carriers
operated within national boundaries but since then Air Asia has launched its first
international route from Kuala Lumpur to Phuket and Indonesia’s Lion Air has
commenced operations to Singapore. The rise of low cost carriers in the region occurs
against a background of an increasingly liberal attitude towards traffic rights. The
success of the low cost model is likely to accelerate the move towards the dismantling
of regulatory barriers as respective governments recognise the economic benefits of
deregulation. Around this time three low cost carriers converged upon Singapore to
take advantage of its liberalised aviation market. There was a gap in the market as
Singapore Airlines is unique in Asia being a predominantly long-haul airline with
only 7% of its revenues in 2003 coming from the short-haul sector (Singapore
Airlines 2004). The new entrants that sought to fill Singapore’s short-haul gap were
Tiger Airways40, ValueAir41 and Jetstar Asia42. These carriers were the first to
commence low cost intra-Asian routes. In May 2004, Valuair started operations to
Bangkok, followed by daily services to Hong Kong and Jakarta with Airbus A320s
leased from Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprises (Chong, 2004). Later in 2004,
Tiger also commenced international services and in 2006 it began serving China. By
Christmas of that same year, Jetstar Asia entered the Singapore market, immediately
pitting it against other new entrants Thai AirAsia and Valuair. It began flights to
Hong Kong, Taipei and Manila. Because of the extra capacity and competition, traffic
on the Singapore-Bangkok route has increased by 60% since 2000, while average
fares have fallen by two-thirds (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, February 2006). By
early 2005, low cost airlines accounted for over 7% of all passengers at Singapore’s
Changi Airport.
In India, O’Connell and Williams (2006) stated that up to 14 Low Cost Carriers were
preparing to launch services in 2005, with another 5–6 in the planning stage in 2006.
That is more than the total complement of such airlines operating in the whole of the
Asia Pacific region and the Middle East in 2004. These start-up carriers have
commitments for over 130 aircraft. There are around 5 million new air travellers in
India every year, which will take the total number of air travellers to around 50
million by 2010. By mid-2005, India’s only low cost carrier, Air Deccan had captured
10% of the domestic market, serving 32 destinations and operating close to 100 flights
daily. Meanwhile, the first low cost carrier in China called Spring Airlines
40 49% owned by main carrier Singapore Airlines, 24% by Indigo, 16% by Irelandia Investments and
11% by Temasek Holdings.
41 Headed by former Singapore Airlines Chairman Lim Chin Beng, funded by Asiatravel.com and
private investors.
42 49% owned by Qantas and 19% by Temasek Holdings and the remainder by 2 private investors.
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commenced services from Shanghai in mid July 2005, signalling that Asia’s biggest
market was quickly incorporating the new airline business model.
Low cost carriers are causing capacity to increase significantly in the Asia Pacific
region with OAG (April 2006) pointing out that the region’s airlines operated nearly
460,000 flights in April 2006 within the Asia-Pacific rim, which is nearly 95,000
more than they scheduled back in April 2003. The Centre of Asia Pacific Aviation
(2006) gave the breakdown of Asia’s low cost carrier activity for 2005/06 and it
indicated that the region’s low cost seat capacity rose by 63% over the previous year
with an additional 17,000 services operated. The low cost carriers have increased their
market share by 4% and they accounted for 10% of the region’s total capacity in
2006. Asia is becoming a two speed market, with high growth rates for low cost
carriers and slow growth with regard to full service airlines. Even though the region
had an immature low cost carrier market compared to the United States and Europe, it
is responding to the high growth rate and building low cost terminals. Kuala Lumpur
opened their facility in March 2006, while Singapore’s Changi opened a similar
facility a week later at a cost of $29 million and $27 million respectively. Jakarta’s
Soekarno-Hatta airport and Bangkok also announced that they too would construct
such terminals. Indonesia’s commitment in furthering its air transport market is
reflected in its historic landmark when Lion Airlines signed a 25-year agreement with
Indonesia's Government to manage Jakarta's secondary Halim Perdanakusuma
Airport. Tiger has indicated that the new low cost terminal at Changi has reduced its
ground costs by 60% as the carrier has eliminated the use of air bridges to board
passengers, saving it $625,000 per year (ATI, April 2006).
Two major prerequisites for the growth and proliferation of low cost carriers are the
availability of secondary airports and internet access. Internet penetration is well
developed in certain strong economies such as Japan and Korean. In Malaysia, Air
Asia has pushed its distribution strategy by offering low fares through its website
enticing its passengers to use the Internet. A survey conducted by O’Connell and
Williams (2005) on Air Asia’s passengers discovered that almost 74% booked online
while Table 15 below shows that over 42% of Malaysia’s residents now have internet
access. This establishes that potential customers who wish to book a ticket on low fare
carriers are willing to source out all available options in order to access cheap travel.
Research has indicated that there is a multitude of secondary airports especially within
Asia, contrary to what many authors such as Lawton, Hooper and Forsyth have
opinionated. Table 15 below outlines all the airports that have paved runways
exceeding 1,600 metres. As a comparison, Ryanair operates a daily service with a
Boeing 737-800 to Derry airport in Northern Ireland whose runway length is 1,672
metres in length. In the Asia Pacific region alone there are 316 airports whose runway
lengths exceed 1,600 metres, while there are 248 airports whose runway lengths
exceed 2000 metres. In addition, Australia and New Zealand have 188 smaller
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airports with runway lengths of more than 1,600 metres as well as 91 larger sized
airfields.
Table 15 Asia’s Airport and Internet infrastructure (2005)
Internet Runway Internet Runway
North Asia Penetration
%
1,600
m+
2000
m+
West Asia Penetration
%
1600
m+
2000
m+
S. Korea 67.1 7 6 Bangladesh 0.01 7 5
Japan 67.7 60 53 India 4.7 61 137
Taiwan Unknown 7 7 Pakistan 4.5 34 15
China 8.5 104 90 Sri Lanka 1.3 3 2
Hong Kong/
Macau
70.1 2 2
South East
Asia
Australasia
Vietnam 4.2 12 9 Australia 68.7 81 35
Laos 0.2 2 1 New Zealand 80.2 8 7
Cambodia 0.2 2 2
Philippines 9.2 28 16
Myanmar 0.1 10 4
Thailand 12.9 25 20
Malaysia 42.3 16 11
Singapore 57.2 3 2
Indonesia 7.8 38 25
Source: CIA fact book, International Telecommunication Union, Centre of Asia Pacific
Aviation and ATI
3.4 Concluding comments
Airline deregulation has already a history of thirty years in the US. Elsewhere
however, the process of liberalisation has been slow, or has only recently been
initiated. In any case, the gales of laissez-faire are blowing strongly with no sign of
reversion at present. This changing business environment in civil aviation has been
marked by the birth and gradual empowerment of low cost carriers. Had the countries
not liberalised their markets, low cost carriers would not have proliferated and
certainly would not have gained so much market share in such a short period of time.
These carriers have caused a paradigm shift in the traditional marketplace. Their entry
causes a two-fold effect; firstly, a market diversion effect where air travellers switch
from high-fare established route carriers to take advantage of lower fares; and
secondly, a market creation effect, where low prices induce more travellers into using
air transportation either for the first time and/or instead of using other modes,
especially in the short-haul markets. The growth rate of low cost carrier traffic has
reformed the competitive dynamics within the air transport industry, primarily
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because passengers have been induced by lower fares. However, Asia which forms
the world’s most populated continent is witnessing pockets of excessive growth while
other areas are constricted due to the regulatory barriers that are restraining their
development. Some Asian low cost carriers have already begun to circumnavigate the
regulatory obstacles and have created franchises which are proving to be very
successful. India’s fast track reforms have completely metamorphosed (in a very short
timeframe) the regulatory landscape of a country that had a bureaucratic and archaic
structure, subsequently experiencing high traffic growth and boosting economic
development. Many organisations envision that Asia will benchmark the step-stone
approach that was used in Europe as a way forward for introducing deregulation into
Asia.
The low cost carriers have revolutionised the way of doing business in aviation by
adopting a fresh approach on both strategic and operational issues. An increasing
worry facing the incumbents is that the low cost carriers have capitalised on their
achievements and have ordered the majority of the narrow body aircraft from the
manufacturers. Thus they have secured most of the interim production slots forcing
the incumbents to order later into the financial cycle which has two major
repercussions; firstly aircraft prices are very high as the financial cycle is peaking and
secondly they run the risk that the arriving aircraft may join the airline during a
downcycle, which would cause an adverse effect financially and would certainly
widen the divide between the incumbent and low cost carrier.
This chapter highlighted the necessary link between airline deregulation and low cost
carrier growth and provided statistics to show the meteoric rise of the latter within a
very short period of time. The next chapter complements this analysis by examining
the core issue, i.e. why low cost carriers have been successful and what makes them
fundamentally different from the traditional airlines.
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4 Chapter 4: Challenges posed by Low Cost
Carriers
Traditional industries are changing: DVDs have replaced videos and flat screens
have made cathode ray tubes obsolete; likewise, low cost (or no-frills) carriers have
re-engineered the design of the traditional airline business model and captured
significant chunks of the air transport market worldwide. This chapter is divided
into three parts: the first part (section 4.1) briefly describes the prolific growth of
low cost carriers worldwide; the second part (sections 4.2 – 4.4) examines in detail
the main problems that the low cost carriers are causing for the full service airlines in
Europe, US and Asian markets, and how conditions vary within each continent; and
the last part (section 4.5) analyses the core differences between low cost carriers and
full service airlines in the context of product features and operating margins, legacy
costs and cost structure, network structure, and ancillary revenues.
4.1 The growth of low cost carriers worldwide
Low cost carriers have experienced a substantial rise in their seat capacity since
2001, as shown in Figure 16. By March 2006 they had secured 8% of the intra-Asian
market, and 23% and 27% of the intra-European and US domestic markets
respectively. In other parts of the world low cost carriers have also being growing
quickly as Gol gained 25% of the Brazilian market, Air Deccan claimed 10% in
India, Virgin Blue acquired 30% in Australia, while Air Arabia had taken 6% of the
Intra Gulf market by 2006. OAG (December, 2006) calculated that the total number
of low cost carrier seats worldwide was up by 16% over the year 2005/06 and there
appears to be no stopping the continuous growth, year after year, of these budget
carriers.
There has been a paradigm shift in the airline business since the start of the new
millennium, as low cost carriers have won the favour of investors and have altered
the strategic thinking of airline directors worldwide. The big market that low cost
carriers are now beginning to penetrate is Asia, as deregulation is slowly changing
the outdated bilateral rules, thus allowing carriers to operate independent of any
regulatory rules. In the US there were two waves of low cost carriers - the first group
comprised of 34 budget carriers and, by 1996, all these carriers, with the exception of
Southwest, had either been acquired by other airlines or gone out of business
(Aviation Systems Research Corporation, 1996). The second wave of low cost
carriers were different as they had learnt from the failings of the earlier carriers and
had anticipated the problems facing them as they entered service. These included
Frontier, AirTran (in its present form) and JetBlue, which were established in 1994,
1997 and 2000 respectively. Southwest, Air Tran and Jetblue had around 16.3%,
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2.1% and 2.3% respectively of the US domestic market (seat capacity) by 2005,
while the remaining budget carriers had around 4.8% (US DOT DB1A Database,
2006). The overall global air transport market grew by 2% in 2005, with low cost
carriers are now becoming a major component of the air transport business
environment - OAG stated that the low cost carriers accounted for 17% of all seat
sales and 15% of all flights across the world in 2006 (DG TREN, 2006).
Figure 16. The growth of low cost carriers in Asia, Europe and the US (in terms
of seat capacity).
Source: OAG (March, 2006)
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4.2 Problems that low cost carriers are causing incumbents
in European markets
Presently, in Europe there are 150 airlines that transport over 2 million passengers
every day (Burstrom et al. 2006). Debus (2005) pointed out that there were just two
low cost carriers in Europe in 1996 operating to 18 airports, carrying 2 million
passengers with just 35 aircraft. However, by 2005 the landscape had completely
changed as there were now 35+ low cost carriers operating to 233 airports (i.e. 50%
of all European airports), carrying around 100 million passengers with 439 aircraft.
In addition, over 50% of all low cost carrier routes that were operating by 2005 had
been started in the previous two years (Anra Consulting, 2005) and they are now the
main drivers of aviation growth according to figures from OAG. The capacity of
budget carriers has doubled in the last four years from 22 million seats on 169,000
flights in September 2002 to 46 million seats on 323,000 flights by September 2006
(DG TREN, 2006). Gillen and Lall (2004) have long argued that low cost carriers
lead to a permanent increase in traffic.
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4.2.1 Penetration and growth of low cost carriers in Europe
In 1997, around 77% of all intra-European routes were serviced by either one or two
full service airlines, and the charter airlines largely controlled the remaining market -
the low cost carriers had an insignificant presence (CAA, 1998). However, by 2005
the landscape had completely changed as the average European low cost carrier
penetration had grown to around 24%: the UK43 had become Europe’s largest low
cost carrier market as 46% of all its intra-European seats were on budget carriers,
followed by Ireland at 41% (as shown below in Figure 17). The British Isles have the
highest concentration of low cost carriers because it is home to both Ryanair and
EasyJet, who have multiple hubs positioned there - these two carriers accounted for
around 50% of the low cost seat capacity in the European market in 2005. In the UK
domestic market 50% is now served by low cost carriers (CAA, 2006). This is a
worrying prospect for the flag carriers of countries such as Italy, Spain and France,
which similarly have a large number of passengers taking domestic flights. Evidence
from the UK suggests that these domestic markets may become dominated by the
budget carriers, despite the fact that incumbents in their home markets have the
strongest presence and brand strength. McKinsey Consulting, sourced in European
Cockpit Association (2006), estimated that the intra-European market of the full
service network carriers and charter airlines had fallen to 66% and 18% respectively
by 2004.
Figure 17. Penetration of Low Cost Carriers in Europe (2005)
Source: Official Airline Guide (2005)
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43 The low cost carriers serving the UK market carried 77.5 million passengers in 2005 (51.3 million
travelled internationally, while 26.2 million took domestic services).
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Low cost carriers are attracting passengers from two primary areas: firstly, they are
attracting passengers who otherwise would not have travelled or who would have
used other surface means, such as car, rail or ferry; secondly, passengers are shifting
from the network airlines to the low cost carriers, and this is severely threatening the
future short-haul market of the traditional full service airlines. In its 2000 air traffic
forecasts for the UK, the Department of the Environment Transport and Regions
(DETR) made the assumption that 30% of the passengers carried by the no-frills
carriers would be diverted from existing airlines and that the remainder would be
stimulated traffic (DETR, 2000). Data from Hapag-Lloyd Express (2004, p30)
indicated that 59% of passengers travelling on budget carriers were new
passengers44, while a further 37% were switching from the network airlines to the
budget carriers. A similar study, conducted in 2002 by the European Low Fares
Airline Association (ELFAA), confirmed the Hapag-Lloyd study and concluded that
approximately 60% of the traffic was stimulated, while the remaining 40% was
substitute traffic (ELFAA, 2002; CAA, 2006). Analysis by the Boston Consulting
Group (2004) revealed that that the low cost carriers have taken up to 60% of the
passenger growth from the legacy airlines, which explains why these carriers have
experienced such low annual passenger growth year after year. There is little doubt
that the growth in low cost travel is the result of an innovative model that has
successfully reduced air fares to a point where they are often cheaper than surface
transport (Doganis, 2001; Caves and Gosling, 1999; Barrett, 2000).
The interplay between Europe’s low cost carriers and full service airlines is shown
below in Figure 18 and Figure 19. Passenger traffic on the London to Barcelona
route has increased five-fold from 1995 to 2005, as shown in Figure 18. The
incumbents have increased the traffic on the route gradually by adding more
frequencies from both Heathrow and Gatwick. However, the growth of the low cost
carriers is substantial. easyJet entered the market in late 1995 followed by Ryanair in
late 2002, which connected London Luton and Stansted to the nearby towns of Reus
and Girona, and both budget carriers supplied seats at lower fares than British
Airways and Iberia. These low cost carriers suppressed the growth of the incumbents
- surprising because British Airways and Iberia collaborated extensively as they were
both members of the Oneworld alliance. Figure 19 (below) shows that Aer Lingus
was the only incumbent on the Dublin to Edinburgh market, and traffic grew on the
route seven-fold from 1986 to 2000. Go (British Airway’s low cost subsidiary),
however, entered the market in 2000 followed one month later by Ryanair. The
ensuing competition between the incumbent and the two no-frills entrants provided
an enormous boost to traffic, which more than doubled within 18 months. A fare war
between the carriers subsequently emerged as Ryanair dropped their fares to £29
return, while Go charged £50 and Aer Lingus’ fares were the highest (Kemp, 2003,
44 These new passengers are comprised of the following: 71% would otherwise not have travelled; 15%
would have travelled by car; 6% would have travelled by rail; 8% others.
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p260). Subsequently, Go withdrew and many of Aer Lingus’ passengers switched to
Ryanair, and by 2005 the incumbent had 59% fewer passengers than it had six years
earlier.
Figure 18. Number of passengers on the
London to Barcelona route (1995 – 2005)
Figure 19. Number of passengers on the
Dublin to Edinburgh route (1996 to 2005)
Source: CAA
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Analysis from CAA data in 2005 showed that the low cost carriers are now a
dominant force on almost all the London – intra European markets, as outlined
below in Table 16. This sets a precedent for what could happen at other European
capitals as budget carriers set up hubs across the EU member states. In the London to
Italy market, the budget carriers are beginning to take advantage of Alitalia’s weak
financial position45: Ryanair, for example, has created hubs at Rome Ciampino,
Milan Bergamo and Pisa, while easyJet has a base at Milan Malpensa. By 2005, low
cost carriers had captured over half of the 12 densest routes between London and
Italy causing Alitalia to retract, and it now only flies between two points in Italy (i.e.
Rome and Milan) to London (Doganis, 2005). In addition, the table below shows that
the budget carriers have gained over 50% of the traffic between London and the
cities of Barcelona and Berlin.
Table 16 Market shares of low cost and network airlines from London to various
European cities (December 2004)
London to: Low Cost Airline Incumbent
Rome Ryanair (35%) easyJet (10%) British Airways (29%), Alitalia (26%)
Milan Ryanair (30%), easyJet (8%) British Airways (37%), Alitalia (25%)
Hamburg Ryanair (37%) British Airways (39%), Lufthansa (24%)
Barcelona Ryanair (27%), easyJet (32%) British Airways (27%), Iberia (13%)
Berlin Ryanair (34%), DBA (4%),Air Berlin (16%) British Airways (45%)
Source: UK CAA
45 Alitalia has had 7 years of consecutive losses and a net debt of €2.6 billion by the end of its financial
year in 2006. It also has had an annual decline of 0.6% in its RPKs from 2000 to 2005.
82
In Ireland, Barrett (2004) stated that Ryanair had displaced Aer Lingus as the
dominant carrier, and that it was transporting 50% of the Dublin-London traffic, 45%
of the Dublin-Manchester passengers and 34% of the Dublin-Paris market by 2004.
This effect forced Aer Lingus to restructure its business model into a low cost carrier
as it was very dependent on its short-haul operations. It implemented the following
changes: trimmed its workforce by one-third, reduced distribution costs, enhanced
productivity, standardised its fleet and eliminated most of its traditional frills,
including phasing out its short-haul business class service. See Chapter 5 for a
detailed account of Aer Lingus’ response to the Ryanair threat. Similarly, in the UK,
British Airways was also experiencing major difficulties when confronted by low
cost carriers in its short-haul markets - because these operations consistently
produced losses: British Airways lost around £165 million in 1999 on its short-haul
European routes; the following year this doubled to £315 million; and from 2001 to
2004 it lost an additional £600 million (BA Reports & Accounts: 2000-01; 2001-02;
2002-03; 2003-04). It was losing both high-yield business passengers and leisure
travellers to the budget carriers. In 1999, BA controlled around one-third of the UK
market (i.e. inbound, outbound and domestic), while Ryanair and easyJet had around
9%. However, the situation changed dramatically by late 2004 as Ryanair and
EasyJet had accumulated around 34% of this market, while British Airways’ share
had fallen to around 22% (Sentance, 2004). British Airways, however, is not
dependent on it short-haul network like other carriers, such as SAS, BMI, etc.,
because it derives the bulk of its profits from its North Atlantic operations (the
region accounted for £1.5 billion of its operating profits from 2000/01 to 2004/05)
while other long-haul markets, such as Africa, Middle East and India, contributed an
extra £785 million over the same period.
Figure 20. European carriers net profit by region 2000 - 2005
Source: AEA, AEA Market Research Quarterly (2005) and Operating Economy of AEA Airlines 2006, 2005
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Figure 20 (above) shows the net profit of the AEA member airlines from 2000 to 2005.
It shows that Europe’s flag carriers have derived most of their profits from the North
Atlantic and the African continent. However, the continuous losses on the intra-
European routes are alarming as they lost a total of US$6.3 billion from 2000 to 2005,
while the North Atlantic markets made net profits of around US$3.2 billion over the
same period. However, the AEA members were able to reduce the losses on the
European market, which declined from US$1.5 billion in 2004 to US$0.7 billion in
2005, as they began to directly challenge the budget carriers (Operating economy of
AEA airlines, 2004, 2005; AEA Market Research Quarterly, 2005).
The majority of European network airlines (with the exception of Luxair) have both
short-haul and long-haul operations. However, some carriers have a far greater
proportion of their network deployed on short-haul sectors and are therefore highly
exposed to low cost carriers. Figure 21 (below) shows that almost all of the British
Midlands network (96%) is exposed, while other incumbents, such as Finnair, SAS
and Aer Lingus, also have a large proportion of their short-haul capacity in
competition with budget carriers (Avery 2004). Subsequently, these incumbents
generate a sizable proportion of their revenues from their short-haul operations, as
shown below in Figure 22. Airlines such as SAS and Finnair, derive over 80% of
their revenues from short-haul operations, while Iberia and Aer Lingus generate over
60%. Thus, it is paramount that these carriers remain competitive as they are highly
exposed to the low cost carrier threat, and they must react aggressively in order to
sustain their market share, at least in their home territory.
Figure 21. The short-haul exposure of the
European network (2004)
Figure 22. The percentage of total
revenues that the short-haul network
produced for European Airlines (2004)
Source: Company Reports and Avery (2004)
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4.2.2 The loss of the Incumbents’ business passengers
Mason (2005) found that 65% of short-haul business travellers took their journeys in
premium cabins in the early 1990s. These business tickets had few restrictions
attached, allowing carriers to charge premium rates. However, the yield of intra-
European passengers travelling on AEA member airlines fell by 41% from 1991 to
2003 as low cost carriers infiltrated markets that were once dominated by full service
carriers, and business passengers began switching to budget carriers. Mason (2001)
established that this was now a major threat for incumbents as almost 50% of
passengers who were travelling on full service had used a low cost carrier in the
previous year. A survey by Barclaycard46 in 2002 confirmed Mason’s research as it
also found that half of its respondents had travelled on low cost carriers, and three-
quarters of those cited that low fares triggered their decision to switch to a budget
carrier for their short-haul trip. The Barclaycard survey also pointed out that 63% of
those business travellers who did not travel with a low cost carrier would consider
doing so in the future (Barclaycard 2002/03). American Express (2005) found in
their survey that 30% of business travellers now ranked price as their number one
concern when purchasing air travel. Mason (2005) also stated that a survey of US
and UK business travellers indicated that they are increasingly using cheaper carriers
as an alternative for short haul travel. Both Tarry (2004) and Alamdari (June 2005)
confirmed that the number of European business passengers who were travelling on
full service airlines was declining. They found that British Midland had witnessed a
three fold reduction in the number of business passengers from 2001 to 2003, while
the numbers were halved at SAS and KLM over the same period. The average
number of business-class passengers travelling on the 24 member AEA carriers
dropped from 17.1% in 2001 to 12.1% in 2003. British Airways and Iberia had
contemplated removing business class altogether from their short-haul fleet, which
indicates the seriousness of the problem facing incumbents; such a decision,
however, may significantly impact the incumbents’ revenues.
4.2.3 The differences in fares between network and low cost carriers
A major problem facing the network carriers is the difference in air fares between
themselves and the low cost carriers. Lawton (2002) pointed out that the average
fares of the no-frills carriers were some 40-60% lower than their full service
counterparts. To determine the fare difference between low cost carriers and
incumbents, a series of fares were collected over a 3-month period47 in 2002/03,
46 Barclaycard questioned 2,500 corporate card holders who were in the following positions; CEOs,
company directors, managers and executives.
47 The fares were collected every Friday on the following dates:
1). Friday 13th December 2002 to Friday 28th March 2003
2). Friday 12th December 2003 to Friday 27th March 2004
3). Friday 10th December 2004 to Friday 25th March 2005
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2003/04 and 2004/05, and are shown in Appendix II. In particular, Table 1 in
Appendix II shows a collection of fares (weekend return) that were taken from the
websites of Aer Lingus and Ryanair, who were operating between London Gatwick
and Dublin. The data for 2002/03 show a 38% difference between the fares of the
budget carrier and the incumbent three months prior to departure, and a 49%
difference on the day of departure. However, the fare of the incumbent increased
sharply two weeks prior to the departure, by 91%, because the increase captures
business passengers who usually book close to departure and penalises leisure
passengers for inadequate forward planning. By 2003/04, the fare data show that Aer
Lingus had responded to Ryanair’s challenge on the Dublin to London Gatwick
route, as 3 months prior to departure the fare differential was around 14% and by the
day of departure the difference between the carriers was around 28%. The carrier
was now operating A320s, having used BAE 146s in the previous year, and the
lower unit costs of the Airbus assisted the incumbent in offering a more competitive
fare. However, Aer Lingus had withdrawn from the London Gatwick to Dublin
market by 2004/05 and subsequently Ryanair increased its fares significantly
because of the reduced competition. Barrett (2004) cited that Ryanair’s average fare
had fallen to €52 in 2001/2, €46 in 2002/3, €40 in 2003/4 and added that the carrier
had attracted an extra 12 million passengers during the time when its average fares
were reduced by 23%. Part of the Ryanair strategy for market stimulation is to give
away free tickets: in 2004 it gave away about a quarter of its seats through numerous
promotions, and the carrier speculated that it could give away up 50% in future years
if its ancillary revenues, such as in-flight gaming, proved successful (The
Independent, 2005; USA Today, 2005). This places enormous pressure on Europe’s
incumbents, whose operating costs could not justify an attempt to match the fare
levels of Ryanair, and who could not sustain operations by giving away free seats.
Table 2 in Appendix II shows the difference in fares (weekend return) for British
Airways and EasyJet, operating between London Gatwick and Barcelona using
Boeing 737 aircraft. The data for 2002/03 show that there was a 34% difference
between the fares of the budget carrier and the incumbent three months prior to
departure and a 92% difference on the day of departure. By 2003/04, there was a
28% difference between the fares of the budget carrier and the incumbent three
months prior to departure and a 64% difference on the day of departure. By 2004/05
the overall fares on the route had reduced and the British Airways’ 2005 fare from
London Gatwick to Barcelona was now replicating easyJet’s fare three years earlier.
Nonetheless, easyJet’s overall fare had further reduced, and the fare difference
between both carriers in 2004/05 was 28% three months prior to departure and the
difference on the day of departure had narrowed to 33%. Pels and Rietveld (2004)
studied fares between the network and budget carriers on the London – Paris route in
2002 and found that British Airways would only reduce its fares due to low levels of
forward bookings. This indicated that the incumbent had not responded aggressively
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in counterattacking the threat posed by the budget carriers, and had allowed them to
strengthen their market share by not adequately responding through fare promotions.
Table 3 in Appendix II shows the difference in fares (one-day return trip –
travelling on a Monday) between several carriers that operate on the London to
Glasgow route. The fares were collected over an eight-week period48 for the years
2003, 2004 and 2005. This would represent a typical business trip where an
executive would take the earliest flight out in the morning and return later that
evening. Most business people book their flights close to departure, and the average
fare difference between the low cost carriers and the incumbents was four-fold one-
day prior to departure in 2003. Foster (2003) studied the fares between London and
Amsterdam for British Airways and easyJet in 2003 and found that the fare
differential was eight-fold between the two carriers one-day prior to departure. Many
business passengers are tied to corporate contracts which stipulate that they must use
that particular carrier for travel, despite the fact that the fare is often much higher
than a budget carrier. The fare data for 2004 and 2005 show that the fare difference
between Ryanair and the incumbent carriers is four-fold while the difference
between easyJet and the network carriers is three-fold, indicating that Ryanair is
maintaining a lower cost base, thus passing on these savings to its customers in the
form of even lower fares - in this way, it mounts further pressure on incumbents.
4.2.4 The difference in aircraft orders between incumbent and low
cost carriers
The number of aircraft ordered by the European low cost carriers is also threatening,
as seen below in Table 17. The four leading low cost carriers has over 330 narrow-
body aircraft on firm order by March 2005, which is more than twelve-times the
combined backlog of the traditional network carriers, and only British Airways has
any significant short-haul aircraft commitment with 129 A319s on option. The
budget carriers have also filled up the production slots at Boeing and Airbus over the
next couple of years - this will provide the necessary capacity for these carriers to
expand, while at the same time constraining the growth of the incumbent airlines and
forcing them to order later into the economic cycle and ever closer to an economic
downturn. If all the low cost carriers’ options are exercised, they will catch up with
the European incumbents, in terms of fleet size, by the end of the decade. These
incoming aircraft will facilitate continued passenger growth, and a study of 13
European countries revealed that there were 431 airports, of which the majority were
underutilised because the national flag carriers had concentrated their networks on
48 The fares were collected every Friday on the following dates:
1) January 26th to 16th March 2003
2) January 25th to 14th March 2004
3) January 30th to 20th March 2005
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hub airports (Fewings, 1999). The low cost carriers have taken advantage of
deregulation and have expanded across Europe by establishing hubs, while
incumbents have remained concentrated within the borders of their own countries.
Consequently, budget carriers such as easyJet, will utilise the capacity of the newly
arriving aircraft on the following: ‘joining the dots49’ (41%), increasing the
frequency (16%) and by developing new routes (41%) (Vandermoere, 2005).
Ryanair is aiming to have around 35 airport bases by 2012 with each base averaging
around 10-11 aircraft (Aviation Strategy, March 2005). By the end of 2005, only Air
France-KLM, Lufthansa and British Airways had carried more passengers50 than
Ryanair and easyJet, but the two are quickly catching up. Overall, this indicates that
incumbents are facing one of their most difficult challenges ever and solutions need
be found urgently in order to curtail the threat.
Table 17. European Narrowbody fleet (March 2005)
Leading
LCCs
Current
fleet
Firm
orders
Options Leading Euro-
Majors
Current
fleet
Firm
orders
Options
easyJet 89 94 120 Air France /KLM 191 8 11
Ryanair 79 157 190 Lufthansa 132 - -
Air Berlin 44 60 42 British Airways 101 7 129
SkyEurope 11 21 11 Iberia 112 5 24
Alitalia 121 - -
SAS 119 6 -
Total orders
leading LCCs
223 332 363 Total orders
leading Majors
776 26 164
Source: Aviation Strategy (March 2005) and SkyEurope
4.3 Problems that low cost carriers are causing incumbents
in US markets
The US is the world’s largest air transport market and, in 2005, the Air Transport
Association51 (ATA) members carried around 738 million passengers, up 18% from
2001. The last year that the US majors had reported a net profit ($2.5 billion) was in
2000 and a lot has changed since then, as they faced multiple problems including:
9/11 terrorist attacks, the sudden decline of the dot.com industry (critical component
of their business class passenger revenues52), high operating unit costs, increasing
49 easyJet will begin to operate from its European mainland hubs to its other hubs e.g. Madrid to Rome,
Paris to Barcelona, Milan to Athens, etc.
50 By the end the financial year 2005 Air France-KLM carried 70 million passengers while Lufthansa
and British Airways carried 51.2 and 35.6 respectively. In contrast Ryanair and easyJet carried 34.5
and 29.6 million respectively for the same year.
51 In 2005, the ATA members comprised of 20 Majors (airlines that generate more than $1 billion in
revenues each year); 33 national (airlines that generate between $100 million and 1 billion each year);
31 regionals (airlines that generate less than $100 million each year) and 55 commuters (airlines with
aircraft that carry 60 or fewer seats) (ATA, 2006)
52 IBM for example spent nearly US$340 million on domestic U.S. air travel in 2001 (IBM, 2003).
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debt53, falling yields54 and the threat posed by the low cost carriers which were
increasingly encroaching on their domestic markets. In addition, there was an over
capacity in the market as the Legacy carriers added 750 mainline and 575 regional
jets in the late 1990s, adding to their financial problems. Subsequently, from 2001 to
2005 they posted net losses of almost $35 billion55 (ATA 2006). By early 2005, 41%
of the US domestic seat capacity was provided by airlines in bankruptcy protection.
4.3.1 Growth and Penetration of low cost carriers in the US
In 1994 low cost carriers only had around 8% of the US domestic market -
Southwest was the dominant competitor. Gittell (2003, p7) stated that Southwest has
grown at a steady rate of between 10-15% per annum, has an unbroken string of 34
consecutive years (to 2006) of profitability, and that it was unaffected by the
negative shocks that rippled through the industry56. In a Department of Transport
study cited by Lawton (2002, p143), the total number of passengers in US markets
with low fare airlines tripled, while the number of passengers without access to low
fare carriers fell. By the mid 1990s, almost 40 percent of passengers within the US
were flying in markets where a low fare competitor existed, compared with less than
15 percent in 1988. This phenomenon is now commonly known as the ‘Southwest
effect’ and it is characteristic with an increase in enplanements and a decrease in
average fares from a particular community after service is inaugurated by a low cost
carrier (Windle and Dresner, 1995; Windle et al., 1996; Southwest Airlines 1999).
Lee (2003) gives a view of the rapid growth of the low cost carriers in comparison to
the Majors (in terms of the top 1000 airport pairs served in the US domestic market).
Analysis from the Department of Transport’s DB1A Database revealed that
Southwest, Air Tran and Frontier had increased their number of airport-pairs in the
top 1000 US markets by 40%, 568% and 320% respectively between 1995 and 2000.
Subsequently, Majors such as American, Delta, United and Northwest had
increased/decreased theirs by -17.4%, 8.8%, 14.7% 4.3% respectively over an
eleven-year period from 1990 to 2000, demonstrating the speed at which these low
cost carriers were infiltrating the most important US markets. Thretheway (2004)
explained that, at the start of the new millennium, low cost carriers had operated 688
aircraft out of a total of 5570 US registered aircraft (12.3%), provided capacity of
53 By late 2005 the US Air Transport Association stated that US airlines accumulated approximately
$100 billion in debt, up 41% since 2000. American Airlines for example repaid $957 million in 2005 to
service its debt, which represented 5% of sales (Air Transport World, July 2006 p30).
54 The yield of Legacy carriers in the US fell by around 17% from 2000 to 2004. United Airlines for
example reported that the proportion of its domestic revenues from its premium passengers (business
class and unrestricted economy) fell from 41.0% in 1999 to 19.8% in 2003 (GAO-05-834T; US DOT
DB1A database).
55 ATA member airlines lost $8.2 billion in 2001; $11 billion in 2002; $2.3 billon in 2003; $7.6 billion
in 2004 and $5.6 billion in 2005.
56 During 2001, arguably one of the worst years in United States aviation history, Southwest remained
profitable, earning $511.1 million on revenues of $5.55 billion.
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106 billion available seat miles (ASMs) versus 999 billion for all carriers (10.6%),
and earned US$12.5 billion (9.1%) of the total US$138 billion in system wide
revenues. By 2001 Southwest’s market share had risen to 15.7%, placing it slightly
above Delta (15.1%) and making it the industry’s largest carrier in terms of O&D
passengers (Lee, 2003). Aviation Strategy’s (June 2004) research showed that
between 1998 and 2003 Southwest’s domestic capacity (ASM) share rose from 7.7%
to 11.5%, while the legacy carriers’ ASM share fell from 83.3% to 74.1%.
In recent years Southwest has further pressurised the Majors by entering primary
airports, such as Dulles (United hub), Denver (United hub), Pittsburg (US Airways
hub) and Philadelphia (US Airways hub), and is moving back to San Francisco
(United hub) - all this proving challenging for the Majors because Southwest enters a
market with the aim of dominating that market (Gittell, 2003). This is clearly evident
from when Southwest entered Pittsburgh (US Airways hub) in early 2005 as it
captured 12% of the airport’s market within a year, causing US Airways market
share to decline by 19% (ATI, July 2006). By 2005, Southwest controlled 70% of the
intra-Texas and intra-California markets, and had a 65% share in its top 100 O&D
markets (Southwest Annual Report 2005): it was a dominant and financially strong
carrier as its market capitalisation in 2005 was equal to British Airways, Air France
and Lufthansa combined (finance.yahoo.com). By 2006 it was carrying almost 84
million travellers, up 32% from 2002, with 473 aircraft and was carrying more
domestic passengers than any of the other majors. In addition, AirTran, which is the
seventh-largest US airline by market value, has also been consistently profitable over
the last several years and has increased its share of the local origin-demand market in
Atlanta57 (home of Delta) from 9.9% in 1998 to 14.1% in 2004, and it has challenged
every route that Delta operates (US DOT Form 41). It quickly replaced US Airways
at Baltimore/Washington after the incumbent withdrew from that market. By 2006, it
was carrying 20 million passengers, twice the number compared to four years earlier
with 127 aircraft, and had around 2.5% of the US domestic market.
In 2000 JetBlue entered the US market and was one of the best-funded start-up
airlines in US history with an initial capitalisation of $130 million. Within seven
years of operation, it was carrying 18.5 million passengers, attracted by its unique
features such as its Live TV58, 32”seat pitch, new aircraft, wide overhead bins,
frequent flyer program, etc. In addition, it positioned itself at New York59, which did
not have an established low cost carrier. Moreover, JFK was not slot constrained,
57 Low cost carriers market presence at various hubs across the US for 2002 are listed as follows:
Chicago, 31.1%; Miami, 27.0; Houston, 32.3%; Detroit 17.9%; Memphis 6.7; Denver 18.5%; San
Francisco 35.9; Washington DC 23.5%; Philadelphia 8.2%; Pittsburg 6.3% (US DOT DB1A
DATABASE 1990-2002)
58 JetBlue purchased the Live TV service in 2002 for US$ 82 million (Wynbrandt, 2004).
59 There are 18 million people in the New York metropolitan area and the airline was awarded 75 slots
at JFK to be phased in over three years.
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which allowed the carrier ample room to expand. Rhoades and Tiernan (2005)
explained that Jetblue’s rate of growth has been one of the highest in the industry as
it increased its number of departures by 748% in its first five years, and by 2005 it
had 2.5% of the US domestic market. OAG (December 2006) showed that US low
cost carriers had around 27% of the total capacity60 in 2006.
Figure 23 (below) shows the changing market dynamics between low cost carriers,
regional and full service airlines over the last six years and it clearly shows that the
network carriers have lost a significant number of passengers. In the US domestic
market, the capacity share accounted for by the regional airlines has increased from
5% in 1980 to 21% in 2005 and they now carry around the same number of
passengers as the low cost carriers. These regional airlines are either contracted or
owned by the network carriers and provide feed traffic from secondary and tertiary
cities into the hubs of the Majors, and they are being used extensively by Majors
whose capacity is being deployed to their international operations. In 2003, more
than 60% of the regionals’ flights fed into the hub-and-spoke infrastructure of the US
majors (US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2004). The low cost carriers also
increased their market share in parallel with the regional carriers, and by 2005 had
around a quarter of the market, with most city-pairs encountering continuous low
cost carrier growth61.
Research group JP Morgan stated that Delta, United, US Airways, American and
Northwest had reduced their domestic capacity by 28%, 24%, 23%, 23% and 22%,
respectively between 2000 and 2006 (Aviation Strategy, June 2006). This left a void
in the market which was quickly replaced by capacity supplied from low cost
carriers. The FAA (2006) stated that the large capacity cuts by the legacy carriers
triggered an 18.5% fall in the number of enplanements from 2000 to 2005, while the
number of low cost carrier enplanements grew by 38% over the same period. As a
result, the legacy carriers’ share of domestic capacity fell from 79.5% in 2000 to
66% by 2005 (FAA, 2006).
60 The total number of seats offered by all the US carriers in 2006 was 899.4 billion seats and the low
cost carriers supplied 239.1 billion.
61 The following city pairs experienced the following low cost market share growth in years
2000/01/02/03;
1) Atlanta – Los Angeles: 5% growth in 2000, 10% in 2001, 7% in 2002, 23% in 2003 (Los
Angles included the airports of Los Angeles International, Burbank, Long Beach, Ontario and
John Wayne).
2) New York – Los Angeles: 11% in 2000; 17% in 2001; 28% in 2003; 31% in 2003 (New York
included the airports of JFK, Newark and LaGuardia and for Los Angeles airports see note 1
above (USA TODAY analysis of the DOT data provided by Back Aviation Solutions, March
16th 2004).
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Figure 23. Changing market dynamics between US full service, low cost and
regional airlines 2000-2005
Source: DOT Form 41 and Form 298C
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Table 18 (below) shows the market exposure (in terms of passengers in Origin and
Destination markets) of the major network airlines to low cost carriers. By 2005, over
70% of all American Airline passengers could also have chosen a low cost carrier to
get to their final destination, while almost three-quarters of all United Airlines domestic
passengers could have done the same. The data reveal that on average around 63% of
all passengers travelling on US Majors could have taken a low cost carrier and that this
is steadily rising with each passing year. Research conducted by Booz Allen and
Hamilton (2002) showed that the US low cost carriers have the potential to operate in
more than 70% of the US market.
Table 18. Proportion of Domestic O&D Passengers by Major airline in markets
with Low Cost Carrier Competition
Majors ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05
American 24.2 27.8 33.5 32.4 32.9 41.5 53.1 56.2 62.0 65.9 71.1 71.3 70.2
Continental 29.3 33.1 38.1 39.7 39.0 39.6 46.5 49.7 63.7 65.1 68.4 66.8 64.7
Delta 18.3 27.9 35.0 37.6 36.4 37.8 43.9 45.3 51.4 52.2 54.5 53.4 56.2
Northwest 14.6 21.8 24.2 25.0 23.6 32.2 46.5 48.1 50.2 49.2 54.7 55.1 55.2
United 29.3 33.6 41.5 45.3 45.8 52.5 62.7 65.8 71.7 76.6 75.0 74.7 74.0
US Airways 6.2 10.8 18.9 19.8 19.0 21.4 25.4 32.7 38.5 39.8 45.9 45.0 58.2
Source: U.S. DOT DB1A Database 1990 – 2002; Ito and Lee (2003); Lee (2007)
Note: LCCs include Air South, Access Air, Air Tran, American Trans Air, America West (2003 onwards),
Eastwind, Frontier, JetBlue, Kiwi, Morris Air, National, Pro Air, Reno, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country,
ValuJet, Vanguard and Western Pacific.
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Table 19 (below) shows the financial exposure of the Majors to the low cost carriers.
By 2002, over half of Alaska Airlines’ domestic revenues were exposed to the low
cost carriers, while almost 70% of United’s domestic revenues were at risk from low
cost carriers. This exposure has created many problems for United Airlines: it lost
$7.4 billion62 from its North American operations between 2001 and 2005, while in
comparison it lost $1.6 billion from its Pacific operations and a further $1 billion
from its North Atlantic market over the same time period, showing that the domestic
market is presently the carrier’s greatest challenge (United Airlines annual report
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). By mid 2006, statistics showed that a much
larger proportion of the domestic revenues of network airlines63 had become exposed
to low cost carriers, as 42% of United Airlines domestic revenues, for example, were
exposed to Southwest alone and an additional 17.1% and 15.5% were compromised
by JetBlue and Frontier respectively. Similarly, almost fifty percent of Delta’s
domestic revenues were threatened by both Southwest and AirTran
(www.darinlee.net/stats.html). This is one of the primary reasons why Majors are
deploying their capacity to international operations where they compete with carriers
with similar cost levels, thus becoming more competitive as they face
insurmountable problems in the US domestic markets.
Table 19. Proportion of Domestic Revenues generated in markets with Low Cost
Carrier Competition
Majors ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02
Alaska 2.7 2.3 6.1 47.0 44.0 53.9 64.8 65.0 59.0 59.8 53.0 52.3 51.8
American 10.7 10.8 11.1 16.1 17.7 24.2 25.2 23.9 30.2 39.7 43.9 50.0 57.1
Continental 11.3 10.4 12.1 20.3 27.0 32.4 35.2 31.9 33.1 39.7 43.5 58.3 60.1
Delta 4.3 4.7 4.5 11.6 21.4 28.8 31.5 28.8 31.0 35.4 36.1 42.5 44.0
Northwest 7.6 7.3 7.4 8.8 13.8 17.8 19.5 18.2 26.8 41.8 44.1 46.8 42.6
United 7.2 8.9 9.5 22.9 25.3 33.3 41.2 40.2 46.5 53.4 57.2 64.1 69.0
US Airways 5.8 3.9 3.4 4.5 7.9 18.7 17.7 11.6 17.1 17.9 25.5 32.6 35.1
Source: U.S. DOT DB1A Database 1990 – 2002; Ito and Lee (2003).
Note: LCCs include Air South, Access Air, Air Tran, American Trans Air, Eastwind, Frontier, JetBlue,
Kiwi, Morris Air, National, Pro Air, Reno, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country, ValuJet, Vanguard and Western
Pacific.
62 United Airlines lost the following amounts in its North American market (US $Billions); $1.7 in 2001, $2.3 in
2002, $1.2 in 2003, $1.4 in 2004, $729 in 2005
63 The domestic revenue exposure of each network airline to low cost carriers in mid 2006 are listed below:
1). United Airlines: Southwest, 42.7%; JetBlue, 17.1%; America West, 16.4%; Frontier 15.5%; AirTran, 8.2%;
ATA, 7.2%; Spirit, 1%.
2). American Airlines: Southwest, 33.8%; JetBlue, 16.7%; America West, 15.9%; AirTran, 12.4%; Spirit 6.3%;
ATA, 5.1%; Frontier 4.4%.
3). Delta: AirTran; 23.4%; Southwest, 21.1%; JetBlue, 12.5%; America West, 10.9%; Frontier, 4.6%; Spirit, 2.3%
4). Continental: Southwest, 34%; JetBlue, 24%; America West, 11.9%; AirTran, 5.7%; ATA, 4.6%,Spirit, 2.6%
5). Northwest: Southwest, 17.5%; America West, 16.7%; AirTran, 14.1%; Spirit, 8.5%; Frontier, 7.9%; JetBlue 1.9%
6). US Airways: Southwest, 36.3%; AirTran, 23.5%; JetBlue, 14.6%; Spirit, 2.1%; Frontier 0.9%.
(www.darinlee.net/stats.html)
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4.3.2 The differences in fares between a US network and low cost
carriers
To determine the fare difference between a US low cost carrier and an incumbent, a
series of fares were collected over a 3-month period64 in 2002/03, 2003/04 and
2004/05, and are shown in Table 4, Appendix II. Fares (weekend return) were
collected from the websites of United Airlines and Southwest operating between
Oakland and Los Angeles. The data for 2002/03 show a 26% difference between the
fares of the budget carrier and the incumbent three months prior to departure, and a
33% difference on the day of departure. By 2003/04, the fare data show that the fare
of both carriers had fallen overall from the previous year but the fare difference
between United and Southwest was 21% three months prior to departure. By 2004/05
the average fare on routes for both carriers fell again, but the fare of Southwest
remained below that of United by an average of 19% over the three month collection
period. This indicates that when United drops its fares, Southwest reacts accordingly
with an even lower fare, making it difficult for the incumbent to sustain a
competitive advantage. Booz Allen and Hamilton (2002) have stated that Southwest
typically prices its fares 50% lower than incumbents in one to two hour markets,
reducing the price realisation of traditional carriers in those markets by 25 to 35%.
4.3.3 The Transatlantic Push
US major airlines have long dominated the long-haul internal US markets as low cost
carriers traditionally have operated on shorter distances (e.g. between 400 – 600
miles). However, this landscape is changing dramatically as the low cost carriers
have also been stretching their average stage length and challenging the Majors on
both medium and long-haul domestic routes. The European Cockpit Association
(2006, p40) indicated that the average sector length of US low cost carriers was
around 540 nautical miles in 1999 but had increased by 50% by 2002. SH&E
Consulting (2006) confirmed, from a study, that the 0-500 mile market was declining
rapidly, while the 500-1,500 mile and over 1,500 mile market had increased by 5.2%
and 5.5% respectively from 2000 to 2004. Field (2006) stated that the average trip
length of Southwest has nearly doubled in the last 12 years from 495 miles (800km)
in 1992 to 793 miles (1,280km) by late 2005. Similarly, Jetblue now offers multiple
frequencies on US transcontinental routes between the east and west coast on its
narrowbody A320s, competing directly with American Airlines out of the New York
market. The US low cost carriers are now catching up with the Majors in long-haul
64 The fares were collected every Friday on the following dates:
1). Friday 13th December 2002 to Friday 28th March 2003
2). Friday 12th December 2003 to Friday 27th March 2004
3). Friday 10th December 2004 to Friday 25th March 2005.
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US domestic markets and have been depressing yields; this is forcing the Majors to
take another step forward by developing their international operations where low
cost carriers have not yet threatened.
The average US domestic yield has declined by 2% annually over the last two
decades, following deregulation in 1978. However, in recent years the decline in
yield has been accelerating: it measured 14.03 cents/RPM (real terms) in 2000,
falling to 11.46 cents by 2004, averaging a 3.5% reduction per annum (FAA, 2006).
However, the yield on international routes has remained relatively steady over the
last few years and the network carriers are now beginning to shift their capacity
internationally. North Atlantic and Pacific yields have both hovered at around 9.2-
9.5 cents/RPM from 2000 to 2004, while the Latin American routes are higher at 13
cents/RPM over the same time period (ATA, 2005). In 2004, the US majors had a
large percentage of their capacity operating within the US, with carriers such as
Delta and American having around 76% and 68% respectively of their capacity
operating on domestic routes. The majors have been retreating from domestic
markets by redeploying the majority of their wide-body capacity to international
operations. Delta, for example, has redeployed 20 767s from its domestic network
and, in the second quarter of 2006, it increased its international capacity by 21.5%
compared to the year’s previous quarter, adding 50 new international routes to 20
overseas destinations in the previous 12 months. In 2006, Delta served 29
destinations in Europe, 48 in Latin America and will launch routes to Dubai, Seoul,
Johannesburg, Dakar and Accra by the end of 2007, and has also applied to operate
into the Chinese market. In 2006, Delta’s international capacity rose by 20.1%, while
domestic ASKs fell by 13.9%. - this reduction in domestic capacity leaves a gap in
the market which will be quickly filled by the low cost carriers, exacerbating the
problem (Field, 2006; ATI October 2006; Aviation Strategy October 2005; Delta
news 2006).
United Airlines has invested $165 million in upgrading its first and business class
seats on its international services as it had around 40% of its capacity deployed on
international routes: it increased its capacity on routes to Asia by 15% and 13% in
2004 and 2005 respectively, and by July 2006, it added another 40 weekly flights to
the region, having 44% of its total capacity in the Pacific (ATI March 2006; Bureau
of Transport Statistics 2006). Field (2004) stated that United planned to derive more
of its revenue from flying between the USA and Asia, Europe and Latin America
than from its domestic operations as its overall international activities accounted for
46% of revenues in 2004 and it targeted 55% for the following year. Similarly,
Continental Airlines has deployed a large number of its 172-seat Boeing 757s to
transatlantic operations, travelling to many European cities that did not previously
have a non-stop US connection, including Belfast, Bristol, Edinburgh, Berlin, etc.,
increasing transatlantic capacity by 19.5% in 2006 (Shifrin, 2006). By 2006, the US
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had 73 open sky agreements - many of these have not been taken up by US carriers,
but they must be cautious as switching capacity from domestic to international
creates voids in the market, allowing low cost carriers to strengthen their position.
This is a major threat as the US based low cost carriers have also been ordering
aircraft, while the network airlines have been unable to do so (except for their
regional airline affiliates). Coombs (2003) reported that US low cost carriers will
have increased their fleet size from 776 aircraft in 2004, to 1,030 by 2006, while
SH&E (2006) shows that Southwest, JetBlue and AirTran have 118, 153 and 52
aircraft respectively joining their fleets over the period 2006 – 2010.
4.4 Problems that low cost carriers are causing incumbents
in Asia-Pacific markets
Asia’s low cost carriers have only been in operation for the last few years, and the
market that they are operating in would be regarded as an immature one. However,
they have caused problems for incumbents in Australia and Malaysia, which sets a
precedent for what could happen in other Asian countries.
4.4.1 Growth and penetration of Virgin Blue and Air Asia
In Australia, Virgin Blue was formed in August 2000 and, a year later, it was
advantageously positioned when Australia’s second largest airline, Ansett, collapsed.
The failed carrier had 40% of the domestic market and this allowed Virgin Blue to
capture 30% of the market within a short time (Easdown and Wilms, 2002 and
Forsyth, 2003). In 2003-04, the Australian domestic market generated profits (before
interest and tax) of $420 million for Qantas, exceeding its international profits by
$120 million, and indicating the importance of Australia’s domestic market and the
need to protect it from low fare competitors (Airline Weekly 2005, p12). Today, the
Virgin Blue group (which includes Virgin Blue, Pacific Blue and Polynesian Blue)
employs more than 4,000 and operates 2,100 flights each week to 30 Australian and
international destinations, including New Zealand, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, Fiji,
Tonga and Samoa. Domestically, Virgin Blue serves 22 destinations, with the
majority of flights to/from three cities – Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne.
Virgin Blue, however, has expanded beyond the normal delineations of a low cost
carrier as it code shares with United Airlines and Virgin Atlantic, providing onward
connections for international passengers within its network. It has not adhered to the
traditional low cost model as it has a frequent flyer program65 and it also appeals
65 Virgin Blue’s frequent flier program operates in conjunction with Emirates, Europcar, National
Australia Bank and Virgin Atlantic Airways.
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directly to corporate business passengers as it offers a fully refundable fare. This has
attracted the business community as its yield increased by 2.6% in 2006 - this action
pressurised Qantas to respond by lowering their business fares, which had a
cascading effect on their own yield (Virgin Blue 2006). The budget carrier also
retrofitted all its Boeing 737-700/800s to accommodate back-of-seat personal
television screens in order to gain a competitive edge over Qantas, and it has also
challenged Qantas and Air New Zealand on their cargo duopoly by carrying freight
in the belly-hold of aircraft flying between Australia and New Zealand through its
Pacific Blue affiliate.
In the Malaysian market, Air Asia entered into service in January 2002. Without the
structural costs of its legacy rival, Malaysia Airlines, it offered promotional fares as
low as RM 1 (US$0.27) and advertised extensively, while the incumbent only
advertised internationally, neglecting its home market. AirAsia soon made inroads
into the Malaysian market and by 2006 it had 50% of the domestic market (Air Asia,
2006). It then expanded into international markets by launching affiliate Air Asia
branded airlines in Indonesia and Thailand from where it operated intra-Asian routes
such as to Singapore in 2003, Macau in 2004, and to China, the Philippines, Vietnam
and Cambodia in 2005. The carrier has ordered a total of 180 A320s (as of March
2007) and aircraft will arrive at the rate of one or two a month till 2011. In order to
facilitate the growth of Air Asia, the airport authority at Kuala Lumpur has built a
low cost terminal with a throughput of 10 million passengers, charging 40% lower
fees than its main terminal. Subsequently, another new terminal is being built in Kota
(Eastern Malaysia), stressing how quickly the region is adapting to low cost carrier
growth (Centre of Aviation Pacific, 2006). By 2007, Air Asia had four bases in
Malaysia, including Kuala Lumpur, Johur Bahru, Kuching and Kota Kinabalu.
The growth of Air Asia in the Malaysian market is similar to that seen in Europe.
Figure 24 and Figure 25, below, show the no-frills carrier growing its markets out of
Kuala Lumpur while Malaysia Airlines’ market share has declined. Ionides and
O’Connell (2004) reported that many passengers are first time flyers as only 6% of
Malaysians have used air travel, but many are also switching from the Malaysian
incumbent to avail of the lower fares.
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Figure 24. Market share of Malaysia Airlines
and Air Asia from Kuala Lumpur to Penang
Figure 25. Market share of Malaysia Airlines
& Air Asia from Kuala Lumpur to Kota
Kinabalu
Source: Malaysia Airports
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Air Asia has become a huge threat to the Malaysian incumbent whose problems are
two-fold66: firstly it is in serious financial difficulty and, secondly, it is unable to
compete with Air Asia’s low unit costs. The incumbent is also heavily financed,
regulated and controlled by the government which has contributed to its problems. In
the domestic market the Government had subsidised all routes and assumed all
losses, which cost an estimated US$135 million each year; this form of protectionism
made the incumbent operate in an un-commercial nature, relying on continued
government support (CNN Money, 2006). In a landmark restructuring deal, the
government concluded that Malaysia Airlines would not become profitable in its
domestic operations and withdrew from the majority of its domestic routes, while a
leaner and more agile Air Asia took over the responsibility of the domestic
operations. In a further example of bureaucracy and government ownership, the
government compensated the Malaysian incumbent with $236 million in exchange
for giving up its loss making routes, while Air Asia received a $5 million subsidy to
service some of the rural routes (CNN Money, 2006). Doganis (2001) argued that
state-owned airlines67 are characterised by bureaucratic and politically interfering
governments. Malaysia Airlines has now retracted from its domestic market because
it was unable to compete with Air Asia, and it is also probable that it will withdraw
from intra-Asian markets as low cost carriers begin infiltrating, thus becoming a
long-haul carrier with an unclear future.
66 Malaysia Airlines has had a consistently underperforming profit margin of only 0.3% for the last
number of years and has accumulated debts totalling $2.6 billion. In addition its unit costs are around 6
US cents per ASK and it competes with Air Asia that had the world’s lowest operating costs in the
airline industry at 2.3 US cents per ASK in 2005 (O’Connell and Williams 2005).
67 Doganis (2006, p226) lists 38 airlines that are 100% Government owned; 32 airlines that are more
than 50% Government owned and 15 airlines that are between 10-49% Government owned.
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4.4.2 The differences in fares between an Asian network airline
and a low cost carrier
To determine the fare difference between an Asian low cost carrier and an
incumbent, a series of fares were collected over a 3-month period68 in 2002/03,
2003/04 and 2004/05, and are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 in Appendix II. Fares
(weekend return) were collected from the websites of Qantas and Virgin Blue and for
Malaysian Airlines and Air Asia. Table 5 shows the different fares for Virgin Blue
and Qantas operating between Sydney and Brisbane. The incumbent had more flights
per day than Virgin Blue and this flight frequency provided it with a competitive
advantage which may justify a fare premium. The data for 2002/03 show that there
was a 55% difference between the fares of the budget carrier and the incumbent three
months prior to departure and a 48% difference on the day of departure. It was clear
that Qantas could not compete successfully with Virgin Blue so, as a competitive
response, it setup Jetstar which had a lower cost base and could counter attack
Virgin’s low fares. The data for 2003/04 show that Qantas had responded by cutting
fares - Virgin Blue’s fares had increased slightly from the previous year but there
was still an average difference of 20% between the fares. By 2004/05 the difference
in fares between the two carriers three months prior to departure was 29% and was
22% on the day of the departure, indicating that Qantas could not close the fare gap
on its low cost carrier rival which was operating on the route for around five years.
Table 6 in Appendix II shows the different fares for Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines
operating between Kuala Lumpur and Kuching. The incumbent had 40% more
flights per day than Air Asia and operated the short route with a mix of 737s and
wide-body A330s. The data for 2002/03 show that there was a 183% difference
between the fares of the budget carrier and the incumbent three months prior to
departure and a 75% difference on the day of departure. The air fare of the
incumbent remained at the same level during the three month collection period
which meant it was very difficult to manage its load factor as passengers had no
incentive to book early with most booking close to the day of departure, while Air
Asia applied yield management principles to boost its load factor and revenues. Data
taken for 2003/04 were roughly the same as the previous year. O’Connell and
Williams (2005) confirmed that the fare (return) difference between Air Asia and
Malaysia Airlines on the Kuala Lumpur – Kuching route had varied between a low
of 75% to a high of 191% and that the incumbent cut domestic fares by 50% (funded
by Government subsidies) in 2004 to compete more effectively with Air Asia. By
2004/05, Malaysia Airlines had implemented its online booking engine and was
using yield management principles. These effects had a large impact on fare
68 The fares were collected every Friday on the following dates:
1). Friday 13th December 2002 to Friday 28th March 2003
2). Friday 12th December 2003 to Friday 27th March 2004
3). Friday 10th December 2004 to Friday 25th March 2005.
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differences between Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia in 2004/05 as there was a 34%
difference between the fares three months prior to departure and a 44% difference on
the day of departure. Even with the help of the Malaysian Government, the
incumbent still could not compete with Air Asia and this should act as an indicator to
other weak Asian flag carriers, such as Garuda, Philippine Airlines, etc., that they
need to respond to low cost carriers before these begin to establish bases in their
countries.
4.5 Core differences between low cost carriers and full
service airlines
The five principle differences between low cost carriers and full service airlines are
as follows:
 Product differences
 Legacy costs
 Cost structures
 Network (hub and spoke verses point to point)
 Ancillary Revenues
4.5.1 Product differences
Several authors (e.g. Barkin et al., 1995; Doganis, 2001; Gilbert et al., 2001;
Williams, 2001; Lawton, 2002, O’Connell and Williams 2005) have extensively
described the characteristics of the low-cost business model. Table 20 (below)
summarises these features and contrasts them with those of a typical full-service
carrier.
Full service airlines remain the most dominant airline business model in the air
transport industry and they sustain multiple differentiating features, despite a
tendency to reduce some services in order to compete on a similar unit cost platform
as budget carriers. Incumbent brands attract leisure and business passengers who can
book tickets through a multitude of channels and travel seamlessly to any destination
worldwide via their own network or through partner arrangements. They provide
services for both leisure and business passengers; this is a difficult balance as they
must reconcile the concept of ‘being all things to all people’. Business passengers’
needs are accommodated through items such as: flexible tickets; chauffeured service
to airports; separate check-in and security lines; comfortable lounges with full
compliment of food, beverages, entertainment and computer facilities; through to
priority boarding, while onboard they lounge in spacious seats; have complimentary
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food, beverages; video-on-demand with multiple channels and email facilities; and
arrive at a prime airport with multiple ground transportation options to city centres.
In addition, they are handsomely rewarded by a frequent flyer program for their
patronage. Leisure passengers do not receive the pre-flight privileges of the business
class but still receive a full compliment of food, beverages and entertainment, and a
solid commitment that their welfare will be cared for if the trip experiences problems
as full service airlines have a strong reputation for superior customer service.
Table 20 Product features of low cost and full service airlines
Product features Low cost carrier Full service airline
Fares Low fare, minimal restriction Generally higher with restrictions
Yield Management Simple ticket price structure Complex multiple fare structure
Distribution Online and direct booking Online, direct, travel agent, GDS
Check-in Ticketless Ticketless, IATA ticket and interline
Airports Secondary (mostly) Primary
Sectors flown Short-haul Short haul and long haul
Connections Point-to-Point Interlining, code share, global alliances
Class Segmentation One class (high density) Two class (dilution of seating capacity)
Inflight Pay for amenities Complementary extras
Aircraft Utilisation Very High Medium: due to unions & primary airports
Turnaround Time 25 minute turnarounds Low turnaround time due to Congestion /Labour
On-Time High on-time performance Low on-time due to congestion & connections
Product One Product: low fare Multiple integrated products
Ancillary Revenue Packaging, on-board sales Focus on the primary product
Aircraft Single type: commonality Multiple types: scheduling complexities
Seating Small pitch, no assignment Generous pitch, offers seat assignment
Customer Service Generally under performs Superior customer service and reliability
Operational Activities Focus on core (flying) Extensions: e.g. cargo, maintenance, holidays
Brand Low fare Differentiated products – value for money
Source: O’Connell and Williams 2005
In recent years, academic literature has covered the low cost carrier in depth and has
categorised full service airlines as broken models due to the fact that they have been
largely unable to challenge the growth, profitability and sustainability of the low cost
carrier business entity. The business model of the full service airlines is such that it
crosses transoceanic continents which are subject to the cyclicality of each region’s
economics, biological problems, terrorism, etc. In Asia, for example, the currency
crisis in 1998 crippled economic growth and development, followed a few years later
by the SARS outbreak, which affected both business and tourist traffic. In the United
States, the network carriers were significantly affected by 9/11 and by the collapse of
the dot.com industry, which also initiated the rapid decline of traffic, including the
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coveted high premium business passenger who began switching to low fare
substitutes.
Despite the fact that passenger traffic has continued to grow, the industry’s profits
have been extremely disappointing. The lament of many industry experts is that
profits are very difficult to extract because full service airlines are riddled with high
cost structures and operate in a hypercompetitive market with competitors that have
much lower unit costs. Figure 26 (below) shows the very tight margin that exists
between operating revenues and expenditures of the world’s full service airlines and
the need for these carriers to reduce their expenses in order to attain profitability and
sustain positive margins. Table 21 (below) shows the widespread disparities between
the operating margins69 of the leading network airlines (in terms of revenues) and
low cost carriers in America, Europe and Asia. The American network airlines have
continuously improved their operating margins, with the exception of Delta70, while
the majority of European and Asian network carriers have also significantly
improved their margins as they have pared costs, reduced capacity and focused more
on international operations. Nonetheless, the persistent cost difference and the
narrowing revenue premium of the full service carriers has not allowed these carriers
to close the operating margin gap on the budget carriers. Franke (2007) shows that
the operating margin for low cost carriers worldwide has hovered at around 10%
over the eleven year period 1995 – 2005, while premium carriers, such as British
Airways, Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific, have been able only to maintain
margins of around 4-5% during the same time period. On the other hand, the
majority of global network airlines have witnessed deteriorating margins, registering
just above 0% for 2005. It is very apparent that the overall business model of the
legacy airlines must continue to be restructured and overhauled or budget carriers
will replace their traditional counterparts and cause a paradigm shift in global air
transport markets.
69 The operating margin indicates how much an airline makes from each dollar of sales before interest
and tax.
70 Delta made an operating loss of $1.6 billion in 2001; $1.3 billion in 2002; $786 million in 2003; $3.3
billion in 2004 and in 2005 it had an operating loss of around $2 billion and subsequently entered
chapter 11 bankruptcy in September 2005, carrying $20 billion of debt.
102
Figure 26. The operating revenues and
expenses of the world’s full service airlines
(1991 – 2006)
Table 21. Operating margins of leading
American, European and Asian full service
airlines and low cost carriers (2002 – 2005)
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2002 2003 2004 2005
American -19.1% -4.8% -0.8% -0.5%
United -19.9% -9.9% -4.7% -1.3%
Delta -9.8% -5.9% -21.7% -12.4%
Southwest 7.6% 8.1% 8.5% 9.6%
Air France/KLM - 2.3% 2.9% 4.4%
Lufthansa 9.4% -0.9% 5.9% 3.2%
British Airways 3.8% 5.4% 7.2% 8.3%
Ryanair 31.3% 23.2% 24.9% 21.8%
Japan Airlines 0.5% -3.5% 2.6% -1.2%
ANA -0.2% 2.8% 6.0% 6.5%
Singapore Airlines 6.8% 7.0% 11.0% 9.1%
Air Asia - 11.4% 14.6% 18.9%
Boston Consulting Group (2004) analysed the breakdown of costs for a typical
European full service airline and their research indicated that its operating environment
is largely responsible for its underperforming margins, as shown below in Figure 27.
Such airlines operate to prime slot congested airports that command a price premium
because demand for capacity far exceeds supply. They use a series of distribution
channels, including travel agents, clearing houses, online agents, online portal sites (e.g.
opodo), airline websites, etc., making distribution an expensive and complex way to
sell tickets. In recent years, fuel costs have escalated and incumbents worldwide
operate multiple types of old aircraft which significantly adds to their overall
complexity in terms of scheduling, maintenance, etc. In addition, strong unions often
outweigh commercial decisions, thus constraining the productivity of the labour force,
which impacts their competitiveness with budget carriers.
Figure 27. An analysis of the low margins of Europe’s full service airlines (2004 data)
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Finally, passengers have become more demanding as they require a full range of
flight products at a low fare. A full analysis of the cost differences between a full
service and a low cost carrier is outlined in detail below in section 4.5.3. Figure 27
(above) shows that when all the costs of operating a flight are factored together, the
profit margin is only 2.9%, and the analysis concludes that the carrier only makes a
€4 profit from a €140 fare: this is clearly not a sound platform on which to build
airline growth and the only option is to vigorously challenge all costs and establish
other sources of revenue streams, such as dynamic packaging options.
4.5.2 Legacy Costs
Labour costs have been the highest operating expense of full service airlines,
representing between 23-35% of the total expenditure for North American and
European carriers, while for Asian carriers this ranged lower at around 20% of the
total cost, with the exception of Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines71 (ICAO,
2002). In comparison, Ryanair’s labour cost is around 15% of its total costs.
Flag carriers were set up by governments back in the 1930s and 1940s and, since
then, they have accumulated legacy costs such as pensions. In the US, the pension
deficit is now an acute problem: the seven US majors72 had a combined pension
shortfall of $22 billion by the end of 2003 (Aviation Strategy, December 2003).
These carriers only totalled $4 billion in profits during the peak of the last business
cycle and then subsequently lost $32.3 billion from 2001 to 2004, thus were not in a
sound position to fund such large pension decifits. United Airlines, for example,
entered bankruptcy in December 2002 and had a pension deficit of $5.9 billion,
which was straining its financial restructuring program. However, under Chapter 11
bankruptcy rules, a company is free to accept or reject any contract or obligation as
long as it can justify the action to the bankruptcy judge. United entered bankruptcy in
December 2002, having the largest pension burden of the US majors, and argued that
this would be viewed unfavourably by capital markets when endeavouring to exit
bankruptcy. Subsequently, the court allowed the government to absorb the four
under-funded pension plans and authorised United to pay the government $1.5
billion in securities in exchange for taking the pensions. The deal with the PBGC73
would save United $4.4 billion in cash contributions, including $1.3 billion in 2005;
however employees in retirement would still lose out on around $1.9 billion in
71 The cost of labour as a percentage of total costs in 2002 are listed for the following airlines: Delta,
41%; American, 30.4%; United Airlines, 29%; Air France, 33.5%; Iberia, 31.6%; British Airways,
24.3%; Cathay Pacific, 25.6%; Singapore Airlines, 21.5%; Japan Airlines, 20.7% (ICAO, 2002).
72 The pension deficits of the US majors by December 2003 were as follows: Alaska, $101 million;
Continental, $1.2 billion; American, $3.7 billion; Northwest, $3.7 billion; Delta, $4.6 billion; US
Airways, $2.5 billion and United $5.9 billion.
73 The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) is the government agency that insures pension
plans and protects benefits. It was designed to serve as a "safety net" (or type of insurance) for
employees and retirees in the event that a severely financially distressed plan is in danger of failing.
104
benefits (Marshall, 2005; Aviation Strategy October, 2004). This was certain to
cause unrest and resentment among United Airline employees, as management had
already trimmed the workforce by 44,000 employees from 2000 to 2006, and the
remaining staff had to accept salary cuts and productivity improvements; yet the
company chose to offset its pension obligations to a third party and, as a result, the
company’s employees will receive a lot less money than anticipated. Similarly,
British Airways’ pension deficit for 2005 totalled £2.07 billion, a rise of £101
million on the previous year. The carrier has indicated that it would give the fund a
one-off payment of around £800 million in exchange for an adjustment to its
retirement age policy and has proposed to raise the normal retirement age for pilots
from 55 to 60 years-of-age and increase the retirement age of its cabin crew to 65
(ATI, September 2006). These legacy costs are a major differentiator between budget
and full service carriers, and the latter group have made inadequate financial
provisions for the welfare of their employees, in turn jeopardising their own financial
stability and the morale of employees.
4.5.3 The cost structure of full service airlines and low cost carriers
Airline operating costs are classified into Direct Operating Costs and Indirect
Operating Costs. Doganis (2002, p78) stated that Direct Operating Costs include all
those costs which are associated with and depend on the type of aircraft being
operated. Indirect Operating Costs include all those costs which remain unaffected by
a change of aircraft type. See Tsai and Kuo (2004) for calculating operating costs.
Table 22. Distribution of the global network airlines operating costs, 1996 - 2004
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Direct Operating Costs 51.4% 50.6% 50.5% 51.6% 54.7% 57.2% 55.5% 55.5% 59.5%
Flight Deck Crew 7.4% 6.8% 7.0% 7.1% 6.3% 6.8% 8.1% 7.2% 7.4%
Fuel and Oil 13.1% 13.3% 11.0% 12.1% 17.0% 16.8% 14.3% 15.4% 19.1%
Flight Equipment Insurance 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4%
Maintenance & Overhaul 9.7% 10.0% 9.8% 10.4% 10.1% 10.9% 11.5% 10.9% 10.9%
Flight Equipment Depreciation 8.1% 7.6% 8.4% 8.2% 7.2% 8.0% 7.0% 6.9% 6.7%
Rentals 4.1% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.0% 5.5% 5.4%
User Charges1 8.7% 8.2% 9.2% 8.8% 8.1% 8.6% 8.9% 9.0% 9.5%
Indirect Operating Costs 48.6% 49.4% 49.5% 48.4% 45.5% 42.8% 44.5% 44.5% 40.5%
Station and Ground 11.8% 11.7% 11.6% 11.7% 11.0% 10.1% 10.1% 10.2% 8.5%
Cabin Attendants 6.9% 6.9% 7.1% 7.2% 6.6% 6.9% 6.9% 6.5% 6.2%
Passenger Service 6.6% 7.1% 6.6% 6.7% 6.3% 6.0% 6.6% 6.1% 5.8%
Ticketing, Sales & Promotion 17.0% 17.2% 16.6% 16.6% 16.1% 14.7% 13.2% 13.7% 13.9%
General & Administrative 6.3% 6.6% 7.7% 6.1% 5.4% 5.1% 7.8% 8.1% 6.3%
Total Operating Costs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1 Airport charges and Navigational charges
Source: IATA Airline Economic Results and Prospectus, part 1, 2005
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Table 22 above shows that the global legacy airlines had an almost 50:50 split
between direct and indirect operating costs in 1996, but nine years later there has been
a gradual divergence as Direct Operating Costs have significantly increased as a
proportion of total costs, mainly due to increased fuel charges, maintaining older
aircraft, increases in the financing and leasing of aircraft, together with the exorbitant
increases in landing and navigational charges. As a consequence, the Indirect
Operating Costs proportion has decreased over the last decade as incumbents started
adopting strategies that were similar to the low cost carriers, such as outsourcing
station and ground expenses, using less cabin crew, especially in short-haul markets,
and by renegotiating productivity and labour contracts. The network carriers have also
removed hot meals on short-haul flights, increased the seating density and used
lounges belonging to alliance members rather than staff their own facilities. The
largest cost reduction, however, has been because of the shift in distribution towards
an online platform that has included e-ticketing and online booking - this reduced the
overall distribution costs proportion of total operating costs of the legacy carriers from
17.0% in 1996 to 13.9% by 2004.
Oum and Yu (1995) stated that the survival and success of a carrier depends largely
on cost competitiveness. However, when unit costs of legacy airlines are compared
against low cost carriers there are alarming differences and, subsequently, they are
unable to match the fares, which encourages passengers to switch to budget carriers.
This has a cascading effect as load factors drop, yields become reduced, market share
stagnates or falls and ultimately the competitiveness of the carrier deteriorates.
O’Leary (2004) stated that the only competitive advantage for the short haul market is
to have a low unit cost operation. Lobbenberg et al (2003) and Doganis (2006, p171)
show that the cost differences between a low cost and a traditional carrier in the UK is
around 50%. Deregulation has allowed the no-frills carriers to set up bases and extend
networks across Europe, where they have begun to threaten each flag carrier’s home
market. The majority of these incumbents have serious operating cost disadvantages
when compared to the no-frills carriers, and passengers may begin to shift to the low
fares carriers as their low unit costs allow them to offer cut-price fares. Ryanair, for
example, had unit costs (stage-length adjusted) that were 60-70% lower that most
European incumbents in 2005 (Doganis (2006, p177). In the United States a similar
effect had emerged as the difference in average unit costs (per ASM) between
Southwest and American Airlines, United and Continental was 43% in 2004 (US
DOT, 2005). Morrell (2005) agreed that the cost ratio was almost 2:1 as he compared
the unit costs of Southwest and US Airways in 2002, and found that their total
operating costs were 48% lower74, citing that distribution had the largest difference in
unit operating costs between the carriers. Franke (2004) stated that the largest
74 Morrell (2002) found the following unit cost differences between US Airways and Southwest: Staff
costs, 46%; Fuel costs, 20%; Maintenance costs, 21%; Distribution costs, 68%; Landing/rents costs,
34%; aircraft/rent/depreciation, 46%; Other costs, 61%.
106
contributing factor to the higher cost of the incumbents is the complexity of the
network carriers’ business model.
A joint study by McKinsey and IATA was conducted on the unit operating costs75
between network and low cost carriers in the US, Europe, Asia and South America,
and is shown below in Figure 28 to Figure 31. It reveals that the network carriers in
each of the continents have been unable to close the operating cost gap between
themselves and the low cost carriers. Figure 28 (below) shows a comparison of the
three largest US network carriers (United, American and Delta) and two low cost
carriers (Southwest and JetBlue). The analysis concluded that Southwest has
maintained a 36% cost advantage between 1996 and 2004, despite all the cost cutting
and restructuring policies implemented at the full service airlines. Aviation Strategy
(June, 2004) confirmed that the unit cost gap between the US legacy and low cost
carriers is typically between 2 and 4 cents per ASK.
In Europe, Figure 29 (below) shows that Ryanair’s unit costs have been reducing
faster than the unit costs of the three largest incumbents (Air France, Lufthansa and
British Airways) and by 2004 it had an alarming 64% average unit cost difference
between itself and the incumbents. Clearly this is an enormous threat and costs must
be urgently addressed and other revenue streams must be sourced in order to
compensate for the high expenses. Similarly, easyJet’s costs have increased
marginally but they still remain 40% below that of the three network airlines.
Hansson et al (2003), cited in Franke (2004), calculated that the adjusted stage length
cost difference between European incumbents and budget carriers can be 5 Eurocents
per ASK which confirms the analysis shown below in Figure 29; they also indicated
that labour costs represented one-third of the unit cost differences, while airports (i.e.
secondary airports, rapid turnaround times, etc.) accounted for a further 21% of the
cost differences. Both US and European incumbents have found it difficult to reduce
costs due to structural barriers such as unions, entrenched hubs, legacy costs, etc.,
and they have been unable to match the agility of their low cost competitors.
Meanwhile, the no-frills carriers have relentlessly reduced or contained costs, which
has resulted in lower breakeven load factors76, and lower fares that induce more
passengers to fly, which ultimately leads to higher operating margins and continued
profitability. Binggeli and Pompeo (2002) have shown in their study of the low cost
75 Information on each airline’s cost and available capacity was taken from the following sources in the
following regions;
1) Information for the US carriers was taken from the Bureau of Transport Statistics’ Form 41
data.
2) Information for the European, intra-Asian and intra-South American carriers was taken from
IATA’s Airline Economic Task Force database and from company accounts.
76 Ryanair’s break even load factor was about 64% in 2004 and its actual load factor was around 85%
(European Cockpit Association 2006, p18). The Break-even load factors for the AEA member airlines
from 2000-2004 have been around 69.5% and for the industry to thrive the break-even load factor must
come down to around 65% (AEA yearbook, 2005).
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carrier sector, that lower costs and higher seat load factors permit these carriers to
offer fares 50–70% lower than those of the incumbents.
Figure 28. The cost gap between the three largest
US network carriers1 and Southwest (1996-2004)
Figure 29. The cost gap between the three
largest European network carriers2 and
Ryanair (1996-2004)
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In Asia and South America, the cost difference between the network and low cost
carriers is also apparent, as shown below in Figure 30 and Figure 31. O’Connell and
Williams (2005) confirmed the joint IATA-McKinsey analysis: they concluded that
the unit cost difference between Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia was around 60% in
2004, and the data show that the unit costs of the state owned incumbent have been
increasing, indicating that it has not yet responded to Air Asia’s threat and has
ignored the damage that budget carriers have inflicted on US and European
incumbents. In South America, the unit cost difference is also striking as Gol had a
cost advantage of around 40% in 2004 over TAM, a full service Brazilian carrier,
despite the fact that its costs had marginally increased year-on-year.
Figure 30. The cost gap between Malaysia
Airlines and Air Asia (1996-2004)
Figure 31. The cost gap between TAM and
Gol (1996-2004)
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The following section will discuss the areas where low cost carriers have such unit
cost advantages over full service airlines. The unit costs of Ryanair are compared to
the average unit costs of British Airways, Air France and Lufthansa as a generic
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representation of where low cost carriers worldwide have such cost advantages over
full service airlines.
The unit cost differences between Ryanair and European network airlines
World renowned aviation consultants, Hansson, Ringback and Franke, stated that
around 70% of the unit cost differences between full service and low cost airlines
can be attributed to the business model (i.e. distribution, secondary airports, seat
density, etc.). They also estimated that 60-80% of the cost gap between the carriers
can be closed (Aviation Strategy, February 2003; Franke, 2004). However, Franke
(2004) alarmingly stressed that the low cost carriers are able to deliver 80% of the
service quality at less than 50% of the cost of the network carriers. This jeopardises
the future of network carriers in short-haul markets as passengers will invariably opt
for the cheaper fare and sacrifice the frills. Figure 32 (below) outlines Ryanair’s cost
advantages over British Airways, Air France and Lufthansa in intra-European
markets for 2005. Each of these areas of cost advantage is explained below.
Figure 32. Ryanair’s cost advantage over Europe’s full service airlines (2005 data)
Unit cost
of Ryanair
Airport charges,
ground handling
Ryanair’s cost advantage
Seat
Density
Use of secondary airports
Low ground handling charges
20% more seats/aircraft
4.1c ( €/ASK)
2.4
11.6c ( €/ASK)
Source: IAT A Airline Cost Performance, March 2007
Average unit cost of British Airways,
Air France and Lufthansa
2.2
0.5
High aircraft utilisation
New generation aircraft and commonality
Fuel hedging, winglets
Aircraft and
fuel Direct sales only
No GDS Fees
No commission on ticket salesDistribution, product
and overhead
Lower compensation costs
Higher crew productivity & commonality
Reduced cabin crew
Labour
1.1
1.2
Allows for quick aircraft turnarounds
Note: Stage lengths are adjusted
109
Seat density
Low cost carriers77 generally do not offer business class seating, which takes up a lot
of valuable space, and instead offer a dense, single class seating configuration as
other space consuming items, such as catering galleys and convection ovens, are
eliminated. Skytrax (2007) shows that the seat pitch of Ryanair is 30 inches while
that of Lufthansa and Aer Lingus is 32 inches, allowing the carrier to pack in extra
seats. A typical Boeing 737-800 in service with a traditional airline will generally
only have 158 seats, whereas Ryanair configures this aircraft to accommodate up to
189 seats, allowing the carrier to sell 20% more seats, resulting in its cost per seat-
km being around 19% lower. In Asia, Air Asia for example, has a 29 inch seat pitch,
while Malaysia Airlines and Thai Airways have a 34 inch seat pitch. In addition,
Ryanair has non-reclining leather seats, which saves the carrier a few hundred
thousand dollars per year as these seats are less prone to breakages and the leather is
more durable and easier to maintain (CNN, 2004).
Airport charges and ground handling
The cost advantage of airport charges and ground handling is the largest area of
difference between the incumbents and Ryanair. According to the IATA airline
economic results and prospectus (2005), airport and en-route charges constituted
9.5% of a full service airline’s operating costs in 2004. En-route charges78 are the
same for both types of airlines. ICAO data for 2004 showed that BA’s and Air
France’s navigation charges represented around 4.5% of their total operating costs,
while low cost airlines generally have higher navigational charges because of their
short-haul, high frequency nature. Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) cost
airlines around €6 billion per annum but the Eurocontrol Performance Review
Commission reported that, if all ANSPs were at the efficiency level of ‘the best in
class’, costs would be reduced by 20% (ATAG, 2004).
However, it is the airport charge that accounts for the main difference between the
airline models as network carriers serve congested primary airports that offer
interconnectivity to other destinations and are usually located close to city centres.
On the other hand, Ryanair serves non-congested secondary airports that are some
distance away from city centres, like Frankfurt Hahn which is 82 miles from the city
centre, while Frankfurt’s primary airport, Frankfurt Main, is only five miles. Suzuki
(2007) estimated that over 30% of travellers will use an ‘out of region airport’ to take
advantage of lower fares, while O’Connell and Williams (2005) found that
77 The exception is Spirit Airlines in the US who offers business class.
78 En-route charges are measured by the following calculation: aircraft weight * distance travelled in
nautical miles. Low cost airlines generally do not report their annual operating costs to International
organisations such as IATA or ICAO.
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passengers flying out on Ryanair had travelled 44% further than Aer Lingus
passengers in order to reach the airport. Similarly, Air Asia passengers had travelled
an average distance of 27 miles further than passengers who were departing on
Malaysia Airlines. Evidence strongly suggests that passengers will tolerate travelling
to distant secondary airports, which will boost the further growth of low cost carriers
at these cheaper airports. Button et al. (2002) illustrated the cost difference between
using Frankfurt’s primary and secondary airports by stating that a 737 operator at
Frankfurt Main pays €13 per departing passenger and an additional landing fee of
€1.75 per passenger, while Ryanair pays €4.25 per departing passenger and has
negotiated with the airport that the landing charge is free. See chapter 7 section
9.2.2. for some examples of where Ryanair has negotiated favourable terms in order
to reduce its airport charges.
Altogether, network airlines spend some $42 billion a year for airport and ATC
charges, representing 10% of their operating costs. However, Boston Consulting
Group (2004) extensively studied the costs associated with airports and revealed that
they could reduce their operating costs by an average of 20-30% and pass on these
savings to airlines. Francis et al. (2004) suggested that airports could derive
additional revenues from non-aeronautical sources, relieving the burden that airlines
pay, and cited that Luton airport has increased its non-aeronautical revenues as a
proportion of its total revenues from 45% to 59% between 1995 and 2001.
Papatheodorou (2003) revealed that secondary airports will substantially discount
landing charges and that they will also provide subsidies to carriers that attract traffic
for the economic benefit of the region’s wider economic area. The much publicised
deal between Ryanair and Charleroi airport demonstrated the incentives that
secondary airports were prepared to give Ryanair as the conditions involved a
reduction in landing charges, a fixed price of €1 per passenger for ground handling
services, and financial support for the opening of Ryanair’s base including
advertising, with the entire package totalling €15 million (Barbot, 2006). Iberia also
argued that incentives offered by autonomous Spanish regional governments
amounted to financial aid worth €10-17 per passenger, putting the national flag-
carrier at serious commercial risk (ATI, January 2005).
There is generally no air traffic control congestion and holding time in the air when
aircraft serve secondary airports; on the other hand, a network carrier has a 10
minute holding time on average when approaching a hub, and there are also further
delays while taxiing to the gate because of the congestion on the ground. Low cost
carriers use the aircraft’s built-in step ladders to disembark passengers, while full
service airlines use air bridges provided by airports. Budget carriers outsource all of
their ground handling work (except for the home base) which eliminates the need to
purchase equipment (tractor tugs, baggage trailers, ground auxiliary units, belt
loaders, etc). In addition there are no interlining passengers and their associated
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bags79, thus reducing the risk of misplacing luggage, and budget carriers have also
eliminated expensive business lounges. Doganis (2006, p174) stated that station and
ground expenses for British Airways’ intra-European operations accounted for
around 16% of its European cost base in 2002, while Ryanair’s equivalent figure is
less than half of this. In an innovative move by Ryanair to reduce the number of
check-in desks, bags and other handling facilities at airports, the carrier has increased
its carry-on baggage allowance to 10kgs and charges £2.50 for each piece of
checked-in luggage. The incentive will reduce Ryanair’s annual handling costs by
10% - equating to around €30 million. Aer Lingus is also introducing such measures
in order to reduce costs (ATI, January 2006).
Another advantage of secondary airports is that aircraft can be turned around in less
than 30 minutes. Dennis (2004) indicated that a 737 operating between London
Heathrow and Frankfurt Main has a 45 minute turnaround at each airport and this
aircraft can perform 6 sectors a day, while a similar aircraft operating between the
secondary airports of London Stansted and Frankfurt Hahn has a 30 minute
turnaround time and can perform 8 sectors a day. McKinsey Quarterly (2005)
calculated that shortening the turnaround time from 50 to 30 minutes can increase the
utilisation of the aircraft by 40% (over a 700 mile sector) and raise the productivity
of the gate agents by as much as 65% in an eight hour time shift. The aircraft is not
generating any revenue while it is on the ground and Gittell (2000) estimated that a
five-minute increase in the turnaround time of the ten US major airlines would
increase their costs by $1.6 billion over a twelve month period.
Distribution, product and overheads
Distribution is now the third largest operating cost for full service airlines after
labour and fuel. It is composed of commissions to travel agents, override
commissions, cost of paper tickets, GDS fees, administration costs, etc. Doganis
(2006, p204) estimated that 67% of these distribution costs could be saved by
booking directly online via the airline’s own website, and Jarach’s (2002) research
suggested that sales through an airline web site are four times cheaper than through
travel agencies and computer reservation systems. Table 22 (above) shows that
distribution expenses for full service airlines have fallen significantly from 1996 to
2004 and that they represented 13.9% of a network airline’s operating expenses by
2004 - but it is a cost that airlines can continue to reduce80. Hofton (2004) argued
that the incumbents must tackle distribution costs if they are to compete effectively
with low cost carriers.
79 In Dublin for example the airport authority charged a transfer fee of €1.0 per passenger in 2006
(Dublin Airport Authority, 2006).
80 Distribution costs at British Airways have reduced from £30 per passenger in 1997 to £15 by 2004.
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Full service carriers in the US and Europe have now eliminated the practice of
paying commission to travel agents, but in Asia around 90% of bookings are still
conducted via travel agents (Mastercard Asian Lifestyles, 2003). If agents sell a large
number of tickets for one particular carrier then they may earn an override
commission81 and this is another incentive used worldwide today. Another large cost
in the distribution chain are the Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) which
aggregate all the network airlines’ seat inventories and schedules worldwide, and
then make them available to both online and traditional travel agents for a fee.
Airlines are generally charged around $13 per ticket ($6.5 each way) and this has
been a major expense to full service airlines - avoidable if the ticket was booked
directly through an airline’s website. Alamdari and Mason (2006) referred to the
wide differences in profit margins82 between GDSs (i.e. Amadeus and Sabre) and
airlines, indicating that the GDSs could significantly reduce their fees. These GDSs
reach out to some 230,000 points of sale worldwide, and the world’s full service
airlines pay $5.5 billion in GDS fees every year for the privilege of their wide
coverage (Clarke and Tunnacliffe 2005).
However, a new generation of GDSs, called Global New Entrants (GNEs), are now
emerging and will use a combination of ITA core software83 and G2 switchworks84
which will direct-connect travel agents to an airline’s reservation system through
vendors (such as Navitaire’s DirectNet distribution service, EDS, IBM or Unisys)
and have the potential to offer the same product for $2-3 per ticket. This new
generation will have a dramatic effect on GDS costs once initiated across all
platforms, allowing network carriers access to multiple distribution channels at low
cost. Passengers booking tickets online pay by credit card and these credit card fees
are an expensive item as they account for over $1.5 billion in the US alone and, in
Europe, they add around 25% to distribution costs. In response, carriers are now
beginning to offer multiple types of payment options on their websites that will
bypass the credit card payment process through debit card mechanisms, such as
Maestro/Switch, Paypal, Bill me later, etc., and this process is estimated to reduce
the credit card cost by over 50% (Burg, 2006). All carriers must be e-ticket
compliant by the end of 2007. IATA estimates that each e-ticket85 will save at least
$9 in processing costs over paper tickets. Given that, at present, 300 million interline
tickets are printed each year, savings of $3 billion per year could be achieved. Other
81 Tsai et al. (2004) studied override commissions in Taiwan and discovered that airlines incentified
travel agents by giving them a $26 rebate per ticket if they sell more than 1,500 tickets on their carrier
and this rises to $46 for selling more than 3,000 tickets.
82 The profit margins of Amadeus and Sabre were 16.6% and 8.1% respectively, compared with the
average margins of 1.9% and −2.8% for European and US incumbents respectively in 2003.
83 ITA software provides all of the information required to book and ticket any itinerary directly in a
carrier's inventory system or in a GDS.
84 G2 switchworks has established efficient and reliable connections with leading travel suppliers that
integrate with existing agency business processes.
85 Ryanair for example sell 97% of their tickets online.
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technologies that will reduce costs include Common User Self Service (CUSS)
kiosks which are estimated to reduce check-in costs by 96% as passengers can
bypass the traditional check-in system, thereby reducing the need for extra staff and
facilities at airports. The cost to use the kiosks is estimated at just $0.16 cents per
passenger, representing $1 billion savings if there is a 40% market penetration
(JetOne, 2006).
Ryanair’s products and overheads, in comparison to the network carriers, are also
stripped down as the carrier does not offer in-flight entertainment systems,
complimentary food and drinks, assigned seating, frequent flyer programs, etc., - it
competes solely on low fares. Its headquarters in Dublin are basic and do not contain
any lavish boardrooms, expensive paintings, furniture, etc., unlike other full service
airline headquarters. Similarly, easyJet’s headquarters consist of portable cabins with
open seating areas for employees.
Aircraft and fuel
Ryanair bulk ordered aircraft in the economic down cycle of 2001/02 at substantial
discounts and locked in a large number of options for future purchase at the same
price. The carrier is currently Boeing’s largest customer in terms of order backlog,
giving it substantial leverage when negotiating with the manufacturer, as noted when
the carrier ordered 70 737-800 series aircraft (including engines and optional extras)
in 2005 each valued at $51 million, while the list price for the model registered
between $61.5 – 69.5 million (M2 Communications Ltd, 2005). In comparison, Air
France/KLM and British Airways, for example, had only eight and five narrow-body
aircraft respectively on firm order by mid 2005, which would not justify deep
discounting.
Financially struggling network carriers continue to operate a mixed fleet of older
aircraft86 which are fuel inefficient and require frequent maintenance work. In
comparison, the average fleet age of the 11 European Low Fares Airline Association
(ELFAA) member airlines was just 3.9 years by late 2006 (ELFAA press release
2006). They generally operate with a standardised fleet of aircraft - Southwest87 and
Ryanair, for example, use an all Boeing 737 fleet which reduces complexities such as
maintenance, crew scheduling, etc. Kilpi (2007) showed that there was a direct
correlation between standardised fleets and operating margins, and revealed that
Southwest’s standardised fleet had a direct impact on its high profit margin in 2000,
while Iberia’s mixed fleet of Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas aircraft
significantly impacted on its operating margin. Table 23 (below) shows the hourly
86 Alitalia for example operates 74 MD-82s while SAS operates 44 MD-81/82/87 variants in 2007.
These aircraft production assemblies have long been terminated.
87 Southwest operates 194 737-300s, 25 737-500s and 264 737-700 but is transitioning to an all fleet of
Boeing 737-700s by March 2007. Ryanair now operates a fleet of 134 737-800s.
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utilisation per day for Europe’s full service and low cost carriers in 2006.
Dobruszkes (2006) confirmed that low cost carriers such as easyJet, Ryanair and
Norwegian, operate their aircraft on average 11 hours a day which is 30% more
flying per day than British Airways, thus allowing low cost carriers to operate more
sectors per day and thereby increase revenues.
Table 23. Hourly utilisation of aircraft per day for European full service and low
cost carriers (2006)
737-300 737-400 737-500 737-800 A318 A319 A320 A321
British Airways 9.1 9.1 8.1 - - 8.4 8.0 8.1
Lufthansa 7.3 - 7.5 - - 9.4 8.4 8.4
Air France - - 8.1 - 9.3 8.6 8.1 8.2
European Low
Cost Carriers1
Generally operate between 10 and 12.5 hours a day
1 European Cockpit Association (2006, p20).
Source: World Air Transport Statistics, Volume 2 Key Performance Indicators, 2006
Fuel is the second largest operating cost for airlines: the cost of aviation fuel escalated
to $62 per barrel by January 2007, up from $36.62 per barrel in January 2004 (US
Dept of Energy). Davy (2005, p28) estimated that a 1 cent movement in jet kerocene
will affect Ryanair’s operating profits by 0.8% or, alternatively, a $1 movement in the
price of a barrel of oil will result in a 3% opposite movement in its earnings. The
network carriers have offset the fuel increase by adding a surcharge to tickets88 -
British Airways, for example, passed on 80% of its higher fuel costs to the consumer,
while Ryanair did not add any surcharge, which makes its comparable fare lower than
that of the incumbent, thus attracting more passengers. Fuel hedging is a practice of
making advance purchases of fuel at a fixed price for future delivery in order to
protect against the shock of anticipated rises in price, and is a widely used practice.
Fuel prices registered $65 per barrel in February 2006: Air France had 61% of its
requirements hedged at $44 per barrel; British Airways had half its requirements
hedged at $55; while Ryanair had 90% of fuel requirements hedged at $48 per barrel
– this for the quarters ending December 2005 and March 2006 (ABN-AMRO, 2005).
Similarly, Southwest had hedged 85% of its fuel requirements at the low price of $26
per barrel in 2005 and 65% at $32 per barrel for 2006, while network airlines such as
Continental, Delta, American and Northwest had no hedging policy in place for 2006,
consequently having to pay market rates. This shows the clear disparity between the
management teams of some network and budget carriers in assessing risk. In another
move to reduce the fuel cost, Ryanair is fitting winglets to its entire fleet which will
88 BA’s short-haul fuel surcharge increases between 2004 and 2005 were as follows: surcharge
increased to £2.50 by May 13th 2004; increased to £4 by October 14th 2004; increased to £6 by March
22nd 2005; increased to £8 by July 27th 2005 (British Airways).
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reduce fuel burn of each aircraft by up to 2%, while network carriers have retained the
conventional aerofoil.
Labour
Network carriers are typically overstaffed: British Airways had around 200
employees per aircraft in 2005, while Ryanair had 29. Similarly, Norway’s low cost
carrier, Norwegian, had 22 staff members per aircraft, while SAS had 73. Doganis
(2006, p128) showed the productivity per employee (measured as ATK per $1,000 of
labour cost) 89 and established that easyJet’s productivity was almost 500% more
than that of SAS and 250% more than of Air France in 2002. The lean workforce of
Ryanair is due to productivity and outsourcing as pilots fly close to 900 hours per
year, the maximum allowed by EU law90. The Economist reported that easyJet and
Ryanair pilots flew 50% more than their counterparts at British Airways in 2002
(The Economist, 17th August 2005). The European Cockpit Association (2006, p19)
stated that low cost carrier crews fly up to 6 block hours per day on average, while
their counterparts at the full service airlines generally do 4. Consequently, the crew
productivity of the low cost carriers is 25% higher, thereby requiring 20% fewer
crews than a network airline for the same number of block-hours flown in their
network.
The flight crews used at network airlines are an expensive commodity as they are
heavily unionised and cockpit crews represent only a small portion of an airline’s
workforce, yet they account for a disproportionate part of salary expenses. Doganis
(2006, p122) shows that Austrian Airlines cockpit crew constitute only 13.6% of the
airline’s staff numbers, yet they represented over 32% of its staff costs in 2002;
similarly, the flight-deck crew of SAS make up 10% of its employees but are
responsible for one-quarter of its staff costs. These costs will be extremely difficult
to reduce as strong unions will prevent deteriorating salaries, but management must
try to increase the productivity of flight crews. Lufthansa, for example, added two
hours to pilots’ flight schedules every month, stating that it would continue to grow
the mainline carrier and offer job security in the event of another economic down-
cycle. The budget carriers continue to cut crew costs as the schedule is structured so
that there is no necessity for overnight crews91, and they do not provide crew
transportation. Ryanair does not provide entry pilots with a type rating92. Similarly,
cabin crew are not paid while they undergo training. Ryanair uses four cabin crew
members per aircraft, which is the minimum number that is allowable under EU
89 Labour rates throughout the world vary enormously.
90 EU directive 79/2000.
91 British Airways for example have around 3,300 people staying in hotels in any given night around
the world costing approximately $85 million per year (Arnoult, 2006).
92 Pilots who already have a twin engine commercial rating pay between €22,000 – 25,000 to attain a
B-737 type-rating.
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directives93, and pay is directly related to productivity: in fact, 50% of Ryanair’s
cabin crew remuneration is productivity based (Davy, 2005).
4.5.4 Network (hub and spoke versus point to point)
Full service airlines operate hub and spoke networks: this allows a number of cities
(spokes) to be linked through a central hub, and each additional spoke that is added
magnifies the linkage benefits and through services. By combining point-to-point
traffic with transfer traffic at a central hub, airlines are able to offer a wider variety
of destinations to consumers with higher frequencies than a point-to-point operation.
Williams (1993) concluded that aircraft load factors increased by 5-10% because of
centralising passengers at a hub. Concentration of traffic at the hub leads to
economies of scale, especially for those airlines with high marginal costs per
passenger (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Pels, 2000). Baltagi et al. (1995), for
example, studied the domestic operations of 24 trunk and local US airlines from
1971-1986 and calculated that the associated airlines experienced 9.7% lower costs,
which were primarily saved by operating from a hub. Many network carriers have
tried to maximise the number of possible connections at a hub in a reasonable period
of time as alliance members entering the dominant hub of one of their partners want
a good onward linkage. The arrival times of aircraft originating from cities at the
ends of numerous spokes, are co-ordinated into a short time period where passengers
and baggage are seamlessly interlined to other flights. A hub is therefore an
integrated air transport interchange through which the dominant carrier94 operates
synchronised banks or waves of flights. British Airways, for example, generates 80%
of its revenues from its operations at London Heathrow, and the hub is responsible
for 90% of its long-haul capacity - which makes the hub a core revenue generator
and is pivotal to its overall strategy (Sentance, 2004).
However, major hubs worldwide are congested and this subsequently results in
delays in both the air and on the ground. Eurocontrol (2004, p29-34) showed that
around 17.5% of all European network airlines suffered delays (greater than 15
minutes) in 2003 and established that ground and route delays combined cost
network carriers €800 million95. In contrast, low cost carriers operate on a point to
point basis where there is no interconnectivity between carriers, and the majority96
do not offer connections between aircraft on their own network as this reduces
93 The legal requirement states that there must be 1 cabin crew member for every 50 passengers.
94 The dominant airlines (% of total flights) at their respective hubs are listed as follows: Delta, 74.8%
of flights at Atlanta; American, 83.2% of flights at Dallas; Air France 57.9% of flights at Charles De
Gaulle; British Airways, 42.3% of flights at Heathrow; JAL; 45% of flights at Tokyo (Airline Business,
Airport Rankings June 2005).
95 The ground delays cost €400 million and the route delays cost a further €400 million.
96 Southwest interlines about 20% of its traffic through its hubs, while Ryanair passengers must take
two separate flights if they wish to travel onwards to another destination. O’Connell and Williams
(2005) found that 17.5% of Ryanair passengers were engaged in do-it-yourself connections.
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complexity and costs. In addition, budget carriers serve secondary airports with little
or no air traffic, so delays are significantly reduced. Ryanair has long prided itself on
good, on-time departure performances, recording an 81.8% on-time accomplishment
in 2005 verses 61.3% for British Airways (Air Transport Users Council 2006).
American Airlines has been using de-peaking97 as a means of reducing delays at its
hubs since 2002. The process allowed American to distribute its flights more evenly
throughout the day giving better on-time dependability and more time for passengers
to make connections. It also reduced costs by $100 million at its primary hubs at
Dallas and O’Hare by shortening the number of block hours (through less
congestion), reducing the number of gates and lowering fuel and crew costs (Shifrin,
2004).
Connectivity between a full service airline’s short-haul and long-haul network is
conducted at the hub and is a primary function of the operating structure of a
network carrier. Data on the percentage of connecting passengers at the hubs of
major European airlines, collected by Fuhr and Beckers (2006), are shown below in
Table 24. According to them, hubs are a vital component of the overall strategic
framework of full service airlines as they are the mechanism by which carriers move
passengers. Aviation Strategy (April 2003) confirmed that KLM is highly dependent
on its connecting traffic and stated that more than 50% of its passengers transferred
at Schiphol. However, British Airways is not as dependent as a large proportion of
its passengers terminate their journey at London, but around 34% of its passengers
connect at Heathrow to other flights. In the US, the major carriers have a large
percentage of their domestic passengers transferring through their hubs: Continental,
American, United and Delta had an average of 37.3%, 40.1%, 45.5% and 49.8%
respectively connecting through their hubs in 2005 (SH&E Consulting, 2006). On
international routes, US connecting traffic was higher as 60% of American Airlines’
traffic on the London – Chicago market was transferring onwards at O’Hare, while
85% of its Manchester – Chicago passengers did so (Office for national statistics,
2004). In Asia there is no data available on connecting traffic, however O’Connell
and Williams (2005) found that around 37% of Malaysia Airlines passengers were
transferring at Kuala Lumpur.
97 Depeaking means spreading flights that arrive to and from the hubs in longer time intervals than its
previous banks of flights. This smoothes out the extremes of the peaks and troughs of the connecting
banks to create a more manageable rolling hub.
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Table 24. Transfer traffic at hubs of major European Airlines
Airport Airline Transfer Traffic1
Amsterdam (AMS) KLM 58%
Frankfurt (FRA) Lufthansa 65%
Paris (CDG) Air France 44%
Munich (MUC) Lufthansa 46%
Heathrow (LHR) British Airways 34%
1 Market shares and transfer quotas are based on the number of departing passengers.
At hub airports, alliance partners of the local Full Service Airline have been included.
Source: Fuhr and Beckers (2006) based on MIDT data tapes (2004)
Hansson et al. (2002), cited in Franke (2004), argued that 60-80% of the cost gap can
be closed between the full service and budget airlines without the need for the full
service carriers to abandon their hub and spoke operations, which has been a set part
of their traditional model for decades. As low cost carriers add extra aircraft and
extend their networks, they will be in a stronger position to offer more direct
services, thereby offering passengers the convenience of flying direct rather than
through a congested hub - this may have enormous implications for network carriers
in the near future.
4.5.5 Ancillary Revenues
Ancillary revenues are incremental revenues that an airline earns after the fare has
been paid and are generated either through the website or during the travel
experience. The industry classifies this process as dynamic packaging, which allows
a customer to assemble individual components such as flight, accommodation, car
hire, insurance, etc. Pilling (2007) stated that, when the components (e.g. car rental)
of a dynamic package are integrated as part of the overall transaction process when
booking a ticket, then they have a much greater penetration rate, and he cited an
example of Ryanair bringing insurance into its sales process, which resulted in its
penetration rising fivefold from 2% to 10%. Low cost carriers in particular have
capitalised on this revenue stream and its importance is growing in stature. The
ancillary revenue of Ryanair, easyJet, Air Asia and Southwest represented 15%, 7%,
6% and 2% of total revenues respectively in 2004/05 (Centre of Asia Pacific
Aviation, November 2005). Both Ryanair and easyJet reported over a 30% growth in
ancillary revenues for 2005 over the previous financial year, and Barrett (2004)
stated that it is a vital component for the sustainability of the Ryanair low cost
model. Table 25 (below) shows the various sources of ancillary revenue that Ryanair
collected in 2005.
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Table 25 Ryanair’s ancillary revenue for 2005
Total
(€) millions
(€) per
passenger
Non-flight scheduled operations 96.1 3.5
Car rental revenues 48.7 1.8
In-flight sales 34.6 1.3
Internet related services 21.2 0.8
Total 200.5 7.3
Source: Davy, 2005
The non-flight scheduled operations shown above in Table 25 include revenues from
sales of rail tickets, hotel accomodation, travel insurance, excess baggage98 and
debit/credit card revenues, which accounted for the largest share of ancillary revenues
at €96 million or €3.5 per passenger. Ryanair’s website is a powerful selling tool as it
rents approximately 400,000 cars a year and 500,000 hotel nights, and this is
electronically conducted with minimal staff interaction. The inflight sales are linked
to cabin crew productivity as they receive 10% commission on all inflight sales99. The
Internet related services include all additional web enabled browsers, such as links to
personal loans, low cost telecom cards, an online shop and access to financial services
like GE and the Bank of Scotland. In addition, it includes the revenues associated with
changing travel dates and names which is £15 (€22) per sector and per passenger
(Davy, 2005). By the end of 2007, the carrier intends to further boost its ancillary
revenues by implementing onboard gambling and in-flight mobile telephony services.
The Airline Business/SITA 2006 Airline IT Trends survey found that 30% of all
ticket sales are now being made online and that incumbents must look further than
just selling seats and take advantage of this revenue generating opportunity.
4.6 The impact of an accident on low cost carriers
Safety has always been a critical element to the business success of the passenger
airline industry. Alamdari (2004) and Holloway (2002, p124) have stated that safety is
a core function of airline operations and today’s passengers expect it to be a basic
fundamental component of air travel. Doganis (2002, p237) stated that an airline’s
‘reputation for safety’ is a key product feature when considering its image. Airline
accident rates have continuously decreased year-on-year from 1.3 accidents per
million departures in 1990 to 0.4 by 2006 (Ascend, 2007). While the accident rate has
98 Ryanair increased its excess baggage charge from €5.72/kg to €6.44/kg in 2005.
99 Onboard sales generated 11% of Ryanair’s total passenger revenues in 2002 (Ryanair annaul report,
2002).
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been decreasing, there has been an exponential increase in the number of flights - and
this trend is set to continue over the next two decades, pressurising pilots, controllers,
maintenance, airports and navigation systems. In Europe, Eurocontrol expects the
number of flights to double from 10.5 million in 2005 to 21 million by 2025, and in
the US, the Federal Aviation Authority estimates that the growth in revenue passenger
miles will increase by between 1.8 to 2.4 times by 2025 (Aerosaftey World, 2007).
This rapid growth in flight activity increases the probability of an accident, and much
of this growth is stemming from low cost airlines. In the week commencing 22nd of
October 2007, Ryanair, easyJet and SkyEurope opened 69, 30 and 19 new routes
respectively, while the network of the full service airlines remained largely
unchanged. McFadden and Towell (1999) report that 70% of all aviation accidents
occur from pilot error, and the European Cockpit Association (2006, p33) indicated
that two-thirds of all the new positions for pilots in Europe stemmed from low cost
airlines. The same study on page 48 confirmed that some managements at low cost
airlines failed to respect the responsibilities and safety-related decisions of captains,
and disciplined crew if they did not extend the number of hours flown on a ‘duty day’
or to operate an aircraft that was considered unsafe for that flight. This will certainly
impact on the probability that low cost carriers may have an accident in the future.
If an accident occurs, the carrier in question will immediately lose social credibility
and many passengers will divert to other carriers. The recent fatal crash of a TAM
Airbus A320 at Sao Paulo Congonhas airport on 18 July 2007 had a measurable
impact on its market share. It lost around 6% of the Brazilian domestic traffic by
September 2007 as compared to the same month a year earlier, while all the other
Brazilian carriers gained market share, indicating that passengers switched carriers as
a result of the accident (Anna.Aero, 2007). USAToday (2006) stated that many
passengers remained reluctant to fly ValuJet after its accident in 1996, and
management subsequently rebranded the low cost carrier ‘Air Tran’ in order to
disassociate itself from an accident which had claimed the lives of 110 people.
Executives concluded that ‘the only way to save ValuJet was to rename the airline
and rebuild it under a different blueprint’.
Insurance companies will compensate for aircraft damage, damages to third parties on
the ground and significantly contribute to claims pertaining to injured passengers.
However, the damage to the brand can be catastrophic. Nomura (2003) estimated that
a large sized carrier could expect to loose up to $900 million in lost revenues as
passengers defected to other carriers. Ryanair’s chief executive, Michael O’Leary,
acknowledged on Radio Telefís Éireann’s television program, hosted by Eamonn
Dunphy in 2003, that an accident would significantly impact the carrier, claiming that
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it would do irreparable harm to Ryanair (Radio Telefís Éireann, 2003). There is little
doubt that an accident would invoke a major investigation into the operations of low
cost airlines with regard to maintenance, pilot training, pilot workload, tight
scheduling, etc. The intense media presence would ensure that any accident would
remain headline news for a considerable time and would trigger passengers to book
with other carriers. If any major inadequacies were detected in the airline operation,
then large fines would be levied, and if these problems were not resolved to the
satisfaction of the relevant authorities, the airline’s Air Operators Certificate (AOC)
could be temporary suspended or revoked - as was the case with Air Madrid, which
was forced to ground its entire fleet in December 2006 due to safety issues. It is
evident that an accident would significantly impact the low cost airline business
model.
4.7 Concluding Comments
This chapter discussed the challenges posed by low-cost carriers in the contemporary
airline business environment. These carriers have experienced a meteoric rise since
the early 1990s and have now become a major component of the air transport business
and have caused substantial problems to major airlines in the European, Asian and
American markets as leisure and business passengers are increasingly switching to
budget carriers, while at the same time low cost carriers are also taking the industry’s
growth thus leaving flat traffic levels at the network carriers. Mounting losses are
accruing for network airlines whose networks are most exposed to budget carriers and
in markets across the world incumbents have been retreating like that witnessed in
Malaysia, United States and Italy. In the US market, the budget carriers are matching
the stage lengths of the network carriers and consequently the latter are pushing
capacity onto international markets to escape from sharply falling domestic yields and
compete with incumbents who operate on similar unit cost platforms. This void in the
market is being quickly replaced by low cost carrier capacity which is again fuelling
their relentless growth, while at the same time the US regional airlines are also
growing but they are partnering with the Majors. The budget carriers’ vision for the
future far outclasses that of the incumbents as they have secured most of the short-
haul capacity, forcing the incumbents to order later into economic cycle and ever
closer to an economic downturn. Part of this additional capacity will be used to
integrate their existing hub structures by ‘joining the dots’ between their bases and
further encroaching into the network carriers’ market share creating umpteen
problems.
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Network airlines have not been successful in reshaping structural barriers such as
unions, entrenched hubs, legacy costs, etc and they have been slow to incorporate the
components that low cost carriers deemed very significant in impacting strong
operating margins such as revenues from ancillary devices. Low cost carriers enjoy
substantial cost advantages over the traditional incumbents, which are subsequently
passed to consumers as lower fares. In this context, low cost carriers offer good
value for money and keep their customers satisfied despite their lower levels of
service. Ironically perhaps, low cost carriers have also helped the incumbents realise
the existing disorder within their cost structures and revenue management. Simplicity
has become a universal principle in the airline business; in fact, traditional carriers
aim now at reducing complexity without destroying value. This is a major task which
is admittedly difficult to successfully achieve. Nonetheless, the very existence of
network carriers relies on producing value-adding and consumer-driven product
differentiation beyond the basics of the low cost carrier product. However one major
circumstance that could permanently disable the growth of low cost carriers would
be an accident.
The airline that is widely acclaimed to have mounted the strongest challenge to low
cost carriers is Aer Lingus and the following chapter discusses the various strategies
that it formulated to successfully compete with Ryanair, Europe’s most aggressive
low cost carrier.
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5 Chapter 5: The response of European Incumbents
to low cost carriers.
An indepth study of Aer Lingus’ response and a synopsis of
the strategies adopted by British Airways, Lufthansa and the
Charter airlines.
5.1 Aer Lingus – the early years
Aer Lingus was established in 1936 as Ireland’s national airline. Its primary purpose
was to form an infrastructural air link between this island nation and other European
capitals. From 1946 – 1957 Aer Lingus had a monopoly on air services between Ireland
and the UK. The heavy hand of full government support was described by Share (1988)
who pointed out that the Irish regulatory authorities were frequently described as ‘‘the
downtown office of Aer Lingus’’ in the era before 1986. Ireland had one of the most
stagnant aviation markets in Europe and it was perceived as an unattractive destination
for new entrants. Many foreign airlines did not take up their entitlements under bilateral
aviation agreements and this allowed Aer Lingus to amass 72% of the entire Irish
market by 1979/80. Agriculture remained the bedrock of employment and economic
development, and in the 1980s high unemployment levels of 17% and a 68% marginal
tax rate prompted mass emigration to the US and the UK with the majority travelling
by sea, as air fares were excessively expensive. The entire income tax of the people
who remained went to service the public debt. In addition, Ireland’s tourism potential
was suppressed by the continuing violence in Northern Ireland, as the country as a
whole was perceived to be in conflict. Barrett (1997) described that traffic on the
Dublin to London route grew by only 2.5% from the period 1980-1985, while fares
increased by 72.6% - it cost IR£209 (€500 today) to travel by air between the two
capitals, while fares between London and Cork/ Shannon sold for IR£240. According
to ICAO (1984), Aer Lingus had one of the lowest productivity figures in Europe and
one of the highest ratios of airline pay to GNP per head. Doganis (2001) explains that
many state owned airlines acquire the symptoms and characteristics of ‘Distressed
State Airline Syndrome’. The BBC News (2001) identified that national airlines
suffered from overstaffing and highly unionised workforces, and confirmed that
management teams were not commercially focused and subjected to constant
government interference. Barrett (2006) described that Aer Lingus had developed all
these complications as it had acquired the following attributes:
 History of losses (28 loss making years: 1939-2001)
 Over politicised (government retaining 85.1% ownership)
 Strong unions (main unions SIPTU and IMPACT were against the low cost
business model and the national carrier suffered numerous industrial disputes)
 Overstaffing (6500 staff for 2.3 million passengers: 1986)
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 No clear development strategy (developed 40 non airline businesses)
 Bureaucratic management (slow change, inefficiencies and high unit costs)
 Poor service quality (high fares bundled with standard service)
The aviation business is well known for its cyclicality and is very exposed to political
uncertainties, such as war. The first Gulf War plunged Aer Lingus into a financial crisis
and it lost $313 million in 1993 with a net margin of minus 23% - this was worse than
all other European airlines, with the exception of Olympic, and by the following year it
lost an additional $187 million. Aer Lingus initiated a restructuring plan (the Cahill
Plan) which was drawn up to restore the airline to profitability, and the government
injected IR£175m (£90m for redundancy payments with the balance used to reduce
debt) - this was the last time that the EU allowed the incumbent to receive any subsidy.
Nuutinen (1993) stated that the equity would only prolong Aer Lingus’ life by a few
years. In an effort to restructure the losses, the company’s non-core businesses were
either sold or dissolved. They included the following subsidiaries; Aer Lingus
Commuter, Aer Lingus Teoranta, Pegasus Hava Tasimaciilgi, AS, Timas, TEAM Aer
Lingus maintenance, Airmotive Ireland Holdings, Aer Lingus Espana and Tourist
Development, Cara Data Processing, PARC and PARC Care.
5.2 Ryanair’s threat to Aer Lingus
Airline competition was relatively benign or nonexistent in Ireland because barriers to
entry and exit were so high, and in 1986 Aer Lingus and British Airways controlled
65% and 35% respectively of the Dublin to London market. Limited competition, high
fares, mass unemployment and emigration pushed the Irish government to issue a
second operating licence to Ryanair. Barrett (1997) outlined that Ryanair commenced
operations on the Dublin-Luton route on 23rd May 1986 offering a fare of IR£99 return
unrestricted, a reduction of 54% on the Aer lingus and British Airways tariff.
Competition intensified as Ryanair increased the number of routes to other UK
destinations in tandem with Aer Lingus. Kangis and O’Reilly (2003) pointed out that
by 1996 Ryanair had become the leader on the Dublin-London market, capturing
36.2% of the market while reducing Aer Lingus’ to 35.4%, and it had also
outperformed the incumbent on the Dublin–Birmingham route gaining 63% of that
market in the same year. Doganis (2001) described that Ryanair had replaced many of
the weaker flag carriers, such as Aer Lingus, Alitalia and SAS, as the dominant airline
on certain routes by the late 1990s. By 1999, British Airways amassed losses of £311
million on its European network, which was largely due to the growing presence of
Ryanair and easyJet (Avmark Aviation Economist July/August 2000). Aer Lingus
entered the new millennium on the back of two years of net profit with respectable
operating margins of 6.1% in 1999, primarily because of its successful transatlantic
operation. However, 2000 was the beginning of a series of catastrophic events that had
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a cascading effect on Aer Lingus. Principle among the factors that had precipitated the
airline’s early decline were scares over the Foot and Mouth disease in the UK at the
start of 2001, which led to a major drop in traffic in one of its most important markets
(in 2000, UK traffic accounted for 3.6 million of the 6.9 million total carried).
Meanwhile, its profitable North American operation was plunged into disarray as the
technology stock crash in 2000, coupled with the 9/11 attacks, pushed the carrier
deeper into a financial crisis. Thereafter, it was haemorrhaging €2.5 million per day and
Buyck (2003) highlighted its distressed state by reporting that the carrier’s cash
reserves would be depleted by January 2002 (Buyck, 2003). The US government had
granted a $15 billion rescue package to struggling US carriers, but European state aid
rules prevented the Government from investing capital into Aer Lingus at a time of
financial misfortune - a time when no other sources of capital were apparent. The
sudden fall in US traffic had disastrous consequences for Aer Lingus, which earned
over 40% of its revenues and 50% of its profits from its North American operations.
According to OAG data for October 2001, Aer Lingus’ North Atlantic capacity as a
percentage of all its Available Seat Kilometres (ASKs) was 64.9%, while airlines such
as BA and Lufthansa registered 39.6% and 34.1% respectfully. With the North Atlantic
market in chaos and continued pressure from Ryanair, the airline lost €140 million in
2001 and its financial situation was rapidly deteriorating.
Figure 33 below, shows that 63% of Aer Lingus’ revenues were earned from its short-
haul operations in 2002 and the airline was severely exposed to the low cost carrier
threat - this case study may prove to be the way forward for other network airlines
faced by similar competitive advancements. London – Dublin, the most contested route
in Europe with over 4.5 million passengers per year, was Aer Lingus’ most coveted
route. This route also provided Ryanair with a sound platform on which to base further
growth and it quickly opened up more routes from Dublin to other UK provisional
airports, and by 2002 there were 3.7 million passengers travelling on these routes. By
2002, Ryanair had already developed hubs at Luton, Stansted, Hahn, Charleroi, Skavsta
in addition to its entrenched hub at Dublin. Williams, Mason and Turner (2003)
described the financial importance of the Ireland-UK market to Ryanair as their
research showed that around half of its revenues were derived from this source in 2001.
Aviation Strategy (January 2003) indicated that Ryanair had controlled around 50% of
the Ireland-UK market by 2002 and continued strong growth was forecasted well into
the future. Aer Lingus was now struggling to address the relentless growth and
continued profitability of its low cost rival, and even more worrying was the fact that
many passengers were travelling to London via Luton or Stansted and were bypassing
Heathrow, which was previously considered as a core strategic advantage over Ryanair.
Heathrow was closer to central London and had an underground rail network that
provided interconnectivity to the greater London area but, more importantly, Heathrow
provided connectivity to other airlines, in particular to Aer Lingus’ Oneworld alliance
partners that served 570 destinations in almost 90 countries. Also of concern, according
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to Lobbenberg (2004) a Heathrow service over a Luton/Stansted operation would
command a value to customers of just €10, which indicated that the prime airport was
no longer a powerful strategic weapon, and which implied that Aer Lingus’ fares would
have to become very competitive if it was to halt the decline in its market share.
According to OAG data for 2002, Dublin was positioned fourth in the top 20 airports
serviced by the ‘no frills’ airlines, just ahead of Stansted and Luton (AEA 2003).
Figure 34 (below) shows that 51% of Aer Lingus’ short-haul routes were in direct
competition with low cost carriers, and that they were increasing their frequencies and
mounting an ever increasing challenge to the incumbent. In contrast, Lufthansa had
experienced only 12% of routes being in direct competition with budget carriers at
Frankfurt Main as they concentrated themselves at Frankfurt’s secondary airport,
namely Frankfurt Hahn, and were considered less of a threat. However, Ryanair and
Aer Lingus shared the same airport, placing enormous pressure on the latter to compete
while, at the same time, Aer Lingus had a significant operating cost disadvantage of 9.2
CASK in relation to Ryanair’s 4.5 CASK for 2001 (O’Connell and Williams 2005).
The Irish incumbent was now facing the fight of its life.
Figure 33. Aer Lingus’ revenues and competition
by region (2003).
Figure 34. Low cost carrier impact on
incumbent operations (2003).
Table 26 (below) shows the airlines that Ryanair has forced off Irish routes and its
aggressive response when carriers threaten its market. When GO, for example, started
operating a new route from Dublin to Edinburgh, Ryanair retaliated by commencing
operations on the exact same route, charging £10 each way for the Edinburgh sector
while at the same time also reducing its price on the Dublin-Glasgow route to £10
(Cassani 2003). Europe’s second largest low cost carrier, easyJet, avoided Dublin and
served Cork and Shannon, but Ryanair’s aggressive pricing again forced the carrier out
of the market.
Source: Aer Lingus
Ireland - UK
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Ireland - Europe
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Ireland - US
37.0%
Ryanair
BMI
BMIbaby
My Travel
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BA
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3.9
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Source: OAG, National Statistics, McKinsey Analysis, July 2003
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Table 26. The route withdrawals on the UK-Ireland market due to Ryanair.
Airline Market
Go Edinburgh-Dublin
Duo Birmingham-Shannon
easyJet Gatwick-Shannon/Cork/Knock
HapagLloyd Express Cologne - Shannon
MyTravelite Birmingham - Knock
Thomsonfly Doncaster-Dublin
FlyBe Birmingham-Shannon
BMIbaby East Midlands-Cork
Aer Arran Birmingham-Dublin Dublin-Cork (Reduced)
EUJet London (Kent) - Shannon
British Airways Manchester - Shannon /Cork Gatwick – Shannon/Cork
Aer Lingus Stansted-Dublin Valencia/Almeria – Dublin
Gatwick-Dublin Dusseldorf – Shannon
Bristol – Dublin Gatwick – Shannon
Leeds – Dublin Paris - Shannon
Stockholm – Dublin
A Salmon Smith Barney (2003) report stated that the European low cost carriers had
taken at least 5 percentage points in market share from the incumbents in almost every
route by 2002. By this time Ryanair was serving 101 routes from 8 bases in 16
countries, while Aer Lingus operated from a relatively small home market with a
population of 4.2 million, and now shared its home base at Dublin with Europe’s most
aggressive low cost carrier. Meanwhile, Ryanair turned misfortune into opportunity as
it took advantage of Boeing’s slump in production capacity following 9/11 and ordered
150 737s - the largest single order for the next generation aircraft ever placed with the
manufacturer, and the airline capitalised by gaining substantial discounts on the bulk
order. 2001 will be remembered as the worst year in aviation history, yet Ryanair
recorded the world’s largest operating margin registering 23.4%, while Aer Lingus
recorded negative 4.7%. Its market capitalisation of $4.2 billion in 2002 was twice that
of BA, the world’s fifth largest airline in terms of RPM (ATI, 2002). As Aer Lingus’
problems escalated, it was widely claimed that it would become another causality of the
industry as it was losing €2.5 per day by November 2001, and Walsh concluded: “The
old business model was a failure – a bankrupt business model” and immediate change
was now urgently required (ATI, April 2004).
5.3 The strategic turnaround of Aer Lingus
It was clear that Ryanair’s strategy of cost leadership had set it apart from other
competitors in the European short haul sector and this permitted it to drive yields to
levels not sustainable by competing carriers without similar cost structures.
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Subsequently, network carriers, such as Aer Lingus, that had a large proportion of their
short-haul network exposed to budget carriers were most at threat, and the incumbent
had the added disadvantage of operating from the same hub in tandem with Ryanair. In
contrast, British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa and Alitalia, for example, operated
from hubs that low cost carriers generally avoided and these incumbents interconnected
passengers by scheduling waves of flights at key times during the day. Burghouwt and
de Wit (2005) stated that Air France had four departing sequences at Charles De Gaulle
per day but that Aer Lingus had no such structure in place, and stressed that the carrier
had a weak schedule. Ryanair was now a well capitalised carrier whose brand name for
low fares had been ingrained into the Irish public over the last decade and this
presented Aer Lingus with a significant commercial threat.
Willie Walsh took over as Chief Executive Officer of Aer Lingus in October 2001. He
was a former pilot and held the post of CEO at the company’s Spanish subsidiary,
Futura, between 1998 and 2000, and for a time he had also acted as the pilots’ union
representative. Prior to his appointment as CEO, he had held the position of Chief
Operating Officer. The carrier was 95% owned by the government - change
management is difficult in any organisation but tends to be far more challenging in
companies whose major shareholder is the government. The Irish government realised,
however, the difficult circumstances that Aer Lingus faced and agreed to support
changes, with the understanding that the alterations would be permanent. O’Toole
(2004) and Harrington et al. (2005) both stated that Aer Lingus had previously
compared its cost structure with other full service carriers that offered a two class
service, but this strategy had now become outdated and the incumbent needed to
benchmark itself against ‘the real competition’ to determine the extent of change
required. Unlike United Airlines for example, which set Delta’s costs as its benchmark,
Walsh correctly perceived that they had to re-position themselves in the market and
modify their business model if they were to avoid the usual pattern of reaching a
targeted goal only to find that the savings were insufficient and the process was to be
restarted. Unlike almost everyone else, Walsh perceived that the new model had to
focus not on the traditional competitors, but on the low cost carriers that posed the
greatest threat to the survival of mid sized airlines like Aer Lingus. The new
management team realised that the low-cost sector had created a radical and
irreversible downward shift in ticket prices. In this changed environment, the need to
offer low fares was now taken for granted, implying the need to vigorously reduce
costs. To determine the extent of change required, benchmarking against Ryanair was
conducted. The optimum strategy for a network carrier that had a large percentage of
its revenues coming from short haul operations would be to find a ‘strategic fit’ where
Aer Lingus could adopt as many low-cost features as possible to further reduce costs
and retain as many differentiators as possible, so as to compete more effectively with
low-cost carriers. Porter (1996) illustrated that a ‘strategic fit’ allows imitation of parts
but not of the whole strategy.
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Aer Lingus initiated a Survival Plan that aimed for cost reductions of the magnitude of
€190 million, which represented 16% of the 2001 cost base. However, management
quickly realised that it needed further cost reductions because of weak yields which
resulted from the slow recovery in premium traffic and its expansion into lower-yield
leisure markets. The Survival Plan etched out from 2001 to 2003 now required cost
reductions to the magnitude of €344 million, which represented 30% of the 2001 cost
base. The following measures were implemented from the period 2001 – 2003 in order
to restructure the airline and mount a formidable challenge to Ryanair.
1) Restructured complex and/or unprofitable product segments
i) Aer Lingus reduced its average fare on its short-haul network from €118 in 2000
to €79.7 by 2004 (37.5% reduction). Similarly, its transatlantic average fare was
also reduced from €340.10 in 2000 to €252 by 2004 (28% reduction). O’Connell
and Williams (2005) concluded that Aer Lingus’ fares on selected Irish routes to
Heathrow were €62 each way, while its main competitor, Ryanair, charged €45
each way from similar airports to Stansted. It also eliminated all restrictions, such
as Saturday night stay over and advanced purchasing. This strategy prompted
customers to avail of the new fare structure by 2002/03 (Aer Lingus, 2003).
Management sourced new innovative ways to advertise its new fares and
instructed cabin crew to announce that the cheapest fares were to be found on Aer
Lingus’ website in an all out effort to heighten awareness.
ii) Aer Lingus, like most traditional carriers, had previously entered new markets
after rigorously pursuing a detailed study which later anticipated substantial
passenger growth. The normal procedure would begin with a loss making route,
allowing two to three years for the route to gain momentum and become
profitable. Aer Lingus was no longer in a position to move so slowly and the
incumbent abandoned this established route development plan and simply
inaugurated service to new, promising destinations – most clearly outside the
established Aer Lingus pattern. If the route was underperforming within a few
months, it would abandon the service (Aer Lingus Annual Report, 2003).
iii) It also reduced its business class fares by 60%, triggering more passengers to use
the service. O’Toole (2004) reported that the airline’s premium return fare from
Dublin to Brussels was lowered from €1,000 to €498.
iv) In 2001, the carrier transported 13% of its passengers in business class, but
demand for the premium service fell to 10% by 2002 to 7% in mid 2004 (ATW
online, June 2004). As a result, it removed business class from most of its 31
European routes with the exception of Dublin-Heathrow and Dublin-Brussels,
Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Manchester, Birmingham, Edinburgh and Glasgow
flights. However, it retained its Premier class on all its transatlantic routes
v) Aer Lingus increasingly concentrated on its leisure travellers and expanded
services to tourist destinations such as Barcelona, Malaga, Prague and Tenerife.
Between 2001 and 2003, some 30 new routes were launched with 10 more
scheduled for 2004.
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vi) It retained its cargo operations on its German and transatlantic flights as these
markets comprised 88% of its cargo business - this allowed it to produce faster
turnaround times at the other airports (O’Connell and Williams, 2005).
vii) It introduced fuel hedging schemes (normally 40% of requirements)
viii) It transformed all economy class catering costs into revenue generators
2) Network and fleet realignment
i) One of Aer Lingus’ core strengths is its service frequency to London Heathrow -
it operates 13 daily flights to Dublin, 5 daily flights to Cork and 4 flights a day to
Shannon. O’Connell and Williams (2005) found that connectivity at Heathrow
was a vital component in its overall strategy as over 40% of Aer Lingus
passengers were interlining at Heathrow with half of the sample continuing their
journey onwards with British Airways. Aer Lingus is also the fourth largest
carrier servicing Heathrow and holds 3% of the slots. Many analysts believe that
these slots are the carrier’s most valuable asset and advised the government to
retain a 28.29% interest in the airline after privatisation in order to prevent the
slots from being sold (ATI March 2006).
ii) In 1999, Aer Lingus was operating four main types of aircraft on its European
network: Fokker 50 turboprops, British Aerospace BAe146, Boeing 737s (400
and 500 series), and Airbus A320/321. The heterogeneous fleet mix added cost
and complexity – clearly, moving to a single standardised aircraft would remove
some costs. Flight crews, engineering, spare parts, etc., could interchange
between aircraft as each operate on a common platform. Pilling (2005) states that
Lufthansa has eight types of aircraft and spends around $1.8 billion on
maintenance, representing 10.5% of its total operating costs, while American
Airlines constitutes 9.9% of operating costs and a large proportion of this cost
was accentuated by operating multiple aircraft types. In contrast, Ryanair’s
maintenance costs for 2004 were 5.4% of its total costs, and a large part of these
lower costs accrued were due to operating a standardised fleet of Boeing 737s
(Ryanair, 2005). Kilpi and Vepsäläinen (2004) estimated that the average
inventory value of spare parts was US$3.35 million per aircraft in 2002, and a
standardised fleet will require much less inventory. Standardised fleets also
reduce the scheduling complexities and the crew training costs, and Airbus
estimated that commonality can save airlines in the region of US$200,000 and
US$1 million per aircraft annually (Clarke, 2001). The majority of low cost
airlines have standardised fleets, including Southwest, Ryanair, Jetstar and Air
Berlin, while other carriers are transitioning to single fleets, such as easyJet and
Air Asia. Table 27 (below) shows how Aer Lingus have reorganised their fleet
whereby the airline would have been operating just one aircraft type by 2006. The
Fokker 50 aircraft was retired in 2001 as part of the plan to move to an all jet
fleet. The BAe146 aircraft were removed in late 2003 with the subsequent closure
of the Dublin to London City Airport route. The Boeing 737s were finally phased
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out at the end of 2005 and Aer Lingus entered 2006 with an all Airbus fleet for its
European operations, consisting of 21 A320s and 6 A321s with an average
aircraft age of just 3 years100. The restructuring of the short-haul fleet resulted in
the airline reducing its fleet complexity from 31 aircraft (6,823 seats) in 1999 to
27 aircraft (7,680 seats) by 2006.
Table 27 The transition of the Aer Lingus fleet 1999 - 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fokker 50 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
BAe146 8 8 8 7 6 0 0 0
B737-400 6 5 4 2 3 3 0 0
B737-500 7 7 8 8 8 8 4 0
A320 0 1 4 4 4 9 17 21
A321 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6S
ho
rt
-h
au
l
Sub Total 31 31 30 27 27 26 27 27
A330-200 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
A330-300 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4
MD-11* 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
L
on
g-
ha
ul
Sub Total 7 8 9 7 7 7 7 7
Total 38 39 39 34 34 33 34 34
*MD-11 was wet leased from World Airways for summer schedules only
Source: Aer Lingus
iii) Table 28 (below) provides an overview of the routes and number of direct sectors
that Aer Lingus operated from its three Irish bases, Cork, Dublin and Shannon,
for the period 1999 to 2005. In 1999 there were more direct routes and weekly
sectors than in 2003, and this was directly attributed to the phasing out of the
Fokker 50 and BAe 146 aircraft which operated on short domestic routes and on
high frequency routes to the UK. When the carrier transitioned to higher capacity
aircraft (174 – 204 seats), many of these routes that were operated by the Fokker
and BAe aircraft became unprofitable and were subsequently closed, which
showed that the new management team were extremely cost focused and were not
influenced by governments to keep certain routes open for economic interests.
Aer Lingus also safeguarded its yields in the short-haul market by extending its
network deeper into central and Eastern Europe as it opened routes to Warsaw,
Lisbon and 8 destinations in Spain. Walsh had taken the view that it was more
important to fly to destinations where the customers wanted to go, rather than
where a legacy route existed. He added 30 new routes to the airline’s European
network, closing four historic loss-makers and experimenting with new, often
leisure-driven services (O’Toole, 2004). Dublin to Malaga was an example of a
new route that the old Aer Lingus would never have been associated with but it
100 Aer Lingus Annual Report and consolidated accounts, 2003 and 2004.
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was clear that others were making money in these markets. Subsequently, the
stage length increased (average European sector length of 597 Kms in 2001
versus 813 Kms in 2004). By 2005, the incumbent was serving 44 short haul
destinations from Dublin, an increase of 130% over 2001. Management also set in
place a structure to increase the daily aircraft utilisation and by 2005 each short
haul aircraft was operating an average of 9.4 hours a day, up by 2.5 hours per day
from 2000. In addition, the operational hours were extended by 4 hours per day,
as the first aircraft departed Dublin at 06:10 and the last aircraft arrived back to
base at 01:10, which allowed the incumbent to add more flights or to increase the
frequency (Mannion, 2006). The turnaround time at the provincial airports was
reduced from 45 to 30 minutes to become more closely aligned with Ryanair’s
performance.
Table 28 Aer Lingus’ route development 1999 – 2005 (Summer schedule)
Period Number of
direct routes
ex-Dublin
Weekly
Sectors
Ex- Dublin
Number of
direct routes
ex-Cork
Weekly
sectors
ex-Cork
Number of
direct routes
ex-Shannon
Weekly
sectors
ex-Shannon
Total Routes
Ex-Ireland
to Europe
Total weekly
Sectors ex-
Ireland to Europe
1999 26 1058 6 128 5 91 37 1277
2000 25 1021 5 118 5 93 35 1232
2001 19 924 4 122 4 88 27 946
2002 22 880 3 106 2 56 27 1042
2003 29 894 4 108 1 56 34 1058
2004 39 834 7 98 1 54 47 986
2005 44 876 10 138 1 54 55 1068
Source: Aer Lingus
3) Realignment of human resources and productivity with the new business
model:
i) Aer Lingus showed all the signs of a government owned airline that was
overstaffed: it employed 7,044 to transport 6.5 million passengers in 1999 and, by
the following year, this had been reduced to just 6,624 employees. However,
Walsh immediately set about changing the staffing mechanism at Aer Lingus by
instantly dismissing 600 temporary staff members and thereafter reduced the head
count by a third (around 1,845 jobs), including a 60% head reduction in the
management group. The job cuts were as follows;
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a. 38% reduction in managers (24 posts);
b. 33% reduction in clerical grades (563);
c. 33% reduction in operatives (427);
d. 32% reduction in information technology specialists (37);
e. 31% reduction in superintendents (93);
f. 31% reduction in cabin crew (476);
g. 28% reduction in technical grades (50);
h. 27% reduction in pilots (156); and
i. 27% reduction in specialists (19).
ii) Introduced a pay freeze for 2002 and 2003, and reduced time off for flight crews.
iii) To give staff incentives and boost morale, management (with government approval)
raised the employee stake at the airline from 5% to 14.9% under an Employee Share
Ownership Trust (ESOT) agreement.
iv) Table 29 (below) shows the productivity improvements at Aer Lingus from 1999 to
2004. Walsh’s management team had impressively enhanced productivity over the
period as the turnover per employee increased by 44% and each member of staff
generated €27,394 profit by 2004, as opposed to each staff member losing €7,375 in
2001. The increase in aircraft utilisation and a longer working day, enforced by
Walsh, positively impacted productivity as Aer Lingus added 9 new routes without
supplementing any additional aircraft. From 2001 to 2004 it increased the
passenger/aircraft ratio by 30%, while the increase in the number of passengers
carried per staff member was very impressive as it almost doubled over the period -
but it still remained distant to Ryanair’s performance as it carried 10,600 passengers
per employee in 2004. Walsh continued to publicise the poor performance of the
carrier in the media and frequently mentioned that the carrier could face imminent
closure unless the past culture of inefficiencies were resolved. Walsh also sold Aer
Lingus’ entire art collection, generating €500,000, and this strategy instilled a ‘fear
factor’ into employees.
Table 29 Productivity improvements at Aer Lingus 1999 – 2004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Staff 7,044 6,624 6,833 5,245 4,281 3,006
Aircraft 38 39 39 34 34 33
Passengers (m) 6.5 6.9 6.3 6.2 6.6 6.9
Turnover (€m) 1,134 1,372 1,097 958 888 906
Profit (€m) 71.6 79.9 -50.4 63 83 107
Turnover/staff (€) 161,016 207,201 160,544 182,650 207,428 231,951
Profit/staff (€) 10,165 12,062 -7,375 12,011 19,387 27,394
Profit/aircraft (€m) 1.8 2.1 -1.2 2.0 2.4 3.2
Passenger/aircraft 171,000 182,000 162,000 194,000 194,000 211,000
Passenger/staff 923 1,041 922 1,182 1,542 1,779
Source: Aer Lingus Accounts 2000 – 2005
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v) A survey conducted by Alan Long indicated that 77% of the Aer Lingus staff
members that he questioned stated that their workload had increased since 2001
(Long, 2006).
3) Radical changes in Distribution
i) O’Toole and Pilling (2003) indicated that the passenger processing costs at Aer
Lingus were €20 higher than Ryanair’s because its distribution channels relied
heavily on travel agents. Walsh widely claimed that distribution was the key to
gaining competitive advantage. The carrier removed the shamrock logo from the
tail fin of a number of its aircraft and replaced it with AerLingus.com livery,
demonstrating its willingness to lose its trademark link with tradition and heritage
in favour of an innovative and technological logo and gain competitive
advantage. From the period 2001 to 2003, Aer Lingus estimated that it reduced its
distribution costs by 56% (€76million) and that the majority of the cost savings
were achieved by simply reducing its dependency on travel agents - it reduced
their commission from 4% in 2002 to zero two years later, widely advertising its
aerlingus.com channel as an alternative, which bypassed GDS fees and
contributed to the savings on distribution costs. It imitated large parts of
Ryanair’s booking engine by incorporating a one-way fare for example, and the
website also reduced the workload on the call centre. By December 2003, 50% of
sales were generated over the web, climbing to around 70% at the end of 2004.
By 2007, a target of 85% of online sales is envisaged.
ii) The incumbent also used the webpage to generate additional revenue streams,
such as fees for changing a ticket, name changes, etc. It invested heavily in IT as
a means of reducing costs in the medium term and it automated its check-in
facilities in 2003 at Dublin and Cork airports, and shortly thereafter extended it to
other airports. The airline reported that some 52% of passengers used the
“FastPass” automated service by November 2004. Aer Lingus views this service
as a means of reducing airport and handling charges through reduced desk rental
and labour costs (Aer Lingus, 2004).
iii) By 2005, it was fully e-ticket compatible with other Oneworld alliance partners
(ATI, March 2005). IATA estimates that each e-ticket will save at least $9 in
processing costs over paper tickets and studies have shown that around 30% of all
intra-EU passengers had tickets that accommodated interlining in 2001 (DG
Competition Consultation Paper, 2001).
4) Retain the Aer Lingus’ differentiated products
i) Professional, efficient and friendly service. Kangis and O’Reilly (2003)
emphasised that the Aer Lingus’ brand represented quality, comfort and
hospitality, embroidered with an excellent customer service reputation. Connolly
(2002) also described that the Irish incumbent had developed a reputation for
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friendliness and service, enabling it to win countless accolades over the years.
Harrington et al. (2005) also argued Aer Lingus’ core strength was its customer
service component, a point at which it judged arch rival Ryanair to be most
exposed. Walsh built on this competency while taking Aer Lingus forward, and
the low prices coupled with a superior product created value for the customer
when compared with low cost carriers. Aer Lingus’ strategy was a twin track one,
namely to offer cheaper fares while maintaining its reputation as a service-
oriented airline. Furthermore, if a customer misses his or her flight or encounters
a cancelled flight, they can get the next available flight – space available - without
any extra cost. Such service propositions increase the perceived value for the
customer, which increases brand loyalty and, ultimately, revenues.
ii) Attractive schedule and interline facilities. Aer Lingus’ prided itself on an
attractive schedule and, at Dublin for example, it had 48.8% of the peak morning
departures101 (Mannion, 2006). A large survey conducted by O’Connell and
Williams (2005) concluded that over 30% of the passengers chose Aer Lingus
because of its attractive schedule and connectivity at Heathrow, as 40% were
interlining onwards to other carriers from there. On the North Atlantic market,
Coleman (2004) stated that around 300,000 passengers interline from American
Airlines to Aer Lingus annually.
iii) Quality. Walsh believed his business model of quality and product consistency,
allied with cheap fares, would win over the doubters by creating greater perceived
value than competitors in the eyes of the consumer.
iv) Reliability and on-time. O’Connell and Williams (2005) concluded that 20% of
Aer Lingus passengers choose the carrier because of its reliability. From the UK,
Aer Lingus had around 68% of their flights running on-time in 2000, and research
from over 23,000 flights unveiled that this had increased to 73% by 2004, while
the carrier had only 4.8% of its flights delayed by more than one hour
(Flightontime, 2004). While the battle between Aer Lingus and Ryanair raged, the
incumbent widely publicised that it safeguarded the welfare of passengers and
would not leave them stranded in the event of a problem with the flight.
v) Continue to serve primary airports. The incumbent continued servicing primary
airports as it provided more value to its customers.
vi) Frequent Flyer benefits. It retained its frequent flyer programme, entitled ‘Gold
Circle Club’, that was commissioned back in 1988, and continued to build on this
program by rewarding the loyalty of passengers for continued service.
vii) It retained its membership of the Oneworld Alliance102.
viii) It retained its airport lounges.
ix) It maintained its standard on allocated seating.
101 The peak morning departures were from 06:00 to 07:30
102 Aer Lingus has elected to leave the alliance in April 2007.
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5) Communicated its new proposition
Leading advertising academics, Rossiter et al. (1991), argue that brand attitude cannot
be formed, and intention to buy cannot occur unless brand awareness has occurred.
Sheehan et al. (2005) carried out a study on customers’ attitude to Southwest Airlines
after watching a 30-minute television program based on the carrier, and the results
indicated that attitudes were positively affected among those who were familiar with
the brand featured in the program, but who had never actually used the brand. Walsh
stipulated that advertising in the past may have focused on the luxury of business
travellers but that was no longer viable and realistic. In the past, Aer Lingus promised
more than they could deliver but now they delivered what was needed. They spent an
estimated €4 million on advertising in Ireland in 2002 and paid out a similar amount for
the UK market (Mitchell, 2003). Figure 35 (below) shows an example of how Aer
Lingus advertised its revamped product - very simple advertising is used, combining a
destination, a low price and a differentiating product feature. Typically, a single
destination is clearly visible, emphasising the use of primary airports, and the price is
also prominently placed - by using ‘from fares’ and one-way pricing, the tariffs look
more attractive. This is reinforced by including the phrase “including taxes + charges”,
an additional item that is often not advertised by budget carriers but sometimes
constitutes a sizable proportion of the total fare. The advertisement shown also alludes
to Aer Lingus’s differentiator of assigned seats, setting them apart from low cost
carriers. The brand is clearly visible, enticing the customer to book via aerlingus.com.
Finally, the [strapline] tries to capitalise on the airline’s experience as a full service
carrier, while emphasising its new low price structure: “Low Fares, Way Better.”
Figure 35. Example of Aer Lingus’ new approach to advertising
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5.4 Evolution of Aer Lingus’ key performance indicators
The ultimate proof of the sustainability of Aer Lingus’ turnaround strategy came about
after the implementation of the survival plan that produced a continuous return to
profit. Table 30 (below) shows the financial results of Aer Lingus through its transition
period 2001 to 2004. Management had radically changed the Aer Lingus’ business
model and achieved a marked improvement in the company’s financial performance.
However, the carrier’s turnover decreased by around 17% to €906 million by 2004
which reflects the organisation’s all-out drive to reduce fares and challenge Ryanair’s
aggressive pricing strategy. Its operating costs have fallen significantly, from €1.3
billion in 2000 to €810 million in 2004. However, the majority of the structural cost
changes occurred between 2001 and 2003 as costs had levelled off by 2004.
Management had transformed an operating loss of €52 million (net loss of €139
million) in 2001 into an operating profit of €67 million (net profit of €35 million) by
the following year – a remarkable return to profit. By 2003 this had further increased to
€83 million and by 2004 the carrier was sufficiently restructured to generate three
consecutive years of profitability. The company could look forward to expanding its
operations under the proven business plan. The low profit for 2004 was due to an
exceptional item, notably redundancies, as the workforce was reduced by a further
1,325 employees. In approximately six months, Walsh and his management team had
turned a significant loss into an altogether unexpected profit and they had turned Aer
Lingus into a role model for similar sized airlines.
It shows that the cost reduction initiatives and changes to the business model were now
positively impacting on profitability. The result of these significant cost cuts indicate
that Aer Lingus’ operating margin rose to 10.6% in 2004, while it was 4.7% in 2001.
Essentially, this means that Aer Lingus was making almost €0.11 cents on every Euro
of sales by 2004 instead of losing about €0.05 cents on every Euro in 2001. This
improvement in profitability has occurred because the fall in turnover over the five year
period (as a result low fares) has been less than the fall in its cost base. Walsh’s focus
on costs made the carrier leaner, flexible and more competitive, and had effectively
turned Aer Lingus into a role model for similar sized companies. The management
team closely focused on Liquidity Management which ensured that the working capital
and cash resources were sufficient to meet the operating and capital asset requirements
of the business.
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Table 30 Aer Lingus Financial Results (€000) (1999 – 2004)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Profitability
Turnover 906,836 888,298 1,170,936 1,097,100 1,372,419 1,207,681
Cost of Sales 659,503 651,598 893,970 905,107 970,025
Gross Profit 211,333 236,700 276,966 191,992 402,161 383,195
Gross Profita (%) 23.3% 26.6% 23.6% 17.5% 29.3% 31.7%
Operating Costs 810,522 805,155 900,738 1,149,326 1,296,904 1,065,166
Operating Profit 96,314 83,143 67,131 -52,226 79,931 95,868
O Oper. Marginb (%) 10.6% 9.3% 5.7% -4.7 % 5.8% 7.9%
Profit for year 1,236 69,217 35,315 -139,923 71,626 55,465
Shareholders Funds 366,204 321,868 255,603 223,921 363,264 289,966
ROCEc % 26.3% 25.8% 26.2% -23.3% 22.0% 33.0%
Activity
Trade Debtors 31,358 36,445 47,232 60,596 71,995 70,559
Debtors Daysd 12.6 14.9 14.7 20.1 19.1 21.3
Trade Creditors 48,440 32,954 29,085 51,192 63,723 55,815
Creditor Dayse 25.4 13.5 11.8 20.6 23.9 24.7
Liquidity
Current Assets 859,445 724,893 763,819 741,709 956,019 897,113
Curr. Liabilities 442,120 408,908 454,083 488,743 520,186 428,588
Current Ratiof 1.94 1.77 1.68 1.52 1.84 2.1
Op. Cash Flow 102,666 111,663 85,407 42,070 164,423 253,721
Financing
Long Term Liab 400,214 383,527 456,739 456,601 457,353 507,535
Gearingg % 109.3% 119.1% 178.7% 203.9% 125.9% 175.0%
Interest Cover -0.24 2.7 1.2 -5.3 2.33 2.1
Source: Analysis from Aer Lingus accounts from 1999-2004
a Gross Profit % is calculated by: Gross Profit/Turnover
b Operating margin % is calculated by: Operating Profit/Turnover
c Return on Capital Employed is calculated by: Operating Profit/Shareholders funds
d Debtors Days is calculated by: (Trade Debtors/Turnover)*365
e Creditor Days is calculated by: (Trade Creditors/Cost of Sales)*365
f Current Ratio is calculated by: Current Assets/Current Liabilities
g Gearing is calculated by: Long Term Liabilities/Shareholders Funds
The Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is used in finance as a measure of the returns
that a company is realising from its capital employed. The ratio can also be seen as
representing the efficiency with which capital is being used to generate revenue. Aer
Lingus’ ROCE has greatly improved over the last three years as it spectacularly
changed from -23.3% in 2001 to 26.3% by 2004 which was positively impacted by its
improving operating profit (Aer Lingus’ operating profit in 2004 had increased by
152% since 2001) together with an increase in shareholder funds.
Debtor turnover, expressed in days, has fallen in overall terms from 20.1 days in 2001
to a low of 12.6 days in 2004. It indicates the average time taken to collect trade debts
and it shows that Aer Lingus has improved its efficiency as it now takes 7.5 days less to
collect debts, which shows that the carrier has moved away from the government
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strings of inefficiency and has become more business-like. This result is two-fold.
Firstly, it shows the impact of online selling as the more seat inventory is sold via the
Aer Lingus website. In 2000 the carrier sold just 1% of their seats online but by 2004
this figure had grown to 66%, and the majority of the sales are conducted by credit
cards whose e-commerce platforms allow the transaction to be quickly credited to the
bank account of the airline, while travel agents use time consuming Bank Settlement
Plans (BSPs) which take weeks to be credited to the airline account. Secondly, the
airline has become a more effective negotiator and it has reduced the time it takes to
turn debtors into cash. Creditor turnover, expressed in days, has increased to 25.4 days
in 2004 from 20.6 in 2001. The poor financial risk of Aer Lingus is shown by the
change in trade creditors from 2001 to 2002 as the volume dropped by 74% because
companies were unprepared to offer credit facilities to an airline that had lost €139
million in 2001, and they also demanded their monies to be paid earlier (from 20.6 days
in 2001 to only 11.8 days in 2002). However, by 2004 the financial situation
significantly stabilised and Aer Lingus was again considered a solid company to offer a
credit extension to, and the airline capitalised on its improved financial condition by
negotiating longer periods to settle accounts. Ideally, the average creditor payment
period should be more than the average debtor collection period so as to improve the
cash position.
An organisation’s current ratio gives an indication of its ability to meet short-term debt
obligations: the higher the ratio, the more liquid the organisation. Morrell (1997, p68)
describes that a ratio of 1 is generally considered to have good short-term financial
strength but a ratio falling below this level indicates that the airline is not generating
adequate cash to meet its short-term obligations. The liquidity of Aer Lingus has
improved over the five-year period, rising from a low of 1.52:1 in 2001 to 1.94:1 in
2004. The current ratio for 2004 represents an improvement in terms of Aer Lingus’
ability to meet its short term debt repayments. The carrier’s long term liabilities have
also decreased over the years, which has improved the performance of the company’s
gearing ratio, and this is critical to the evaluation of a company’s financial structure
and bankruptcy risk. A gearing ratio may take many forms but it usually examines the
relative relationship between debt and shareholders’ funds (i.e. equity and assets of a
company). From 2001 to 2004, Aer Lingus’ gearing ratio halved and this is because the
carrier has chosen to lease ten of its A320s from ILFC rather than purchase the aircraft.
Morrell (1997) explained that gearing will decline as more assets are financed by
operating leases. Aer Lingus now depends less on fixed interest debt as a source of
finance relative to shareholders’ funds and is a welcome development, given that the
higher the gearing ratio, the greater the proportion of an organisation’s money that is
borrowed, which increases the risk. Moreover, an organisation with a high gearing ratio
may become very exposed should interest rates go up. Another measure that can be
used to assess whether an organisation is over-exposed to interest rate changes is the
interest cover ratio. It also describes the safety margin that a business has in terms of
being able to meet its interest obligation. A low value for the interest cover ratio means
140
that the business is potentially in danger of not being able to meet its interest
obligations. Morrell (1997, p65) suggested that this ratio is particularly important as it
shows the ability of the airline to meet interest payments on its debt, and banks
generally look for an interest cover of 2.5:1. Aer Lingus’ interest cover fell
dramatically in 2001 to -5.32, but has continuously improved since then as it had a
cover of 2.7 times in 2003. Coleman (2004) stated that this positively impacted the
decision by the banks Bank of Ireland, Lombard Aviation Capital and Macquarie Bank,
to finance its two Airbus A330 aircraft, raising approximately $70 million at a cost
significantly below market cost of funds. However, the interest cover for 2004
registered -0.24 times - this was due to exceptional items for the year, which amounted
to €102.5 million and was mostly related to the voluntary redundancy and early
retirement packages that were given to employees leaving the company.
Table 31 (below) shows the impact of the structural changes that Walsh and his team
applied at Aer Lingus through the turbulent times of 2001 to 2003. The carrier’s overall
capacity fell by 10%, which represented a closer alignment to demand, thus triggering
higher load factors. Aer Lingus’ reduction in fares had a cascading effect on its income
as yields fell by 23%, which subsequently reduced its unit revenues by 13%. However,
unit costs (excluding depreciation, amortisation, interest and operating leases) fell by
23% and, if these items were factored into the cost element, then overall costs would
have fallen by slightly over 30% in just three years (see below). Therefore, costs fell at
a much greater rate than yields and this result generated very impressive cash returns as
its cash flow on a per seat basis increased by over 150% from 2001 to 2003, clearly
indicating the importance of the cost reduction strategy. By 2004, the company had
over €800 million in cash, which earned €33.5 million in interest. Table 32 (below)
examines Aer Lingus’ core cost reductions from 2001 to 2003. Its overall costs had
fallen by 30% and management were targeting a further 5% reduction in 2004 to be
followed by further cuts beyond that. At the onset, Aer Lingus targeted to reduce costs
by €190 million but, as a result of the actions taken, described above, the airline
exceeded the target and reduced its costs by €344 million. High cost components that
could be easily stripped were quickly addressed, which included distribution, aircraft
hire and outsourcing. Aer Lingus sold its BAe 146s and two 737s (leased one back),
and moved to a standardised fleet. The arrival of the new Airbus aircraft lowered the
depreciation and maintenance costs significantly while at the same time new contracts
were negotiated by management to increase aircraft and crew productivity, which
further lowered the cost structure. Aer Lingus increasingly focused on a point-to-point
service and placed less emphasis on its hub and spoke operation since it did not operate
schedules that incorporated waves of departing flights like that seen at BA, Air France,
Lufthansa, Iberia, etc. The staff cuts and savings in overhead costs amounted to IR£148
million as management eliminated around one-third of the workforce, and by 2003 it
was carrying 11% more passengers than it did two years previously. Fuel is a major
expense to all carriers and Aer Lingus uses about 400,000 tonnes annually - a
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movement of $1 per tonne impacts its cost by $400,000. However, management
contained fuel costs by hedging around 40% of its fuel requirements 18 months in
advance (Coleman, 2004).
Table 31. Changes in Aer Lingus’ key performance indicators
2001-2003.
Table 32. Aer Lingus’s primary
areas of cost reduction 2001-2003
Seats 7,578 6,479 6,823 - 10%
Load factor RPK/ASK 72% 79% 81% + 9%
Yield €/RPK 0.114 0.110 0.087 - 23%
Unit Revenue €/ASK 0.082 0.087 0.071 - 13%
Unit Cost* €/ASK 0.074 0.071 0.056 - 24%
Cash/Seat €/Seat 22,363 50,692 56,398 +152%
* Excludes depreciation, amortisation, interest and operating leases
Source: Aer Lingus
Source: Aer Lingus
Unit 2001 2002 2003 (2001-03)
Total -30%
Distribution - 56%
Aircraft hire -51%
Misc. DOCs -49%
Overheads -36%
Fuel -31%
Airport charges -28%
Depreciation -21%
Maintenance -12%
Staff costs -21%
En-route +6%
Table 33 (below) shows that Aer Lingus has recovered from the crisis of 2001 to
become one of the best performing network carriers in Europe by the end of the
financial year 2003. It had the lowest fleet age and the highest load factor when
compared to other full service airlines, and its yield is on a similar platform to that of
Iberia or 64% higher than Ryanair’s. However, the difference between Aer Lingus’ cost
per seat and revenue per seat is very impressive (26%), and it matches that of easyJet
and is five-times higher than SAS or Alitalia. This shows that the structural changes
made at Aer Lingus have greatly improved its competitive position as its operating
margin was the highest (9.3%) among its peers, and it has integrated many important
differentiators into its business model but still retained a low unit cost, which has
allowed it to challenge the low cost carriers.
Table 33. Peer Benchmarking of European airlines (financial year ending 2003)
Home Population (m) 4.0 8.2 40.3 19.0 58.1 7.5 --------- -------------
Passengers (m) 6.6 7.1 25.6 19.3 22.5 10.7 23.1 20.3
Employees 4,281 7,167 24,441 9,147 22,126 8,072 2,302 3,372
Aircraft (S-H) 27 76 122 164 157 61 72 74
Aircraft (L-H) 7 12 27 10 25 20 0 0
Total Seats 6,823 12,798 34,363 25,268 33,709 15,785 11,368 10,576
Avg. Fleet Age 4.6 6.1 8.5 8.7 9.7 5.6 7.3 6.0
Load Factor 81% 70% 74% 63% 70% 60% 81% 84%
Yield (€/RPK) 0.087 0.077 0.088 0.120 0.095 0.068 0.053 0.078
Cost*/ASK (€) 0.056 0.042 0.055 0.073 0.063 0.040 0.024 0. 063
Revenue per Seat (€) 130,190 139,182 133,424 139,235 128,606 139,622 81,683 136,644
Cost per Seat (€) 102,798 119,793 113,437 132,719 122,389 137,675 45,827 110,116
and Cost per Seat (%) 26% 16.1% 17.6% 4.9% 5.1% 1.4% 78.2% 24.1%
Difference Revenue
* Excludes depreciation, amortisation, interest and operating leases
Source: Company accounts
Operating Margin 9.3% 2.8% 3.5% 6.5% -8.8% -12.8% 23.2% 5.2%
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5.5 The Response of European incumbents to low cost carriers
ABN AMRO (2005) gives the positioning of European carriers that have responded to
low cost carriers and have found that Aer Lingus restructured itself the most in order to
react to the low cost carriers, as shown below in Figure 36. The chart also shows that
the two other network carriers that most reacted to low cost carriers were British
Airways and Lufthansa, but the latter did not internally reform itself as much as some
of the other carriers. These two incumbents are now described in some detail (below) to
outline the strategies that they implemented to counteract the threat posed by budget
carriers.
Figure 36. European network carriers’ response to low cost carriers.
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Source: Adaptation from ABN AMRO (2005)
5.5.1 The response of British Airways
Management has implemented numerous changes which have transformed the financial
results of BA’s short-haul operations from a loss of £172 million in 2001 to a profit of
$7 million by 2006. The following is an outline of the core strategies that they changed:
1) Rationalised the network.
i) British Airways did not have a seamless, short-haul airline, but a collection of
strategically diverse carriers, such as Go, Deutsche BA, Air Liberté, Bral,
Brymon, Maersk Air and CityFlyer Express, each of which was an
independent/quasi-autonomous business with separate management and sales
divisions. It sold Go as it cannibalised its own sales and restricted management’s
ability to cut costs at the mainline carrier. It also sold Air Liberté and Deutsche
143
BA. Regional subsidiaries, British Regional Airlines Group (BRAL) and Brymon
Airways, were merged to form British Airways CitiExpress. Maersk Air was re-
branded under the name Duo Airways following a management buy-out of the
Birmingham-based carrier, while CityFlyer Express was reabsorbed into BA’s
mainline short-haul operation at Gatwick. It also realigned capacity with demand
as it replaced B767s to Oslo, for example, with A320s, and closed routes to
secondary airports on the continent. Its short-haul fleet was reduced from 234
aircraft in 2001 to 179 by 2005, and subsequently its short-haul capacity (ASKs)
was reduced to 21% in 2005/06 from 23% in 2001/02.
ii) BA operated a twin hub policy at Heathrow and Gatwick. It restructured its
Gatwick hub to focus on leisure passengers, and its network there provides high
frequency, point to point leisure services on its 43 routes, with 15% of its short-
haul services connecting to BA’s long haul network at Gatwick, while the
Heathrow network retained a two class service that interconnects extensively to
its long-haul operation.
iii) In January 2006, BA CitiExpress, the loss-making UK regional airline, was
renamed as BA Connect in an effort to make it more “distinct” in the market
place. It included the following strategies on all routes (excluding London City):
 Single-class cabins
 One-way fares were reduced by 40% (compared to BA CitiExpress)
 Open seating arrangement
 Introduced pay-on-board meal and beverage services, however free in-flight
meals remained on London City routes
 Route frequency was a differentiating feature
 BA Connect reduced its fleet by 40 aircraft since 2001, which simplified its
fleet from 9 aircraft types to 3, and it reduced its number of bases from 15 to 8
BA Connect continued to under perform financially as it only managed to
minimally curtail its losses from £27 million in 2005 to £20 million a year later,
while transporting around 3.4 million passengers a year. Subsequently, Walsh
(who moved from Aer Lingus to BA) informed management to transform the
carrier into a profit making venture or it would face closure by 2008. In the
interim, BA Connect was sold to Flybe in return for a 15% stake equity in the
enlarged regional airline which will gradually rebrand the BA subsidiary.
However, British Airways retained BA Connect’s London City based flights.
2) Distribution changes
i) BA’s distribution/selling costs were reduced from 18% in 1994/95 to 7.7% by
2004/05. In 2003 it reduced this cost by £212 million and by a further £100 million
in the following year. It has achieved this by the following methods:
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 Eliminated travel agent commission.
 Around 60% of all short-haul travel is made on BA.com, while one-third of
BA’s total passengers booked online in 2006.
 In the 1990s, BA had at least 70 ‘selling classes’ and by 2004 this had been
reduced to 25.
 Fare restrictions such as Saturday night stay, advanced purchasing, etc., were
eliminated
 Yield management systems were structured on a similar platform as budget
carriers with the fares increasing as the departure date approaches.
 BA restructured its flexible tickets to three simple grades: flexible fares, fares
that can be changed for a fee, and restricted fares that are unchangeable.
 BA.com allowed customers to manage their frequent flyer programs online
and to customise their own bookings, such as seat selection, meal choice, etc.
One-third of all BA customers now use the e-commerce platform to customise
their itinerary.
 BA.com also enabled ‘upselling’ to premium economy (more legroom) which
had increased yield by 1.5% on tickets sold through the website.
 It introduced dynamic packaging where customers can assemble their own
holiday components, such as car and hotel
3) Labour cost reduction
Wave after wave of cost cutting campaigns have been launched since 2001. The 2002-
04 ‘Future size and shape’ restructuring program saved £460 million in labour costs,
followed by a further push to save £450 million - and this was followed by yet another
cost reduction campaign, called ‘Fit for Five’ (moving to Terminal 5), which was
estimated to remove an additional €300 million in labour cost103. Similar to the
strategy adopted at Aer Lingus, Walsh will eliminate more than one-third of all 1,715
management positions by March 2008, including 200 senior and 400 middle level
positions, saving the company £50 million by the end of 2006/07 financial year.
Productivity has significantly increased as a result of the downsizing as the
productivity per employee (ATK) increased by 40% to 53.3 million in 2005/06 from
2001/02.
Overall, British Airways has come a long way in reforming its business model but
needs to continuously benchmark its costs against low cost carriers to determine the
extent of change required to remain competitive in the short-haul market (British
Airways reports and accounts 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Aviation Strategy, April
2004; ATI, January 2006; ATI, May 2003; Pilling, 2006).
103 British Airways’ short haul and long haul aircraft will be positioned at Terminal 5, where economies
of scale will reduce costs by basing all staff, equipment and logistics at the new site. T5 is in the middle
of both runways enabling taxi and turnaround times to be reduced.
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5.5.2 The response of Lufthansa
Lufthansa was the second airline shown in Figure 36 above, to have significantly
reacted to low cost carriers but did not internally reform itself as much as some of the
other carriers. Lufthansa’s capture of a ‘bull in a china shop’ is reflective of its
numerous court battles with Ryanair with regard to its misleading advertising
campaigns over the naming of its secondary airports. Lufthansa tried to block Ryanair
from adopting Frankfurt Hahn as a designated airport for Frankfurt, and similarly for
adopting Niederrhein Airport as a designated Dusseldorf airport. Numerous clashes
over fares also evolved. Klingberg (2005) reported that the low cost carriers increased
their market share between Germany and the UK by 23% from 2002 to 2003,
triggering an average 23% drop in the average fares of Lufthansa. Adding to its
problems, Air Berlin raised €235m from an IPO in May 2006 and has accelerated the
process of consolidation in Germany by acquiring Germania Express and Deutsche
BA. The merger increased the pressure on Lufthansa as its combined fleet had grown
to 64 aircraft and was carrying around 20 million passengers by 2006. The following
is an outline of the core strategies that Lufthansa changed:
1) Rationalised the network.
i) Lufthansa de-peaked its Frankfurt and Munich hubs by moving around 25 flights
per day to off peak times, and has reorganised its regional feeder flights to catch
its departing waves of international flights. Subsequently, these hubs have
become two of the most punctual hubs in Europe104 and have allowed the
incumbent to reduce its short haul turnaround times to 40 minutes105, increasing
productivity by 11%. Its short-haul flights have also incorporated a ‘Ping-pong
strategy’ that enables crews to fly between two airports all day, minimising pilot
planning and scheduling complexity.
ii) Lufthansa’s five regional airlines, namely Air Dolomiti, Augsburg Airlines,
Contact Air, Eurowings as well as Lufthansa Cityline, mounted a challenge to
budget carriers while at the same time constraining their growth. The arrangement
between Lufthansa and its regional affiliates stipulates that the commercial side is
the responsibility of Lufthansa, while the operations are the responsibility of the
regional associates.
2) Germanwings
i) Lufthansa’ affiliate Eurowings106 set up a low cost carrier subsidiary called
Germanwings in late 2002. It opened bases at four primary German hubs that
partitioned the German market as: Cologne/Bonn covered cities to the west of
104 Luftansa’s punctuality at Munich was 79.9% for 3Q 2005, while Frankfurt was 77.9% (AEA, 2006).
105 At the decentralised stations Lufthansa turns around aircraft in 25 minutes (30 minutes when crew is
changed).
106 Lufthansa has a 49% equity partnership in Eurowings since April 2004.
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Germany; Stuttgart covered the southwest; Berlin Schoenefeld encompassed
destinations from the north-east; and Hamburg was serving cities from the north
of Germany. However, this strategy must be questionable as it is not directly
challenging low cost carriers who were largely operating from secondary airports.
ii) Crew costs were contained by establishing a two-tier pay structure between
Lufthansa mainline pilots and Germanwings/Condor flight crews. The structure
also allowed mainline pilots to switch to a more senior position at Germanwings,
albeit on a lower salary structure.
iii) 100% online booking and has a frequent flyer program linked to the mainline
program.
iv) Around 50% of the passengers on Germanwings are travelling for business
purposes and the carrier has offered a ‘corporate package’ that includes reduced
fares, ability to change flights and cancel flights. However, this strategy is
confusing for companies and it may dilute its own corporate travel policy at the
mainline carrier.
3) Product and pricing changes
i) Lufthansa kept its focus on its short haul business passengers by adopting the
following strategies: configuring the business cabin107 to a four-abreast seating
configuration; fast-tracking passengers through airport security; more lounges at
domestic airports; and “improved onboard service” (i.e. catering). This strategy
has been effective in halting the decline of the short-haul business traveller as the
number of passengers fell from 32% in 2001 to 18% in 2003, but since the
revamped seating arrangement, introduced in April 2004, the numbers have
stabilised and, by the end of 2005, the number of business passengers travelling in
short-haul business class has remained at 18%.
ii) It simplified its economy fares into two levels of flexibility. Firstly, its flexible
ticket does not incur a re-booking charge and allows the ticket to be refunded.
Secondly, its inflexible ticket is non-refundable and is subject to a €25 rebooking
charge.
iii) It introduced budget economy flights, called ‘BetterFly’ fares, for €99 return
inclusive of taxes, and the incumbent reiterated that this has provided real
competition to the low cost carriers - and especially to Air Berlin.
4) Airport equity
In October 2005 Lufthansa purchased a 9.1% stake in Fraport, the operator of Frankfurt
airport (Lufthansa’s biggest hub). The airport group also owns equity in other airports
that include Antalya, Hahn, Hannover, Lima and Saarbrucken. Strategically, Fraport
owns 73% of Franfurt Hahn, which is the German base of Ryanair, and this equity
107 Lufthansa is the only European airline that offers four abreast seating in short-haul business class. It
also installed new seating on all its 145 short-haul aircraft in both economy and business class.
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investment by Lufthansa could lead to higher charges for the budget carrier and a lower
charge for the incumbent at the main airport as Ryanair pays €4.35 per passenger at
Hahn, while at Frankfurt main a full service airline pays €17 per passenger.
5) Inadequate internal reform of Lufthansa
Table 34 (below) shows that Lufthansa has not restructured its internal process like that
of Aer Lingus or British Airways. Comparing 2005 with 2000, the only notable areas of
cost success have been in sales commission, which went down by 44% over the period,
and its foreign currency translation losses also decreased. Unlike Aer Lingus and
British Airways, Lufthansa’s staff costs have increased by more than a third and they
have also been unable to curtail staff expenses, which increased by 15%. BA had
limited the rise in fuel costs to 48% over the period 2000 to 2005, while Lufthansa’s
fuel costs increased by 78%. Similarly, it did not contain costs with the other expenses.
Unlike British Airways, its employee productivity remained relatively level from 2000
to 2006 (increased from 2002 to 2004 and fell again by 2006).
Table 34. Lufthansa’s cost breakdown 2000 - 2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005 v
2000
Staff costs 3,625 4,481 4,660 4,612 4,813 4,853 +34%
Staff expenses 503 585 538 524 509 579 +15%
Fuel 1,499 1,621 1,347 1,352 1,819 2,662 +78%
Purchased services 2,869 3,692 3,610 3,563 3,883 3,802 +33%
Rents and maintenance 475 595 648 617 581 594 +25%
EDP Distribution 236 259 245 223 242 240 +2%
Sales commission 1,181 1,078 997 868 790 662 -44%
Advertising 155 146 153 149 203 213 +37%
Foreign currency losses 445 431 535 469 298 345 -22%
Charges 2,250 2,311 2,239 2,290 2,542 2,543 +13%
Depreciation & amortisation 1,022 1,714 1,243 1,930 1,112 1,398 +37%
Other 1,143 1,592 1,282 1,264 1,057 1,127 -1%
Source: Lufthansa annual report, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005
Lufthansa urgently needs to curtail its costs as they will become uncompetitive, and
low cost carriers could become a much greater threat (Lufthansa annual report, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
5.5.3 The Response of the other European network carriers
Iberia, which is positioned in the ‘Co-existence’ quadrant in Figure 36, has been in
competition with chartered airlines for the last twenty years as UK charters, such as
Monarch, Britannia, Air 2000, MyTravel Airways and JMC, and German charters, such
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as Condor and LTU, have serviced Spanish beach resorts in competition with the
Spanish incumbent. Iberia set up its own chartered carrier, called Viva108, as a
counteroffensive mechanism to gain market share in the Spanish charter market. Iberia
also faced competition from Spanish domestic carriers, such as Aviaco, Air Europa and
Panair, and set up its own subsidiary, called Air Nostrum, in 1997 to compete more
cost effectively on the shorter seat-mile operation. However, low cost carriers have
now largely replaced the charters, as Baker (September 2005) stated that 29% of
tourists holidaying in Spain in 2004 had used budget carriers. By 2002, Iberia had cut
capacity by 5.6% which positively impacted load factors and reduced staff by 2,300
employees. It also reduced its fares by 20-30% on non-peak flights and has tightened
its relationship with British Airways by jointly co-operating on matters such as pricing
and scheduling on routes between London to Barcelona and Madrid. In addition, Iberia
replicated its earlier strategy of addressing competition with a similar airline business
model as it took a 20% stake in a new Barcelona-based low-cost carrier, Clickair.
There are few low cost carriers based in France, and a report cited by Anker (2005)
indicated that low cost carriers only penetrated 4.4% of French domestic markets by
early 2005, while they constituted 18.6% of its intra-European market with Air France
and its partners having the remaining share. Flight International (2004) outlined that the
incumbent holds 53% of the slots at Paris Orly and 74% at Paris Charles de Gaulle,
which represents 60% of the total French airport traffic. This fortress position has
caused an imbalance as easyJet carried 3.2 million passengers in 2003 to and from
France, compared with 44.1 million carried by Air France and its affiliates. Brit Air
(Air France subsidiary) ceased services from Gatwick to Strasbourg, claiming unfair
competition from Ryanair by stating that its service was ‘subsidised’ by Strasbourg’s
local chamber of commerce and alleging that it constituted illegal state aid (ATI, July
2003). Ryanair subsequently moved its services to Baden Baden just 40km away, and
Brit Air recommenced its original services - clearly Air France exerted its political
clout in the French courts to limit competition.
Alitalia has been the weakest performer in responding to the low cost carriers. By 2004,
there were twenty-five low cost carriers operating to the Italian market and,
consequently, it witnessed a 180% increase in low cost seat capacity from 2002-04.
Ryanair and VolareWeb accounted for two-thirds of these departures - however, the
latter collapsed in 2004. Ryanair has also encroached into the Italian domestic market -
the first foreign carrier to do so. It now serves 15 airports with bases at Milan Bergamo,
Rome Ciampino and Pisa, and Doganis (2005) noted that Ryanair had captured 43% of
the total scheduled traffic between Italy and London by 2004. Alitalia has many
problems, including an aging fleet, frequent strikes, management changes, and is
burdened with net debts of €1.8 billion, while net losses of €2.4 billion have been
108 Iberia sold Viva to Iberojet for €18 million in December 2003 (ATI, December 2003).
149
accumulated to date. It was granted access to a €400 million state-guaranteed bridging
loan, which signals that it was unable to secure financing from banking institutions.
However, out of the assorted European incumbents mentioned above, Aer Lingus has
been the genuine reformer and has successfully adapted its strategy to produce
transformational changes that have been very effective in competing with low cost
carriers.
5.6 Changes in Aer Lingus to 2006
Walsh remained aggressive over further cost cuts: he wanted to trim another 1,300 jobs
and to privatise the national airline, even proposing a management buyout of Aer
Lingus. The government concluded that the direction of the national carrier was no
longer in line with the vision of Walsh, and he subsequently left the carrier in February
2005. Mannion replaced Walsh in August of the same year – he was seconded from
Emirates which had posted 18 years of consecutive profits and achieved a 14.7%
operating margin in 2004/05, which is comparable to the margins attained by the low
cost carriers. Table 35 (below) shows that Aer Lingus continued to exert pressure on its
unit costs (excluding fuel) as they fell by almost 16% from 2004 to 2006. Walsh’s staff
attrition process was still taking effect as additional employees left the company and
investments in IT substituted the need for staff as passengers increasingly used kiosks
and checked in by web. In 2004, Walsh negotiated new work practices with cabin crew
that reduced the number of cabin crew per aircraft, and introduced a strategy called ‘Fly
anywhere’, which consisted of clauses that forced cabin crew to transition from a short-
haul route to a long-haul route if required. Aer Lingus paid €200 million for airport
charges in 2006, down by 2.5% over 2004 levels, and the carrier negotiated more
favourable landing charges at primary airports. An increased proportion of its capacity
was also serving the Eastern European and Spanish destinations which had lower
airport charges than Western Europe. The carrier also achieved economies of scale
from expansion of its network while maintaining relatively fixed direct operating costs
and overhead costs. It also reduced its ground and catering charges by 27% through
outsourcing to third party service providers, which eliminated the associated cost for
staff, equipment and rent. It also provided catering to other carriers at Dublin and began
turning this cost component into a revenue generator. Maintenance also fell by 25%
over the three year period as the carrier transitioned to an all Airbus fleet by 2006 with
an average aircraft age of just 3 years. The cost effective maintenance contract that
Walsh had successfully secured remains in force until 2008, and this also impacted its
reduced maintenance charge. En-route charges increased as a result of the carrier’s
extending route network and its average stage length was also increasing. Distribution
continued to decrease as the number of people booking through the net increased from
66% in 2004 to 73% by 2006. The website had been restructured to accommodate a
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truly European audience as it had 8 languages, including Polish and Portuguese. Fuel
represented the carriers’ largest change in operating cost, growing from €61.7 million
in 2004 to €200 million by 2006, but its fuel hedging strategies contained this cost as it
secured each barrel at $38 in 2005 and $53 in 2006. It hedged 31% of its fuel
requirements at $60 for the last six months of 2007 (Aer Lingus annual reports 2007,
2006, 2005; Mannion 2006).
By 2006, Aer Lingus had developed two other core areas of revenue, which included
income from ancillary sources and cargo. Aer Lingus imitated the success of Ryanair’s
ancillary revenue strategy in order to increase revenues. Ryanair’s home page offers a
virtual shopping mall experience with offers for car insurance, personal loans, pre-
arranged airport parking, airport motor coach transfers, airport lounge access, co-
branded credit cards, holiday packages, bed & breakfast stays, and golfing in Ireland.
Aer Lingus’ ancillary revenue increased from €4.9 per passenger in 2004 to €7.3 per
passenger by 2006 (Aer Lingus annual report, 2007). Pilling (2004) stated that Aer
Lingus’ car hire booking increased by 54% when it integrated this component as part of
the transaction flow. The airline has also turned its baggage service into a profit centre
as it began charging all short-haul passengers €4 ($5.10) per bag if booked in advance
through the website, and €8 per bag if checked-in at the airport (ATI, August 2006).
The carrier has retained its 30 minute turnaround times on its short-haul routes and re-
introduced cargo on its short-haul routes, concentrating on high value freight, such as
software, computer accessories, etc., which are easily loaded/unloaded, but 90% of its
cargo revenues are derived from its long-haul operation - cargo overall contributed
almost €50 million in 2006.
Table 35. Aer Lingus unit costs (€/ASK) from 2004 - 2006
2006 2005 2004 % Change
2004 to 2006
Staff 1.57 1.62 1.81 -13.2%
Airport Charges 1.17 1.16 1.20 -2.5%
Ground Operations and Catering 0.53 0.58 0.73 -27.4%
Maintenance 0.42 0.49 0.56 -25.0%
En-route charges 0.29 0.28 0.27 +7.4%
Distribution costs 0.25 0.27 0.32 -21.8%
Other 0.03 0.02 0.02 +50.0%
Total Unit Costs (ex-fuel) 4.24 4.38 4.91 -15.8%
Fuel 1.16 0.90 0.78 +48.7%
Total Unit Cost 5.41 5.28 5.69 -4.9%
Source: Aer Lingus annual accounts 2004, 2005, 2006
The route structure of Aer Lingus is almost unrecognisable when the network in 2001
is compared against the network in 2006, as shown below in Figure 37 and Figure 38.
In 2001 it was operating to 16 European destinations with a mixed fleet of 39 aircraft
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that comprised of BAe 146s, Boeing 737s and Airbus 320s. To ensure that it
formulated a challenge to Ryanair, management at Aer Lingus opened up 43 extra
routes and, by 2006, it was operating to 74 destinations with a standard fleet of 34
Airbus aircraft. Subsequently, its hub at Dublin airport has experienced 15 years of
continuous growth and a passenger throughput of 21.1 million passengers in 2006, up
by 2.7 extra passengers over the previous year. In response to the growth, the airport is
building a low cost terminal to be operational by 2009, and a new runway is also
earmarked. Ryanair has firm commitments to acquire 140 more 737-800s (net of five
older 737-800 retirements) through to the end of the fiscal period 2012, as well as
options for an additional 179 737-800 aircraft. Some of this additional capacity will be
deployed at Dublin, taking advantage of the low cost terminal’s favourable charges -
this mounts increasing pressure on Aer Lingus to sustain its present market share and to
find additional strategies that will increase its present customer base. However, Ryanair
has now set its sights at Shannon and by mid 2006 it had positioned four aircraft at the
base and serviced 24 destinations, while Aer Lingus only operated one short-haul route
to Heathrow four times daily from Shannon. The incumbent elected to concentrate its
Southern operations at Cork, positioning four A320s serving 16 destinations, thus
challenging Ryanair on airport location. However, research by O’Connell and Williams
(2005) suggested that Ryanair passengers were travelling 44% further than Aer Lingus
passengers to reach their departure airport in order to avail of a lower fare, while
Lawton (2002) and Doganis (2001) have also referred to the fact that European
passengers flying on low cost carriers are travelling further to reach their departure
airport. Thus, Aer Lingus must urge caution and remain competitive at its Cork base as
there is evidence that passengers are willing to switch, despite the inconvenience of
travelling to Shannon.
Figure 37. Aer Lingus European route
structure 2001
Figure 38. Aer Lingus European route
structure 2006
Aer Lingus withdrew its membership from the Oneworld alliance as it no longer fitted
into its changed business strategy, and replaced it with extensive bilateral agreements
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with British Airways and American Airlines, its two primary interline partners. It has
also provided a linkup with JetBlue at JFK, allowing passengers to take onward
connections with the low fare carrier. Aer Lingus’ launched an IPO in October 2006
and the proceeds from the sale of the new shares were intended to be used to finance
the airline’s fleet expansion, as well as a one-off contribution to its pension fund. After
the exercise of the over-allotment option, the government’s stake was reduced to
28.29%. Shortly thereafter, Ryanair acquired 16% of the formerly state-run airline
which represented a departure from the Group’s focus on the low-cost airline sector.
The IPO offered shares at €2.80 ($3.56) per share, thus valuing Aer Lingus at €1.5
billion as the carrier was deemed attractive given its net cash post-IPO of around €1.1
billion (before operating leases of €350-400 million), prized landing slots at Heathrow
and a fleet of 17 owned aircraft (largely short haul and less than 3 years old). Days
later, Ryanair increased its equity in two staged phases totalling 25.22% equity. The
Aer Lingus board unanimously rejected Ryanair’s takeover proposal, which was
blocked by the major shareholders, including: the Government, 28.29%; Aer Lingus
Employee Share Ownership Trust, 13%; the Aer Lingus pilots pension fund which
increased equity to 2.27%; and Denis O’Brien, a businessman that O’Leary had
previously infuriated by advertising a new route from Dublin to Malta to highlight his
tax exile status, acquired a further 2.1% of the airline’s shares. All refused to sell
onwards to Ryanair. However, raising its ownership of Aer Lingus above 25 percent
will afford Ryanair increased rights to meddle in the key decision-making of its major
Irish competitor. Ryanair could wield a blocking vote at extraordinary general
meetings, when Aer Lingus chiefs could be seeking shareholder approval to buy
airlines, expand route networks or make other strategic decisions to improve its head-
to-head competition with Ryanair.
5.7 The response of the charter airlines to low cost carriers
These airlines usually offer flights as part of a holiday package that also includes
transfers and hotels, most of which provided by vertically integrated tour operators.
Europe accounts for over 90% of the world’s non-scheduled passenger traffic, while
vacation traffic in the US and Asia takes place on scheduled carriers. The operating
business model of the charter’s encompasses very similar concepts to that of the low
cost carriers. Charter airlines were the first to operate on low cost principles and they
gain their cost efficiencies through the following characteristics:
 Operate high seating capacity aircraft (e.g. A321 with 220 seats; A330-200 with
360 seats; B767-300 with 328 seats).
 High utilisation of aircraft and flight crews (fly throughout the night);
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 Capacity closely matches demand. This allows charter airlines to attain very high
load factors - in the range of 85-90% (flights are pre-sold to large tour operators)
while poor flights are cancelled or consolidated.
 Schedule is optimised as many flights arrive at tourist destinations at unsuitable
hours (i.e. 00:00 – 06:00). This is possible because passengers are immediately
transferred from the airport to their awaiting hotels by coaches which are part of the
vertical integration supplied by the tour operators.
 Charters operate to secondary airports and they avoid peak time operations at
primary airports.
 Distribution, administration and finance expenses are undertaken by the tour
operator parent company.
 Vertical integration spreads the risk.
Consequently the unit operating costs of charter airlines are around half those of
Europe’s full service airlines and more closely aligned to that of Ryanair (Williams
2001). Much of the European charter market involves short to medium distance
journeys, with the average sector flown by the larger charter carriers being typically
around 2,500 km. Low cost scheduled airlines not surprisingly have taken the
opportunity to enter the shorter distanced routes and have been able to capture many
of these passengers. The greater flexibility offered to the traveller by low cost airlines
particularly in respect of service frequency, their easily accessed fares and their
success at convincing customers that they offer the lowest prices have been the key
factors in bringing about this transformation.
UK CAA data shows that the charter traffic between the UK and Malaga fro example
had peaked in 2000 with 2.4 million passengers and by 2006, traffic had fallen to less
than 900,000 passengers. By contrast, the scheduled traffic had quadrupled over the
same period to over 4 million; nearly all of the increase was attributed to low cost
carriers. The majority of charter airlines throughout Europe had witnessed a sharp
decline in their short-haul markets as they continued to lose passengers to low cost
carriers. In response to this encroachment charter airlines have responded in different
ways and the following outlines some of the strategies adopted.
 Monarch, MyTravel and Thomsonfly began operating scheduled services.
Monarch has undergone the largest transformation. It began operating scheduled
services to a small number of its traditional holiday charter destinations in Spain
and Portugal back in 1983, but has considerably expanded its scheduled offerings,
doubling the number of scheduled passengers that it carries every three years. By
2006 Monarch was carrying more half of its passengers (3 million) on scheduled
services by 2006 and the remaining 2.8 million on charter flights.
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 MyTravel and Thomsonfly opted to establish subsidiary companies to operate low
cost scheduled services. MyTravel’s incursion into the low cost scheduled market
began in October 2002 in the guise of MyTravelLite and lasted three years before
being subsumed into the charter airline, at a time when the MyTravel Group was
experiencing severe financial difficulties. Thomsonfly emerged two years later,
the scheduled low cost arm of the Thomson Group, in effect a subsidiary of its
charter carrier, Britannia Airways.
 The tour operators have been consolidating the market in order to take advantage
of scale economies and control supply. Over a ten year period from 1980s to
1990s there were multiple cross border mergers and acquisitions of charter airlines
and Williams (2001) researched that by the late 1990s, there were four major tour
operators in the UK and four operating in the German market, accounting for over
80% of the charter market in the UK and Germany. The industry continued to
restructure itself and by 2004 there were two tour operating pan-European giants,
notably TUI and Thomas Cook. Consolidating the market strengths the brand and
increases the market share but purchasing other carriers in order to gain such an
advantage is an expensive strategy as it increases costs as a mix of aircraft, staff,
computer systems, etc. are combined – adding complexity to the existing airline.
 First Choice’s strategy of reducing its dependence on short haul mainstream
holiday destinations, developing a better quality long haul product, and acquiring
specialist niche market tour operators has proved successful (Air Transport World,
2005). From 2003 – 2006 the carrier reduced its short-haul market by around
10% while it increased its medium and long-haul market by 5.4% and 4.7%
respectively. Table 36 below gives details of the company’s share of passengers
by length of haul between 2003 and 2006. Analysis from UK CAA data indicates
that charter airlines have been increasingly adopting First Choice’s type of
strategy as the charter airlines have been focusing on longer-haul flights. In 2000
around 2.5 million passengers travelled on charter airlines to long-haul
destinations from the UK and this doubled to 5 million by 2006. Charter flights to
North Africa, predominantly Egypt, and Central America, mainly Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and Mexico, have increased substantially and nearly all of
the charter traffic to the US is to Florida. These are all destinations that are outside
the operating capability of low cost carriers and remain safe unless long-haul low
cost carriers begin emerging. Other markets being capitalised be charter airlines
include day-return flights to Lapland, away soccer matches, etc., whereby the
aircraft waits at the airport for the passengers to return – a strategy which is not
compatible with the business model of the low cost carriers.
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Table 36 Split of First Choice Charter Airline passengers by length of haul
Short-haul (%) Medium-haul (%) Long-haul (%) Passengers (Millions)
2003 44.6 49.9 5.6 2.9
2004 41.0 52.8 6.2 2.8
2005 36.5 56.4 7.1 2.7
2006 34.4 55.3 10.3 2.5
Source: First Choice Annual Reports
5.8 Conclusion
In its early days, Aer Lingus had all the symptoms of the ‘Distressed State Airline
Syndrome’ - it was overstaffed, highly unionised, inefficient and over politicised, and
charged fares that were beyond the means of the traveller. The licensing of Ryanair
changed forever the dynamics of airline competition within Ireland, as fares
immediately reduced and the carrier opened up several routes to the UK, based on the
success of its Dublin-London route. The minnow continuously clawed market share
from the incumbent but its connectivity links at Heathrow and its transatlantic network
buffered the severity of Ryanair’s advances. The new millennium had a cascading
effect on Aer Lingus as its short-haul and long-haul markets were in a downward spiral
due to external events completely out of its control, and its strategies to circumnavigate
the new problems were outdated, causing it to lose millions every day it operated.
Walsh’s innovative and disruptive management approach immediately set about to
overhaul and restructure a government owned airline that was not akin to sudden
changes. New benchmarks to determine the extent of change required were
implemented which produced a series of cascading strategies, such as mass layoffs, a
complete overhaul of the distribution system, fleet standardisation, productivity
enhancements and imitation of the low cost model as much as possible, while keeping
vital product differentiators such as customer service reputation, primary airports,
attractive schedules, frequent flyer programs, connectivity, etc. The simple secret to its
success was because the fall in turnover over the five year period (as a result low fares)
had been less than the fall in its cost base. In addition, it retained vital service
differentiators which were increasingly impacting on profitability. By 2004 the carrier
was sufficiently restructured to generate three consecutive years of profitability and the
company could look forward to expanding its operations under the proven business
plan. Other carriers, such as British Airways, are following similar methodologies,
while Lufthansa have failed to address unit costs
Aer Lingus’ new culture of cost reduction is now ingrained in its new management
team, taking the carrier forward and building on revenue opportunities, such as cargo
and income from ancillary sources. Its successful IPO signals investors’ interest in the
proven business model that could be a role model for other carriers severely threatened
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by a low cost carrier. Charter airlines are also finding it difficult to compete with low
cost carriers and are resctructuring their business model and operate longer sectors and
find niche markets, which does not attract the interests of low cost carriers. There is
little doubt that the airline business is changing rapidly and that carriers must evolve or
risk extinction. In the Darwinian evolutionary race, it is not necessarily the strongest
that survive but the most adaptable.
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6 Chapter 6: Key Aspects of Airline Marketing
This chapter extrapolates the key aspects of strategic marketing from the literature and it
also examines the core marketing principles extracted from within the airline industry and
the chapter seeks to intergrate the most important core competencies of both displines. This
core competency provides a solid framework of marketing strategies that full service
airlines could deploy in order to compete more effectively and gain competitive advantage
against low cost carriers in short-haul markets worldwide. This framework was the
blueprint to a series of marketing questions that made part of a survey which was
administered to airline executives working at full service network carriers worldwide. It
was conducted in association with IATA as shown in Appendix VII. Its aim was to
determine which marketing strategies had the highest impact against low cost carriers.
6.1 Introduction to airline marketing
In the early 1990s there were just over one billion passengers travelling by air. A decade
later and this had risen to almost two billion. The 2006 Boeing forecast predicted that air
travel will grow at 4.9 percent per annum over the next 20 years (Boeing Current Market
Outlook, 2006). Clearly, the growth in demand for air travel shows no sign of abating.
Airline marketing is largely centralised around the passenger and its core function is to
attract new passengers while, at the same time, retaining the loyalty of existing passengers.
A Google search for ‘customer importance’ returned 11.3 million responses giving a clear
indication of the depth of the subject area. Drucker (1974, p61) pointed out that it is ‘the
customer who determines what a business is’. Reichheld and Sasser (1990) suggested that
it is the customer who gives the business its foundation and keeps it in existence. Kohli et
al. (1990) and Webster (1992) indicated that the customer is the core aspect to marketing,
while Wayland and Cole (1994) argued that customer relationships are one of the key
assets of a business. Philip Kotler, a well-known academic in the field of marketing, stated
that customers are a company’s only true ‘profit centres’ (Kotler and Keller, 2006 p140). In
their 2006 annual Press and Analysts conference109, Lufthansa reiterated that ‘…
passengers are at the core of our business and are the engines for driving the group
forward’. Few marketers would dispute the need for developing a sound understanding of
customers.
With the above in mind, it is somewhat surprising that airline marketing literature is rather
limited and very few books have actually been dedicated to the subject. Well known
authors, such as Doganis (2006, 2002, 2001, 1991), Morrell (2002), Williams (2002, 1993),
Holloway (2003) and Lawton (2002), have largely avoided the area, while Hanlon (1999)
addressed airline marketing through loyalty programmes and gave an excellent in-depth
109 Speech by Wolfgang Mayrhuber, CEO of Lufthansa, accessed at
http://konzern.lufthansa.com/en/downloads/presse/downloads/reden/lh_mayrhuber_bpk2006.pdf
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analysis on pricing principles. Taneja’s book, entitled ‘The Passenger is Flying the Plane’,
only briefly scratched the surface, examining passenger segmentation, customer focus and
flight products. Another of Taneja’s books, entitled ‘Optimising the Airline Business
Model’, only referred to marketing in terms of branding. However, Stephen Shaw has
written five editions of the same book, entitled ‘Airline Marketing and Management’, and
is one of the few authors who have written extensively on the subject matter.
In order to examine the various aspects of marketing, this chapter is structured around the
theoretical framework provided by Kotler, one of the world’s most esteemed and respected
marketing academics. Kotler’s latest edition of his renowned marketing book, entitled
‘Marketing Management’, is co-authored with Keller whose expertise in branding and
consumer behaviour provides the marketing literature with further insight.
Figure 39 below extrapolates the core marketing principles from Kotler and Keller (2006)
and then overlays these principles onto the airline marketing literature sourced from Shaw
(2004). This will form the framework of marketing strategies that airlines can use to
compete more effectively and gain competitive advantage, while retaining value for the
customer. Each of the concepts listed below were incorporated as part of a survey that
was administered to airline executives worldwide in conjunction with IATA. Each of the
concepts listed in figure 39 below are fully described in this chapter.
Figure 39 The Aspects of Airline Marketing
Airline
Marketing
Understand
Marketing
Passenger
Segmentation
- Business Traveller
- Leisure Traveller
Connecting with
Passengers
- Customer Relationship Management
- Frequent Flyer Program
- Corporate Policy
Build a
Strong Brand
Shape the Market
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- Setting the Product Strategy
- Develop Pricing Strategies
Advertising
Source: Adapted from the literature of Kotler and Keller (2006) and Shaw (2004)
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- Customer Satisfaction
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Section two of this chapter focuses on alternative definitions of marketing in order to
provide a solid understanding of its fundamental concepts. Section three then highlights the
importance of passenger market segmentation (primarily in leisure and business class), and
section four captures passengers’ insights in terms of satisfaction and perceived value of
the product. Supply-side connotations are then analysed in section five, followed by an
examination of customer retention strategies. Section seven focuses on branding, and
section eight covers the last aspect of marketing, i.e. advertising. Finally, section nine
provides a summary and conclusion.
6.2 Understanding Marketing
Strategic marketing is concerned with ensuring that marketing activities support efforts to
fulfil overall organisational objectives with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage
over rivals (Burk Wood, 2004; Wilson and Gillingan, 1997). Day (1994) stated that the
basic underpinning of marketing is to ensure that organisations stay close to their
customers, while Jenkins (1996) argued that customers are a central stakeholder in the
strategic behaviour of the organisation. There is no doubt that marketing is directed entirely
at the customer: it must reach out to a wide range of customers who are scattered across a
wide spectrum of society, consisting of those who may take only a few trips in their
lifetime, those who may take a few trips per year to visit friends and family, and business
travellers who may take many trips per month. Marketing must try and analyse the needs of
each of these customers and then align the internal strategies of the company to satisfy
those needs.
Many definitions of marketing have appeared in marketing theory. Kotler in the 7th of 12
editions of Marketing Management uses the following definition of marketing, which was
approved in 1985 by the American Marketing Association (Kotler, 1991 p11): ‘Marketing
is the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion and
distribution of ideas, goods and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual and
organisational objectives’. This definition is often used and quoted in marketing textbooks
and is classed as the official definition of marketing.
However, as time moves on conditions change and modern concepts must be incorporated
in order to reflect those changes. As marketing was beginning to move into the new
millennium, its core principles also needed updating. Hoekstra et al. (1999) confirmed that
modern marketing has taken a new direction and companies need to refocus their
marketing efforts and keep pace with the shifting pattern in order to sustain competitive
advantage. Sheth and Parvatiyar (2000) proposed that ‘an alternative paradigm of
marketing is needed, a paradigm that can account for the continuous nature of
relationships in marketing.’
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Therefore, pressure from industry and academics forced change, and marketing became
redefined. The update in marketing theory was reflected in Kotler’s 12th edition of
Marketing Management, which was also approved by the American Marketing Association
in 2004 (Kotler, 2006 p6). Its new definition is as follows: ‘Marketing is an organisational
function and a set of processes for creating, communicating and delivering value to
customers and for managing customer relationships in ways that benefit the organization
and its stakeholders’.
When comparing the 1985 and 2004 definitions, some changes are apparent. Firstly, there
is a broadening of the marketing concept as it has now become part of an organisational
function. The new marketing activities include decisions with regard to the firm’s stated
vision, objective(s), strategy, organisational structure, culture, information systems,
marketing instruments, business processes and human resource management (Hoekstra et
al., 1999 p43). Secondly, there is a transition from the contemporary 4 Ps (Price, Product,
Place, and Promotion) to ‘creating, communicating and delivering customer value’.
Businesses are now concerned with the concept of ‘creating value for the customer’, which
is pivotal to relationship marketing (Grönroos 1997; Gummesson 1996; Christopher et al.,
2002). Thirdly, the focus has changed from transactions to relationships. This strategy
aims at creating long-term profitable relationships with customers (Christopher et al.,
2002).
Three conditions have shaped the new marketing world:
1) Carrying out business today has become more difficult because of the increased
competition. Many of the barriers have been eliminated and it is easier for firms to enter.
2) The Internet has caused a paradigm shift in the way companies market themselves.
Sheth and Sisodia (2001) have strongly argued that the Internet has been the principle force
in changing the face of marketing.
3) The expectations of customers are increasing (Doyle, 2000 p9) and it has become much
more difficult to satisfy the customer and generate loyalty.
6.3 Passenger Segmentation
The origins of segmentation theory are attributed to Smith (1956), who stated that: Market
segmentation involves viewing a heterogeneous market as a number of smaller
homogeneous markets, in response to differing preferences, attributable to the desires of
consumers for more precise satisfaction of their varying wants. Market segmentation
quickly grew in popularity both in academic and practical fields and became recognised as
one of the most important concepts in marketing (Wind, 1978). The assumption is that
customers can be grouped, on the basis of similar needs and buying behaviour, to provide a
more homogeneous response to marketing programmes (Choffray and Lilien, 1980). By
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dividing customers into homogenous groups, it becomes easier to track their buying
behaviours and to ensure that their needs are better served (Blattberg et al., 1978; Wind,
1978; Beane and Ennis, 1987). Once target markets are identified, the organisation
develops a product offering (marketing mix) that is designed to be attractive to that
particular segment. It can also facilitate the understanding of different elasticities of
demand and location of gaps in the market into which a new service can be placed. Kotler
(1991) stated that General Motors outpaced Ford because it started designing cars that
recognised different income levels. He also indicated that a new company can break into an
entrenched market if it discovers new segmentation possibilities in the marketplace.
IBM surveyed over 120 companies (90% of whom had revenues of over $100 million) and
discovered that 77% cited segmentation as a valuable part of their marketing strategy,
while 97% relied on segmentation in strategy development (IBM, 2003). Market
segmentation has both strategic and tactical uses. At a strategic level, segmentation can be
used to identify profitable customers, thereby allowing decisions to be made concerning
where and how the organization should be competing. At a tactical level, segmentation
encourages businesses to develop a deeper understanding of customers, which can be used
to enhance the relationship between the parties (Storbacka, 1997). According to Zeithaml
and Bitner (2003), market segmentation is the foundation block of relationship marketing.
Weinstein (1994) strongly argued that various benefits have been accrued as a result of
segmenting a market. The competitive environment becomes more defined as each
passenger segment becomes clearly identified. This will lead to better informed and more
effective targeting and positioning decisions (Dibb and Simkin, 1996; Kotler, 2000). By
allowing a business to focus on the particular needs of well defined customer groups,
marketing programmes can be more precisely specified, leading to greater effectiveness
(McDonald and Dunbar, 1995). The rationale is that companies should invest in the highest
value customers by identifying those who are most profitable and loyal, require less service
and prefer stable, long-term relationships (Reichheld, 1993; Blattberg and Deighton, 1996).
Segmentation is often confused with product differentiation - however, Van Raaij and
Verhallen (1994) clearly distinguished between the two by referring to market
segmentation as the demand side component and product differentiation as the supply side
component (Weinstein, 1994). Thus, market segmentation focuses upon differences in
customers while product differentiation focuses upon differences in products (and/or the
accompanying marketing mix) to meet the needs of these different customers. Datta (1996)
argues that both market segmentation and product differentiation have become the
battlegrounds for competitive wars. Feldman (2006) joins the two forces and stresses that
successful segmentation is achieved when a firm crafts specific products/services for each
segmented market.
Shaw (2004, p23) concurs with the earlier authors and defines a market segment from an
airline’s viewpoint by stating that ‘A market segment is a group of customers who have
sufficient in common that they form a viable basis for a product/price/promotion
combination’. If surveys were taken on a bi-annual basis, then airlines could easily
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determine which passenger segments are gaining from specific marketing programmes and
which groups are beginning to shift to other competitors so that corrective strategies could
be implemented. Table 37 below shows the segmentation of passengers that were identified
in surveys conducted by O’Connell and Williams (2005, 2006). It placed each passenger
into a specific group which presented a clear view of the passenger mix.
Table 37 Passenger Market segment (Business and Leisure passengers)
Business Passengers Leisure Passengers
Meetings Visiting Friends & Family
Conferences Holiday
Training Week-end Break
Trade Fair Shopping
Employment Cultural/Religious
Sports
Study
Source: O’Connell and Williams 2005, 2006
In fact, an airline’s clientele normally consists of leisure and business passengers - both
categories being important in terms of revenue. Table 38 below shows the amount of
money spent on leisure and business travel. It shows that the world’s top five countries
spent $1,584 billion in 2004 on personal travel and tourism, while the business community
spent $363 billion during the same period. The leisure passengers outspend business
passengers by a ratio of 4.3:1 and are an important component of air travel even though
they generate low yields. In the UK, for example, the World Travel and Tourism Council
estimated that leisure travellers spent $175 billion in 2004; their expenditure is forecasted
to rise to $230 billion by 2014. On the other hand, UK business passengers spent $41
billion in 2004 and their expenditure is expected to rise to $52 billion by 2014 (Airline
Business, December 2004). By 2014, leisure expenditure by the world’s top ten countries
is set to rise by nearly 70%, while business spending is forecast to rise by 45%. This
predicted growth of leisure and business traffic creates an enormous opportunity for
airlines.
Table 38 Leisure and Business spend in the top 5 countries for 2004
Personal Travel and Tourism
Expenditure ($ Billions)
Business Travel Expenditure
($ Billions)
Rank Country Expenditure Rank Country Expenditure
1 USA 805 1 USA 168
2 Japan 279 2 Japan 65
3 Germany 182 3 Germany 50
4 UK 175 4 UK 41
5 France 143 5 France 39
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council (Airline Business, December 2004)
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Typically an airline derives the bulk of its income from passengers and freight. ICAO
calculated that around 87.3% of revenues come from passengers while the remainding
12.7% is derived from freight, mail and express cargo110. Table 39 below shows the
economic data for leisure, business and first class traffic and the associated revenue
attached to each class.
Table 39 Economic data of the different cabin classes (2003)
Class of
Service
Capacity
ASKs %
Load Factor
%
Yield per RPK
USc
Revenue
%
Revenue/Capacity
First 2.4 36 23.4 4.2 1.75
Business 16.1 52 18.9 29.6 1.84
Economy 81.4 77 5.4 66.3 0.81
Source: IATA, Airline Economic Task Force 2003
As expected, yield in first class is very high. The relationship between investment (in
terms of allocated capacity) and gross return (in terms of revenue) is very healthy (1.75),
but the overall revenue generated by this class is low, primarily due to weak load factors.
A small proportion of the cabin is dedicated to this segment, yet it creates a high expense
for the carrier as extra cabin crew are assigned (e.g. at Singapore Airlines there is one
cabin crew member for every four passengers) and the most sophisticated flight products
are installed. Many airlines have addressed the poor net return generated by the first class
cabin by incorporating first and business class into one single cabin as a way to improve
the overall revenue. The author has established that there are only five full service airlines
operating on the North Atlantic that still have a first class option and they include
American, United, BA, Virgin Atlantic and Lufthansa. Air France for example has
dropped first-class from all its long-haul aircraft except its Boeing 777 (ATI, October
2005).
The business class cabin, however, produces almost 30% of an airline’s revenues with a
load factor exceeding 50%; moreover, the ratio between revenue and capacity is 1.84.
Mason’s (2005) research indicated that the business class revenues and load factors have
remained stable over the last ten years. Airlines carefully target these passengers because
they have a twofold benefit:
i) They are frequent flyers whose fare elasticities are generally low
ii) They generate high yield (18.9 cents per RPK)
110 ICAO 291-AT/123 – World of Civil Aviation 2001-2004, 279-AT/116, 275-AT/115, 271-AT/112
164
An IATA survey revealed that business travellers made, on average, 4.6 long-haul trips and
12.8 short-haul journeys in 2004 (IATA, 2004). In the UK, CAA surveys indicated that
36.5 million passengers travelled for business purposes in 2003, which is roughly equal to
the total number of passengers carried by BA (Manchester Airports Group, 2005). These
business passengers are widely acknowledged as the ‘cash cow’ of the airline industry, and
the extended range of flight products that are offered to business passengers enable the
carrier to charge premium fares (Westwood et al., 2000). Shaw (1998, p198) stated that
United Airlines earned 45 per cent of its revenues from 9 per cent of its passengers in the
mid 1990s. Similarly, a study from the banking industry supports the theory that a small
proportion of a company’s customers generate the largest returns, as 20% of a bank’s
customers may account for as much as 100% of its profits (Hartfeil, 1996; McCormick et
al., 1996). There can be little dispute, therefore, that the business travel sector is of major
importance to the airline industry. However, recent research by Piercy et al. (2006) has
indicated that companies who earn the majority of their revenues from a small proportion
of their customers now have a high probability of failure. Economy class passengers also
contribute to the revenues of an airline in a significant way. Table 39 (above) clearly
demonstrates that economy class passengers generate the largest proportion of the income
(66.6%), but over 80% of the airline’s capacity is dedicated to these low yield travellers
(i.e. the ratio is only 0.81). Mason (2005) showed that the revenue from leisure passengers
has fluctuated from a high of 70% in 1992 to a low of 63% in 1997, but overall it averaged
67% throughout the last decade. This indicates that airlines have found it difficult to
increase the revenue stream derived from leisure passengers; they must become more
innovative in finding ways to increase their income from this passenger segment. Low cost
carriers have been successful in generating additional revenue through ancillary methods,
such as charging for baggage, selling food and beverages, selling insurance, etc. They also
get compensated from hotels and car rental companies when passengers make bookings via
the host airline’s website.
Other forms of airline segmentation include the following categories: Behaviouristic
(number of trips per year, loyalty), Demographic (nationality, age, company size, gender),
Geographic (long haul, short haul) and Psychological (service seekers, flag supporters,
frequent flyer points) (Shaw (1998, p193; Mason 2004). Porter (1998) argued that
collecting customer demographics and behavioural data makes precision targeting possible.
This type of targeting also helps when devising an effective promotional and marketing
plan to meet tough competition. Shaw (2004, p6) pointed out that airlines should identify
the requirements of the customers in each segment. Some passenger market segments are
growing significantly, such as female business travellers. Women represent a solid and
growing percentage of business travellers and account for around 50 per cent of the
corporate travel market. In Europe, for example, almost 40 per cent of the business
travellers are female (Alamdari and Burrell, 2000; Westwood et al., 2000). The increasing
complexity and variety of customer lifestyles are adding a new dimension to the
segmentation challenge (Sheth et al., 2000). In consumer markets, demographic changes in
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lifestyle, income, ethnic group and age are increasing the diversity of customer needs and
buying behaviour. This is generating market fragmentation and consequently, mass
marketing will become less effective and efficient. Qantas like many other legacy carriers
had a large part of its market captured111 by a low cost carrier and it discovered that its
clients could be segmented into not only domestic versus intercontinental travellers and
leisure versus business travellers but also into two additional dimensions: loyal versus
opportunistic clients and outbound versus inbound clients (Franke, 2007).
To compete successfully in fast-changing and challenging global markets, airlines should
include segmentation as one of their core marketing strategies - this will assist them in
becoming competitively advantaged. Segmentation-driven marketing strategy helps
companies design responsive products, develop effective promotional tactics and
campaigns, gauge competitive positions and fine-tune current marketing initiatives.
6.4 Capturing the Insights of Passengers
Passengers are the lifeblood of every airline: without them airlines would cease to trade
and flourish. Risser (2003) indicated that no fewer than 80 of the Fortune 100 companies
emphasised the importance of being customer-driven in their 2001 annual reports.
Kleymann and Seristo (2004, p125) reported that a study conducted by Ernst & Young
found that 77 percent of corporations that it surveyed identified knowledge about its
customers as their most important criteria. Airlines must understand the distinctive
behaviours, needs and preferences of their passengers to be able to deliver value. However,
meeting rising customer expectations has proved to be one of the most difficult challenges
to service businesses (Sonnenberg, 1991). Day (1999) argued that customers are becoming
ever more demanding in a business environment where competition is getting fiercer.
David (2001) offered a solution: he strongly argued that a firm’s marketing strategy must
involve anticipating, creating and fulfilling customer needs and wants for products and
services. Essentially, marketing literature strongly advocates that the customer is pivotal to
the entire business process, and strategic marketing literature indicates that companies
should place huge emphasis on their customers as they are crucial to strategy formulation.
6.4.1 Customer Satisfaction
Customer satisfaction is becoming the key factor in attracting and retaining customers
(Kotler and Keller, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005). It influences future purchase behaviour
(Mittal and Kamakura 2001; Voss et al., 1998; Zeithaml, 1996) and has been embraced by
practitioners and academics alike as ‘the highest order’ goal of a company (Peterson and
Wilson, 1992). Marketers must constantly seek insights into what constitutes the
multifaceted needs of consumers and how to satisfy those needs (Holbrook, 2001). The
111 30% of it domestic market was capture by Virgin Blue
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concept of customer satisfaction is seen as the core of the post-purchase period (Westbrook
and Oliver, 1991). Service satisfaction is assessed via a comparison of what service was
expected (predicted) and what was actually perceived (Zeithaml et al., 1998). Fournier and
Glenmick (1999) elaborated further and stated that: if performance matches expectations,
the customer is satisfied; if performance exceeds expectations, the customer is highly
satisfied. Research has indicated that companies that offer superior service are able to
charge eight per cent more for their product (Gilbert and Wong, 2003). Lufthansa
Consulting ( 2004, p11) conducted a survey evaluating the primary objectives of airlines
worldwide and the results concluded that customer satisfaction was rated the most
important objective followed by competitiveness. IATA (2006) strongly emphasised that
customer satisfaction is one of the keys to passenger retention and profitability in a
competitive marketplace. Lawton (2002, p73) suggested that corporate loyalty is largely
dependent on high levels of customer satisfaction. The low cost carriers are noted for their
poor customer service and a survey on 16,000 travellers conducted by Carlson Marketing
Group in 2003 confirmed that easyJet and Ryanair had the industry’s poorest customer
relations (Travel Trade Gazette, 2003).
Firms can attempt to satisfy customers in various ways, such as adding features to a
product (e.g. flatbed), improving performance of a product through various attributes (e.g.
faster Internet connectivity), offering more services to customers and offering better quality
services (e.g. friendly and welcoming staff). Also, customer service literature stresses that
it is essential to resolve customer complaints quickly. This becomes a powerful strategy in
satisfying customers who have experienced difficulties. Albrecht and Zemke (1985)
claimed that 54-70 per cent of customers will remain so if their complaint is resolved, and
Rust et al. (1992) revealed that up to 95% of customers will remain so if the complaint is
resolved quickly. Customers who have complained to an organization and had their
complaints satisfactorily resolved tell an average of five people about the good treatment
they received (Kotler, 1991, p18).
Literature emphasises three principle reasons why companies should focus on satisfying
their customers. Firstly, satisfied customers tend to be loyal and willing to pay higher
prices (Reichheld and Sasser, 1990; Finkelman 1993, Johnson et al. 2005); secondly,
satisfied customers serve as an advertising medium by positive word of mouth (Howard
and Sheth, 1969; Reichheld, 2003) which helps to acquire new customers; and thirdly,
customer satisfaction is a significant component of repeat service usage or of repeat
purchasing (ISO 9000, 2006; Mittal and Kamakura, 2001; Oliver 1999).
6.4.2 Customer Perceived Value
The construct of perceived value has been identified as one of the most important measures
for gaining a competitive edge (Parasuraman, 1997), and has been argued to be the most
important indicator of repurchase intentions (Parasuraman & Grewal, 2000). In the past
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decade, quality has been recognised as a strategic tool to strengthen a firm’s competitive
position and improve its profitability (Reicheld and Sasser 1990). However, Woodruff
(1997) believed that customer value is the next underlying source of competitive
advantage. Consistent with this view, Weinstein and Johnson (1999) considered that
customer value is the strategic driver that differentiates a firm’s offering in a crowded
marketplace.
Perceived value has been defined as ‘the consumer’s overall assessment of the utility of a
product based on perceptions of what is received and what is given’ (Zeithaml, 1988 p14).
Within this definition, Zeithaml (1988) identified four diverse meanings of value: (1) value
is low price, (2) value is whatever one wants in a product, (3) value is the quality that the
consumer receives for the price paid and (4) value is what the consumer gets for what they
pay. The majority of past research on perceived value has focused on the fourth definition
(Bojanic, 1996; Zeithaml, 1985). Woodruff (1997) also stated that ‘received value’ leads to
overall satisfaction, which is the customer’s feeling in response to an evaluation from using
the product or service. Creating superior customer value is also a key to ensuring a
company’s long-term survival and success (Slater 1997; Woodruff 1997). The leading
marketing academics, Keller and Kotler (2006, p141), stated that customers make decisions
based on the perception of how much value the product or service will deliver.
Figure 40 Customer Perceived Value
Image
Value
Personal
Value
Services
Value
Product
Value
T otal
Customer
Value
Psychic
Cost
Energy
Cost
T ime
Cost
Monetary
Cost
T otal
Customer
Cost
Customer
Perceived
Value
Source: Keller and Kotler 2006, p141
Figure 40 (above) shows that a prospective customer will make a purchasing decision
based on an evaluation of all the perceived benefits and all the associated costs of an
offering. The marketer can increase the value being offered to the customer by a
combination of raising the functional benefits and/or by reducing one or more of the
various types of costs. Anderson and Narus (2004) believed that customer value can be
regarded as the cornerstone of the marketing management process.
6.4.3 What does the passenger want?
There is an increasing amount of literature on the need for airlines to better understand
their customers. Academics, such as Parasuraman et al. (1985), found that there was a gap
between a passenger’s expectations and perceptions. Gilbert and Wong (2003) and Aaker
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et al. (2003) argued that airlines must accurately perceive what passengers want and
expect. Park et al. (2004) confirmed that airlines need to understand their customers and
determine what their passengers expect from the service. The McKinsey group also
reiterated that airlines must gain a better understanding of their customers (McKinsey
Quarterly, 2005 p6). ICAO’s scholar Abeyratne (2001) also noted that airline managers
needed be aware of passengers needs. Holloway (2002, p230) stated that airlines must
bridge the gap between a passenger’s expectations and actual delivery. Taneja’s book,
entitled ‘The Passenger is Flying the Plane’, stressed that airlines must start prioritising
their passengers’ needs (Taneja, 2005). Every month, Airline Business conducts an
industry interview with an airline CEO, and the majority of them stress that they want to
increase passenger numbers and market share. However, they have rarely stated that they
will uncover the principle characteristics that their passengers require and, also, they have
seldom mentioned the need to understand their customers, which would assist them in
increasing passenger numbers. Kotler (1991, p14) pointed out that GM’s failure to expand
its market was due to the fact that it failed to ask customers what they wanted. Doganis
(2002, p237) stated that an airline’s potential customers will be influenced by five key
product features when choosing between airlines - these are summarised below in Table
40. An airline must then decide how to combine these various product features in order to
meet customer needs.
Table 40 Key product features affecting travel decisions and choice of airline
1 Price Fare levels and conditions
2 Schedule-based Points served and routings
Frequency
Timings
Connections
Punctuality
3 Comfort-based Type of aircraft
Interior configuration
Individual space
On-board space
Ground/terminal service
Airline lounge
In-flight entertainment
4 Convenience Distribution/reservation system
Capacity management policy
Seat availability
5 Image Reputation for safety
Branding
Frequent Flyer Program
Promotion and advertising
Marketing position
Source: Doganis (2002, p237)
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Numerous other authors have cited multiple reasons why passengers choose a
particular airline. Table 41 below displays a list of the different reasons why
passengers choose a particular airline. It shows the difficulty facing airlines as
passengers want a multitude of different attributes - it is impossible to be all things to
everyone at the same time.
Table 41 Published work on airline choice by passengers
Author Reasons for choosing airline
Buzzell and Gale (1987) Product and service quality
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry (1988) Quality
Toh and Hu (1988) Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs)
Zeithaml, Parasurman and Berry (1990) Reliability
Fick and Ritchie (1991) Reliability
Dobsen and Lederer (1993) Fare and Frequency
Truitt & Haynes, 1994;
Ostrowski, O’Brien and Gordon (1993)
Airline Service Quality
Proussaloglou and Koppleman (1995) Schedule, Low Fares, On-time, FFPs
Yoo and Ashford (1997) Fare, Schedule, Nationality
Tsaur, Chang, and Yen (2002) Comfort, Reliability,
Responsiveness & Courtesy of Attendants
Chang and Yeh (2002) Comfort, Reliability, Schedule, Attitude
of employees, Service
Hsu and Wen (2003) Frequency and Fare
Passengers are also changing their priorities as time evolves. A comparison between
IATA’s Corporate Air Travel Survey (CATS) taken in 1999 and again in 2004, revealed
that business passengers have completely changed their preferences. Figure 41 below
shows that business passengers cited schedule as the principle reason why they choose a
particular carrier in 1999, for both short haul and long haul travel. However, five years
later the priority has completely changed as business passengers have now identified fare
as the singularly most important reason for carrier choice, as illustrated in Figure 42. This
implies that airlines must constantly adapt and remain agile to react quickly to the
constantly evolving market conditions.
Figure 41. Factors influencing carrier choice
1999 of Business Travellers (IATA Survey, 1999)
Figure 42. Factors influencing carrier choice
2004 of Business Travellers (IATA Survey, 2004)
Source: IATA’s Corporate Air T ravel Survey, 1999
C
on
ve
ni
en
tS
ch
ed
u l
e
FF
P
Fa
re
s
P
un
ct
ua
lit
y
S
ea
tC
o m
fo
rt
P
as
tE
xp
er
ie
nc
e
S
af
et
y
A
irp
or
tC
on
ve
ni
en
ce
A
irc
ra
ft
Ty
pe
C
on
ne
ct
io
ns
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Short Haul
Long Haul
Source: IATA’s Corporate Air Travel Survey, 2004
Fa
re
s
F F
P
C
on
ve
n i
en
tS
ch
ed
ul
e
P
as
tE
xp
er
ie
nc
e
S
ea
tC
om
fo
rt
S
af
et
y
P
un
ct
ua
lit
y
A
irp
or
tC
on
ve
ni
en
ce
C
on
ne
ct
io
ns
A
irc
ra
ft
Ty
pe
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Short Haul
Long Haul
170
6.5 Shape the Market Offerings
The in-flight experience is the factor which will shape the passenger’s perception of an
airline, while the fare paid will determine its value for money.
6.5.1 Setting the In-flight Product Strategy
Providing superior product/service quality is critical for a company’s long-term survival
and success (e.g. Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan 1975; Mittal et al., 2005; Rust, Moorman, and
Dickson 2002). Taneja (2005, p79) stated that the products of full service carriers must
provide both value for passengers and an adequate return on investment to the airline -
however he emphasised that neither has occurred. Franke (2004) and Taneja (2005, p81)
both argued that airlines need to produce high level products in order to sustain their
competitive advantage. Alamdari (2004) stated that product strategy is one of the most
crucial stages of airline marketing and needs to be an accurate reflection of what
passengers want. Holloway (2002, p124) and Alamdari (2004) have identified four levels
of products that full service airlines can provide, although many airlines fail to fully
provide them. They are:
1) Core Services. This is the platform upon which all airlines compete, and passengers
expect these attributes as the minimum criteria when selecting a carrier. These may
include safety, schedule and reliability.
2) Expected Services. Full service carriers all compete on the expected services, such as
FFPs, baggage allowance, wide seat pitch, etc. If an airline decides to reduce/eliminate
one of these attributes, then it could quickly lose market share.
3) Augmented Services. These are the extra products that go above and beyond what
passengers expect. These may include such items as live TV, Internet access112,
chauffeured limousine service, welcoming and friendly cabin crew, etc. These convey
added value and serve as differentiators from competitors. These augmented services
can also be achieved by delivering an expected service in a better way than
competitors.
4) Potential Products. These are future additional products that may add more value and
attract extra passengers. The carrier may allow the passenger to use their mobile phone
on-board. Emirates, for example, have already signed a contract to initiate such a
service.
Both low cost carriers and full service airlines supply the core products. However, full
service airlines need to distance themselves from the low cost carriers by providing an
enhanced ‘expected service’ and value-adding ‘augmented service’. This will provide the
full service carriers with differentiators which will allow them to charge a fare premium.
112 Boeings Connexion allowed passengers to send and receive emails inflight and Asset Fleet and Asset
Management (2004) estimated that it cost between $25-35 for an eight to 14 hour flight and messages with
attachments in excess of 5KB incur an additional cost of 10 cents per KB. Boeing has subsequently withdrawn this
service.
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Alamdari (2004) outlines a series of flight products that airlines need to focus on in order
to become industry leaders and to set themselves apart from other carriers. See Table 42
below.
Table 42 Flight products needed in order to retain leadership
Pre-flight On-Board Post-flight
Ticketing arrangement Seat specification Arrival lounge
Access to the airport Interior design Baggage collection
Parking at the airport Cabin attendants Egress from Airport
Check-in facilities Food and Drink
Baggage handling IFE & communications
Airport lounges Blankets and pillows
Source: Alamdari (2004)
However, it is very difficult to determine which flight product features are more important
than others, and airlines encounter enormous difficulty in selecting the right balance
between product features. Numerous authors have suggested that specific in-flight products
are the key differentiators between carriers; for example, Arnaud et al. (1994) suggested
that the meal is the only way to differentiate the in-flight experience, while Tsaur et al.
(2002) suggested that comfort and cabin crew are the most essential features of the flight
experience. Alamdari (2004) stated that all flight related products are an important
contributor to the entire flight experience and each airline should retain high standards in
all their products. Oxford based Inflight Research Services is a company that investigates,
analyses and accesses the prevailing products and customer service quality standards of
each airline worldwide. It sub-divides each flight product into specific features and then
applies a weighting to each feature. These can be used as benchmarks so that airlines can
assign a weight (level of importance) to each particular feature of a flight product, as
shown in Table 43 below. Benchmarks such as these will revive an airline’s competitive
advantage and restore its quality (Inflight Research Services, 2000).
Table 43 Airline product quality grading system (Business passengers)
Cabin
Seating
Comfort on L-H
Seat Pitch
(16%)
Seat Width
(10%)
Seat
Recline
(12%)
Headrest
Comfort
(12%)
Sleep
Position
(16%)
Footrest
(10%)
Legrest
(12%)
Lumbar
Support
(12%)
Cabin
Comfort
(comfort)
Air
Quality
(8%)
Toilet
Amenities
(10%)
Clean
Toilets
(18%)
Clean Cabin
(18%)
Blanket
Quality
(13%)
Pillow
Quality
(13%)
Towel
Service
(12%)
Catering
(Meal
Quality)
Dish
Temp
(22%)
Menu
Quality
(10%)
Layout &
Standard
(12%)
Tableware
Standards
(16%)
Visual
Impact
(16%)
Branding
& Image
(24%)
IFE
(Quality)
Movie
Selection
(20%)
Screen
Quality
(18%)
News
(20%)
Interactive
Facility
(12%)
Audio
(18%)
Headset
Quality
(12%)
Cabin Staff
(Friendliness)
Natural
Ability
(18%)
Sincerity
(22%)
Courtesy
(18%)
Interaction
with Pax
(22%)
Enjoy
Job
(20%)
Cabin Staff
(Service
Attention)
Service
Dedication
(16%)
thru Meal
Service
(16%)
Call Bell
Response
(14%)
Helpfulness
(14%)
Cabin
Presence
(20%)
Presence
(Sleeping)
(20%)
Source: Inflight Research Services, 2000
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6.5.2 Develop a pricing strategy
Holloway (2003, p114) stated that pricing is part of the marketing mix, along with services
design. Doganis (2002, p276) argued that the fare is a crucial element for leisure and VFR
passengers. In planning the supply of services on each route, an airline must decide on the
various fares and product mixes that will generate the greatest level of demand. However,
this is a difficult balancing equation as fare is becoming a more important differentiator
today. Airlines charge different travellers different prices depending on their demand
characteristics, charging higher prices for those with more inelastic demand and lower
prices for those with more elastic demand. The fares of full service airlines are very
complex. In the United States, the major domestic carriers operate around 5,000 flights per
day, serve over 10,000 markets and offer over 4 million tickets. On a typical day they will
change 100,000 fares and alter their schedule twice each week (OAG, 2005). The full
service airlines must also consider the interconnecting traffic from their partner carriers
(such as alliances, code sharing affiliates and interlining carriers), which further increases
the complexity of the pricing structure. The full service airlines have multiple fare class
structures, with Doganis (2001, p152) quoting as many as twenty four different booking
classes, while the low cost carriers generally have around four to six. The latter rely on
demand to fill a flight and lower fares are removed as the flight fills up. This approach is
different from the network carriers, which attempt to segment the market via fare rules and
then sell high and low revenue tickets simultaneously. The cheap fares are very restrictive
and passengers are forced to pay higher fares if they travel within the dates of these
restrictive rules. The following are some of the conditions that determine the fare in the
context of effective yield (or revenue) management:
i) Advance purchase requirements
Airlines require passengers to book tickets in advance if they want to avail of cheaper
fares, and the earlier that the ticket is booked, the cheaper the fare. Common periods for
taking advantage of cheaper bookings include 7, 14 and 21 days. See Gale and Holmes
(1992, 1993) and Dana (1998, 1999) for more information on ‘advanced purchasing’.
ii) Minimum/maximum stays
Most low fares carry restrictions such as ‘Saturday night stay required’. The objective is to
erect a purchase ‘fence’ whereby business passengers would be forced to pay a higher fare
if they returned home before Saturday.
iii) Peak/off-peak pricing
Depending on the seasonality of demand in particular markets, as well as the time of day
and day-of-week patterns of demand.
iv) Sales/ticketing/travel windows
The demand for air transport is cyclical and there are certain months with weak traffic.
Airlines counter-measure this by enticing customers to book the ticket by a specific date
and then travel by another date.
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v) Fare Penalties
Business fares are expensive and are justified by the fact that they can be changed at no
cost. However, leisure passengers must pay a penalty to change the ticket as a penalty for
poor travel planning. Passengers must also pay the difference between the previous fare
and the new fare obligation.
vi) One-way versus round trip purchase requirements
Up until recently, full service airlines have only been offering return fares - however, the
low cost carriers have forced the incumbents to change their practices. Still, some full
service carriers charge higher fares for one-way segments.
Table 44 below shows the ‘traditional fare’ structure offered by legacy network carriers
and how the fares are affected by restrictions. The highest fare, in Y class, is unrestricted
and does not require any advance purchase. The second highest fare, in B class, includes a
Saturday night stay and a seven-day advance purchase requirement, but is cheaper than the
full fare. M and Q class fares are increasingly cheap and restricted
Table 44 Fare restrictions imposed by incumbent
Fare Class . Fare ($) . Restriction . Advanced Purchase
Y 400 None n/a
B 200 Sat 7 days
M 150 Sat, NR 14 days
Q 100 Sat, NR, CF 21 days
Notes: CF = Change Fee, NR = Non-Refundable, Sat = Saturday night
Source: Gorin and Balobaba (2004)
These fare rules have caused many passengers to switch to low cost carriers. Network
carriers need to rethink their strategy regarding the fare restrictions that are imposed on
tickets. Table 45 (below) shows the fare pricing rules endorsed by Europe’s full service
airlines as compared to the low cost carriers for March 2005. The majority of the network
airlines still require that passengers book a few weeks in advance in order to avail of low
fares, while the opposite occurs for the low cost carriers. In addition, all the incumbents
still require that passengers must stay over a Saturday night in order to acquire lower fares;
they also require that passengers should book a return ticket to secure low fares, which is
not the case with low cost carriers. However, the incumbents refund business class fares if
they are not used, while the low cost carriers do not segregate between leisure and business
passengers, and do not refund tickets as they operate on the basis of ‘use it or lose it’.
Having all the above facts in mind, it seems that the incumbents must change the way they
structure their pricing strategies as passengers find it inconvenient and will switch to low
cost carriers which are largely non restrictive. Incumbents should continue to refund
unused business fares as this is an attractive magnet for retaining high yield customers who
need the inbuilt flexibility.
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Table 45 Pricing rules used by European Airlines within the E.U. (March 2005)
Advanced
purchase
required for
some lower fares
Refundability on
some (generally-
higher) fares
Saturday night stay
required for some
lower fares
Round trip travel
required for some
lower fares
Aer Lingus No Yes No No
Air France Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alitalia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Austrian Yes Yes Yes Yes
BMI Yes Yes Yes Yes
BA Yes Yes Partially1 Yes
Finnair Yes (Only for
very few fares)
Yes Yes (Minimum
stay of 3-days)
Yes
Iberia Yes Yes Yes Yes
KLM Yes Yes Yes Yes
LOT Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lufthansa Yes Yes Yes Yes
Olympic Yes Yes Yes Yes
SAS Yes Yes Yes (Minimum
stay of 3-days)
Yes
TAP Yes Yes Yes Yes
Air Berlin No Yes2 No No
Bmibaby No No No No
Centralwings No No No No
easyJet No No No No
Germanwings No No No No
Ryanair No No No No
SkyEurope No No No No
Wizz Air No No No No
1 The Saturday night stay is gone for all UK flights and for 35 European cities
2 Partial refund based on days before departure
Source: Airline weekly (2005, p8)
6.6 Connecting with the Passenger
6.6.1 Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
Since the term relationship marketing was first introduced by Berry (1983), the concept has
been continuously growing and developing. Kotler and Keller (2006) explained that the
new paradigm shift in marketing was due to relationship marketing. There is no doubt that
today’s customers are becoming more demanding and less loyal. Companies need to adapt
to the changing patterns of customer behaviour or risk them switching to other competitors.
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is now a valuable tool. Jenkins (1999) defines
it as ‘the process of predicting customer behaviour and selecting actions to influence that
behaviour in order to benefit the company’. CRM uses data mining tools, which Rygielski
et al. (2002) described as a sophisticated data search capability, that use statistical
algorithms to discover patterns and correlations in data. This aids companies in
understanding the specific requirements of customers and provide a framework for creating
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a long-term customer relationship. Both Galbreath (1998) and Couldwell (1999) argued
that profiling the purchasing behaviour of customers will positively impact the profitability
of companies. Ryals and Payne (2001), the world’s leading academics in the field, have
found that companies are progressively identifying their most profitable customers, as well
as their least profitable. In addition, companies are seeking ways to identify, attract and
increase the retention of their profitable customers by managing relationships with them
(Renner, 2000; Ryals et al., 2000; Lemon et al., 2001). An American Express study, which
was quoted in Peppers and Rogers (1996), also confirmed that businesses are identifying
their most profitable customers. The study indicated that the best customers outspend
others in the ratio of 16 to 1 in retailing, 13 to 1 in restaurants, 12 to 1 in airlines and 5 to 1
in the hotel and motel industry. Field (2003) uncovered that a common industry rule of
thumb in the airline industry was that ten percent of the passengers produced half of the
overall revenue. Peppers and Rodgers (1999), in their later work, point out that mass
marketing is becoming less effective and should be replaced by the concept of one-to-one
marketing that responds to an individual customer, based on what that customer requires.
An extremely popular form of direct marketing is now conducted through the internet with
companies sending personalised e-mails. Nail (2000) described that every Tuesday, United
Airlines sends out an email to each of its 2.7 million most loyal users, containing
information about discounts and special fares. These passengers are regular flyers on
specific routes (e.g. San Francisco – New York) and the airline rewards these travellers
with reduced fares on these specific city pairs as a gesture of their appreciation for using
United Airlines.
In the nearly 20 years of practice since the first customer databases were built by banks,
credit and catalogue sales companies in the mid 1980s, businesses have matured in terms
of their knowledge and expertise in collecting, interpreting and using data for decision
making and commercial action. Shaw et al. (2001) described the vast quantities of data that
companies are acquiring on their customers in order to serve them better. He quotes that
Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in the US, has a customer database that contains around 43
tera-bytes of data, which is larger than the database used by the Internal Revenue Services
for collecting income taxes. Many authors agree that it is important to understand the
customer’s needs, as it will allow companies to respond and react, boosting customer
satisfaction and retention (Christopher et al., 2002; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Reichheld,
1996a, b; Jackson, 1994; Levine, 1993). Other authors argue that the relationship between
the customer and the company is deemed to be one of the company’s most important assets
(Srivastava et al., 1998; Hunt, 1997; Peppers and Rogers 1994 and 1997; Flouris and
Oswald, 2006 p69).
However, the airline industry is riddled with problems ranging from high labour costs,
cyclical revenues, volatile fuel prices, under-funded pensions, low capitalisation and cut-
throat competition, all of which have displaced the priority of passengers in today’s airline
management boards. Subsequently, the carriers have not been able to respond adequately to
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understanding the needs of their passengers because of all the other associated problems.
McKinsey, the consulting firm, confirmed that this was actually a very big problem
throughout the airline industry. It surveyed 17 airlines113 from around the world in 2001
and revealed that airlines had only a rudimentary understanding of their customers and had
little knowledge of their most valuable passengers. The survey also highlighted that the
airlines had incomplete and inconsistent data on their passengers (Binggelt et al., 2002).
Viaene and Cumps (2005) provided an insight into why KLM had poor data and
knowledge on its customers. The Dutch carrier contained over a dozen databases of useful
customer data, however none of them were linked. Data on the monetary value of a
passenger, for example, was embedded in the Accounting database, data on customer
complaints resided in the Sales database and the data for incidents (delays, cancellations,
downgrading) resided in the Operations database. Also, the corporate customer data was
not linked into the individual customer data114. All this useful customer data needs to be
linked and integrated so that the airline has all the customer data centralised at one point. It
can then provide an integrated and friendly Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
solution. Pitta (1998) also confirmed that the data from loyalty programmes was scattered
amongst different databases and was not used properly. Adding to the problem is the fact
that the airline industry has been continuously reducing their investment in IT over the last
number of years. In 2001, the carriers spent 3.5% of their revenues on IT - by 2006 this had
been reduced to around 2% (Baker, 2006).
Binggelt et al. (2002) stressed that airlines should implement CRM or make better use of
their existing Relational Marketing systems. They suggested that such arrangements could
enhance an airline’s revenue by as much as 2.4% a year, representing incremental revenues
of $100 to $250 million per year for a large carrier. They also claimed that 25% of this
incremental revenue could be achieved within one year through campaigns to win back
customers who have switched to competitors. Rigby et al. (2002) discussed the effect that
CRM had on the New York Times in 2000: since it was implemented, the circulation of the
newspaper rose by 2% in a falling market and its customer retention rate rose to 94%
against an industry average of 60%.
IBM (2001) outlined how CRM can improve customer service and build customer life-long
value from an airline’s perspective. It gave an account of a passenger who is checking in
and who had previously complained of a broken in-flight entertainment system while
travelling on a long-haul flight. CRM allowed the information from the customer service
system and the frequent flyer database to become centralised into a data warehouse.
Intelligence and data mining tools have categorised the passenger as a “valuable customer”
113 Nine European, five North American and three Asia-Pacific airlines participated in the survey.
114 Viaene (2005) cited an example where KLM’s most important cargo customer and his family had
been denied boarding because the airline overbooked the flight. This cargo executive could have easily
shifted his business to another carrier in protest. If the data between the individual and corporate
customers had been integrated this would not have occurred.
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with a predicted high lifetime value. Due to the status of the passenger and in recognition
of the customer services incident, the system decided that the passenger should be
upgraded as an apology for the previous mishap. CRM systems can also retain information
regarding customised customer preferences. These may include items such as seating
arrangement, meal and drink choice, newspaper and use of electronic items (for instance,
laptop, phone, PDA, etc.). Peppers and Rogers (1999) stated that the American Airlines
website builds customised customer views in real time, allowing two million frequent fliers
to have a unique experience each time they log on, thus enriching the relationship. They
confirmed that companies must consistently seek to offer individualised relationships,
while Coviello et al. (2002) argued that firms are increasingly beginning to move in this
direction, and consequently are offering more precision type marketing which is being
designed to build strong customer relationships. Companies are now becoming more
sophisticated in the way they deal with customers, as they are predicting online buying
patterns and enticing customers with special offers or services. They can also calculate the
value of each customer and build long-term mutually beneficial relationships. [See Rigby,
Reichheld and Schefter (2002) for further information regarding personalised and
customised products and services]. Holloway (2002, p303) agrees that full service airlines
are very interested in developing long-term relationships and stressed that they also want to
strengthen the loyalty of their passengers. Low cost carriers do not practice such one-on-
one marketing relationships, and this is an important differentiating feature between full
service airlines and their low cost challengers.
By continually offering superior quality to the customer in an extended relationship, the
financial or psychological cost to the customer of switching to another supplier rises
dramatically. The result is increased levels of customer retention and profitability, and a
potential decrease in customer sensitivity to price.
6.6.2 Frequent Flyer Programmes
The Oxford English Dictionary defines loyalty as ‘being faithful . . . true to allegiance’.
Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFP) are designed as a competitive strategy to build customer
loyalty and encourage repeat patronage from passengers. The need to attract, acquire,
leverage and retain customers is still of primary concern to most businesses. Revenue
growth through customer acquisition and retention remains a major requirement for
competing successfully. American Airlines launched the first frequent flyer programme in
May 1981 and, by 2006, it had 52 million members. Worldwide, in 2002 there were around
70 different FFP programmes which, combined, had over 100 million members115, while
Ferguson’s (2003) research showed that Europe and Asia accounted for approximately 24
and 21 million respectively. The Frequent Flyer website estimated that a business traveller
115 http://www.frequentflier.com/ffp-005.htm
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could spend more than $500,000 on airline ticket purchases over his or her lifetime116. This
long-term perspective is largely responsible for the new emphasis on “relationships” in
today’s consumer marketing. Other travel businesses, such as hotels and car rental
agencies, soon launched their own frequent-user programmes, and most entered into joint
venture programmes with airlines. Today, most loyalty schemes of airlines, hotels, car
rental agencies, credit cards and other companies are heavily interlinked. It is expensive,
however, to set up and run these programmes. Mason and Barker (1996) established that
the setup costs for Frequent Flyer Programmes ranged from US$2 to US$12 million.
The full service airlines do not sell all their seats on every flight and subsequently there is a
lot of wastage. IATA World Air Transport Statistics (2006) estimated that the average load
factor for incumbent airlines was around 75% in 2005, which indicates that seats go unsold
prior to departure. These empty seats are issued to prospective passengers who wish to use
their mileage points. Peterson (2006), the Publisher of WebFlyer, has estimated that
substituting each empty seat with a passenger who is offloading their frequent flyer
mileage points costs the airline an average of at least $23.95. This includes the associated
costs of food, beverage, fuel, reservations, liability insurance and other miscellaneous
expenses, and also assumes that the occupied seat would have remained unsold. In Europe
flying is more expensive, and a study by Aviation Strategy (1997) estimated that a low cost
airline serving Paris from London Stansted would incur costs of £27 per seat (at 68%
passenger load factor), while a network carrier operating from Heathrow would incur costs
of £52. The Economist (January 8th 2005, p14) estimated that, by the end of 2004, almost
14 trillion frequent-flyer miles had been accumulated worldwide. However, not all of this
mileage is used - Humphries (1991) stated that only approximately half of European
business passengers had actually redeemed their mileage points. Beaver (1996) estimated
that around 28% of frequent flyer points are redeemed, while Alamdari (2004) estimated
that it was closer to 33%. The majority of the mileage points (90%) are redeemed in the
form of free flights (Alamdari, 2004). Most loyalty programmes, however, contain
blackout dates such as Christmas, New Year and Easter - this safeguards an airline’s
capacity for high peak travel periods and acts as a barrier to prevent its members from
using their mileage points.
Beaver (1996) estimated that one Frequent Flyer Mile is worth somewhere between 1 cent
and 10 cents. The Frequent Flyer magazine, in 2006, confirmed the earlier work by Beaver
and stated that a partner company (e.g. hotel) pays the host company (e.g. airline) between
1-2 cents per mile117. The USA Today newspaper (2006) reported that the US airlines
generated $4 billion in additional revenues in 2005 by selling mileage points to partner
companies at prices of up to 2 cents per mile. In 2005 the newspaper also reported that
about 54% of frequent-flier miles in the United States were earned from outside the airline
industry. Consequently, Frequent Flyer Programmes are high value products. Air Canada’s
116 http://frequentflier.com/ffp-007.htm
117 http://frequentflier.com/ffp-007.htm
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Frequent Flyer Programme, Aeroplan, for example is valued at $2 billion and it recently
secured $250 million from an initial public offering (IPO) (ATI, June 2005). Similarly, the
Alaska Air Group reported that its Frequent Flyer Program added $8.4 million to its pre-tax
revenue for the last quarter of 2003 (ATI, February 2004). Research by Yang and Liu
(2003) also confirmed that the frequent flyer programme had a positive impact on the
financial performance of Air China, while Gudmundsson (2002) reported that there are
even more benefits when member airlines from alliances integrate their loyalty
programmes.
The research carried out by Kalakota et al. (2001) showed that the average company loses
half of its customers every five years. However, one of marketing’s core functions is to
attract and retain customers, and it is much more expensive to attract a new customer than
to retain an existing one (Christopher et al., 1991; Webster, 1992). Reichheld (1996a)
explained that it costs five times more to attract a new customer than to keep the loyalty of
a current customer. Holloway (2002, p314) confirmed the earlier analysis and cited that
American Airlines also believed that it cost five times more to attract a new passenger.
Some authors, such as Goetz (2002) and Shaw (1999), have identified that the cost of
attracting new customers is high, and deduced that it costs 10 times more to win a new
customer than to retain an existing one. Once a customer becomes attached to a loyalty
programme, there is a high probability that he/she will take all their additional flights with
the same carrier in order to build up loyalty points. These incentive programmes prevent
passengers from switching to competitors and therefore have the potential to boost
company profits. In fact, the longer the customer stays with a company, the more that
customer is worth (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Mithas, Jones, and Mitchell 2004).
Reichheld and Teal (1996) claimed that companies can consecutively generate additional
profit year after year if they keep customers loyal to a company. They stated that a
company can boost profits by anywhere between 25-85% per year if it increases its
customer retention by just 5%, and they also indicated that a 2% increase in customer
retention has the potential economic impact of lowering costs by 10%. An earlier study by
Reichheld and Sasser (1990) revealed similar results. Thus, building and nurturing
customer loyalty is becoming a key element in marketing practice today.
Palmer et al. (1996) identified that two-thirds of airlines who use loyalty programmes
declared that the scheme was very effective in targeting high-value customers and that they
allow airlines to form deep relationship with their customers. Passengers also value
Frequent Flyer Programmes and cite them as being an important part of the overall flight
product package. On average 90.8% of all business travellers are members of at least one
FFP (IATA’s Corporate Air Travel Survey, 2004). Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999)
found that business passengers who travel very frequently place a monetary value on their
membership of $72 dollars, while a business passenger who travels less frequently places a
lower value of $52. Numerous authors have mentioned the extent to which loyalty
programmes influence passengers when they proceed to book with a particular carrier: Toh
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and Hu (1988) reported that 67% of passengers declared that such schemes had influenced
their choice of carrier and other authors, such as Nako (1990, 1992), found that business
passengers were particularly influenced by their frequent flyer programmes. Proussaloglou
and Koppelman (1995) found that passengers who are members of a frequent flyer
program are 72% more likely to choose that carrier when considering a trip and this
increases significantly for passengers who take more than 20 trips per year as they are 92%
more likely to choose a particular carrier because of their frequent flyer membership. A
survey conducted by the Official Airline Guide, cited in Hanlon (1999, p53), found that
90% of the world’s business travellers participated in a FFP, and confirmed the previous
findings by indicating that passengers who take more than 20 trips per year are 97% more
likely to chose an airline because of their Frequent Flyer Programme. IATA’s Corporate
Air Travel Survey (2004) stated that fares and frequent flyer programmes were the two
most important factors for passengers travelling on both short-haul and long-haul routes.
However, it is increasingly difficult to retain customers as competition in the marketplace
provides so many opportunities that may cause the customer to switch. Most business
passengers today belong to more than one Frequent Flyer Programme (Doganis, 2006
p277): Uncles (1994) confirmed that Britain’s business travellers were loyal to three
different FPPs, and in Asia, Chin (2002) conducted a passenger survey on Singapore
Airline’s business passengers and deduced that on average each traveller belonged to 2
loyalty programmes. This indicates that a lot of today’s customers are not loyal and that
they tend to shift regularly between different companies. Therefore it becomes important to
determine which customers are the most loyal – and thus more valuable. In response,
airlines have introduced a range of ‘elite’ reward levels - most elite programmes have three
tiers, and the number of miles that are accrued normally determine which tier the passenger
joins. Table 46 below gives an outline of the mileage required to reach certain tier levels
for a number of airlines worldwide.
Table 46 Tier levels of a number of full service airlines
Airline FFP
Name
Tier 1
Mileage
Tier 2
Mileage
Tier 3
Mileage
Air Canada Aeroplan 25,000 35,000 100,000
Air France/KLM Flying Blue 25,000 40,000 70,000
American Airlines AAdvantage 25,000 50,000 100,000
Cathay Pacific Marco Polo 30,000 60,000 120,000
Continental Onepass 25,000 50,000 75,000
Japan Airlines JAL Mileage 30,000 50,000 70,000
Qatar Airways QA Privilege 25,000 50,000 85,000
United Airlines Mileage Plus 25,000 50,000 100,000
Source: WebFlyer, Japan Airlines, Cathay Pacific and Air Canada
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The top tier entitles a traveller to certain privileges regardless of the class that he/she is
flying in. These privileges may include access to airport lounges118, priority check-in at
first class desks, preferred boarding, preferred seating, free upgrades, priority on
reservation waitlists and airport standby lists, priority check-in, early boarding and mileage
bonuses on future flights. These incentives encourage consumers to accumulate all of their
points in a single airline’s FFP or to fly with a particular alliance where points will also be
added. Once consumers start accruing frequent flyer points, any flight not taken with that
airline represents foregone FFP points.
A study conducted by Cranfield University in 1996 found that frequent flyer programmes
were the industry’s second most important barrier to entry after airport slots (Cranfield
University, 1996). They are an important differentiating feature when such airlines are
competing against low cost carriers which generally do not participate in such loyalty
programmes. Klophaus’s (2005) research showed that about 20% of European low cost
carriers had such schemes, while the majority of these carriers had originated from charter
airlines such as Air Berlin. Clearly, this is a competitive advantage for the established
network airlines. Table 47 below shows that the incumbents have a clear advantage when
compared to the low cost carriers (with the exception of Southwest) and that they should
further exploit this advantage by leveraging additional points as a further incentive for
choosing to travel on a full service airline. .
Table 47 Frequent Flyer Members for Incumbent and Low Cost Carriers (2006)
North American
incumbents
Number of
Members
(millions)
North American low cost
carriers
Number of
Members
(millions)
American 52 Air Tran 2.0
Delta 38 JetBlue 2.4
United 48 Southwest 40.0
Air Canada 5
US Airways 32
European Incumbents European Low Cost Carriers
BA 4.5 Air Berlin 0.33
BMI 0.175 HapagFly 0.15
Lufthansa 7.5 Virgin Express 0.12
Air France/KLM 10.0
Alitalia 1.8
SAS 2.5
Asian Incumbents Asian Low Cost Carriers
Qantas 4.3 Cebu Pacific 0.075
Singapore Airlines 1.6 Lion Air 0.03
Thai Airways 1.9 Virgin Blue* 1.0
Malaysia Airlines 1.0
* Virgin Blue figures include those members from Virgin Atlantic
Source: WebFlyer, ATI and Airline Business (March 2006) and Lion Air
118 If travelling with one of the airlines that belong to the Oneworld alliance, the top tier frequent flyer member
(with one guest) gets access to over 400 airline lounges across the Oneworld network.
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6.6.3 Corporate Policy
Corporate Policy is another important marketing strategy - yet there is little written on the
subject. Most corporations forge relations with airlines because they have a large number
of employees who travel very frequently. The corporations leverage a large part of their
total travel volume in order to secure discounted air fares and other privileges, such as
extra baggage and upgrades. Frontier Airlines, for example, issues a 3% rebate of the cost
of the initial airfare, which is then directly debited into the airlines bank account (Frontier
Airlines, 2006). These corporations represent a very wide range of businesses, such as
finance, manufacturing, oil, computing, retail and pharmaceutical, many of which require
frequent air travel. Lian and Denstadi (2004) stated that approximately 40 industrial sectors
account for 80% of business air travel volume. Visa’s (2004) research showed that
corporations in the United States spend around $193 billion every year on travel. To some
airlines, income from corporate clients is a very important source of revenue - O’Connell’s
research (2005), for example, showed that 80% of Jet Airway’s revenues came from
corporate customers.
Corporate arrangements with airlines are now commonplace. Carlson Wagonlit (1998)
estimated that around 79% of companies had a travel policy, and a later study by Mason
(2001), indicated that around 50% of business travellers were subject to some form of
travel policy which was enforced by the company. This may be due to the fact that
corporate discounts of between 30-50% are not uncommon on business class tickets
(Fridstrøm et al. 2004). Gilbert and Morris (1995) found that corporations also had travel
policies with hotels, and they estimated that 51% of business travellers must use certain
hotels. The corporate executive is a business passenger who travels very regularly and, as
such, is classed as a high value customer. In addition, these executives are the least price
sensitive of all airline passengers (Bender and Stephenson, 1998; Stephenson and Fox,
1993; Mason and Barker, 1996). Mason (2002) surveyed a number of multinational
companies in conjunction with the UK’s Institute of Management and found that their
executives, on average, travelled on 17 short-haul trips and 6 long-haul trips a year. All the
companies that he surveyed had a travel policy and the corporations chose the airline
without the involvement of their frequently travelling employees. Whyte (2002) confirmed
the work of Mason as his research pointed out that almost one-quarter of corporate
passengers take more than 20 trips a year. He also stated that almost half of the corporate
travellers do not have the freedom to choose their own airline due to corporate policy
arrangements.
An airline’s marketing department normally assumes the responsibility of managing
corporate accounts, negotiating, managing and tracking the contract performance. The
corporations require travel agent expertise with a full understanding of travel policy
structures, such as visa requirements, vaccines and onward connections. Around half of
corporations consider Travel Management Companies to be the most effective way of
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managing travel (Alamdari and Mason, 2006). Bender and Stephenson (1998) described
the importance of travel managers: they cited that 86% of all companies that had a travel
and entertainment budget of over $5 million had a travel manager. Pachon et al. (2006)
emphasised the importance and net worth of the corporate contract. The authors cited that
British Airways had more than 200 account managers and sales executives who managed
over 600 corporate contracts that netted the airline more than $2.7 billion in revenue. The
authors used a multinomial logit function to model the effect that the corporate policy had
on British Airway’s profit, and it showed that total travel demand, service quality and
airline competition all impacted on how much the air fare was discounted.
Multinational companies employ thousands of employees who travel regularly, and it is a
big revenue spin-off for an airline when such contracts are secured. IATA’s Corporate Air
Travel Survey (2004) pointed out that over 40% of business travellers (all over the world)
work for companies with more than 1,000 employees - work carried out in Ireland and
Malaysia by O’Connell and Williams (2005) confirmed the IATA study. This research
revealed that companies with increasing numbers of employees are more likely to have
secured a corporate contract with an airline. A survey by Mason (2001) of the UK market
demonstrated that larger companies are more likely to have a travel policy, as illustrated in
Table 48 below (in spite of the small decrease recorded for companies with employee
numbers ranging between 1,000 and 5,000). Evangelho et al. (2005) and Mason (2000)
also confirmed this hypothesis. It was also noted that self employed business people and
those who worked for small companies (i.e. less than 100 employees) were more inclined
to use low cost carriers because they were more price sensitive and had smaller travel
budgets (O’Connell and Williams 2005; McKinsey 2005).
Table 48 Company travel policy by number of employees
Company size 1-24 25-99 100-999 1000-4999 > 5000
Proportion of companies
with travel policies
25.9 % 48.5% 75.0% 67.9% 89.5%
Source: Mason (2001)
IATA’s Corporate Air Travel Survey (2004) has indicated that the proportion of business
passengers who remain tied to corporate contracts has remained very stable over the last
four years. O’Connell and Williams (2005; 2006) showed that the largest low cost carriers
(in terms of passenger numbers) in Europe and Asia had no such corporate contract with
any company, while all the incumbents had contracts. Research by Alamdari and Mason
(2006) pointed out that less than 10% of corporate trips are booked with low cost carriers,
and the majority of the corporations do not use them. Similarly, Carlson Wagonlit Travel
(2006) confirmed the earlier studies by conducting their own research into the area and
found that 81% of travel managers from around the world stated that they rarely booked
corporate executives on low cost carriers.
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Corporate contracts are a strategic weapon that holds the loyalty of the business passenger,
and they are not an evident component with low cost carriers. The McKinsey group
stressed that incumbents must focus on corporate contracts in order to secure business
travellers from big companies (McKinsey Quarterly, 2005, p6). Incumbents should
continue to cement their business-to-business relationships with companies and broker
long-term deals that will bind corporate business travellers to a specific airline, thus
capturing high yield traffic. This is another marketing strategy that is highly effective
against low cost carriers as it captures and then secures high yield business passengers.
6.7 Branding
Branding has been present for centuries and it spans all frontiers of business. In the fine
arts, for example, branding began with artists like Leonardo de Vinci signing his works in
the early 1500s. Brands today are an important marketing strategy as a successful trade
mark is instantly recognised and can significantly enhance the financial value of a firm.
The process of branding originated as a means for firms to differentiate their goods and
services from those of their competitors (Cowley, 1991). David Aaker is considered the
leading academic in branding strategy - he stated that ‘A company’s brand is the primary
source of its competitive advantage and a valuable strategic asset’ (Aaker, 1996). He
argued that the power of the brand lies in what the customer has seen, read, heard, learned,
thought and felt about the brand over time (Aaker, 1997). More recently and along the
same lines, Keller (2003) measures the strength of the brand by the customer’s perception
of the brand through thoughts, feelings, experiences, images, perceptions, beliefs and
attitudes, all of which differ from one customer to another. Aaker (1996) aserted that
brands consist of 12 dimensions organised around 4 perspectives: brand as a product
(product scope, product attributes, quality/value, uses, users, country of origin); brand as
an organisation (organisational attributes, local versus global); brand as a person (brand
personality, brand consumer relationships); and brand as a symbol (visual imagery and
brand heritage). Keller and Kotler (2006, p278) integrate and then narrow down the
literature to reflect that a brand is a marketer’s promise to deliver a predictable product or
service performance, and a brand promise is the marketer’s vision of what the brand must
be and do for consumers. However, around 75-85% of all new brands fail (Kohli, 1997;
Murphy 1998).
The airline industry has both strong and weak brands. Dennis and Denton (2004) pointed
out that airlines, such as BA and Lufthansa, have developed strong brands which are
associated with quality and recognised world-wide. Arnoult (2004), having probed a little
deeper, reported that British Airways’ brand consists of professionalism, heritage,
reliability and quality, while Lufthansa’s brand is based more on quality, innovation and
trust. The brand strength of British Airways and its consumer pulling power becomes
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apparent when one considers the studies conducted by Dumazel and Humphreys (1999).
They illustrated that travel agent awareness, or willingness to promote the Manx European
service from Cardiff to Brussels was low when compared to the KLM service from Cardiff
to Amsterdam. However, once Manx European was later renamed as British Regional and
became a BA franchise, recognition grew substantially and passenger numbers soared,
primarily because of its association with a strong and well known brand. When Duo left the
BA franchise in 2003, it quickly deteriorated and, within six months, it was forced to cease
operations. Hanlon (1996) strongly argued that franchising is an excellent marketing tool
which can be used by airlines that lack a strong brand name.
Some brands, such as Gillette, Merck, 3M, Sony and others, have been leaders in their
product categories for decades, due in part to their continual innovation. In much the same
way, British Airways are retaining their leadership in the market because they continuously
upgrade their flight products. In 2000, for example, the carrier outfitted its premium class
with a new £600 million makeover that included the world’s first flatbed on its long-haul
aircraft (ATI, January 2000). Six years later it reinvested an additional £100 million in
revamping its Club World business class product (ATI, November 2006). Doyle (2001), a
noted author in branding, argued that building a successful brand starts by developing an
effective product or service. Lufthansa and Air France imitated the BA product in 2004 in
order to remain competitive. Lufthansa also became the first airline to install a broadband
communication service allowing its passengers to use the internet while in-flight, costing
close to $600,000 to install per aircraft (Flight International, 2004). JetBlue has now
become synonymous with its in-flight television entertainment system which it pioneered
itself. Chernatony and McDonald (1998) have indicated that products which match the
consumers’ needs most closely become brands. O’Connell (2006) reveals that Emirates is
now one of the world’s strongest airline brands, and partially attributes its success to its
affiliation with multiple high calibre sporting events, such as golf, horse racing, yachting,
cricket and rugby; moreover, the airline recently signed a seven-year deal costing $195
million in order to become a FIFA partner, thus giving it global awareness.
Companies enter into sponsorship arrangements for a variety of reasons - two of the most
common are: (1) to increase brand awareness, and (2) to establish, strengthen or change
brand image (Comwell and Maignan 1998; Gwinner 1997; Crowley 1991). The carrier is
also highly innovative as it is one of the first carriers to install mobile phone
receivers/transmitters onboard. Qatar Airways has been strongly branding itself as the
world’s only five-star carrier in an effort to differentiate itself from other carriers in the
Arabian Gulf. Meanwhile, Singapore Airlines developed its brand around innovation,
technology, genuine quality and excellent customer service - it was the first to introduce
hot meals, free alcoholic beverages, hot towels with a unique and patented scent, personal
entertainment systems and video-on-demand in all cabins. Kapferer (1997, p5) stated that
the brand is not the product but it does give the product meaning. Its brand, however, is
largely centred on the iconic ‘Singapore Girl’: she encapsulates Asian values and
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hospitality, and could be described as caring, warm, gentle, elegant and serene (The Brand
Channel, 2004). The icon has become so strong that Madame Tussaud’s Museum in
London started to display the Singapore Girl in 1994 as its first commercial figure.
There are many full service airlines with weak brands, such as Olympic, Alitalia, Malev,
Garuda, Aeromexico, PAL and Alaska - they are very vulnerable when low cost carriers
enter into their markets as they do not have a good reputation for delivering a top quality
airline service. Low cost carriers themselves are quickly developing strong brands: Ryanair
is now the fifth most searched website worldwide119; it gave away 20% of its flights for
free in 2004 and has plans to give away 50% of its flights for free by the end of the decade
- therefore, prospective passengers perceive that the brand will deliver very low fares: this
is the principle reason why the carrier has become so well known and sought after
(O’Connell and Williams, 2005). Southwest is regarded as the leader in low cost travel in
the United States and carried 77.7 million passengers in 2005, surpassing United,
Continental and Northwest. Air Asia’s brand in Asia is strengthening because it has
franchised its operations into Thailand and Indonesia. Similarly, the brands of other low
cost carriers around the world have been growing quickly, such as India’s Air Deccan,
Brazil’s Gol, Australia’s JetStar and Air Arabia in the Middle East.
In an effort to compete with the low cost carriers, the incumbents have changed their short-
haul product. Their economy class has become more like that of low cost carriers, as they
have been eliminating meal services, reducing the number of cabin crew and equipping the
aircraft with a higher seating density - some carriers have even eliminated short-haul
business class. All these changes have caused their brands to become diluted. In addition,
the full service carriers are faced with the dual marketing dilemma of offering a business
class to cater for time sensitive travellers and an economy class to cater for fare sensitive
passengers. Trying to brand two important elements of the marketing mix is becoming a
major problem for the full service airlines. Taneja (2003, p79) stated that an airline brand
can be diminished if it tries ‘to be all things to all segments’. He further argued that the full
service airlines have failed to establish their brand and their product’s unique value. This
results in a mismatch between the expectations of passengers and the airline promise,
which may frustrate passengers and make them question the integrity and competence of
the brand. Porter (1979) stated that consumers tend to be more price sensitive if they are
purchasing products that are undifferentiated, thus leading more passengers to take low
cost carriers. The United States leading airline branding company, Aerobrand, confirmed
that there is very little product differentiation between carriers – thus, marketing efforts to
strengthen the brand become paramount (Arnoult, 2004). However, Mercer Consulting
(2001) provided evidence that the strength of a brand can become the differentiating factor
119 The 2003 Year End Google Zeitgeist survey (based on 55 billion searches over the past year), that
tracks the most popular sites, ranks Ryanair.com as the fifth most searched for brand across the
worldwide web.
187
when service differentials are close to equal (e.g., price, schedules, in-flight amenities, on-
time performance, etc). The consulting company stated that customers were four times
more likely to choose the airline with the strongest brand than the airline with the weakest.
Teece (2000) also argued that strong brands are key value creating resources and are
important in sustaining competitive advantage. He also stated that high-value customers
place great importance on brands when making their travel related choices compared to
more price-sensitive, lower-value customer groups. In a similar vein, Hanlon (1996)
advocated the importance of image: ‘the image projected by one airline can be more
favourable in marketing terms than that projected by another’. He further suggested that the
brand image associated with one carrier can be more saleable than that of another.
Kalligiannis et al. (2006) surveyed 27 airlines that were associated with the Star, Oneworld
or SkyTeam alliances, and concluded that 89% of airlines wanted to keep their individual
brands and did not want their brands to become absorbed by the alliance brand. This may
dilute their originality and would certainly reduce the differentiation between the members
in each alliance. Brands, however, erode over time: Swissair, for example, was one of the
world’s leading airline brands a decade ago, but, since then, it has deteriorated and has now
being absorbed into the Lufthansa group but still remains a Swiss flag carrier. Other
carriers, such as Malaysia Airlines, Garuda, Gulf Air, SAS and Alitalia, are also
experiencing an erosion of their brand value. Forrester Research agreed that airline
branding has eroded over the past few years and stated that it is important for carriers to
focus on marketing, customer service and the entire flight experience in order to strengthen
their brand (Arnoult, 2004). Semans (2004) cited four reasons why brands erode over time:
decreased customer loyalty, lack of differentiation, increased price sensitivity and the lack
of internal alignment with the brand promise.
Airlines must continue to strengthen their brands and must communicate their brand values
to their customers. It is an excellent way to differentiate between their products and
services. The economy class cabins of full service carriers must not become mistaken for
those of low cost carriers; a fortiori, the brands of full service carriers must reflect the
attributes of leaders, such as Singapore Airlines, that portray innovation, technology,
genuine quality and excellent customer service. However, a key element in image building
is to ensure that what is promised before the flight actually materialises and meets
passenger expectations when the flight takes place (Doganis, 2002 p250).
6.8 Advertising
Kotler and Armstrong (2001) define advertising as ‘any paid form of non-personal
presentation and promotion of ideas, goods, or services by an identified sponsor’. To
advertise means to inform. Advertising is a big industry, and ZenithOptimedia (2004) have
estimated that advertising spending worldwide amounted to over $400 billion in 2003.
Advertising influences and persuades people to take a desired action - like choosing a
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particular airline when there are several available in the market. Therefore, advertising
positively impacts on the customers’ perception of a brand. Traditionally, academics and
practitioners in the field of marketing have supported the view that advertising plays an
important role in building the brand and customer equity (Ambler et al., 2002; Duncan
2005; Jones and Blair 1996; Rust et al., 2004).
There is a large void in literature regarding airline advertising, and very little research has
been conducted in this important marketing area. Stephen Shaw is one of the few authors
who has undertaken research on this subject area. Advertising can be transmitted via
several types of media, television generally being acknowledged as the most powerful
advertising medium. Airlines spend around 25% of their advertising budgets on television
advertising, costing around £70,000 per minute (Alamdari, 2004). Radio is another
persuasive medium. Research carried out by Keller and Kotler (2006, p572) showed that
around 96% of Americans listen to the radio daily and that it is a very effective media
source but lacks the visual image. Radio advertisements are relatively cheap to broadcast,
costing around £6,000 per minute on an early morning BBC channel (Alamdari, 2004).
Another effective medium is newspaper and magazine advertising as they generally cross-
subsidise their income from selling advertising space - this type of advertising can provide
detailed product information, generally costing £50,000 per page, however, print media is
generally passive and it is more difficult to measure how consumers respond to the
advertised message. The top Web portals (e.g. Yahoo, MSN, Google) now reach mass
audiences, and Internet advertising is becoming mainstream for airlines. In the United
States, the overall advertising industry grew at 7.7% in 2004, while Internet advertising
grew by 28.8% during the same year and is a $9.3 billion business (Business Week, 2004).
The allocation of an airline’s advertising budget among the alternative information media
is a very serious task and should consider local consumer preferences and durability of
conveyed messages in passengers’ minds.
To give an idea of how much airlines spend on advertising, Doganis (2002, p143) revealed
that Qantas and Singapore Airlines annual advertising spend per flight amounted to
£124,000 and £117,000 respectively in 1995, exclusively in the UK marketplace.
Consequently, their loads in first and business class were very high. Many airlines spend
around 2% of their revenues on an advertising budget every year. They may spend much
more than this when they launch new products or when they begin a new service, as they
want to create awareness. Lufthansa spends around 1.8% of its revenues on advertising or
the equivalent of €4 per passenger. British Airways spends roughly 80 per cent of its
advertising budget in the London and New York markets and has allocated a large portion
of this money into promoting its flat bed (Sentance, 2004). Emirates spends around 4% of
its revenues on advertising each year and subsequently won the Airline Business marketing
award in 2006. It stated that this level of investment is required in order for it to develop
into a globally recognised premium brand (Airline Business, August 2006). However, the
US majors were unable to invest the standard 2% of their revenues on advertising and this
may have contributed to their deteriorating performance as their presence on television,
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radio and in the newspapers disappeared, thus distancing themselves from the public. In
2003 American Airlines spent 1.21% of its revenues on advertising, while United only
spent 0.54%. Meanwhile, low cost carriers such as JetBlue, allocated 3.34% of their
revenues to promotion, while Southwest allocated 2.92% (Unisys Transportation Insights,
2003). Thus, the flag carriers were unable to target those passengers who were switching to
the low cost carriers partly because of insufficient advertising budgets. This contributed to
the majors losing market share to the low cost carriers. For benchmark purposes, BMW
spends 8.6% of its revenues on advertising, while McDonalds, the leading fast food
franchise, spends around 19%.
Nielsen Media (2005), a UK research company specialising in advertising, estimated that
the British travel industry spent around £622 million on advertising in 2004, while retailing
spent around £2 billion. Table 49 below shows how much airlines have spent on
advertising in the UK market in 1998 and again in 2004. The Nielsen research group
indicated that British Airways spent around £45 million on advertising in 2004 in the UK
market, while easyJet allocated almost £34.6 million to its advertising budget. Sull (1999)
stated that easyJet spent 8% of its revenues on advertising in its early days in order to
establish its brand - it has increased its adverting budget by 1050% from 1998 to 2004,
while its passenger numbers have increased by 1400% over the same period. The sharp
increase in advertising has triggered public awareness of easyJet and has stimulated many
passengers to use the carrier. Surprisingly, Virgin Atlantic’s adverting budget for 2004 was
very low, registering £3.1 million. Branson’s charismatic figurehead and brand stunts, such
as around-the-world ballooning, give the Virgin group continuous presence in the media,
thus reducing its advertising budget. Research by Naghuj (2005) confirmed that airline
advertising stimulates people’s awareness and encourages more passengers to try out the
service. His survey pointed out that customers best remembered British Airways, followed
by Emirates and then easyJet. Incidentally, these airlines had the highest advertising
expenditures, as shown in Table 49. He also stated that television was the best medium to
transmit advertisements, followed by the Internet and magazines.
Table 49 Airline Advertising Expenditure by rank in the UK for 1998 & 2004
1998 2004
Rank Airline Expenditure
(£ millions)
Rank Airline Expenditure
(£ millions)
1 BA 25.6 1 BA 45.1
2 Virgin Atlantic 8.9 2 easyJet 34.6
3 British Midland 8.5 3 United Airlines 10.8
4 United Airlines 4.8 4 Emirates 5.4
5 American Airlines 3.8 5 American Airlines 5.2
6 Qantas 3.1 6 Malaysia Airlines 3.8
7 easyJet 3.0 7 Iberia 3.2
8 Singapore 2.8 8 Virgin Atlantic 3.1
9 Emirates 2.7 9 Qantas 2.9
10 Air Canada 2.1 10 Continental 2.6
Source: Nielsen Media Research 2005
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Continental Airlines was one of the few US majors that did not enter bankruptcy in recent
years. When its revenue traffic began to fall in 2000, it immediately began to increase its
advertising expenditure. From 2000 to 2003 it increased its advertising expenditure by
30%, as shown in Figure 43 below. Even after 9/11 it continued to increase its advertising
expenditure and was one of the first majors to experience an increase in passenger traffic
by 2002/03. The Continental example proves the importance of embedding counter-
cyclicality in the advertising process. If an airline applies a counter-cyclical advertising
policy, raising its respective expenditure to face negative conditions and reducing it in
positive ones (when advertising is needed less), then it may eventually achieve better
returns overall.
Figure 43 Continental Airlines advertising shift and traffic impact
Source: BA accounts and Nielsen Media Research
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An effective advertising campaign needs to have a clear and well defined set of objectives
as an advertisement ultimately portrays the brand image of the company. Shaw (2004,
p272) argues that good airline advertising campaigns should contain good quality of
production, be well researched and persuasive; advertising portrays the true brand value of
the airline and can credibly offer a unique selling proposition to its customer, such as ‘The
first flight of the day’.
6.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined various aspects of marketing, highlighting concepts such as
passenger segmentation, satisfaction and perceived value, product and pricing strategies,
customer retention, branding and advertising. Due to the fierce competition from low cost
carriers, full service network airlines should capitalise on these marketing concepts and
aspects in order to devise a strategy of efficient and value for money product differentiation
in the passenger’s mind. Among others, full service carriers should pay particular attention
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to the business class passenger as the revenue/capacity ratio of this class is very healthy;
they should keep their customers satisfied by innovating and offering better quality of
service when and where needed; they should communicate their yield management strategy
to the passengers effectively to avoid complaints about excessive pricing; they need to
emotionally and financially connect to the passenger by developing a solid customer
relationship through the wise and integrated use of databases built around frequent flyer
programmes; they must attract corporate customers and travel management companies to
sign long-term contracts with them; they should resist reducing costs associated with value-
added services as this destroys their brand; and finally, they must spend heavily on
advertising, albeit on a selective and counter-cyclical basis. If network carriers follow the
above, then they may succeed in proposing an alternative marketing proposition to the
aggressive pricing strategies implemented by low cost carriers; this may be the only way
forward for full service carriers as the entire replication of the low cost model from a
supply-side perspective is neither possible nor sustainable.
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7 Chapter 7: Competing Against Low Cost
Carriers: A Strategic Management Perspective
This chapter extrapolates the core principles of strategic management from the literature.
This core competency provides a solid framework of strategies that full service airlines can
use to compete more effectively and gain competitive advantage over low cost cost carriers
in short-haul markets worldwide. This framework of ‘strategic management principles’
were added to the ‘marketing principles’ framework, extrapolated from previous chapter
(i.e. chapter 6) to form a detailed questionnaire on how full service airlines can compete
effectively with low cost carriers. This questionnaire was administered to airline
executives working at full service network carriers worldwide in association with IATA as
shown in Appendix VII. Its aim was to determine which marketing and management
strategies had the highest impact against low cost carriers.
7.1 Introduction
Traditional airline incumbents have come under attack from a new generation of leaner
and more agile types of airline. These low cost carriers are relative newcomers to the
industry but they have quickly reshaped the competitive dynamics of the global airline
industry and have been responsible for the paradigm shift of passengers who are
switching to the low fare carriers. Rather than embrace the full-service, hub-and-spoke
strategy of the major airlines, the new-comers introduced a low-cost, point-to-point, no-
frills strategy that proved to be a hit with consumers. Before long, they had captured a
large segment of the market, and established airlines were searching for answers to the
threat. Meanwhile, incumbents from a whole spectrum of other industries were also
facing competition from low cost competitors: long established book stores such as
Barnes and Noble, were facing new threats from online book distributors like
Amazon.com; and stock brokers such as Merrill Lynch, were now competing with online
brokers including E*Trade and Ameritrade - which was beginning to impact their
business. Many incumbent businesses were coming under attack from newcomers who
employed radical, new, low cost strategies and, as a result, established leaders in a variety
of industries were asking the same question: What strategies could be implemented in
order to successfully challenge these new innovators?
This chapter aims at addressing the above question by adopting an integrated strategic
management analytical framework: by firstly defining the concept of strategy; secondly
discussing the structural pillars of the contemporary airline business environment; and
thirdly, analysing in great detail, alternative competitive strategies for traditional carriers
to counter-attack the intrusion of low fare airlines. An initial framework (based on
Kotler’s five defence modes) provides the foundation for a generic defence mechanism
that is used by a wide spectrum of industries in order to oppose competition and guard
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markets. Then an additional framework of specifically aviation related strategies were
added that would support full service airlines in fending off budget carriers. This
additional framework consists of the following strategies: leadership and differentiation;
improved competitiveness through collaboration; marketing the flight products to
passengers; re-examining strategies that would accentuate profits and spread risk. It
would also incorporate various tools of analysis that would access strategies through:
strengths that would provide competitive advantages and strategies that would shore up
weaknesses; Porter’s five forces of competitive rivalry; and the capability of management
in dealing with the low cost carrier threat. In essence, this total framework plays a
fundamental role in the theoretical argument of this dissertation, which is then tested
empirically using a set of questionnaires (analysed in chapter 10).
7.2 What is Strategy?
The Oxford dictionary defines strategy as a ‘plan of action or planned change’. Porter
(1996) described strategy as ‘the creation of an unique and valuable position involving a
different set of activities’ and added that a company can claim that it has a strategy when
it performs different activities from its rivals, or performs similar activities in different
ways. In his book entitled ‘Competitive Strategy’, he linked competitive strategy to
thirteen dimensions that could be used when competing with rivals, as follows: brand,
specialisation, push verses pull, channel selection, product quality, technological
leadership, vertical integration, cost position, service, price policy, leverage, relation with
parent company, and the relationship with its home country and government (Porter,
1980 p127-8). Porter later restructured his description of competitive strategy and stated
that it consisted of business initiatives to attract new customers, withstand the
competitive environment and strengthen competitive market position (Porter, 1996).
Rowe et al. (1993) and Grant (2002) indicated that strategy can also be seen as creating
opportunities by building on an organisation’s resources and competences. Wood (1999)
stated that the strategy process enabled an organisation to focus and sense (define the
organisation and the context in which it is operating with some precision), anticipate
(develop ways in which the organisation’s context changes and how the organisation
might respond to those changes), influence (develop ways in which the organisation
might change context in order to improve its own sustainability), and act (motivate
intelligent action at the right time in the right place in accordance with the themes of the
strategy). Today’s leading academics of strategic management, notably Johnson, Scholes
and Whittington (2005, p9), defined strategy as ‘The direction and scope of an
organisation over the long term, which achieves advantages in a changing environment
through its configuration of resources and competencies with the aim of fulfilling
stakeholder expectations’. Companies from all types of industries need forward planning
to successfully compete - this stems from having an effective strategy in place, giving the
company a solid direction.
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7.3 The forces that shape the airline industry
The environment in which airlines operate encapsulates many different influences and
interconnecting forces. Understanding the operating environment is important when
building a strategic picture of the airline industry. In the contemporary highly competitive
marketing environment, there are many forces that shape the structure of the airline
industry, and that ultimately affect strategy. The ability of a carrier to compete depends
on its strategic capability (resources and competencies) which is affected by its operating
environment (both external and internal) (Johnson et al., 2005). Figure 44, below, shows
the operating environment of today’s airline industry, comprising of two mainstreams,
namely a macro and micro environment. The macro-environment applied here is a
generic type used in multiple industries and is commonly referred to as the PESTEL
(Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological, Environmental and Legal elements).
These forces have a direct impact on the airline industry but are largely outside of its
control. The second operating environment of the airline industry is the micro-
environment, which includes all the aviation related forces which have a direct impact on
the overall competitive environment and it includes: the level of competition,
deregulation, operational capability, and marketing and financial strengths that shape the
competitive structure and market conduct of an airline. These factors can also determine a
carrier’s position in the market as a leader, challenger or follower.
Figure 44. The operating environment of the airline industry
Strategic
Positioning
of an Airline
Pol itical
Government stability
Taxation policy
Foreign trade regulations
Social welfare policies
Economic
Factors
Business cycles
GDP growth/decline
Interest rates
Money supply
Inflation
Unemployment
Income levels
Oil Supply
Sociocultural
Terrorism and extremism
Population demographics
Income distribution
Social mobility
Lifestyle changes
Attitude to work/leisure
Consumerism
Levels of education
Technological
Research & Developement
Internet & eCommerce
A380 v 747
Obsolescence
Cost to acquire technology
Th
e
M
ac
ro
-E
nv
i ro
nm
en
t
Legal
Competition law
Data Protection Act
Employment law
Health & safety
Environmental
Emmissions
Carbon Trading
Energy Consumption
Th
e
M
ic
ro
-E
nv
iro
nm
en
t
Competition Deregulation
Operational
Financial
Marketing
Network/geographical coverage
Growth/decline of market share
Demand versus capacity
Code sharing & Alliances
Competitive strategy
Fare
Liberalised markets
Open skies
Current bi-laterals
8 Freedoms of the Air
Operating Margins
Performance earnings
Cash flow
Debt
Equity investment
Airline valuation
Merger/acquistion
Passenger Segmentation
Distribution channels
Differenciating features
Sustaining customer loyalty
Connecting with passengers
Business/leisure product mix
Effective Advertising
Brand
Aircraft utilisation
Employee productivity
On-time performance
Schedule
Fleet mix
Contingency plans
195
The strategy of an airline also depends on the level of risk that it faces in pursuing a
particular strategy. Johnson et al. (2005, p369) stated that risk ‘concerns the probability
and consequences of the failure of a strategy’. Kichisaburo (2003) classified airline risk
into four categories: strategic, operational, financial and hazardous. The level of risk
shapes the strategy of an airline and determines its competitive advantage. Figure 45
below, shows the various risks facing the airline industry, both from an internal and
external perspective. Central to all airline risk is safety as it has always been a critical
element to the economic success of the industry. Although fatal air accidents are
extremely rare compared to other transport modes, the rapid growth in the number of
commercial flights has resulted in aviation’s increased exposure to risk. Mercer
Consulting surveyed the aviation industry over a ten year period from April 1991 to
April 2001, which captured the full range of an economic cycle including the recession
of the early 1990s and the boom of the mid to late 1990s. It found that airlines lost $46
billion in shareholder value because they did not manage the entire spectrum of risk
(i.e. strategic, financial, operational and hazardous) during this period. The strategic
risks accounted for 49% of the losses, followed by the financial risks at 22%,
operational risks at 18% while hazardous risks only accounted for 11% (Mercer
Management Consulting, 2002). This implies that strategic management is vital to the
success of a carrier as it will steer the company through change and enable corrective
adjustments to be made in order to remain competitive and profitable
Figure 45. The risks facing the airline industry
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7.4 Designing a survey to access which marketing and management
strategies had the highest impact against low cost carriers.
A questionnaire was designed to determine which strategic management concepts could
be implemented by the full service airlines to be most effective in competing against the
low cost carriers. The design had a two-fold framework. Firstly as a result of a deep-
rooted study of the strategic management literature, a large number of strategies were
selected for the questionnaire in an effort to determine which particular strategies had the
greatest impact in competing against budget carriers. Secondly, the core marketing
concepts extrapolated from the previous chapter (i.e. chapter 6) was added to this design
framework to provide a solid set of well structured questions on how full service airlines
can compete effectively with low cost carriers. This questionnaire (see appendix VII)
was then sent to airline executives worldwide in collaboration with IATA. The principle
concepts of strategy and marketing are extrapolated from the literature and serve as the
fundamental underpinning of what airline executives can do to defend and compete
against low cost carriers as outlined in Figure 46 below.
Figure 46 below is composed of two parts. Firstly it outlines a series of defensive
mechanisms that full serviced airlines can implement in order to defend themselves
against low cost carriers. Secondly it consists of a series of strategies that network
carriers can implement to gain competitive advantage and build value over encroaching
low cost carriers.
The first subsection examines generic defensive strategies. Strategy can be viewed as the
building of defences to protect a company from competitive forces or to position the
company where competition is weak (Porter, 1979). Knowledge of the company’s
capabilities and the forces of the surrounding competition will become indicators to a
company if it should confront or avoid competition. Kotler (1991, 1994, 1997, 2000)
outlines a framework whereby a company can segment its defences depending on the
objectives of the encroaching competition. The five types of defence put forward by
Kotler are outlined below and are represented diagrammatically (enclosed rectangle) in
Figure 46:
1) Flanking Defence. The market leader erects flanks/outposts to protect a weak front
2) Pre-emptive Defence. A more aggressive defence manoeuvre is to launch an attack
before competitors launch their offensive.
3) Counter-offensive Defence. Most market leaders when attacked will respond with a
counter attack. The leader cannot remain passive in the face of a competitor’s price cut,
product improvement, promotions or market territory invasion.
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4) Mobile Defence. The leader stretches its domain over new territories. It spreads
through market broadening and market diversification. Market broadening involves
shifting focus from the current product to the underlying generic need. Market
diversification involves shifting into other business areas.
5) Contraction Defence. Large companies realise that they can no longer defend all
their territory and the best course of action would be a planned contraction or strategic
withdrawal. This is where the company gives up weaker territories and reassigns
resources to stronger territories.
Kotler’s five defences have been taken as the foundation framework, which provide a
generic defence mechanism to shield against competition and counter-attack low priced
entrants.
The second subsection of Figure 46 comprises of an additional framework of strategies
and analytical tools which are added to Kotler’s defense mechanism. These are
supplementary strategies or components that network carriers can implement to gain
competitive advantage and build value over encroaching low cost carriers. Such
strategies include collaboration, marketing, diversification, negotiation and
management’s ability to implement change, while tools of analysis included bases of
competitive strategy, strengths/weaknesses identification and Porter’s theory of
competitive rivalry.
Both frameworks are shown below in Figure 46. The strategies and analytical tools
used by full service airlines to fend off low cost carriers are outlined below:
i) Porter (1985) argued that successful enterprises stem from cost leadership,
differentiation or by focusing on a niche market. Bowman and Faulkner (1996) build
on Porter’s original three generic strategies by developing a ‘Strategy Clock’ which
outlines a range of different strategy options (e.g. strictly low fare, low fare with frills,
etc.). Johnson et al. (2005, p245) argues that the strategy clock is an important
concept in helping managers understand the changing requirements of their markets
and the choices they can make about positioning their companies and their
competitive advantage. The bases of competitive strategy as outlined in Figure 46
shows this.
ii) Collaboration between incumbents can be crucial in achieving advantage or
avoiding competition. Collaboration allows the incumbent to compete in some markets
and join forces in others (Doz and Hamel, 1998 and Faulkner, 1995). Goold and
Campbell (1998) claimed that extensive synergies exist from pooled resources and give
airlines more leverage. Carriers can comfortably coexist by forming partnerships
without antitrust immunity, and by developing more common synergies through
alliance membership and extensive code sharing agreements.
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iii) It is important to identify an airline’s strengths and weaknesses in relation to its
business environment. Effective use by management of a company’s resources and
capabilities will strengthen its competitiveness, and, conversely, ineffective
management weakens its position. Feurer and Chaharbaghi (1995) argued that strategy
can be defined by a company’s strengths and weaknesses. Many other authors such as
Schnaars (1998), Thomson and Strickland (2001), McDonald (1999) and Kotler (2000)
all indicated that a company’s strengths may be leveraged to realise opportunities; they
also showed how weaknesses (which exacerbate threats or impede progress) can be
strategically strengthened.
iv) Porter’s theory of competitive rivalry explores the various forces of competition.
Some airlines are more profitable than others because of the dynamics of the
competitive structure within which they operate. The most influential analytical model
in assessing the nature of competition in an industry is Porter’s five forces that shape
every industry and every market. These forces determine the intensity of the
competition, and include barriers to entry, threat of substitute products, bargaining
power of buyers, bargaining power of sellers and the rivalry among existing
competitors in the industry (Porter 1985).
v) Marketing strategies incorporates all the various aspects of marketing, highlighting
concepts such as passenger segmentation, satisfaction and perceived value, product and
pricing strategies, customer retention, branding and advertising These are all very
important strategies if an incumbent wants to differentiate its services from those of
low cost carriers. Chapter 6 describes all of these in detail.
vi) Additional strategies in the form of diversification and managerial capability are
added here to the overall framework of analyses. Diversification allows a company to
expand beyond its core competencies. A number of well known authors have argued
that diversification has important influences on the performance of firms (Hitt et al.,
1997 and Kim et al., 1989). The ability of management to direct strategy is crucial. An
organisation may have the ‘right’ strategy (content) but, without the appropriate
organizational structure and capabilities in place, it will not be able to implement its
strategy successfully. These components are addressed as Strategy Formulation in
Figure 46 below.
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Figure 46. Defensive and competitive strategies to compete against low cost carriers
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Collectively, these defence and strategic options outlined in Figure 46 above, represent
a wide spectrum of possible strategies that the incumbent could implement in order to
respond to low cost carriers. These integrated defence and strategic options were
included in a questionnaire which was sent to airline strategy directors worldwide,
in collaboration with IATA. The questions are designed to identify an incumbent’s
capabilities in dealing with low cost carrier competition and also to identify which
options prove effective against the low cost carriers. The questionnaire also
includes a subsection on air travellers’ choice, which lists all the reasons for
choosing an incumbent, according to passenger surveys conducted in Ireland,
Malaysia and India. The rationale for its inclusion is to investigate if the airlines’
perception of passenger requirements synchronises with what the passenger
actually wants. The results of the questionnaire are discussed in detail in the
empirical part of the thesis in Chapter 10. A description of each of the strategies
listed in Figure 46 follows.
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7.5 Bases of competitive strategy (cost leadership & differentiation)
Porter (1985) argued that, in order to succeed in business, a firm needs to adopt one of
the three generic competitive strategies, cost leadership, differentiation or market focus,
and that the firm’s strategic choice ultimately determines its profitability and
competitiveness (Porter and Millar, 1986). Porter’s framework for competitive strategy
is one of the most widely accepted business planning models (Bourgeois, 1996; Pearce,
1994; Thomson 1995). Alamdari and Fagan (2005) stated that the full service airline is
essentially one based on a differentiation strategy, in contrast to the low cost carrier
approach which is based on cost leadership or cost minimisation. Firstly, a cost-based
strategy enables a firm to sell its products either at average industry prices to earn a
profit higher than that of rivals, or below the average industry prices to gain market
share. In the event of a price war, the firm can maintain some profitability while the
competition suffers losses (e.g. Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia). Secondly, a firm
differentiates itself from its competitors when it provides something worthwhile that is
valuable to buyers beyond simply offering a low price (e.g. Inflight Entertainment120,
LiveTV121). The aim is to achieve competitive advantage by offering better products or
services at the same price as that of competitors, or by enhancing margins by pricing
slightly higher. Differentiation also reduces the price sensitivity of consumers (Porter,
1980; Aaker, 1991; Pearce and Robinson, 1994). Figure 47, below, shows the
economic theory behind the strategy of differentiation. Let D denote the demand curve
in periods 0 and 1 (D0 and D1), and AC the average cost curve (AC0 and AC1). It is
assumed that increasing economies of scale prevail throughout production because of
high fixed costs and low, constant marginal costs. As an airline pursues a
differentiation strategy122, the average cost curve shifts from AC0 to AC1. This shift is
not parallel as the average cost difference between the two curves becomes lower for
higher levels of production. It is also assumed that, as a result of product
differentiation, more passengers will become attracted123; this will push out the demand
curve from D0 to D1. Subject to the market conduct of the other incumbents, this
differentiation strategy may allow an airline to increase the fare124 from, for example,
P0 to P1, while at the same time attracting more passengers, Q0 to Q1, as they are
prepared to pay a price premium for the added value. Moreover, the price mark-up in
120 It can cost between $10,000-15,000 per seat to install an audio-video on-demand fully interactive ,
web-enabled system (Aircraft Economics, 2003). 43% of the world’s fleet has an IFE system (ATI,
September 2003).
121 JetBlue’s LiveTV cost the company $41 million to acquire but the feature ranks as its second or
third most important reason why passengers travel with carrier (Aircraft Economics, 2003).
122 BA for example invested £600 million into the design and development of flatbeds for their premier
classes in 2000 (first mover advantage) and six years later it reinvested an additional £100 million into
its next generation flat bed.
123 BA saw its premium business class passengers grow by over 8% in 2005 and consequently it will
increase the number of its business class seats by a further 8% (Pilling, 2007).
124 Singapore Airlines invested $370 million in its flatbeds and will increase business fares by 15-20%
as a result of its differentiated strategy (Pilling, 2007).
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period 1 after the introduction of product differentiation (equal to P1C1) is higher
compared to period 0 (P0C0, i.e. before differentiation).
Figure 47. Economic theory of differentiating products
D0 D1
Price
AC1(Q)
AC0(Q)
P1
Q1
P0
Q0
Volume of Output
C0
C1
Source: Adapted from Besanko et al. (2000) Economics of Strategy, p424
Nowadays, due to the homogeneity of the core product, carriers try to distinguish
themselves through secondary services (e.g. wide seat pitch, speciality foods, etc.) or soft
factors like the friendliness of staff, which become important differentiators amidst
growing competition.
Finally, a company may obtain a strategic advantage by choosing to become specialised
and focus on a market niche instead of competing broadly in the market (e.g. Privatair,
Maxjet, Air Asia X, Oasis Hong Kong, Silverjet). The idea behind the focus strategy is to
serve the particular market more effectively than competitors on the basis of product
differentiation, low cost, or both. However, Porter argues that organisations must choose
between either a differentiation or a cost leadership strategy, otherwise they become
‘stuck in the middle’ and will not achieve competitive advantage because, if several
airlines compete on the basis of low prices and undifferentiated products, then it is likely
that a cut-throat competitive battle will emerge. Markus Franke, a noted airline consultant
from Booz Allen Hamilton, has argued that despite cost-cutting efforts, many legacy
carriers find themselves ‘stuck-in-the-middle’ between a number of very successful
premium carriers on the one hand, and the low-cost carriers on the other hand (Gillen and
Niemeier, 2006). According to Porter, firms become stuck in the middle for three
reasons: firstly, they may fail to differentiate themselves from competitors; secondly,
they may fail to develop the capabilities or resources needed to be a successful cost
leader; and thirdly, they may try to pursue more than one generic strategy simultaneously
(Porter, 1985). However, airline competition today is changing because of the effect of
low cost carriers, as traditional network carriers pursue an integrated cost
leadership/differentiation strategy (Coulter, 2002; Hitt et al., 2003) - that is, network
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carriers are striving to reduce costs while at the same time keeping their products
differentiated from low cost carriers.
Gursoy et al. (2005) have stated that one of the biggest challenges facing the airline
industry today is to determine which strategies are best suited to becoming better
positioned in the market. Porter established that an important determinant of a firm’s
profitability is its position within the industry in which it operates. A firm positions itself
by leveraging its strengths or competitive advantage. Strategy itself is conceptualized as a
firm’s realised position in its competitive marketplace (Mintzberg, 1987; Porter, 1980).
Bowman and Faulkner (1996) developed an assessment tool in the form of a ‘Strategy
Clock’ which accesses a company’s competitive position in comparison with its rivals
based on cost advantage, differentiation or stuck in the middle. This is adapted for
specific reference to the airline industry as shown below in Figure 48. Airlines are
organised into specific groups because they each have similar characteristics. Each
position on the clock represents a unique group of airlines which have similar generic
characteristics (i.e. cost leadership, differentiation, stuck in the middle). Johnson et al.
(2005, p245) argues that the strategy clock is an important concept in helping managers
understand the changing requirements of their markets and the choices they can make
about positioning their companies and their competitive advantage.
Figure 48. Strategic positioning of airline groups
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Figure 48 above begins with low cost carriers, such as Ryanair and Air Deccan, that are
cost leaders and thus compete on the basis of low fares and no frills, while a second group
of low cost carriers, such as Air Berlin, compete by offering low fares and some frills (e.g.
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Frequent Flyer Program, allocated seating, etc.). The figure then categorises the
incumbents’ attempts to differentiate themselves in order to challenge the low cost carrier
threat. Noted academics have stressed that a cut-throat competitive battle will commence if
several firms compete on low prices and undifferentiated products (Porter, 1980; Kotler
1991). Incumbents have been unable to compete on cost and their only alternative was to
differentiate their products from those of low cost carriers. The actions of Aer Lingus were
a noted exception as they reduced cost significantly and retained some of their product
differentiators. Other incumbents, such as British Airways, competed on the basis of
multiple differentiated flight products (e.g. business class, primary airports, FFPs, onward
connectivity, superior inflight products, etc), thus charging a fare premium for these add-
ons - these appealed to a large number of passengers but the higher fare caused the price
sensitive passengers to switch to a low cost carrier. Network carriers, such as Qantas,
created low cost carrier subsidiaries which competed on a similar cost-based platform as
that of the low cost carriers. Other incumbents, such as Alitalia, have been unsuccessful in
their attempts to compete with LCC because they offered standard products that
commanded high prices, and consequently these carriers continue to lose market share. Full
service airlines, such as Midway, have been forced out of business because of losses, the
result of poor strategies, high fares and blurring boundaries, while a large number of low
cost carriers have also failed because of weak brands and cost structures that could not
support low fares.
7.6 Collaboration
Airlines, being an international and service business industry, have always been
naturally interested in extending their network beyond the markets they serve,
improving revenues, reducing costs and enhancing customer services. As international
airline traffic has expanded in recent years, a new development has swept the industry:
extensive cooperation among international carriers in the provision of service. There
has been a steady increase in the number of alliances and cooperative agreements with
regional airlines over the last decade. In 1994, an Airline Business magazine survey
found over 280 separate alliances involving around 136 airlines (Burton and Hanlon,
1994). By 2006 there were around 500 alliance agreements in force among 120
passenger airlines (Airline Business, September 2006). These alliances were designed
to offer international passengers a ‘seamless’ travel experience. Collaboration between
airlines allows passengers and baggage to transfer between carriers as if the passenger
was travelling on the same airline, connecting to any city in the world.
There are three categories of collaboration that network carriers have adopted:
 Marketing agreements
 Alliances
 Collaboration with Regional Airlines
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7.6.1 Marketing agreements
Airlines that collaborate within a marketing alliance are marketed as an independent
entity. Marketing alliances consist of the following types of collaboration:
 Interline/pro rate agreements
 Pooling arrangements
 Code sharing agreements
Interline/pro rate agreements
An interline agreement is an agreement concerning the sale, endorsement and
acceptance of tickets between airlines so that passengers can transfer from one airline
to another in order to reach their final destination - it also involves the coordination of
baggage (Iatrou, 2004). Ito and Lee (2004) subdivided interline agreements into Non-
allied interline agreements and Allied interline agreements. A Non-allied interline
agreement is a connecting ticket between two carriers that are not part of an alliance,
whereas an Allied interline agreement is an interline transfer between two carriers that
are alliance partners. SITA (2005) indicated that 300 million interline tickets were
produced in 2004 and it showed that collaboration is an important part of the strategy
of network airlines. Studies have shown that around 30% of all intra-EU passengers
had tickets that accommodated interlining and a further 10% had a fully flexible
interline ticket in 2001 (DG Competition Consultation Paper, 2001). Passengers
travelling on network carriers can use a single ticket that involves multiple airlines to
get to any destination in the world, and the revenue earned from the ticket is shared
between the carriers on a pro-rata basis depending on distance. However, shorter
distances are given greater weight to compensate for the higher costs associated with
operating short-haul flights. The interline system used to be a very important
constituent of international air transport as it represented as much as a third of an
airline’s total traffic125 and was particularly prevalent on routes serving large hub
airports.
Pooling Arrangements
This is a unique agreement between two or more carriers in which they share the cost
of operating the flight and the associated revenue that it generates. Burton and Hanlon
(1994) described that, in some cases, revenues are divided up in proportion to the
capacity offered by each carrier. In others, airlines pool revenues only up to a certain
percentage of seats sold. Pooling agreements are usually conducted between carriers
who operate on the same route, where each carrier charges the same fare and the
arrangement reduces the competition. Doganis (2001, p37) found that pooling was
125 GAO/RCED-95-99.
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widespread in Europe until the early 1990s and accounted for 75-80 percent of the
intra-European passenger kilometres. However, in recent years they have largely been
replaced by code sharing and block space agreements - although pooling still remains
commonplace in some Asian, Middle Eastern and African airlines.
Code Sharing Agreements
The most common type of collaboration between airlines today is code sharing126.
According to ICAO (Circular 296-AT/110, 1997), code share is the practice whereby
one airline permits a second airline to use its airline designator code on a flight, or
where two airlines share the same airline designator code on a flight. The agreement
allows an airline (‘ticketing carrier’) to market and sell seats on their partners’ aircraft
(‘operating carrier’) as if these seats were owned by the ticketing carrier. The common
structure of the agreement allows the operating carrier to set the fare, and the operating
carrier pays the ticketing carrier a commission for selling seats through its various
distribution channels. Upham’s (2003) research showed that there were over 2000 code
share and franchise agreements worldwide in 2002. Code sharing allows carriers access
to the network of numerous airlines, which increases the number of destinations
instantaneously. In support of a code sharing agreement, the carriers may adjust
schedules and take other steps to foster seamless travel, just as if they were formal
alliance partners.
There are a number of distinct advantages gained by network airlines that employ such
code share strategies. Firstly, code share agreements increase traffic which pushes up
load factors and ultimately revenues. A comprehensive worldwide survey conducted by
Iatrou (2004, p203) revealed that 65% of airlines indicated that code sharing had a
significant impact on increasing traffic, while the remaining carriers (35%) announced
that code sharing had some impact. Secondly, code-shared flights have certain
advantages in CRS display screen listings over other flights: code shared flights are
listed twice on the GDS screens because both partners list the same flight as if it were
their own (screen padding); and code shared connecting flights get listed ahead of
interline flights on the GDS. Strongly branded airlines, such as British Airways, can
position weaker brands, such as Aer Lingus, higher up the travel agent screen due to
the code share link (Humphreys 1994; Rhoades et al., 1997). Thirdly, code sharing
allows carriers to circumvent bilateral constraints (Graham, 1995). Airlines operating in
international air travel markets are subject to a complex set of bilateral agreements
among countries.
Beyhoff (1995) distinguished between five types of code sharing agreements outside of
the normal code share arrangement, and concluded that block space was the most
common and useful. Block space is an agreement to purchase a fixed number of seats
126 According to the OECD (2000, p.30), 70% of alliances include a provision for code sharing.
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on the operating partner’s flights, and to sell them under its own designator. It is the
responsibility of the marketing carrier to sell those seats through its own marketing and
distribution system (Burton and Hanlon, 1995). Some block space agreements, called
‘soft block space’, allow the carrier to return any unsold seat inventory. Block space is
still widely used by Asian, Middle Eastern and African carriers, and the 2006 Airline
Business alliance survey showed that carriers such as Air India and Egyptair, for
example, had nearly 50% of their code share agreements in the form of block space
agreements in 2006.
However, some low cost carriers are also using code sharing as a tool to extend their
global reach: for example, Virgin Blue code shares with United Airlines and Virgin
Atlantic, while Jetstar and Qantas are utilising both code share and block space
agreements (O’Connell, 2004). In addition, Southwest now code shares with ATA
airlines (ATI, January 2005). This is a clear indication that low cost carriers are closing
the gap between themselves and the traditional airlines.
7.6.2 Alliances
Airlines that are members of a strategic alliance share resources and activities in order
to strengthen their competitive position. Li (2000) argued that airlines which do not
belong to an alliance will be severely disadvantaged, while Oum et al. (1996) indicated
that such carriers would become marginalised and evolve into niche players in localised
markets. Alliances consist of the following types of collaboration:
 Strategic Alliances
 Equity partnerships
 Airline Franchises
Strategic Alliances
Johnson et al. (2005, p353) described strategic alliances as ‘two or more organisations
that share resources and activities to pursue a strategy’. In May 2001, the editor of
Forbes magazine wrote, in a special edition about alliances, that ‘Alliances may be the
most powerful trend that has swept (global) business in the past 100 years’ (Pekar,
2003). Ernst’s (2002) research revealed that the top 500 global companies had an
average of 60 alliances each. The International Air Transport Association (2001)
defined an airline alliance as ‘three or more airlines participating in a commercial
relationship or joint venture, where a joint and commonly identifiable product is
marketed under a single commercial name’.
A vast amount of literature exists on airline alliances, covering areas such as the causes
and effects of equity alliances (Youssef, 1992), selection criteria for alliance partners
(Harvey and Lusch, 1995), the effect of code sharing on international fare levels (Oum
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et al., 1998), the factors affecting the operational success of alliances (Bissessur, 1996;
Bissessur and Alamdari 1998), performance issues between alliances (Park and Cho,
1997), the price effects of international alliances (Brueckner and Whalen, 1998), key
factors for alliance success and demise (Li, 2000), scheduling issues and network
strategies for international airline alliances (Dennis, 2000), the regulatory issues
concerning global alliances (Oum et al., 2001), and the impact of alliance airlines on
partners’ traffic (Iatrou, 2004).
By 2006, there were three global alliance partnerships, namely Star, Oneworld and
SkyTeam, and there has been a wider ontogenesis between carriers in more recent
years. The Star Alliance carried 425 million passengers and served 873 destinations in
147 countries, while Oneworld carried 242 million passengers and served 591
destinations in 128 countries, and SkyTeam carried 373 million passengers and served
730 destinations in 141 countries in 2006 (Star Alliance, 2006; Oneworld, 2006;
SkyTeam, 2006). Collectively, the three alliances constitute a significant proportion of
the world’s passenger market: the Star partnership accounted for 20.6%, while
SkyTeam and Oneworld respectively constituted 18.6% and 14.5% in 2006. The
remaining 46.3% of the world’s passenger market belongs to carriers that are not
affiliated to an alliance, and include important carriers such as Emirates, Malaysia
Airlines, Gulf Air, Air India and Virgin Atlantic. In the same year, the three alliance
partnerships had 72.5% of the European-American capacity, 84.4% of the European-
Asia Pacific capacity and 73% of the American-Asia Pacific capacity (Baker, 2006).
These alliances also provide around 56% of the IATA freight volume.
Figure 49 (below) shows each alliance partner airline’s market share in its regional
market. Delta Airlines, for example, has 42% of Skyteam’s market share in the North
American market, while Continental and Northwest have 28% and 25% respectively.
Each of these carriers has huge networks that cover the entire US and Canada, and that
serve many cities several times a day. Airlines from Europe and Asia can then feed
their traffic into the hubs of Delta, Continental and Northwest, which will enable
passengers to access nearly all the cities in the US and Canada. These carriers
coordinate schedules, reciprocate FFP privileges and, in some cases, the member
airlines can obtain antitrust immunity127. This is an important strategy for network
carriers as they can interline traffic seamlessly to any destination worldwide, while
passengers travelling on a low cost carrier are restricted to destinations within its
network.
127 Antitrust immunity enables airlines to collaborate on fares, schedules and code sharing without
being in violation of U.S. laws.
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Figure 49 Market strength of the alliance members in their home market (2005 data)
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Note: SkyTeam: DL=Delta, CO = Continental, NW= Northwest, AM=Aeromexico, AF= Air France,
KL=KLM, AZ= Alitalia, OK= CSA, SU= Aeroflof, KG=Korean, CZ=China Southern
Star: UA= United, US=USAir, AC= Air Canada, RG= Varig, LH= Lufthansa, SK= SAS,
OS= Austrian, Others include BMI, LOT, Spanair, Swiss and TAP, SQ= Singapore Airlines,
TG = Thai, NH= ANA, OZ= Asiana, NZ=Air New Zealand
Oneworld: AA= American, LA= Lanchile, BA= British Airways, IB= Iberia, OY= Finnair,
EI= Aer Lingus, CX= Cathay Pacific, QF= Qantas
Airlines throughout the world are increasingly entering into international alliances with
foreign carriers in order to extend their networks and gain access to new markets,
which will attract more passengers (Park, 1997; Park and Zhang, 1998; Park et al.,
2001). In 2003, a comprehensive questionnaire was sent by Iatrou (2004) to the heads
of the alliance departments of all airlines that were participating in an alliance. Almost
90% of the respondents stated that traffic had increased because of their collaboration
with a corresponding increase in load factors, while all the airlines stated that their
revenues also increased. A large number of academics have concluded that alliances,
overall, have resulted in lower fares for the consumer, (Oum et al., 1996; Brueckner
and Whalen, 2000; Park and Zhang, 2000; Goh and Uncles, 2003; Brueckner, 2001,
and Brueckner, 2003). This indicates that airlines which are associated with an alliance
have a competitive advantage over a non-aligned carrier. Alliances also allow member
airlines to reduce operating costs by integrating and coordinating activities between
each other (Park et al., 2001; Pels, 2001). Iatrou (2004) concluded that 80% of the
airlines who were members of an alliance had lower costs as a result of the alliance.
The lower costs emerged because of joint purchasing programs, coordination of flight
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schedules, shared airport facilities128, joint services (e.g. maintenance and advertising),
joint development of systems or systems software, loyalty programmes, etc., which are
all long-term sustainable competitive advantages. Some of the newer and more
revolutionary synergies that have resulted from alliances include joint purchasing of
fuel by the Star partners. Star announced in late 2003 that it planned to form a joint
company called Star Alliance FuelCo to manage the procurement of jet fuel at selected
airports around the world (ATI, June 2004). Smaller airlines within the alliance can
benefit from the higher credit rating of the group in obtaining fuel discounts. Those
airlines not associated with the alliance will have to compete out of the same market
with higher fuel costs. In a similar strategy, the Star alliance outlined plans to purchase
around 200 aircraft in 2003 (Field, 2003), which would enable individual member
airlines to procure aircraft at reduced rates and challenge the low cost carriers bulk
ordering. In 2005, the Star alliance outlined plans for a unified configuration of their
member airlines’ new aircraft, which would allow members to easily transfer aircraft
and delivery slots (ATI, December 2005). Doganis (2001, p 78) stated that the Star
alliance members purchase around $15 billion worth of goods and services each year,
and he estimated that joint purchasing could reduce the overall price by 5 to 7 per cent
per year (i.e. $1 billion). Similarly, Baker and Field (2003) indicated that the Oneworld
member airlines saved around $300 million through joint purchasing schemes between
2000 and 2003. Appendix III provides details of the benefits of alliances, showing
how alliances can increase traffic, enhance revenues and lower incumbents’ costs.
Equity
Equity partnerships represent cross-border acquisitions of other airlines - however, the
ability to buy into foreign carriers is still heavily constrained by governments.
Ownership laws and nationality clauses in bilateral air services agreements limit cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. In Europe, airlines from outside the EU can purchase
up to 49% of a European carrier129, while only 25% equity can be purchased by a
foreign airline in an American carrier. Australia, on the other hand, has the most liberal
ownership laws as 100% foreign equity can be invested in an Australian domestic
carrier (Chang and Williams, 2002). At the end of 2001, over 60 airlines had
shareholdings in foreign airlines, while about 200 had equity owned by foreign
128 British Airways and Iberia, who are both members of the Oneworld alliance, will move their
members to the new £4 billion Terminal 5 at Heathrow and to the new €6 billion terminal 4 at Barajas,
Madrid, respectively. Similarly, Japan Airlines will house all the Oneworld carriers alongside Japan
Airlines in terminal two of Tokyo Narita International Airport. The co-location of all the member
airlines at one terminal will enable passengers, baggage, cargo, etc. to be easily transferred and reduces
the risk of mismanaged baggage. The connection time between carriers is estimated to be 60 minutes,
which is half the normal time that is required.
129 In Europe, the Third Package (Council Regulation 2407/92) removed the national ownership
restrictions for EU carriers who wished to invest in other EU carriers. British Airways for example
purchased a 49% shareholding in 1992 in Delta Air, a German regional carrier (later renamed Deutsche
BA), increasing this to 100% in 1997.
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investors (ICAO, 2000). Full service airlines are also purchasing equity in low cost
carriers and visa versa: Icelandair purchased a 10.1% stake in easyJet in October 2004,
while Ryanair purchased 25% of Aer Lingus in November 2006.
Purchasing equity in another carrier represents a long-term interest and, if the
investment is well managed, the equity will mature and increase in value. British
Airways, for example, sold their 18.25% share in Qantas in September 2004 for $800
million, which allowed the British carrier to pursue other strategies, such as financing
redundancy payments and upgrading their flatbeds. Table 50 (below) gives an account
of the top eight world airlines in terms of RPKs, and their investments in other carriers.
Table 50 Top 8 world airlines (RPKs) and their equity in other airlines (2005)
Rank Airline RPKs
(millions)
Equity Partnership
1 AmericanAirlines 224,294 1% Iberia
2 Delta 193,006 Comair 100%
3 Air France -
KLM Group
189,253 Brit Air 100%, Cityjet 100%, Régional 100%, Air
Calidonie 2.1%, Air Ivoire1, Air Madagascar 3.1%,
Air Mauritius 2.7%, Air Tahiti 7.4%, Austrian
Airlines 1.5%, Cameroon 3.5%, CCM Airlines
11.9%, Royal Air Maroc 2.8%, Tunisair 5.6%
KLM cityhopper 100%, KLM cityhopper UK 100%,
Transavia 100%, Kenya Airways 26%
4 United Airlines 183,262 Ted 100%, United Express 100%
5 Northwest 121,994 Compass Airlines 100%
6 Continental 114,659 Continental Micronesia 100%, Copa Airlines 10%,
Expressjet 8.6%
7 British Airways 111,859 BA Connect 100%, Manx Airlines 100%,Air Mauritius 3.8%, Comair 18%, Iberia2 10%
8 Lufthansa 108,185 Air Dolomiti 100%, Lufthansa CityLine 100%, BMI30%, BMI Regional 30%, Condor Flugdienst 10%,
Eurowings 49%, Luxair 13%
1 Air France holds 51% of All Africa Airways, which has 76.42% of Air Ivoire
2 BA increased its equity shareholding in Iberia by 1% and paid £13 million in ’06 (ATI, November 2006)
Source: Airline Business and ATI
The equity that these airlines have purchased gives them a foothold in foreign markets
and provides an alternative to setting up expensive bases in other countries. Chang and
Williams (2001) outlined a number of reasons why European airlines invested in other
European airlines, and these are illustrated in Table 51 below. One of the principle
reasons why airlines purchase equity in a foreign carrier is because it provides a
significant volume of feeder traffic to the long-haul operations of the investor. Doganis
(2001, p74) stated that KLM expanded its European services by purchasing 100% of
Air UK, and later re-branded the carrier KLM UK in 1995. At the time, Air UK was the
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third-largest short-haul carrier in the UK, serving multiple cities within Europe,
however, KLM later rescheduled its operations by using the carrier to connect 13
regional UK airports to its hub at Amsterdam, in effect becoming a feeder for KLM.
Another important reason why airlines build up equity in other carriers is to access slots
at capacity constrained airports. Airlines, under certain circumstances, can exchange
slots and gain a more favourable arrival and departure time slot, which would
particularly boost business traffic.
Table 51 Motives for purchasing equity in other airlines
Airline
Stakeholder
Partner Purpose for Ownership
BA Deutsche BA (100%) To access the German market
Air Liberte (70% in 1999) To access the French market
Iberia (9%) To strengthen the Oneworld alliance
KLM KLM UK (100%) To feed British passengers into the KLM
long-haul network
Lufthansa Luxair (13%) To feed the Lufthansa network from Luxemburg
Lauda Air (20%) To feed the Lufthansa network from Vienna,
Salzburg and Milan
British Midland (20%) To acquire Heathrow slots
SAirGroup Austrian Airlines (10%) To access slots at Vienna
Sabena (49.9%) To obtain Sabena’s network from Brussels
SAS Spanair (49%) To link over 100 cities to Spanish destinations
British Midland (20%) To acquire Heathrow slots
Source: Chang and Williams (2001)
Airline Franchises
Airline franchising essentially involves one airline (the franchisee) gaining the right, in
return for a fee, to assume the public face or brand of another (the franchisor), together
with the associated intellectual property and know-how, and to receive the services
which go with it (Denton and Dennis, 2000). The franchisor (e.g. British Airways)
allows the franchisee (e.g. BMED) access to its sales and reservations systems, revenue
accounting and yield management systems, and access to its frequent flyer programme.
In addition, it gains instant worldwide recognition and becomes associated with a
quality carrier. The franchisor also gains advantages as the arrangement spreads its
name more widely and generates revenues on thin routes that would have been
unprofitable to operate (Button et al., 1998). There is normally an agreement not to
compete head-to-head with the franchisor. Iatrou (2004, p111) stated that one of the
principle reasons why airlines franchise their brand is because the arrangement
generates feeder traffic. Dennis and Denton (2000) pointed out that almost half of BA's
short-haul destinations are served by franchise partners at Gatwick, while at Lyon more
than half Air France’s routes are franchised. Hanlon (1999, p109) stated that British
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Airways had nine franchises in 1999, of which seven were UK based, and these
collectively carried seven million passengers a year, and that the additional traffic
generated the incumbent an additional £105 million in 1998/1999. The Civil Aviation
Authority (1998) reported in 1998 that franchising was profitable for both parties (i.e.
franchisee and franchisor).
Incumbents can retain unprofitable routes by transferring them to a franchised carrier
that has a lower cost structure. Barrett (2001) stated that cityJet, an Air France
franchise, had costs that were some 40% below that of the French incumbent. Pagliari
(2003) agreed that franchised airlines had a lower cost structure and noted that the
British Airways franchise of its Scottish Highland and Island routes came about
because the British Regional airline (BRAL) had a lower cost structure and the
franchisee used a more appropriate sized aircraft for the operation. Doganis (2001,
p118) argued that franchising safeguards valuable airport slots as the route can be
operated from secondary airports, freeing up the slots for more lucrative, high-
yielding destinations.
7.6.3 Collaboration with Regional Airlines
Services run by regional airlines have become a significant component of the
operations of scheduled airlines and are used as a counter offensive strategy in
combating low cost carriers. They are an effective force as North America’s 27
regional airlines130 carried 150 million passengers in 2005 (roughly equal to those
carried by United, Continental and Northwest combined), while Europe’s 42 regional
airlines carried 68 million, and Asia’s 17 regional airlines transported 27 million
passengers (Mountford et al. 2006). In the US domestic market, the regional airline
market increased from 5% in 1980 to 21% in 2005 and they now carry around the same
number of passengers as the low cost carriers. The capacity (ASMs) of the US regional
airlines increased by 67% from 2001 to 2006, while the capacity of the legacy carriers
decreased by 20% over the same period. The number of passengers carried by the
regional airlines worldwide increases by 11% each year, which represents the highest
growth segment of the overall airline industry (Bombardier Aerospace, 2006). These
regional airlines provide feed traffic from secondary and tertiary cities into the hubs of
majors. In 2003, more than 60% of their flights fed into the hub-and-spoke
infrastructure of the US majors (US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2004).
Appendix IV gives a breakdown of the regional airlines which operate services on
behalf of the network carriers. In the US market, independently owned regional carriers
130 The 27 US regional airlines carried roughly the same number of passengers as United, Continental
and Northwest combined in 2005 and around one in every five US domestic passengers now fly on a
regional airline. Fiorino (2006) stated that regional aircraft constitute one-third of the entire US fleet
and that 72% of 655 US airports with scheduled airline service depend exclusively on those carriers.
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are contracted by several incumbents: Mesa131, for example, is used by United,
America West and Delta, while American Eagle (100% owned by American Airlines)
operates on behalf of Delta and American. Mountford et al. (2006) showed that 53% of
the regional passenger traffic is carried by independently owned regional carriers, while
the remainder is carried by regional carriers that are owned by the US legacy airlines.
The regional carriers that are contracted are heavily restricted by unions as pilot scope
clauses132 restrain the type of regional jet that can be used on a major’s network.
Aviation Strategy (January 2002) reported that the network airlines pay the regional
airlines a fixed fee per seat rather than per passenger. Shrifin (2004) illustrated the
importance of the regional airline affiliate to United Airlines by stating that around
45% of its connecting passengers come from its regional partners.
The regional airlines serve a dual role by feeding passenger traffic into the hubs of
incumbents and by operating on low-density routes that were unprofitable for the
network carriers. Almost one-third of US domestic passengers fly in city-pairs that are
deemed too small for point-to-point service, and airlines access these passengers by
operating small regional jets (Bombardier Aerospace, 2006). Button (2002) added that
the regional airlines enlarged the networks of the legacy carriers and established a solid
presence in the short haul market. Dresner et al. (2002) agreed and stressed that the
regional airlines were ideal tools in generating additional passengers, while at the same
time bypassing the traditional hubs, thus counterattacking competition in secondary and
tertiary markets. Taneja (2003, p110) cited a study conducted by Bombardier
Aerospace and described that the most important role (44%) of regional jets was to
supplement the services provided by the majors.
In contrast, Europe’s regional airlines are mostly owned by the network airlines, as
seen in Appendix IV - subsequently 73% of Europe’s regional traffic is carried by
incumbent owned regional airlines. Lawton’s (2002, p46) research revealed that around
30% of passengers travelling on Europe’s regional airlines were making connections,
indicating their importance in feeding passengers to hub airports while, at the same
time, challenging low cost carriers which operate on a point-to-point basis. Lufthansa
owns three regional airlines133 and the incumbent indicated that it will use these
regional carriers together with its turboprop partners, Augsburg Airways and Contact
Air, to coordinate its operations and routes in order to protect its non-hub operations
and suppress encroaching low cost carriers (Aviation Strategy, March 2005). Unlike
131 Mesa carried 13 million passengers in 2005 and operates 111 Regional Jets and 43 Turboprops. It
generated 35% of its revenues from United, 20% of its revenues from Delta and 40% from America
West in 2005, while the remainder were from independent operations (Arnoult, 2006).
132 Scope clauses are components of U.S. major airline pilot contracts that limit the size and number of
regional jets within the airline's network. The following airlines restrict the seat capacity of the regional
jet that can operate on their behalf; American Airlines and Delta 70 seats, US Airways and Northwest
69 seats, Continental 59 seats, United 50 seats; America West has no restrictions (Aircraft Commerce,
December 2003 – January 2004). The purpose of a scope clause is to protect mainline pilot job
security.
133 Lufthansa’s three regional airlines include Air Dolomiti (100%), Cityline (100%) & Eurowings (49%).
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the majority of the low cost carriers, the regional airlines code share with most of their
partners and they have reciprocal frequent flyer points. In addition, regional airlines are
also establishing themselves as members of an alliance, as evidenced by Blue 1’s
membership of the Star alliance; this broadens their network extensively while it
becomes very attractive for passengers.
With increasing competition from low fare carriers, mainline airlines are forced toward
further specialisation in order to reduce costs while maintaining their networks. As a
result, mainline carriers will continue to outsource short-haul and low-density routes to
lower cost operators, currently represented by their regional airline partners. With this
partnership approach, mainline airlines can maintain frequency and schedule on routes
that are not cost-effective with their own narrow-body equipment.
7.7 Porter’s Competitive Rivalry
In his competitive model, Porter (1980) argued that the nature and degree of
competition hinged on five forces: the threat of new entrants, the bargaining power of
buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, the threat of substitutes and the rivalry
among existing competitors, which are outlined below. According to Porter, the goal of
competitive strategy is to find a position in an industry where a company can best
defend itself against these five competitive forces or can influence them in its favour.
The cumulative strength of these forces determines the ultimate profit potential of an
industry, as shown below in Figure 50.
7.7.1 The threat of new entrants
Porter’s competitive force ‘the threat of new entrants’ is particularly relevant to the
airline industry, as many new, low cost competitors are entering the established
markets of incumbents. There are now around 35 low cost carriers operating in Europe
alone, and OAG (December 2006) showed that the total number of low cost carrier
seats worldwide was up by 16% over the year 2005/06, which is posing an ever larger
threat to incumbents. The seriousness of the threat depends on the barriers to entry and
on the reaction from existing competitors that entrants can expect.
In a recent study, the US GAO (2001, p12) found that the following act as a constraint
when new carriers enter a market:
 Access to airport facilities, such as gates, ticket counters, baggage handling and
storage, take off and landing slots.
 Frequent Flyer Programmes
 Corporate incentive agreements
 Travel agent commission overrides
 Flight frequency
 Network size and breadth
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Lin et al. (2002) conducted an investigation into the various responses by incumbents
when carriers entered their markets. They used data on the reactions of 889 incumbents
to competitors that entered their markets between 1991 and 1997, and found that the
responses were very varied and largely depended on the type of competition.
Interestingly, the research found no evidence that incumbents responded more
aggressively to small, low cost carriers than to other carriers. The research found that
incumbents reserved their highest price cuts for larger, new incumbents with higher
costs, which indicates that incumbents believed that low cost carriers did not pose a
threat. In another study, Ito and Lee (2003) examined incumbent responses to low cost
carrier entry and based on their analysis of 370 markets, the authors found that highly
aggressive incumbent reactions (with respect to price and capacity) are more the
exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, their study showed that the entrant’s
success or failure on a certain route cannot be explained by the incumbent’s capacity or
pricing decisions but rather depends on factors such as the entrant’s capacity choice,
pre-existing market density and the entrant’s pre-entry presence at the endpoints of a
market. In a study on behalf of United Airlines, Bamberger and Carlton (1999)
examined the entry of low cost carriers since 1990, the survival rates of low cost
carriers, and the fare and capacity responses of incumbents to the entry of low cost
carriers. They concluded that incumbents did not engage in predatory fare wars to force
out budget carriers.
7.7.2 The Bargaining Power of Buyers and Suppliers
These two forces can be considered together because they have similar effects.
Powerful suppliers can squeeze the profitability out of an airline unable to recover cost
increases through its own fares. Airports, for example, are very powerful suppliers and
have been raising their charges as demand outstrips runway capacity at primary
airports. Baker and Tacoun (2005) described that the average operating margins of the
world’s top 100 airports were over 20% for 2004/05, while the top 150 airlines in the
world were just above breakeven. A study conducted on UK traffic showed that
primary airports display almost ‘monopolistic’ like supply status as a 50% increase in
all airport charges would result in only a 7.5% reduction in total demand (DETR,
2000). Pilling (2003) discussed the value of Heathrow’s slots and stated that United
sold two peak-time slots to BA for $20 million in 2003, while Graham (2003, p125)
revealed that the value of a slot at Heathrow is in the region of £50 per passenger per
enplanment. According to IATA, airlines pay over US$40 billion annually to airports
and air traffic service providers. In 2003 BAA announced that it was introducing a
6.5% annual increase in landing charges at Heathrow airport over the next five years,
despite the fact that it had a pre-tax profit of £524 million for that fiscal year. In 2007 it
was proposing to raise charges again by between 4-8% annually over the next five
years (ATI, December 2006). This shows the strength and power that airport suppliers
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have on their most important client (i.e. the airline) and the inability of the client to
reduce these charges.
Most of the sources of ‘buyer power’ can be attributed to the different types of
consumers who purchase airline tickets (see section 6.3). Figure 50 (below) shows the
various consumers (buyers) and it outlines the groups that have the greatest impact on
revenues. Consumers tend to be more price sensitive if they are leisure passengers or if
they are purchasing products that are undifferentiated. Leisure trips account for the
majority of all air travel demand, as 79% of all journeys made by Europeans in 2003
were made for this reason (IPK International, 2004). Mason (2005) stated that the
proportion of leisure trips taken by UK residents increased from 50% to 68% - these
passengers are low yield but their volume can significantly impact revenues. A
changing trend in the holiday market has been the increase in the number of short-
breaks taken by UK holidaymakers: they are now 70% more likely to take short breaks
than they were 5 years previously (Mintel, 2004). Graham (2006) described that
holiday travel is by far the most important type of travel and it represented almost 70%
of all travel undertaken by Europeans in 2003. Baker’s (2005) research showed that
43% of the tourists that visited Spain in 2004 were on a package holiday, but this is
quickly being replaced by the dynamic packaging opportunity which is being offered
by low cost carriers. Graham (2006) agreed that there is a clear trend towards booking
packages online as holiday makers can assemble their own package (e.g. flight, hotel,
car rental) as package holidays sold by travel agents peaked in 1994 to 63% but, by
2004, they had decreased to 48%. This generates a lot of ancillary revenue for airlines
as they receive a proportion of each hotel and car rental booking that was completed
through the airlines’ websites. The highest revenues are generated through business
passengers as they are less price sensitive, and Mason (2001) pointed out that around
50% of business travellers are subject to some form of corporate travel policy which
requires them to travel with a particular carrier or group of carriers.
7.7.3 The Threat of Substitutes
Substitution reduces demand for a particular service as customers switch to an
alternative supplier (Porter, 1980). Substitutes limit the potential of an industry by
placing a ceiling on the prices firms can charge. The threat posed by the low cost
carriers is indeed very serious, but the incumbent is also threatened by several other
types of airline business model, as outlined below in Figure 50. The number of
passengers using the business class of incumbents is increasingly coming under threat
from substitutes, such as corporate business jets and all business class airlines. At the
end of 2003 there were 14,555 corporate jet operators in the world, utilising a fleet of
23,121 aircraft, according to industry research group AvDataInc (General Aviation
Manufacturers Association, 2006). More companies are now using fractional
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ownership, whereby individual corporations reserve the jet for a fixed number of flying
hours each year. In addition, there have been a number of business class carriers, such
as PrivatAir, MaxJet and EOS, with Silverjet commencing operations in 2007.
PrivatAir now operates a daily service on behalf of KLM, Lufthansa and Swiss to the
United States using a Boeing Business Jet, configured with 48 seats (Thomson, 2005).
The carrier also ordered a Boeing 787 VIP aircraft, which will be configured in an all–
business-class arrangement - this development may change the dynamics at the top end
of the air transport market in future years.
Another recent development is the introduction of long haul, low cost carriers which
become a substitute for economy class of traditional airlines134. Michael O’Leary,
Ryanair’s chief executive, stated that it was a ‘logical extension’ of the airline’s
business formula (Airliner World, 2005). Francis et al. (2007) stated that a long-haul,
low cost model could have a 20% cost advantage over a traditional network carrier,
which could trigger passengers to switch if fares were lowered accordingly. Oasis
Hong Kong, Jetstar and Air Asia X are the first of the new long-haul low cost
operators. Williams (2002, p87) claimed that charter airlines accounted for about 30%
of Europe’s Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) and transported around 80% of
European passengers on holiday packages, even up to the late 1990s. However, charters
are now flying longer sectors and are unbundling their package tours and selling seat
only fares, directly challenging the network carriers. Similarly, regional airlines that are
not affiliated to network carriers also threaten the short-haul operations of network
carriers, such as Aer Arran, as well as franchised network airlines, such as CityJet.
7.7.4 Rivalry among existing competitors
Porter’s competitive forces (i.e. threat of new entrants, bargaining power of buyers and
suppliers, and the threat of substitutes) highlights on the direct competitive rivalry
between an organisation and its most immediate rivals. Rivalry is the degree to which
companies respond to the competitive moves of other companies in the same industry
(e.g., price cutting, new products, advertising etc.). The level of competitive ‘rivalry’ is
one of Porter’s key determinants of industry profitability (Porter, 1980: Ch.1): a healthy
level of rivalry is presumed to force competitors to be innovative and focus on
satisfying customers; and it generates customer satisfaction through differentiated
products and rapid adoption of new technology, as firms try to stay ahead of the
competition.
134 Freddie Laker introduced the world’s first low haul low fare airline in 1977 called Skytrain and
operated to multiple points in the US from London.
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Figure 50. Porter’s competitive forces on an Incumbent
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The rivalry between incumbents and low cost carriers is set to continue in favour of the
latter. In addition, increasing competition will stem from low cost, long haul airlines
and all-business class carriers, creating intense rivalry for the network airlines as there
will be an even greater choice of switching between carriers. Incumbents are faced with
difficult challenges in attracting both leisure and business passengers as new entrant
airlines (incorporating several different airline business model) continually enter the
market, while at the same time suppliers, such as airports and ground handling
companies, continue to exert high prices, creating a very difficult environment for
airlines to generate profits. In order to reduce the competitive rivalry, an airline should
seek to avoid a price war, accentuate its differentiation, reduce overcapacity, focus on
different segments, increase collaboration with partners, strengthen its brand, reduce
the number of intermediaries, increase the switching costs of passengers, increase the
value-added options for passengers, and trigger cost savings through economies of
scope and density135. See Figure 50 above.
135 Economies of scope occur when the unit costs of the service decrease as the number of markets served
by the airline increases. Economies of density occur when the unit cost of serving additional passengers over
an existing network decreases with increased traffic.
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7.8 Strengths and Weaknesses
Feurer and Chaharbaghi (1995) stated that strategy can be defined by a company’s
strengths and weaknesses. Johnson et al. (2005, p17) argued that the strategic capability
of an organisation is dependent on its strengths and weaknesses, and that a company can
become competitively advantaged if its strengths are superior to that of its competitors.
Flouris and Oswald (2006, p126) list the sources of strength from an airline’s perspective
as follows: employees, strong financial position, strong brand name, brand loyalty,
quality product, strong knowledge management, international operations, good operating
procedures, good supplier/customer relations, and strong promotional practices. They
listed the weaknesses as: old facilities, lack of IT integration, unused capacity, high
inventory costs and obsolete inventory, no strategic direction, poor quality products, lack
of research and development, lack of leadership and vision, and no product recognition.
An airline can use its strengths to take advantage of opportunities and to avoid threats,
while at the same time taking advantage of opportunities by minimising weaknesses.
Johnson et al. (2005, p14) identified British Airways’ competitive strengths as: having a
strong brand, high standard of quality, comfort, safety, addressing the needs of the long-
haul business traveller, membership of the oneworld alliance, Heathrow slots, modern
and cost effective fleet, and as being a listed company whereby it must satisfy
shareholder expectations. Figure 51 below is a summary of the various strengths and
weaknesses of incumbents and low cost carriers that were derived through discussion
groups with airline representatives who attended IATA courses which were conducted by
the author. The discussions subdivided each airline business model into four primary
divisions: Organisational; Operational; Financial; and Marketing from which the various
strengths and weaknesses from each division were extrapolated.
Figure 51. Strengths and Weaknesses of incumbents and low cost carriers
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The above figure shows that incumbents are weak in terms of organisational and
financial aspects of their businesses, while in respect of operations they have strengths
in important areas, such as good schedules, slots at primary airports and interlining
passengers at their hubs. In addition, network carriers have significant marketing
strengths but in critical areas, such as fares, distribution and advertising, they are weak
when benchmarked against low cost carriers.
Johnson (1987) showed how the strategy of an organisation is moulded by its culture.
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argued that weakness at the organisational level
spreads throughout the entire company, creating a similar type of culture. Lobbenberg
et al. (February, 2003) compared British Midland’s disadvantaged cost advantage to
easyJet and found that the head office expenses were the third largest cost difference
(6%) between the carriers. Many of easyJet’s offices, for example, are portable cabins
where staff sit in open, non-partitioned work settings. Leaders at low cost carriers are
visionary as they take full advantage of Europe’s deregulated market, while Asia’s low
cost carriers have begun to set up subsidiaries in other Asian countries (e.g. Jetstar
Asia, Thai Air Asia, Air Deccan Lanka) to get around regulatory barriers. They have
also ordered much of the production capacity from manufacturers, forcing the
incumbents to order later and therefore constraining their growth. In addition, they have
been visionary in capitalising on the Internet, which enables carriers to reduce
distribution costs significantly. There has been little vision shown by the leaders of flag
carriers. The morale of staff working for full service airlines has been tested severely as
the industry has encountered thousands of redundancies. There were 125,000
redundancies at the six US major airlines between the latter part of 2000 and the latter
part of 2003, while 8,000 were made redundant at the seven largest European
incumbents136. In addition, there were countless strikes aimed at job security and at
stopping management from further reducing employees’ pay and pension obligations.
In contrast, Gittel (2003) reported that Southwest’s employees are the source of its
competitive advantage.
Management at incumbent airlines have been imitating the entrepreneurial leadership
of the low cost carriers as they changed their focus to online booking (including
dynamic packaging), generating higher asset and employee productivity, getting
passengers to use kiosks, reducing business class on short-haul routes, etc. The senior
management teams at low cost carriers have been relatively stable over the last number
of years in comparison to network carriers. Since 1991, Ryanair, for example, has
136 The staff reductions including the percentage of the total staff that were made redundant at US and
European airlines from the end of 2000 to 2004 were as follows: American 35,200 (31%); United
40,600 (40%), Delta 15,000 (21%); Northwest 14,100 (26%); Continental 8,100 (17%); US Airways
16,800 (39%); British Airways 6,600 (12%) KLM 2,800 (10%), SAS (2003) 3,200 (15%); Iberia 500
(2%); Alitalia 1,200 (6%). The following airlines increased their staff numbers during this period Air
France 2,600 (+5%); Lufthansa 1,300 (3%); Thai, 4,200 (16%); Qantas 2,600 (10%); Malaysian 1,000
(5%); Japan Airlines 1,800 (10%); Cathay Pacific 1,000 (7%); Singapore Airlines 200 (1%). (Source:
Air Transport World Statistics 2001 and 2004).
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retained its principle management team, while the CEO at Aer Lingus has been
changed six times. Ionides (2006) stated that part of Malaysia Airlines’ problems were
due to its continuous restructuring of its senior management board. When new
management comes to the helm of an airline, they give it a different direction, not
allowing the existing strategies that are in-place time to reach their objectives. Finally,
the incumbents have not been fast enough in their response to the threat of budget
airlines and have lost a significant amount of market share. By 2004, there were 35 low
cost airlines in Europe, carrying 80 million passengers (up from 47 million in 2003).
This involved some 20% of the European market, a figure predicted to rise to 40% by
2010 (Economist, January 27th, 2005). Vlaar et al. (2005) described that incumbents
could take up to seven years to respond after the launch of the first new entrant low
cost carrier.
Operationally, incumbents’ strengths include schedules that have frequent and
convenient departures times from airports that are close to downtown centres with good
ground transport links. They operate from hubs where they control a large percentage
of the total schedule from that airport. In 2004, Delta operated 966 flights a day from
Atlanta, thus controlling 77% of its entire capacity, Lufthansa operated 378 flights a
day from Frankfurt, thereby commanding 62% of its departures, while BA had 276
flights a day, controlling 43% of all departures at Heathrow (OAG, January 2005).
These hubs are also heavily safeguarded because they are slot constrained due to
historical grandfather rights, adding enormously to their value. One of the core
strengths of a network carrier is its ability to transfer passengers from its short-haul
destinations via its hub to its long-haul network (or visa versa). Delta transferred 50%
of its passengers through its major hubs in 2004137, while Lufthansa transferred 65% of
its passengers at Frankfurt, and British Airways were able to transfer 34% at Heathrow
(MIDT, 2004). Passengers travelling on a low cost carrier cannot generally interline
and are restricted to its network, whereas network carriers offer passengers seamless
travel via their own network or in collaboration with their alliance or code share
members. See Chapter 4 for a detailed account of the hub and spoke system, and the
interline operations of incumbents. However, because of congestion at the hub, a large
percentage of flights are delayed: ATKearney (2004) calculated that around 23-24% of
all flight arrivals at London Heathrow, Frankfurt and Barcelona were late138, while low
cost carriers that serve uncongested, secondary airports generally have a high
percentage of on-time arrivals. One of the core weaknesses of network carriers has
been their high operating costs when benchmarked against budget carriers. Darby
(2003) estimated that the operating cost differential139 between a LCC and a typical
137 US DOT O&D Survey, 2004.
138 The flights were more than 15 minutes late.
139 The cost advantages of low cost carriers over full service airlines are as follows: Seating Density (4%-
8%), higher load factor (4-8%), crew productivity (2-4%), aircraft utilisation (2-5%), airport charges
(10%), inflight service (5%), distribution (10-20%), HQ/IT (5-10%), aircraft ownership & maintenance
(5%).
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Full-Service airline is at least 40% and may be as high as 60%. Lobbenberg et al.
(February, 2003) agreed as they found that easyJet’s cost per passenger was half that of
British Midland in 2003, while O’Connell and Williams (2005) calculated that Air
Asia’s costs (CASK) were almost 60% below that of Malaysia Airlines. However, the
network carriers are endeavouring to reduce the cost gap - but Hansson et al. (2002)
argued that 40-60% of the cost gap between the two business models cannot be closed
unless the full service airlines abandon their hub and spoke operations. See Chapter 4
for a detailed account of the operating costs (including productivity) of both airline
business models.
Financially, the low cost carriers have greatly outperformed their counterparts. From
2000 to 2004, Ryanair had an average operating margin of 29.4%, EasyJet 8.9% and all
other incumbents had a combined margin of -3.5% (McKinsey Quarterly, August
2005). Similarly in the US, Alamdari and Fagan (2005) reported that Southwest is the
only airline in the history of aviation to record 30 years of consecutive profits and, in
2001, it was the most profitable scheduled airline in the world, both in terms of
operating profits and net profits. In Asia, Air Asia recorded a net profit of US$31
million for 2005, while Jetstar made $34 million for the same period (m-travel.com,
2006; ATI, August 2005). See Chapter 2 for a more detailed account of the financial
data between low cost carriers and full service airlines.
Finally, the marketing divisions of network airlines have a number of strengths. See
Chapter 6 for a detailed account of an incumbent’s marketing principles. Nevertheless,
incumbents are disadvantaged when fares are compared between the budget carriers
and the full service airlines, even though the latter group are beginning to close the gap
on the budget airlines. Lawton (2002) pointed out that the average fares of the no-frills
carriers were some 40-60% below that of their full service counterparts. O’Connell and
Williams (2005, 2006) have measured the fare differences between low cost carriers
and full service airlines through passenger surveys and found that the average one-way
fare difference between Ryanair and Aer Lingus (without taxes) was 37%, while
another survey conducted in India also confirmed that Air Deccan’s fares were 30%
lower that its competing network carriers. See Chapter 4 for an account of the fares
charged by both sets of airline groups. Another important weakness of full service
airlines is their continued reliance on travel agents and Global Distribution Suppliers,
which impacts costs. Alamdari and Mason (2006) reported that British Airways
distribution costs were reduced from £20 to £15 per passenger from 1998 to 2004,
which was a small reduction considering that the internet has now become a mature IT
tool. In addition, network carriers must market themselves through more aggressive
advertising promotions in order to sustain their advantage and attract more passengers.
It is unlikely, however, that the full service airlines will be able to close the cost gap
between themselves and the budget carriers - subsequently it will be difficult to lower
fares accordingly and incumbents must find alternative strategies, such as
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differentiating their products, which will allow them to charge a price premium, or find
core weaknesses in the low cost carriers’ business model.
Incumbents should capitalise on the weaknesses of low cost carriers: Figure 52 (below)
shows the results of an IATA worldwide survey that was conducted in 2004, and lists
the principle reasons why passengers did not travel on a low cost carrier. Flight
products such as frequent flyer programs, flight schedules and airport location are the
most important criteria why passengers prefer network carriers. Furthermore,
passengers also wanted their journeys to be comfortable, and the survey indicated that
legroom, crew service, and food and drink are important differentiators between a low
cost carrier and a full service airline. Passengers also ranked convenience as being
equally as important as comfort, and emphasised that company policy and connections
were some of the reasons for not choosing to travel on a low cost carrier.
Figure 52 Reasons for not travelling on low cost airlines (Worldwide)
Numerous surveys have all pointed to the fact that the principle reason for travelling on
a low cost carrier is because of low fares (O’Connell and Williams, 2005, 2006; IATA
Corporate Air Travel Survey, 2002, 2004). Incumbents must continue the drive to
lower costs and to differentiate their products from low cost carriers, thus enabling
them to recapture high value passengers who have switched to the no-frills carriers.
Source: IATA Corporate Air Travel Survey 2004, p87
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7.9 Strategy Formulation
Strategy formulation is represented here by a series of strategic and management
tools used to strengthen an incumbent’s overall strategy. These are also integrated into
Figure 46 (above) as they are important analytical components for further depicting
how an incumbent’s strategy is directed. Two areas are applied and consist of:
 Diversification Strategies
 Ability of Management
7.9.1 Diversification Strategies
There are two types of diversification that can be identified from the literature: related
and unrelated diversification. Related diversification is where firms diversify within the
same industry, while unrelated diversification is where firms diversify across
industries. Research into related diversification has established that it has a strong
effect on a company’s performance (e.g. financial and productivity), while
undiversified and unrelated diversification had little effect (Palich, Cardinal and Miller,
2000; Geringer et al., 2000). A McKinsey Quarterly (2006) publication of ‘A new
organisational model for airlines’ indicated that airlines should expand into businesses
that offer higher margins or require less capital than their core passenger operations.
Air Canada’s break-even load factor was calculated at 90.9% when passenger (only)
revenues was applied, however that figure dropped significantly to 75.8% when the
Canadian incumbent applied all other sources of revenues in 2001 (Air Canada annual
report 2002). These diversified businesses should be stand-alone divisions that are
independently accountable for their own costs, revenues and profits. In addition, they
should have their own autonomy, which shortens the decision time through the
hierarchical pyramid. Numerous authors have argued that these subsidiaries had the
potential to generate strong returns but should be managed as separate business entities
and not integrated as part of the airline (Lindstädt and Fauser, 2004; Taneja, 2004,
p146; Doganis, 2006, p285).
TREN DG (2002) showed the operating results for Lufthansa’s different group
divisions for the year 2002 and highlighted that its subsidiaries contributed very
positively to its overall financial position. Its cargo division had an operating profit of
€168 million, the catering division €7.8 million, while its IT group had an operating
profit of €54 million. Mercer Management Consulting (2002) outlined that Lufthansa’s
revenues from its core business of flying passengers accounted for only 56 percent of
its revenues for 2002, down from 70 percent in 1995. The McKinsey Quarterly
(January 2006) showed that Lufthansa’s share of group revenues from ancillary
business units, such as Technik (the maintenance unit) and cargo, increased by 10
percent to 35 percent from 1995 to 2004. While Lufthansa is still reliant on the air
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transport sector, it is better positioned to reduce its earnings volatility by spreading risk
across multiple divisions. Heracleous et al. (2004) have stated that Singapore Airlines’
ancillary divisions (i.e. aircraft maintenance, airport management, catering, etc.) have
healthier profit margins than the passenger section of the airline itself. Qantas has
recently reorganised its business enterprise by setting up ten independently managed
business units140. In addition, Virgin Atlantic has four main business divisions and its
net earning for 2004 were derived as follows: passengers £912 million, cargo £92.4
million, holidays £312.2 million and travel store £71.5 million (Humphries, 2005).
Disney, for example, has expanded its label into theme parks, such as Florida, Paris,
Tokyo and later Dubai, and it has also developed television programs (Disney channel)
as well as opening stores and publishing books worldwide, and it has also spread its
brand to hotels, resorts and holidays. Figure 53 (below) shows an Eclat Consulting
study confirming that the European airlines’ financial success is partly due to their
diverse revenue source, and that they are less dependent on their core passenger
revenues (Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2005). The US carriers have divested
themselves of peripheral businesses, including their computer reservation divisions,
while budget carriers are taking low to medium yield passengers from network airlines
but they have an opportunity to replace this lost revenue by retaining and expanding
their subsidiaries.
Figure 53. Percentage of Revenue from Non-passenger sources in 2004
Source: Aviation Week and Space Technology (2005)
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140 Qantas’ ten business units includes Qantas, Qantas Link, Australian Airlines, JetStar, Engineering-
Technical operations, Maintenance Services, Airports and Catering, Freight, Qantas Holidays, Qantas
Defense Services and Qantas Consulting (ATWonline, 2003).
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Some of the diversification opportunities that can be used by the full service airlines
include:
 Cargo,
 In-house business units such as maintenance, holidays, etc.,
 Set up a low cost carrier.
Cargo
According to the Boeing World Air Cargo forecast (2006/07), world air cargo traffic
will expand at an average annual rate of 6.1% for the next two decades, outpacing
maritime growth. Asia’s air cargo market will continue to lead the world’s air cargo
industry by growing at 8.6% per year. Overall, world air cargo traffic will more than
triple during the next 20 years, increasing from 178.1 billion RTKs in 2005 to more
than 582.8 RTKs in 2025.
Air Cargo constitutes just 1% of the total volume of cargo that is transported worldwide
(Gronlund and Skoog, 2005), which represented around 40 million tonnes in 2005
(IATA WATS, 2006), and it is worth $40 billion to the airline industry each year
(Conway, 2005; Morrell 2005). However, its potential is enormous as IATA
projections for 2007 indicate that air freight will become a $60 billion business by then
(Air Cargo World, 2006): this indicates that the network airlines will get a sizable
chunk of this extra revenue, since low cost carriers do not generally carry cargo as it
impacts the short turn around times. Otto (2005) stated that the nature of the air cargo
business was changing because 82% of the cargo market in 1997 was composed of
standard141 cargo, and this has been forecast to fall to 54% by 2009. It is being replaced
by high-value goods, which will comprise 29.6% of special freight goods142 and 16.4%
of express freight by 2009 - these can be easily transported in the bellyholds of
passenger aircraft. Express freight extracts a high premium due to its urgent nature and
is a lucrative enterprise for incumbents who operate from primary airports close to
down-town business centres. Otto (2005) described the volume of intra-European
express shipments by indicating that there were 522,000 shipments per day by 2005,
considerably up from 138,000 shipments per day in 1993. In addition, mail is relatively
cheap to handle and is a valuable contract for airlines: as Conway (2006) explained,
American Airlines’ contract with the US Postal service was valued at $100 million in
2006. Worldwide, freight, mail and express cargo accounted for 12.7% of the world’s
scheduled revenues in 2004143. Overall, around half of all air cargo is currently
transported in the bellyholds of passenger aircraft (Taneja, 2002 p136; Gronlund and
141 Standard cargo includes all shipments that do not require any specific handling requirements.
142 Special freight includes goods that need to be temperature controlled, such as pharmaceutical, and
goods that are shock sensitive, such as semiconductors.
143 ICAO 291-AT/123 – World of Civil Aviation 2001-2004, 279-AT/116, 275-AT/115, 271-AT/112.
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Skoog 2005), while Boeing estimated that the figure is closer to 60% (Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group, 2000/01).
Table 52 (below) gives a comparison of the yield (Revenue per Tonne-KM) between
passengers and cargo for the Association of European Airlines in 2003. It shows that
the yield of carrying cargo within Europe itself is 50% that of the passenger yield,
while the corresponding yields on African/Middle-East/Atlantic are lower. To counter
the risk of losing additional low value passengers to the low cost carriers, the network
airlines should focus more on carrying cargo within Europe as the potential is apparent.
Many airlines in the past have neglected the air cargo segment of their operation
because of its small contribution to revenue when compared to passenger traffic, but
this is now changing rapidly. Incumbents should avail of this opportunity as their
turnaround time is longer than the budget carriers, which gives more time for loading
and unloading freight and at the same time it contributes positively to the overall
revenues.
Table 52 Association of European Airlines Yields (Revenue per Tonne-KM) for 2003
US Cents Pax Yield* Cargo Yield* Yield Ratio*
Pax : Cargo
Domestic 188.5 133.7 1 : 0.71
Total Europe 170.5 83.5 1 : 0.49
Europe/Africa 83.2 27.3 1 : 0.33
Europe/Middle East 96.4 26.5 1 : 0.27
Europe/Far East 70.7 31.1 1 : 0.44
North Atlantic 60.6 22.2 1 : 0.36
* Revenue per Tonne-KM
Source: Association of European Airlines 2004: Summary of traffic and airline results
Some airlines, however, generate much more revenue from cargo than others,
particularly those with cargo divisions that have dedicated freighters, such as China
Airlines, Korean Airlines, Emirates, etc. - these carriers generated 43.5%, 30.6% and
19.3% of their revenues, respectively, from cargo operations in 2005. The majority of
airlines carry cargo in the bellyhold and this contributed 10% to Alitalia’s revenues in
2005, while at Malaysia Airlines and Lan Chile, bellyhold cargo contributed 18% and
36% to their respective revenues for the same period (Airline Business, November
2006). Conway (2006) explained the importance of cargo to British Airways. He noted
that it invested $500 million in its cargo business over the last 10 years, generating
£498 million in 2005/06, up 3.3% over the previous year (BA Reports & Accounts
2005/06). Airlines could also purchase Quick Change (QC) aircraft, whereby they can
operate passenger flights by day and then, by changing the aircraft’s configuration in
just one hour, operate as a freighter by night. Airlines such as China Southern and
Hainan frequently use such aircraft and this concept could be implemented in Europe,
provided the aircraft departs before the night-time curfew. The Freight Forwarders still
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have a great influence on the traditional airfreight industry as they act as an
intermediary between airlines and the end supplier (e.g. manufacturing industry), and
are used in more than 80% of air cargo transactions (Clancy and Hoppin, 2001).
However, the e-commerce platform could replace the freight forwarder, as it did with
the travel agent, thus allowing disintermediation, i.e. the airline to deal directly with the
end supplier. The competition from low cost carriers has put an enormous strain on
generating revenues in the short-haul market for the network carriers; however,
carrying cargo has become an important differentiating strategy that has remained
unchallenged by the low cost carriers.
In-house business units such as maintenance, holidays, etc
Historically, it was the norm for flag carriers to run several subsidiaries in concurrence
with their primary function of providing air transport. These operations were
government owned and were bureaucratic, inefficient and poorly managed -
subsequently, when airlines became privatised, many of these ancillary divisions were
sold off and did not receive the opportunity to be operated under modern business
practices, which would have established industry benchmarks of efficiencies and
productivity, ultimately focusing on profit.
Maintenance is one such business unit: it represents between 10-15% of an airline’s
operating costs and a large volume of this work is outsourced, creating opportunities
for airlines that have maintenance divisions (Kilpi and Vepsäläinen, 2004). In 2005, the
expenditure in commercial aircraft maintenance was estimated to be US$38.8 billion,
56% of which was accounted for by work on engines, 21% for components, 23% for
line maintenance and the remainder for heavy modifications (Flint, 2006). Air France
and KLM’s maintenance divisions, for example, had revenues of more than €2.6 billion
in 2005, of which 30% came from outside their own group (Flint, 2005). Many strongly
branded airlines throughout the world generate a large amount of revenue from their
maintenance divisions144.
However, more carriers are now outsourcing their maintenance to countries with low
labour costs, and almost half of the US carriers’ heavy maintenance is now outsourced:
a carrier would need a fleet of around 50 aircraft or 150 engines to justify the heavy
expenditure required for a heavy maintenance division (Aviation Strategy, 1999).
Unlike heavy maintenance, a lot of carriers perform lighter maintenance checks in-
house (e.g. A, B and C checks), and Doganis (2006, p287) argued that smaller
maintenance checks could be done in-house economically. Some carriers have
144 The revenue generated by airlines through their maintenance divisions for 2005 were as follows:
Lufthansa Technik $5.5 billion, American Airlines $1.9 billion, British Airways and Japan Airlines
$1.5 billion, Continental $780 million, SAS $615 million, Thai $614 million, Air Canada $567 million,
Iberia $509 million and Singapore Airlines $493 million (Pilling 2005).
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developed a market niche and have become the world leaders on specific components,
like American Airlines who has become specialised in the overhaul of 757 landing
gears, 777 slides and avionics components (Sobie, 2006). This maintenance niche has
enormous potential financially: a survey conducted by Aviation Economics in 2000
pointed out that over 70% of airlines contracted out avionics maintenance, while over
80% outsourced landing gear components (Aviation Economics, 2000). Lufthansa has
recently won a contract to support the component overhaul of Spirit Airlines in the US,
while KLM won a similar contract with Spice Jet of India, and the Dutch carrier
recently signed an agreement with SkyEurope for its Total Aircraft Care package on its
older generation 737 (Flint 2005). More creative strategies to expand maintenance
revenues were implemented by KLM as it provided overnight line checks on A330s
belonging to its former alliance partner, Northwest, at Schipol (Flint, 2005).
Many incumbents still have holiday divisions that offer an entire package, consisting of
flights, hotels, excursions for sight seeing, etc. Inclusive tours continue their steady
growth despite the advent of the internet: from 1997 to 2001, the number of holidays
taken by UK residents increased from 29 million to 39 million, of which inclusive tours
increased from 52.8 per cent (15.4 million) to 53.4 per cent (20.6 million), representing
an annual growth of 7.6 per cent (Lei and Buck, 2004). Mason et al. (2000) stated that
the difficulty in finding suitable accommodation and arranging local surface transport
will always make inclusive holidays more attractive to some. In addition, the packaged
holidays aimed at the mass market invariably have a price advantage over the same
holidays organised by individual travellers. Moreover, package holidays are also
bonded, at least in some developed countries (e.g. the ATOL system in Britain), which
gives consumers more protection in the event of the operator becoming insolvent.
Though many of these trips were taken on charter airlines, this division has huge
potential to reap ancillary revenue, especially from long haul destinations - Virgin
Atlantic’s holiday division, for example, earned £312.2 million in 2004 (Humphries,
2005).
The network carriers have begun to imitate the dynamic package strategies that were
initiated by the low cost carriers. Dynamic packaging is inherently flexible as it allows
the customer to build their own holiday package by assimilating individual components
such as flight, accommodation and car hire. Mas Llabres (2003) also pointed out that
travel insurance could become an important component of the overall package.
Dynamic packaging is dynamic because pricing, constraints and ultimate choice are
determined online, based on real-time inventory. In this way, consumers become self
appointed travel agents by building a tailor-made package that better suits their
individual needs. According to the 2003 Airline Business IT Survey, this is a
developing business entity as 33% of interviewed carriers offered hotel bookings, 32%
offered excursions and 24% car hire (Airline Business, 2003). Dynamic packaging will
become an important tool in generating additional revenues for incumbents as more
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people are becoming cash rich and time poor. Mintel’s (2006) research showed that the
short-break market has increased by an estimated 2.5 million trips in 2001 to 7.8
million by 2006 in the UK alone, while expenditure has risen by a significant 70% to
reach nearly £2 billion over the same period as rising levels of disposable income allow
holidaymakers to spend more. This market now represents some 16% of the total
overseas holiday market in terms of volume, thus making this market segment very
lucrative and creating a revenue opportunity at little additional cost, and also becoming
an effective strategy against low cost carriers.
There are numerous other subsidiaries145 that incumbents could implement, such as IT,
call centre, flight training, consultancy, aircraft leasing, catering and ground handling.
However, incumbents are reverting to their core competencies and selling off many of
their ancillary divisions, thereby reducing the potential to earn additional revenues.
Reducing the number of business units subsequently reduces the revenue potential of
the incumbents, and the competition becomes more intense between incumbents and
low cost carriers as they have less differentiating features and compete purely on the
basis of passenger revenue.
Set up a low cost carrier
In recent years there has been a notable increase in the number of low cost carrier
subsidiary start-ups, indicating that incumbents have considered it a feasible, worth
pursuing strategy. History, however, suggests the opposite: Lawton (2002, p199)
pointed out that all the US based subsidiaries were dissolved, while Bethune and Huler
(1998) stated that Continental Lite was the primary reason why Continental Airlines
was losing $55 million per month in 1994. Porter (1996) identified a primary reason for
their failure, arguing that running two different and conflicting airline business models
simultaneously can result in poor quality, dissatisfied customers, discouraged
employees and losses. Graf (2005) provides an insight into the failure of some of the
European low cost carrier subsidiaries, and her research concluded that the only carrier
remaining (Germanwings) was due to the fact that it was almost entirely independent
from the incumbent. Delta’s Song was doomed to failure as its pilots were under the
same pay scale and benefits as the incumbent but the flight attendants were under
different contracts, stipulating that they worked 10-hours longer than their colleagues at
Delta. Porter (1996) supported the argument that each business model requires a
145 Examples of airlines that have such subsidiaries: Jet Airways IT division, Egyptair call centre, SAS
flight academy, Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprises (SALE), Lufthansa Consulting, Lufthansa LSG
Sky Chefs, Singapore Airport Terminal Services (SATS). Others include Czech Airlines duty free
business, Thai Airways airport management subsidiary, Royal Air Maroc hotel and service units,
Iberia’s 11.4% interest in Amadeus, American Airlines helicopter subsidiary connecting JFK to
Manhattan.
231
different set of resources and capabilities, as well as different organisational structures,
control and incentive mechanisms.
Morrell (2005) argued that there were three possible objectives in establishing low cost
carrier offshoots: to spin off profitable businesses; to see off low cost competition in
key markets (e.g. Song vs JetBlue); and to establish a test bed for adapting low cost
business practices to their mainline operations. The CEO of British Midland provided
another objective, stating that it wanted to diversify away from its core routes and build
a presence in secondary markets (ATI, April 2003).
There have been some examples of low cost carrier subsidiaries being very effective in
combating encroaching competition from peer groups. Qantas’ Jetstar, for example, has
changed the dynamics of competition between low cost carriers in the Australian
market. By 2004, Virgin Blue had 30% of the Australian domestic market and was
aiming for 50% by 2006; however, Jetstar was launched in May 2004, claiming 14% of
the market in late 2006 and holding Virgin Blue’s market share to 34% (ATI,
November 2006). By late 2006, Jetstar operated 24 A320 aircraft configured to carry
177 passengers. Its operation differed from other low cost carrier models because it
added its flight code to a limited number of Qantas-operated services in order to expand
its reach within Australia and to cover routes that it did not operate itself - Qantas also
purchases a fixed block of seats on every JetStar flight. It also carries cargo, which
increases its revenue per departure. Importantly, JetStar has adhered to a strict policy of
keeping off city-pairs operated by Qantas. Its fare policy also differed from
conventional low cost carriers as it offered two types of fares, namely JetSaver and
JetFlex, with the latter allowing passengers to make changes without additional fees
and earn Qantas Frequent Flyer points (Joyce, 2005). JetStar has now taken its
successful model and has established another subsidiary in Singapore, called JetStar
Asia, and plans a long-haul, low cost carrier in the near future.
The Polish market was also facing unprecedented competition from low cost carriers as
LOT’s market share was falling sharply because, in 2004, it had 49% of the market and
one year later this was reduced to 36%. Budget airlines were fast establishing and
reinforcing their presence: seven out of the top ten airlines, in terms of the number of
passengers carried, were in fact low cost carriers. In response, LOT set up its own low
cost carrier offshoot, called Centralwings, in early 2005 and, after one year in
operation, it claimed 5.7% of Poland’s market (ATI, May 2006). In an interesting
development to further reduce costs, the low cost carrier subsidiaries of alliance
members have joined forces as LOT’s Centralwings and Lufthansa’s Germanwings co-
operate on ground handling and IT. These incumbents are both members of the Star
alliance and have innovatively extended their synergies to their low cost subsidiaries in
order to further reduce the cost base (Baker, 2005).
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These low cost subsidiaries have the advantage of being able to access the incumbent’s
financial and operational strengths: United Airlines, for example, transferred nine
A320s to the carrier’s low-cost subsidiary, Ted, in 2005 (ATI, March 2005); and, in
another example, Air India applied its purchasing strength to procure 68 aircraft, of
which 18 were intended for its low cost subsidiary, Air India Express - they were
obtained at a lower price because of the incumbent’s bulk order (Ionides, 2006).
However, an area of concern for operating a low cost carrier subsidiary is the passenger
confusion between the two associated brands and the integrated coordination of both
enterprises. Appendix V outlines the low cost carrier offshoots that have been
dissolved (13), the present number (17) and the carriers that are planned for the near
future (8).
7.9.2 Capability of Management
Johnson et al. (2005, p119) stated that the strategic capability of an organisation
depends on its organisational competencies, which are ultimately driven by its
management. Knowledge of the company’s capabilities and of the causes of the
competitive forces it faces will highlight the areas where the company should confront
competition and where to avoid it. Unclear strategy, conflicting priorities, an
ineffective senior team and a leader who is too controlling or too disengaged in
management style, can all interact to prevent a company from competing successfully.
Thus, companies need to be quick in their innovation strategies (Markides, 1997),
consistent in implementation and embrace industry turbulence so as to leap-frog other
competitors in the market. Management must interpret confrontation quickly and then
exploit the window of opportunity faster than other competitors. Below are two
important management components, implementing change and negotiation, that have
a direct impact on the implementation of strategy and were sourced from the literature
of Johnson et al. (2005), recognised as the leading strategic management academics,
and from Kotler and Keller (2006), the leading marketing academics.
Implementing change
The effect of managers and strategies on a firm’s performance is central to the study of
strategic management (Child, 1972; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Amason et al., 2006).
Indeed, the literature is replete with models linking manager and strategy
characteristics to performance. Harrington et al. (2005) stated that there was little doubt
that the airline business is changing rapidly and that carriers must evolve or risk
extinction. In the Darwinian evolutionary race, it is not necessarily the strongest that
survive but the most adaptable.
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Government interference has stifled airline management for decades as they have
directed managers to endorse policies that satisfied local and political issues, regardless
of their commercial nature. Consequently, the management at Malaysia Airlines have
been unable to challenge the low cost carriers and have allowed Air Asia to take over a
large number of their domestic routes. It has been one of the few incumbents that has
completely failed in competing with low cost carriers, largely because of the strong
influence being exerted by its government (Saw, 2003). The government forced it to
operate on uncommercial routes and it also insisted that Malaysia Airlines should retain
its 23,000 strong workforce, as well as unsustainable operations such as maintaining a
first-class configuration on its regional routes, when most of its competitors had
abandoned theirs. Doganis (2006, p256) suggested that change could come about if
government owned airlines became privatised and lost their political link so that
managers could become empowered to make their own decisions based on a
commercial strategy.
Privately owned airlines, such as British Airways, have had much more success at
implementing change. Management was able to cut costs by £450 million over a five
year period, ending in March 2005. Management streamlined its decision flow process
through its hierarchy pyramid by eliminating around 600 middle management jobs, in
turn saving the company £50 million. It also concentrated on selling direct to the
customer by bypassing intermediaries, reducing its distribution146 cost base by £700
million (60%) over the seven years from 2000 to 2006. As part of a further £450
million cost cutting plan to be completed by March 2008, each department has been
given specific cost targets which will force employees to negotiate lower prices from
suppliers, including airports. Management also changed its yield management system
so that it competed more effectively with low cost carriers by abolishing fare
restrictions (with an ability to change an economy ticket for a fee of £30). It also
changed the structure of its fares so that they became more closely aligned with the
fares offered by budget carriers, by reducing fares on many of its short haul routes by
as much as 50% but retaining its high quality products (assigned seating and
complementary food and drinks, etc.) and requiring that all domestic UK travellers use
the self-service check-in or online check-in mechanism. Management has continued to
be innovative in improving its margins and fitted ‘space saver’ thinner seats to all its
Heathrow-based aircraft, which allows an extra row of seats to be added to its short
haul aircraft - this adjustment will improve capacity out of Heathrow by 2.9%. They
have also been able to increase the utilisation of their 87 short-haul aircraft based at
Heathrow by 15% by reducing the turnaround time while, at the same time, increasing
the productivity of their pilots.
146 BA reduced its distribution cost per passenger from £30 per passenger in 1997 to around £15 per
passenger by 2004.
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British Airways’ twin hub policy at London has been challenging as connecting traffic
through the Gatwick hub was not a positive option. However management’s robustness
in finding a fast solution has been impressive. It managed to funnel a large part of its
leisure passengers through Gatwick and its current fleet (around 33 short-haul aircraft
positioned at Gatwick) mostly provides high frequency, point to point leisure services
on its 43 routes, with 15% of its short-haul services connecting to BA’s long haul
network at Gatwick. Management’s new focus on profitability is evident by its decision
to sell its unprofitable regional affiliate, BA Connect147, to Flybe in return for 15%
equity in that carrier. In addition, management’s ability to drop an underperforming
route was noted by its decision to close its Gatwick – Vilnius city pair in 2006 after just
seven months in operation. Overall, management has implemented numerous changes
and their actions have transformed the financial results of BA’s short-haul operations
from a loss of £172 million in 2001 to a profit of $7 million by 2006. It has also
reduced its debt from $5.7 billion in 2001 to below $2 billion by 2006. BA made an
operating profit of £705 million for 2006, achieving an impressive operating margin of
8.3%, and rewarded staff with bonuses totalling £48 million (BA Reports & Accounts
2000-01; 2001-02; 2002-03; 2004-05, 2005-06; Buyck, 2006). In contrast, management
at Alitalia were unable to offset five sets of strikes in 2005 and numerous strikes in
2006, including a 6-day stoppage in January in protest over the company’s
restructuring initiatives, indicating management’s inability to implement change.
Subsequently, the Italian flag carrier is unable to compete with low cost carriers and is
expected to post an operating loss of around €380 million for 2006 - a year in which
most European network airlines have made substantial profits (ATI, January 2007).
Negotiation
Negotiation is viewed as a process of compromise, involving parties with different sets
of objectives and values, based on their different vested interests (Fisher and Ury,
1991). IBM (2006) stated that airlines needed to focus on negotiation in order to
maximise profits. Airline managers at scheduled airlines are typically poor in
negotiation, while their counterparts at low cost carriers excel in this. The majority of
the service providers generate high returns that are primarily derived from incumbents,
and this is evident at airports - the operating margins of airports such as BAA, Hong
Kong and Atlanta were 31.2%, 60.2% and 65.5% respectively for 2005, while
comparable margins at airlines are very substantially weaker (Airline Business,
December 2006). Low cost carriers, however, have been able to extract low charges
from airports and, in some cases, subsidies. Ryanair negotiated Shannon Airport’s
passenger charge from €7 per passenger to €1 while the regional authorities in Northern
Spain paid Ryanair €3.8 million in 2005 to connect London Stansted to Santiago de
147 BA connect carried 3.4 million passengers in 2005 but it only managed to reduce its losses from £27
million in 2005 to £20 million in 2006.
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Compostela, staggered over a four year period (ATI, March 2005). Aer Lingus, which
began operations to the same airport a year later, paid the normal airport charges, which
highlights the benefits of successful negotiations and how they can impact operating
costs. Fisher and Ury (1991), who are considered to be the academic authorities in
negotiation, stated that it is the most effective means to increase profitability.
Management has also found it difficult to successfully negotiate higher productivity
deals. In 2002, European low cost airline pilots worked an average of 210 days per
annum, whereas full service airline pilots worked an average of only 184 days per
annum, the salaries of the low cost carrier pilots still being 27% less than their peers
(European Cockpit Association, 2002 p7). By 2006 there was a 25% difference in the
productivity of pilots between the two sets of airlines and this reduced the number of
flight crews required by the low cost carriers by 20% (European Cockpit Association,
2006 p20). Taneja (2003, p146) also described how management had extracted
additional productivity from the Southwest employees by citing that American used
four gates to handle 18 flights a day into and out of Hartfort, Connecticut, whereas
Southwest used only two gates to accommodate 17 departures.
Despite the escalation in fuel costs, labour remains the highest operating cost in the airline
industry. Management’s primary function is to retain its cost leadership, and this is
achieved via effective and staged negotiations with labour. Doganis (2006, p137) stated
that negotiating new terms and conditions is a very effective strategy in reducing labour
costs. This was realised by the management at United Airlines when they succumbed to the
negotiation pressures of their pilots union in 2000 and awarded them pay increases of
between 21.5% and 28.5% with immediate effect, together with annual increments of 4
percent for each of the following four years. Subsequently, this triggered a series of pay
increases at other US carriers with Delta’s pilots receiving a 23-34% wage hike - Merrill
Lynch had estimated that labour costs would rise in the US by 12% in 2001 (Aviation
Strategy, March 2001). Clearly, management’s poor negotiation skills were at fault for
granting such large pay increases. The terrorist attacks, followed by years of huge losses148,
caused United to enter bankruptcy protection from where it was considerably easier to
negotiate concessions because of the industries turbulence and uncertainty which resulted
in pilots accepting a 30% pay cut. However, management must be more vigilant when
negotiating the next round of pay talks, and not succumb to union pressures of granting
large salary increases. Meanwhile, Continental Airlines149 was one of the two legacy
carriers that did not enter into chapter 11 bankruptcy and it was able to negotiate a
reduction of $500 million in payroll costs because of its transparent and amicable relations
148 United Airlines had a net loss of $30 billion over the years 2000 to 2005 and creditors and
employees had no choice but to make concessions. These concessions were substantial as it cut its
annual costs by $7 billion and reduced its balance sheet debt by $13 billion, including a cut of $7
billion in pensions.
149 Continental Airlines has the lowest CASM of the US legacy airlines at around 9.3 cents verses 11.5
cents at US Airways and 10.7 cents at Delta.
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with pilot unions. Its ability to meet the work force half-way eased the negotiation process,
as the CEO took a 25% pay cut and the other top executives also took a 20% cut. It
developed a relationship based on ‘providing each other with accurate, factual information
and considering each others input regarding operational issues and seeking common
solutions’ (Aviation Strategy, December 2004). A more hard line approach in negotiations
was used by Lufthansa which indicated that future growth would be concentrated at its low
cost subsidiary or with its Star alliance partners if pilots refused to cut their cost base by
6% (€55 million). Management also wanted to alter the pension scheme and add an extra
two hours to pilots’ flight schedules every month and, in return, management would
guarantee the full employment of all its pilot members for the foreseeable future. The
negotiation process took one year but it secured all of Lufthansa’s objectives (Lufthansa,
2005).
7.10 Concluding comments
This chapter adopted a strategic management perspective in discussing alternative
solutions for traditional carriers to compete effectively with low cost carriers. Emphasis
was given on the design of a structural analytical framework of complex inter-
relationships between the following strategic components: cost leadership and product
differentiation; collaboration with other carriers; strengths and weaknesses; Porter’s
theory of competitive rivalry; key aspects of airline marketing; and enhancement of a
business’ structural position via possession of a capable management team and by
diversification outside an airline’s core competency. This overall framework provided a
‘blueprint’ to a questionnaire that was sent to airline strategy directors worldwide, in
collaboration with IATA, to facilitate the assessment of incumbents’ capabilities in
competing with low cost carriers.
Incumbents must decide if they wish to replicate the low unit costs of the budget carriers
or pursue a differentiation strategy - the latter option is evidently more achievable as
structural costs at traditional airlines are higher due to unions, pensions, airports,
distribution, etc. It is therefore important that full service airlines continue to offer
passengers a full range of flight products, which provide a clear delineation between the
brands of low cost carriers and full service airlines. The key will be to lower the
structural costs of the legacy airlines to within 20% of budget carriers and to retain their
full set of flight products which will justify the carrier charging a higher fare premium.
Traditionally, low cost carriers compete on an individual basis with all other airline
business models, while the full service airlines are unique because they collaborate with
other carriers, thereby stretching their networks into new markets without the associated
costs of operating aircraft to those destinations. Full service airlines must continue to
partake in a wide range of bipartisan arrangements, such as equity partnerships, pooling
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arrangements, code sharing franchising and having regional carriers feed traffic from
peripheral regions to their hubs - all these options provide competition to the low cost
carriers. Alliances, however, are an important competitive weapon as they allow different
carriers to integrate their operational and marketing platforms. This strengthens their
competitive positions and provides an opportunity to reduce costs through areas such as
joint purchasing, whereby a group of carriers can negotiate much more favourable terms
than a single carrier.
Once a company has determined its strengths, it can go about the process of utilising
those strengths to improve its position in the marketplace. Conversely, an examination of
internal weaknesses (e.g. uninspired products, recalcitrant work force, etc.) should spur
initiatives to design long-term strategies to address those shortcomings. Furthermore,
incumbents should capitalise on the weaknesses of budget carriers. Michael Porter has
repeatedly emphasised that it is very important to interpret how companies will respond
to competitive moves made by rivals. This has long been a cornerstone of overall
competitive strategy and is key to profitability. Finally, low cost carriers compete purely
on the basis of transporting passengers, while incumbents have other aviation-linked
businesses which could be restructured, adding to the overall revenue streams. However,
the management team will have the overall responsibility in implementing change - this
disrupts the previous status-quo and, also, it takes time for the strategy to produce results.
Management should resist in reverting to the previous order thinking about the
‘optimality of suboptimal patterns’: new order can only emerge with well defined and
structured plans.
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8 Chapter 8: The passenger perception of low
cost airlines and full service carriers.
A case study of Aer Lingus, Ryanair, Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia
8.1 Introduction
The competition between low cost carriers and network airlines on the Ireland – UK
pairing was Europe’s most intense battleground as Ryanair armed with low fares,
excess capacity and a low cost structure encroached on the market share of the
incumbents who also operated on the routes. At the end of 2005, there were 37 airlines
operating regular scheduled services to 103 different destinations from Dublin, Cork
and Shannon. Traffic from the UK was up 16% for the year 2004/05 while European
traffic recorded the strongest growth during this period, rising by an impressive 25% to
over 4.4 million passengers. The increase in this market was supported by the launch of
over 30 new routes and services into mainland Europe (O’Donoghue, 2006). The
annual growth rate of European low cost carriers from 1999 – 2004 was 35% while the
incumbents remained relatively flat. Meanwhile in Asia, low cost carriers were just
beginning to establish themselves. Prior to 2002 there were no significant low cost
airlines operating in the region150. By late 2005 Asian based low cost carriers
represented 6% of the region’s total traffic, although penetration rates were much
higher in countries such as Malaysia (30%), Thailand (12-13%), Singapore (11-12%)
because the markets had a deregulated domestic and/or liberal international foothold.
Air Asia has challenged Malaysia Airlines in much the same way as ‘Ryanair/Aer
Lingus’ and the incumbent lost 30% of its domestic market in just 3 years. As Air Asia
expands its borders to intra-Asian markets, it will continue to encroach on Malaysia
Airlines market.
The chapter begins by examining the background of the carriers including traffic
carried and operating cost performance. The empirical study then concentrates
primarily on the surveys that were conducted in Europe and Asia, highlighting key
findings such as passenger characteristics, journey purpose, booking methods, fares,
connecting traffic, trip description. It concludes with an in-depth analysis of the factors
that influence carrier choice and the ranking order of flight products for both leisure
and business passengers.
150 Virgin Blue commenced operations in 2000, and operated within Australia. In February 2004 it set
up a subsidiary called Pacific Blue to serve international routes linking Australia, New Zealand and
several pacific island destinations.
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8.2 Background of the surveyed airlines
8.2.1 Aer Lingus and Ryanair
Aer Lingus has been described in detail in Chapter 5 but a brief descriptive
comparison of traffic numbers and operating costs staged over a number of years will
set the scene of the contrasting characteristics of both Aer Lingus and Ryanair, each
domiciled in Ireland. Figure 54 below shows the annual passenger traffic carried by
Ryanair and Aer Lingus between 1997 up to when the survey was conducted in 2003.
Aer Lingus continues to serve destinations out of Ireland while Ryanair has taken full
advantage of European deregulation to become a pan-European airline. Its creation of
multi-hubs across Europe has enabled the carrier to transport an enormous volume of
traffic, which is increasing each year. Ryanair’s relentless focus on reducing its
operating costs has enabled the carrier to pass on these savings to passengers in the
form of low fares. Aer Lingus has managed to reduce its unit cost to a level that it can
now challenge its low fare rival. Figure 55 below shows how Aer Lingus has been
reacting to Ryanair by significantly reducing its operating costs and the difference in
operating costs per ASK between the two carriers in 1998 was around 78%, however
by 2003 this had been reduced to around 53%. Aer Lingus’s structural reformation of
its operating costs and its transition to a low fares airline, caused Ryanair’s profits on
the Dublin to London city pair to fall by 20% in 2003 (O’Connell and Williams, 2005).
Figure 54. Number of passengers carried by
Aer Lingus and Ryanair (1997-2003)
Figure 55. Units Costs of Aer Lingus
and Ryanair (1996 – 2003)
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8.2.2 Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia
The history of Malaysia’s Air Asia is similar to that of Ryanair, as both carriers have
transformed themselves from loss making regional operators to profitable low cost
airlines. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that Air Asia is managed by Conor
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McCarthy, an ex-Ryanair director. Besides attracting passengers from buses and
ferries, both carriers have experienced a large proportion of first time flyers, largely
attracted by the low fares on offer.
At the time that the survey was conducted Air Asia had a 30% share of the Malaysian
domestic market. Since the airline’s inception in December 2001, the market has grown
from 9 million passengers annually to 13 million. In 2004, bankers had valued Air Asia
at between $750 million to $1.2 billion (Ionides, 2004). By late 2005 the carrier had 19
Boeing 737-300s in its fleet and ordered 100 A320s with options for an additional 30
aircraft. The low cost carrier has now franchised its operation into Thailand and
Indonesia and is also looking to repeat the business opportunity in Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh. Chapter 3 gives a further description of how these carriers are expanding,
despite operating in a highly regulated environment.
Figure 56 below shows that the passenger enplanements for Malaysia’s incumbent has
been relatively stagnant over the last number of years. In 2005 domestic operations
accounted for 8.9 million passengers (48.7% of Malaysia Airlines total passengers)
down from 6.6 million in 2002 (Centre of Asia Pacific Aviation, 2006). Yassin-Knan
(2003) stated that Air Asia was beginning to attract passengers from the domiciled
incumbent but was also capturing its annual growth in the domestic market of 4-5%
and it was also enticing passengers from the arduous train and bus journeys. Figure 57
shows the unit costs for Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia between 1998 and 2004. Air
Asia has the world’s lowest unit cost of US$0.023/ASK and a passenger break-even
load factor of 52% and it is showing all the signs of being a Ryanair clone. This is
based on the fact that it has hedged 100% of its fuel requirements for the next three
years, produces short turnaround times of 25 minutes, its crew productivity is triple that
of Malaysia Airlines and has an average aircraft utilisation rate of 13 hours a day. In
comparison, Malaysia Airlines has hedged only 20% of its fuel requirements, takes one
hour to turnaround its aircraft and uses its aircraft for just 8 hours a day in its domestic
markets. In 2004 the unit cost differential between the carriers was very significant at
268% and is due to Malaysia Airlines excessive labour force, poor productivity, low
aircraft utilisation, unprofitable domestic routes and the limitations of intra-Asian
bilaterals. The currency crisis of 1997, followed by three successive years of poor
revenues and a debt of $2.6 billion forced the Malaysian Government to intervene and
rescue the airline. It transferred ownership of 73 aircraft, leases on another 17 and
liabilities of $1.8 billion to the Malaysian Finance Ministry (Penerbangan Malaysia
Berhad PMB). Ionides (February, 2005) stated that Malaysia Airlines was financially
reengineered and converted into a ‘virtual airline’ with few assets and its liabilities
were replaced through debt-for-equity swaps. However in 2005 the incumbent had the
world’s second worst operating margin at -13.2% with a $421 million net loss.
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Figure 56. Number of passengers carried by
Malaysia Airlines & Air Asia (1998-2004)
Figure 57. Unit costs of Malaysia
Airlines and Air Asia (1999 – 2003)
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8.3 Survey Methodology
Two questionnaires were used to gather information on passengers’ perceptions of full
service airlines and on low cost carriers in Ireland and Malaysia. The passengers were
surveyed in the relaxed open landside public area of the airport. The airports where
permission was granted to undertake the surveys were Cork and Shannon in Ireland,
and Kuala Lumpur International in Malaysia. Small teams of personnel were involved
in capturing the data, as pilot studies concluded that the second page of the survey was
often omitted and it was important that all questions were understood and fully
answered. The personnel also assisted with language barriers and in answering any
issues raised regarding the open-ended questions, in which each respondent could give
a personal response in his or her own words. A total of 281 responses were collected at
the Irish airports, which represented around 22% of the total number of passengers that
were travelling to London airports on the day that the survey was administered. Ryanair
passengers made up 52% of the sample while the remainder comprised of Aer Lingus
passengers. A total of 247 responses were taken at Kuala Lumpur International airport,
which represented around 20% of the total number of passengers that were travelling to
airports within Malaysia. Air Asia passengers accounted for 48% of the sample and the
remainder comprised of Malaysia Airlines passengers.
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8.4 Survey Findings
8.4.1 General findings; Demographics, group travel, surface
access to airport and accommodation
As expected, the low-cost carriers attracted a high number of younger people, with
24% of the Ryanair passengers surveyed and 47% of Air Asia’s being in the under 24
years age group. Eighty-seven percent of this age group on average were travelling for
non-business purposes that included visiting friends/family and trips to/from places of
education. Parents mostly paid for these trips. For the 25–58 year age group, which
represented on average 84% of those surveyed, passenger choice changed considerably
in favour of the incumbent carriers. The age segregation between the carrier types is
very clear, with the older passengers tending to prefer the incumbent carriers, possibly
because these offer additional airline products not offered by the low cost carriers.
Group travel is particularly significant to airline revenues. Business travellers usually
tend to travel singularly but leisure travellers often journey in small groups. Low cost
airlines carry more passengers who travel as part of a group than do the incumbent
airlines, with almost 40% of Ryanair passengers travelling in pairs and 31% of Air
Asia’s passengers travelling as part of a group of people comprising three or more. It is
only in recent years that the incumbent carriers have sold discounted one-way tickets.
This has been in response to the provision of such fares accessible via the Internet by
the low cost carriers.
The mode of surface access and the distance travelled to the departing airport was also
ascertained. The significance of having a frequent high-speed, non-stop train service
from the city centre of Kuala Lumpur to the airport was apparent, with one third of the
passengers surveyed making use of this. In contrast, there is no such service linking any
Irish airport, and on average 76% of passengers accessed their flights by personal car,
which provides a significant income to the airport authorities in parking fees.
Passengers were also asked how far they had travelled to the airport. In Malaysia, those
who were using the national flag carrier travelled an average distance of 50 miles to
reach the airport, while Air Asia passengers travelled an average of 77 miles. The
distance from Kuala Lumpur to the international airport is approximately 40 miles. In
Europe, the survey found that Ryanair passengers travelled 44% further than the
incumbent carrier’s passengers to reach the airport. Lawton (2002) and Doganis (2001)
have referred to the fact that European passengers flying on a low cost carrier are
travelling further to reach their departure airport. The positioning of secondary airports
long distances from the major cities does not seem to pose a significant barrier to the
use of low fare carriers.
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Finally, questions were asked about the type of accommodation used. There was a
noticeable difference in the type of accommodation used by low cost airline users in
Europe and those in Asia. A total of 31% of Ryanair’s passengers stayed in hotels,
while almost 49% of Air Asia’s passengers stayed in places such as inns, guesthouses,
bed and breakfast establishments, or hostels. The European travel trade has often
suggested that passengers who travel on a low cost carrier tend to use the savings that
were derived from the lower fares in staying at more luxurious accommodation, such as
a hotel. The incumbent carriers’ passengers tended to opt for hotels, which generally
reflects their requirement for additional full service attributes, with an average of 39%
of them staying in this type of accommodation.
8.4.2 Journey Purpose
Table 53 below shows journey purpose and as expected, the two incumbent airlines
carried a significant proportion of business traffic, with meetings being the primary
reason for the trip. However, almost 29% of the Ryanair passengers surveyed were also
travelling on business, which was only 8.5% less than the equivalent figure for Aer
Lingus. Of significance here is the fact that Ryanair is operating to a secondary airport,
which adds time and inconvenience for business travellers in getting into central
London. Some 40% of the passengers travelling for business purposes with Ryanair
were going to events such as conferences and training courses. These journeys would
generally be considered as being less urgent business trips and have a higher p-value151
when compared to Aer Lingus.
In Asia, the amount of business travel on a low cost carrier was previously unknown
but this survey reveals that approximately 8% of Air Asia passengers, all of whom
were male, were travelling for business purposes. The low p-values for the Asian
carriers cited above reflects the fact that passengers are more likely to travel on
Malaysia Airlines for meetings and conferences and are more likely to travel on Air
Asia for sporting events and that these differences are statistically significant. In more
mature European markets however, this trend is somewhat reversed.
151 The p-value shows the probability of accepting the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is no difference
between the carriers).
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Table 53 Journey Purpose
Note: SD refers to Standard Deviation between the incumbent and low cost carrier.
Source: O’Connell, Williams (2005).
Doganis (2001) refers to the fact that 28% of Ryanair’s traffic between London
Glasgow (Prestwick) in 1996 was business-related. In a survey undertaken by Tu
(2003) at London Gatwick, over 32% of easyJet passengers were travelling for bus
purposes.
Table 54 below provides details of the sizes of companies that the surveyed bus
passengers work for. It is perhaps not so surprising that such a high proportion o
employed people choose the low cost carriers. A cross tabulation of self empl
passengers and primary reason for choice of a low cost carrier revealed that 91
these travellers chose the carrier primarily due to the fare and were not attracted b
extended full service products offered by the incumbent airlines. Business passen
travelling on incumbent airlines tend to come from larger companies that employ
100 people. These companies would generally have larger travel budgets and w
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Table 54 Company sizes of the surveyed business passengers
Aer Lingus Ryanair Malaysia Airlines Air Asia
Company size: number of employees % % % %
Self Employed 9.6 32.1 12.3 67.4
1-24 11.3 26.5 8.2 20.7
25-99 18.3 24.3 16.1 11.9
100-999 26.2 17.1 29.2 -
1000-5000 29.2 - 23.7 -
5000 + 5.4 - 10.5 -
The low cost carriers attracted proportionately more leisure traffic, with Ryanair and
Air Asia having respectively 10% and 22% higher proportions of their traffic
comprising leisure users than their incumbent counterparts. It was also apparent that the
biggest leisure market segment comes from those passengers who regularly visit
friends and family.
Lehto et al. (2001) confirms from statistical research that Visiting Friends and Family
(VFR) is one of the top reasons for international travel. The World Tourism
Organisation estimates that 20% of international tourism in 1998 was for VFR, health
and religious purposes. As expected, the surveys confirm that low cost carriers attract
proportionately more leisure traffic. Ryanair and Air Asia had respectively 10% and
22% higher proportions of traffic comprising leisure users than their incumbent
counterparts. The surveys reveal that the biggest leisure market segment comes from
those passengers who regularly visit friends and family.
Paci’s (1994) research showed that the Asian leisure market, and in particular, the VFR
segment was steadily growing and that culturally, time spent with family and friends is
a very important leisure activity. The surveys referred to here indicate that Air Asia’s
VFR traffic represents almost a quarter of its total market, while that of Malaysia
Airlines represents fewer than 17%. This segment represented the largest number of
passengers carried on both surveyed airlines. Student travel accounted for the second
largest non-business market of the surveyed passengers. Cross-referencing indicated
that most of this travel was paid for by parents, although the choice of airline was
largely selected by the students. Most of these students have migrated from travelling
on trains and buses to Air Asia. Overall, a large proportion of Air Asia’s passengers are
first time flyers (Aviation Strategy, May 2003). The brand perception of lower fares,
large network, high advertising awareness campaigns and 24 hour booking via the
Internet is certainly pushing the Malaysian low cost carrier’s non-business market.
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Between 1993 and 1999, which covered the establishment and growth phase of
Ryanair, VFR traffic from Ireland to the UK grew from around 500,000 to 835,000.
The effect is even more revealing when considering VFR traffic from the UK to
Ireland, which grew from 950,000 to 1.8 million over the same period (Mintel 2000).
This growth was primarily due to a large second and third generation Irish-British
population living in the UK. The surveys referred to here reveal that VFR traffic
constituted the largest segment of non-business passengers, with respectively 20.5% of
Aer Lingus and 27.7% of Ryanair passengers surveyed travelling for this purpose.
The second biggest non-business segment consisted of passengers travelling for holiday
and short break purposes. Both the low cost carriers that were sampled carry more of
this type of traffic than the incumbents. In Europe, low cost scheduled carriers are
encroaching on the charter market. Williams (2001) argues that package tour charter
carriers are vulnerable to low cost airlines on sectors of up to 2.5 hours, given that
travellers can now integrate their own flights and accommodation into personalised
package holidays via low cost carrier websites. However this is not the case in
Malaysia, where there is an absence of such charter airlines. Short holiday breaks have
become very significant, representing an important market in the leisure sector. The
two low cost carriers attracted slightly more short break travellers than the incumbents,
with this sector accounting for an average of 12.5% of their traffic. Mintel (2002)
estimated that UK nationals took 5.6 million short breaks in 2002, which represents
around 15% of all UK holidays abroad. By 2005 this figure is forecast to increase to 7.2
million, accounting for around one fifth of international holidays. Graham (2000) states
that there is a strong relationship between demand for holidays abroad and income
levels, with the result that there has been a shift from domestic to international holidays
and in particular growth in the short-break travel market.
The low cost airlines are extending their brands to capture this short break market. Air
Asia is marketing packages on its website under ‘Go Holiday’, offering a wide range of
mini-breaks consisting of 2-3 nights, including activities such as golfing and spa
treatments, as well as short stays at beach resorts. The package includes flight, transfer,
accommodation, meals and activities (Air Asia, 2004). Ryanair also offers these short
breaks and advertises leisure activities on its website as ‘Ryanairbreaks’; an all-
inclusive package that includes events such as concerts, football games, Formula One
racing, etc., (Ryanair 2004). These packages form an important part of additional
ancillary revenue with the low cost airlines integrating package holidays into their core
business model. These short break packages were only recently introduced on the Aer
Lingus website but remain absent from the Malaysia Airlines’ website. However,
Dynamic packaging may also bear risks for passengers too, essentially due to
inadequate consumer protection and there should be some sort of insolvency protection
like Air Travel Organisers’ Licensing (ATOL) that will safeguard consumer interests.
247
8.4.3 Booking Methods
Jarach (2002) states that 75% of leisure passengers and 80% of business passengers
used travel agents in the mature US market in 1998. In the same year, travel agents in
the UK were responsible for 80% of bookings (Dumazel and Humphreys, 1999). The
survey conducted in 2003, revealed that the booking dynamics have changed
considerably as 58% of Aer Lingus passengers booked through the company’s website,
while 78% of Ryanair passengers booked online, but would have increased to 93% if
one considered the aggregate channels of: website; office booked; and family/friend as
shown in Table 55 below. However 16% of Aer Lingus’ passengers were still using
travel agents, which show that they remain an important distribution channel, whereas
none of Ryanair’s passengers used them. When the survey was commissioned the
incumbent’s commission to agents in the UK and Ireland was just 1% and in Europe it
hovered between 4% and 7%. The contrast in distribution is even more apparent in
Malaysia, as passengers used a combination of travel agents and call centres, while Air
Asia’s passengers predominantly used the Internet. The agents in Asia are still a
powerful force and airlines still pay a high commission to encourage the agent to direct
passengers in their favour and Yassin-Knan152 explained that the Malaysian incumbent
offers travel agents 5% commission on domestic flights and 7% on international flights,
while override commission is also paid as an extra incentive to book high volumes of
passengers. Malaysia Airlines was very slow to develop its e-commerce platform and it
only introduced its online booking engine in early 2004.
Table 55 Booking profiles (%)
Website Travel Call Office Family/ Purchased Other Statistics significance
Agent Centre Booked Friends Today Website
Aer Lingus 58.1 16.2 8.1 9.6 2.2 2.9 2.9 x2 = 189.66, df=6, p<0.000
Ryanair 77.9 - 6.3 11.7 3.4 0.7 -
Malaysia - 50.8 18.0 14.8 8.6 7.8 - x2 = 868.53, df = 5, p<0.000
Air Asia 64.4 3.4 13.6 1.7 7.6 9.3 -
Source: O’Connell, Williams (2005)
8.4.4 Fares
Lawton (2002) pointed out that the average fares of no frills carriers were some 40-60%
lower than their full service competitors. Ryanair’s one-way fares averaged €50 in 2002
reducing to €40 by 2003/4 and the carrier has become renowned by stimulating traffic as
a result of low fares and this has now become known as the ‘Ryanair effect’. The carrier
152 Author interview with Strategy Director at Malaysia Airlines, Kuala Lumpur
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gave away 20% of its flights for free in 2003 and the passengers’ perception is therefore
to expect low fares from the no frills carrier.
The survey was conducted of passengers who were travelling to London based airports
from Cork and Shannon and the average Ryanair one-way fare was approximately €45
one-way and €117 for return journeys. The Aer Lingus average one-way fare was
approximately €62 one-way and €135 for return journeys. Table 56 below shows the fare
differences between the two Malaysian carriers surveyed on a number of routes. Shortly
after the government assumed 6.9 billion Ringgits of Malaysia Airlines’ debt, the carrier
cut fares by 50% on 14,000 seats a week to compete more effectively with Air Asia in the
domestic market. The information shown in the table below takes account of these
discounted fares.
Table 56. Fares profile of Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines surveyed passengers
Air Asia Malaysia Airlines Difference
Route One-Way Return One Way Return O/W Return
KL-Kota Bahru 89.99 179.98 158 316 75 75
KL-Kota Kinabalu 249.99 499.98 437 874 75 75
KL-Kuching 99.99 179.98 262 524 162 191
KL-Labuan 269.99 448.98 437 874 62 94
KL-Langkawi 129.99 275.98 205 410 58 48
KL-Miri 169.99 368.98 422 844 148 129
KL-Penang 69.99 139.98 158 316 125 125
Note 1: KL is Kuala Lumpur
Note 2: All fares are quoted in Malaysian Ringgits
8.4.5 Airline Connections
Figure 58 below shows the percentage of connecting traffic for both groups of carriers.
A big feature of a full service carrier is the ability to interline traffic at its hub airport.
Slightly over 42% of Aer Lingus passengers surveyed were interlining, as compared to
36.7% of those of Malaysia Airlines. This reflects an incumbent’s ability to leverage its
‘network benefits’ and thus attract a high proportion of passengers who wish to connect
seamlessly. In contrast low cost airlines operate mostly on a point-to-point basis only
and these carriers emphasise that they will not be responsible if passengers fail to make
their connections, even if the onward journey is on the same carrier. The risk of failing
to make a connection involves the traveller purchasing another ticket. Data from the
surveys indicate that passengers are willing to accept that risk. By mid 2006, Ryanair
had eleven bases across Europe and it will continue to expand by ‘joining the dots’. The
carrier’s low fare brand, high frequency operations and the creation of strong European
traffic bases, has effectively created an opportunity for its passengers to transfer to any
of its destinations. The surveys showed that 17.2% of Ryanair’s passengers questioned
were connecting at Stansted. Air Asia’s transfer traffic was only 5.8%, which is not
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surprising as the low cost carrier was only formed in December 2001 with travellers not
having been exposed for long to this type of routing possibility. Research indicates that
there are a large number of passengers transiting via the hubs of the US based low cost
carriers as Taneja (2003) and Lawton (2002) both pointed out that 18.3% of
Southwest’s passengers made connections in 2001, while Still (2002) claimed that
approximately 45% of AirTran Airways’ passengers connect at Atlanta. This may
extend to low cost carriers elsewhere in the world and Ryanair’s bases which are
scattered across Europe now has the framework that would facilitate the interlining of
passengers.
Figure 58. Percentage of connecting traffic
Aer Lingus Ryanair Malaysia Airlines Air Asia
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Figure 59 below identifies the principle airlines to which the interlining passengers
surveyed were transferring. It is apparent that the incumbent carriers have a significant
proportion of their traffic transferring to alliance or code-sharing partners. Aer Lingus has
55.3% of its connecting passengers transferring to other Oneworld alliance partners, of
which the majority were transferring to British Airways. By contrast, 72% of Ryanair’s
passengers surveyed who were making connections continued their journeys from
Stansted on other Ryanair flights, while around 20% connected with easyJet services. At
the time of the survey, Ryanair operated 130 daily departures out of London Stansted and
accounted for 52% of the airports capacity, thus providing numerous permutations of
connections and ample opportunity for passengers to transfer to other destinations.
In Malaysia, the incumbent is not part of an alliance, but 68.5% of its connecting
passengers surveyed were transferring to other code-share flights. Only 6.6% of Malaysia
Airline passengers questioned connected with Air Asia at Kuala Lumpur. In contrast,
very few of Air Asia passengers surveyed were transferring: four of these were
connecting to a Malaysia Airlines long haul service, while the remaining three were
transferring onwards with Air Asia. As the market begins to mature and as Air Asia
develops additional hubs, there will be a greater opportunity for passengers to transfer to
other flights. The perception is evident in the Asian market that passengers can use a
combination of carrier types to reach their destinations, and that interlining via a low cost
carrier network is certainly a workable option.
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Figure 59. Percentage of traffic transferring to other carriers
8.4.6 Principle Reasons for carrier selection
An important element of this research was to establish the principle reason why each
passenger had selected a particular airline. A study undertaken by Proussaloglou and
Koppleman (1995) on the demand for air carrier services concluded that carrier selection
was based on a combination of factors that included the airline's market presence,
schedule convenience, low fares, on time performance, reliability and the availability of
frequent flier programs. Figure 60 below provides confirmation of their results, with the
evidence from this research showing that passengers choose a full service carrier for a
variety of reasons, including: service reliability, service quality, flight schedules, fares,
connections, frequent flyer programs, comfort, safety and company policy. Passengers
questioned chose an incumbent carrier in order to benefit from the wide range of services
available and the high reliability associated with this type of airline. Service reliability
was one of the top reasons for choosing an incumbent airline as over 20% of Aer Lingus
passengers and 18.7% of Malaysia Airlines passengers questioned selected this as their
principle reason for carrier choice.
Figure 60. Question posed to Incumbent passengers to determine their most
important reason for choosing an incumbent over a low cost carrier
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Figure 61 below shows that low cost airlines’ passengers questioned had a very different
principle reason for carrier selection. The majority replied that fare was by far the most
important factor in choosing to fly on a low cost airline, with flight schedules coming a
distant second. Turner (2003) also showed that passengers travelling on a low cost carrier
selected fare as their principle reason for carrier choice, while passengers travelling on an
incumbent carrier indicated flight timings. Ryanair’s strategy of issuing free flights
encourages passengers to try its website when searching for flights as their general
perception is that the carrier offers cheap tickets and Air Asia is also beginning to
replicate this tactic.
Figure 61 Question posed to low cost carrier passengers to determine their most
important reason for choosing a low cost carrier over an incumbent
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The evidence presented above clearly confirms the principle differences in passengers’
perceptions between incumbent and low cost airlines. Passengers are selecting low cost
carriers primarily because of their low fares, while passengers selecting full service
airlines opt for them because of the wide range of products and services that they
provide.
8.4.7 Types of Trips Taken by Passengers in the Previous Year
8.4.7.1 Short trips
Table 57 below shows the number of short haul trips taken by the sampled passengers
over the 12-month period 2003-04. It shows that around one-third of Aer Lingus
passengers and a quarter of Ryanair passengers had travelled frequently (taking
between 3-4 trips per year) over the 12-month period, which indicates the maturity of
the air transport market in this region. In Asia, the low cost airline business model is
not as mature as in Europe/Asia and it appears that the traveller takes fewer trips.
However, an alarming number of passengers (56%) travelling on Aer Lingus revealed
that they also had travelled on a low cost carrier within the preceding 12 months, while
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around one-third of Ryanair passengers disclosed that they had also taken a full service
carrier for their travel needs. In Asia however, this had not developed into a problem as
only 8.6% of the Malaysia Airlines passengers had opted to use a no-frills carrier
within twelve months of when the survey was administered. Mason (2001) also
estimated that 48.6% of the incumbent carrier’s passengers he surveyed at Heathrow
had used a low cost carrier in the previous year. Therefore, these passengers are the
likely candidates to regularly switch between carriers as they not swayed by one
particular airline and this thesis will further investigate the dynamics of switching via
cross-price elasticity.
Table 57. Number of short-haul trips taken over the period 2003-04
0 Trips 1-2 Trips 3-4 Trips 5-7 Trips > 8 Trips Total
% % % % % %
Aer Lingus Passengers 24.4 33.8 33.1 7.3 1.4 100
Aer Lingus Passengers on a LCC 43.9 32.7 20.5 2.9 - 100
Ryanair Passengers 22.8 45.5 26.2 5.5 - 100
Ryanair Passengers on a FSA 67.8 23.1 9.1 - - 100
Malaysia Airlines Passengers 31.1 28.1 26.5 12.8 1.5 100
Malaysia Passengers on a LCC 91.4 8.6 - - - 100
Air Asia Passengers 72.4 21.0 5.0 1.6 - 100
Air Asia Passengers on a FSA 85.2 13.2 1.6 - - 100
Note: LCC is Low Cost Carrier and FSA is Full Service Airline
8.4.7.2 Business trips
Mason (2001) estimated that 41% of a network carrier’s passengers had used a low cost
carrier for business purposes in the UK. A survey conducted by Barclaycard (2002) of
2,500 business travellers in the UK revealed that 62% of them had used a low cost
carrier for business purposes. Some three years later, Company Barclaycard (2005)
have revised those figures upwards by indicating that 71% of UK business travellers
have used low cost carriers for business trips in 2004/05. Table 58 below shows the
number of business trips taken by the surveyed passengers. It reveals that 29.1% of Aer
Lingus and 6.9% of Malaysia Airline passengers had undertaken business trips on a
low cost carrier over the preceding year. Interestingly, 26.1% and 5.9% of Ryanair and
Air Asia passengers respectively admitted that they had selected full service airlines for
business travel.
These figures confirm that the low cost carriers are indeed taking business traffic away
from the incumbents in the short haul market and that business travellers are accepting
the no frills product as an alternative means of transport. However the survey also
reveals that business passengers are switching between low cost carriers and full
service airlines making the operating dynamics more difficult for the latter group. It is
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apparent that new innovative and visionary strategies must be found in order to regain
and then retain the business passenger as this group believes that short-haul trip taken
in business class does not offer value for money. Mason (2001) conducted an empirical
investigation into this area and concluded that 75% of passengers travelling on full
service airlines at Heathrow did not believe that business class offered value for money.
easyJet are now advertising in magazines such as The Economist153 that passengers can
take an earlier flight at no cost, depending on seat availability which encourages
business travellers to take the budget carrier.
Table 58. Number of business trips taken on both incumbent airlines and low
cost carriers over the period 2003-04.
0 Trips 1-2 Trips 3-4 Trips 5-7 Trips > 8 Trips Total
% % % % % %
Aer Lingus Passengers 59.4 27.4 9.3 2.3 1.6 100
Aer Lingus Passengers on a LCC 70.9 23.8 5.3 - - 100
Ryanair Passengers 62.0 24.8 13.1 0.1 - 100
Ryanair Passengers on a FSA 73.9 18.6 7.5 - - 100
Malaysia Passengers 59.5 8.6 19.5 10.1 2.3 100
Malaysia Passengers on a LCC 93.1 5.4 1.5 - - 100
Air Asia Passengers 90.9 7.5 1.6 - - 100
Air Asia Passengers on a FSA 94.1 5.9 - - - 100
8.4.8 Cross Price Elasticity Analysis
From an academic and commercial point of view, fare is a very important determining
criteria for passengers in selecting an airline for travel, especially in short-haul markets.
An important part of this research was to measure how many passengers would switch
airlines, when there is a change in the fare level and determine what flight products
passengers would substitute for higher fares, concluding the section with an analysis of
what flight products keep passengers loyal to an airline. Cross price elasticity measures
the sensitivity of the quantity demanded by passengers of Airline A due to a change in
the fare of Airline B. It thus provides an indication as to what proportion of passengers
would most likely switch over to another carrier due to a change in the fare. The
research sought to determine what proportion of passengers would begin switch over to
another airline when fares were changed in phased intervals of 10%, 20% and 30% (in
general) and to determine what proportion of passengers would remain loyal. In the
earlier part of this chapter, fares for a low cost carrier and an incumbent were collected
and the results concluded that there was a 30% fare difference between Ryanair and
153 easyJet advertisement on Economist Magazine, September 23-29th 2006, p 29.
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Aer Lingus. In addition a different set of fares were also collected for both Ryanair and
Aer Lingus over a 3-month period from 2002 thru to 2005 (See chapter 4, section
4.2.3), which showed that the fare difference between the carriers on the Dublin to
London Gatwick route had narrowed to 30% by 2004, but soon afterwards Aer Lingus
withdrew its services. In the Asian market however, there is a much greater
discrepancy between the fares of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia, because the
incumbent had not reacted sufficiently to the low cost carrier threat at the time that the
survey was administered. However, fares collected between Air Asia and Malaysia
Airlines over a 3-month period from 2002 thru to 2005 indicated that the incumbent
was closing the gap on fares and by 2005 there was only a 34% difference between the
fares three months prior to departure and a 44% difference on the day of departure (See
chapter 4, section 4.4.2). Figure 62 below shows the proportion of Ryanair’s and Air
Asia’s leisure and business passengers that would switch over to an incumbent if the
full service airline reduced its fares by respectively 10%, 20% and 30% (in general).
The results show that if incumbents reduce their fares by 10%, then a very small
proportion of leisure passengers would switch, while a reduction of 20% would entice
almost 20% of Ryanair passengers to switch carriers, which constitutes 23.2% of
Ryanair’s leisure passengers and 11.1% of its business passengers (at 20% level) to fly
with a full service operator. Similarly a 20% fare reduction by Malaysia Airlines would
attract 14.4% of Air Asia’s leisure passengers and 12.5% of its business passengers (at
20% level). Air Asia had only been in operation a short time before the survey was
administered and had not targeted the business community, consequently only 8.8% of
the sample were business passengers. However by 2005, close to 20% of Air Asia’s
passengers were travelling for business purposes (Azmi, 2005).
A significant objective of the survey was to find the fare levels at which a large number
of passengers travelling on a low cost carrier would be willing to switch over to an
incumbent airline. The survey indicated that when the incumbents reduced their fare by
30%, it triggered a substantial number of passengers to switch carriers, as 45.9% of
Ryanair’s passengers which constituted 33.7% of its leisure travellers and 75% of its
business travellers would be prepared to switch to an incumbent like Aer Lingus.
Similarly 39.4% of Air Asia’s passengers which constituted 37.8% of its leisure
passengers and 62.5% of its business travellers would be prepared to switch to a full
service airline such as Malaysian Airlines for example. However there is also a
significant proportion of passengers who would not be enticed to switch airlines and
remain loyal subjects. The data shows that around 28% of Ryanair’s passengers would
not switch their loyalty to another carrier and analysis concludes that 33.7% of
Ryanair’s leisure passengers and 13.8% of its business travellers would continue to use
the low cost carrier, while 44.1% and 25% of Air Asia’s leisure and business
passengers respectively would remain loyal supporters. This is due to a combination of
factors, such as brand development, fares, flight schedule, simplified website, package
holidays, etc.
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Figure 62 Percentage of low cost carrier passengers who would switch over to
incumbent if it reduced its fares
Question posed to Low Cost Carrier passengers
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Although low cost airlines are relatively new to Asia, they have already developed very
strong low fare brands through strong advertising and clever use of the media. The
wide perception of people in Malaysia, when acknowledging Air Asia, is that it
represents low fares. Gilbert et al. (2001) argued that branding is becoming
increasingly important as a means of product and service differentiation, and that the
low cost airlines are building brand recognition to compete in such a competitive
environment.
Figure 63 below provides an indication of what proportion of an incumbent carrier’s
passengers would switch over to low cost airlines if it raised its fares by respectively
10%, 20% and 30%. This information provides an indication of the amount of fare
flexibility that incumbent airlines have and identifies the point at which passengers
would begin to shift their business to low cost carriers. Given incumbents offer the
benefit of full service, including interlining, serving primary airports, business class,
frequent flyer mileage, etc., some passengers are clearly willing to pay more for these
features.
The data shows that a 20% increase in fare does not impact the business passengers of
Aer Lingus and Malaysia Airlines, however leisure passengers have an elastic demand
pattern and this sensitivity to a change in fare shows that 16.6% and 15.5% of Aer
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Lingus and Malaysia Airlines leisure passengers would consider switching to a low
cost carrier if the fare hike was implemented. However there is a paradigm change
noticed when the incumbents raised the fare by 30% as 41.6% of Aer Lingus and
51.4% of Malaysia Airlines leisure passengers would shift their travel needs to a low
cost carrier, thereby substituting the extensive flight products offered by the full service
carriers for a lower fare. The survey also revealed that 44% of Aer Lingus and 35% of
Malaysia Airlines business passengers would look for alternative travel options with a
30% fare increase rendering that the service is no longer value for money. Overall, a
large proportion of business passengers that were surveyed decided to remain loyal
followers as 55% of Aer Lingus and 44% of Malaysia Airline business passengers
would not consider switching to a low cost carrier. This was largely due to the frequent
flyer programs, schedules and corporate policy arrangements between the airline and
industry, whereby contracts enforce and validate an employee to travel with a specific
airline.
Figure 63. Percentage of Incumbent passengers who would switch over to a low
cost carrier due to a fare increase by Incumbent
Question posed to incumbent passengers
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It is clear that low cost carriers offer a strong substitute to the full service airline
product. Not surprisingly, this has important implications for marketing and
advertising-branding, customer loyalty and satisfaction should be carefully considered
by every airline. Interestingly, the results of the survey show that cross-price elasticity
is not constant. This defies the usual assumption made in various econometric models
of constant cross-price elasticity and shows the importance of absolute fare levels in
determining customer choice.
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8.4.9 Cross-Price Elasticity dynamics and its substitution effect on
a passengers’ flight products due to a change in fare
This section further investigates what flight products were deemed important by both
leisure and business class passengers when the fare was changed at specific increments
of 10%, 20% and 30%. This question was broken down by asking the low cost carrier
passengers at what point would they switch to incumbents because of a fare reduction
of 10%, 20% and 30% or would they prefer not to switch (mutually exclusive), while
the full service airline passengers were asked at what point would they switch to a low
cost carrier due to a fare increase by the full service airline and also at what point
would passengers prefer not to switch. This was then cross referenced with the flight
products that each passenger had chosen at the specific sensitivity level that they had
chosen i.e. 10%, 20%, 30% and not switch. The result will give a deeper insight into
the cross-price elasticity dynamics and identify the point whereby passengers will
begin to substitute the various flight products against a change in fare and this is
examined for both business and leisure passengers travelling on a full service airline
and on a low cost carrier. Firstly, the analysis measures the importance of each flight
product by rank-ordering each attribute from most important to least; secondly, it
determines the relationships between the product features of full service airlines and
low cost carriers at each fare increase increment (i.e. 10%, 20%, 30%); and thirdly, it
measures the degree of these relationships.
Each passenger surveyed was asked to rank each flight product (see Figure 60 and 61
above) in terms of importance. Business passengers travelling with the full service
airlines were given a list of ten product features, with one less feature listed for leisure
passengers154; while low cost carrier passengers were asked to rank from only eight
flight characteristics155. The Hodges-Lehmann156 estimator, the median value of Walsh
pair-wise averages, was chosen for the ranking of these product features, as it is a more
robust and stable estimator and is not affected by high outlier numbers (Sprent, 1993;
Gardner, 1989). Passengers’ preferences for the flight products of various airlines are
represented by scatter plots. Statistical correlation between the stated preferences of the
passengers from the two air carriers in each case is measured using a variant of
Pearson’s correlation coefficient that is used with rank data called Spearman’s Rho (rs).
The application of this analytical technique provides us with a basis to predict traveller
choice.
154 Leisure passengers travelling on a full service airline ranked each flight product from 1 to 9, as
corporate policy was not included.
155 Low cost carrier passengers ranked each flight product from 1 to 8, as Frequent Flyer Programs and
Corporate Policy are not included in the low cost airline’s business plan. The data associated with
Ryanair and Air Asia is rescaled to account for this discrepancy.
156 The Hodges-Lehmann estimator is the natural measure of central tendency when using rank-order
tests, such as Wilcox or Mann-Whitney (Hettmansperger, 1984).
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8.4.9.1 Cross-price elasticity and its effect on the flight products of leisure
passengers for Aer Lingus and Ryanair.
Figure 64 below shows the median values that represent the product rankings of
Ryanair and Aer Lingus leisure passengers if fare is raised by 10%. From the histogram
it is clear that this particular group of travellers selected fare as the singular most
important reason for choosing to travel with their chosen airline, regardless of whether
it was a full service carrier or the low cost one. The corresponding scatter plot diagram
illustrates the strong correlation that exists between the ranking of the flight products
regardless of which airline type passengers choose, while the associated table shows
the Spearman Rho coefficient. It evidently quantifies that this specific group of leisure
passengers ultimately requested fare as the most important reason for airline choice and
that there was a very close correlation between the other flight products, which
indicates that this passenger segment require similar flight products. Statistically the
similarities did not occur by chance as p<0.01 for Aer Lingus and Ryanair. Figure 65
below shows a noticeable change in the ranking of fare and flight schedule by leisure
passengers when fares are changed by 20%. While the survey revealed that both full
service and low cost airline passengers’ product feature rankings are broadly similar, it
is apparent that the rankings are beginning to diverge as a higher proportion of Ryanair
passengers’ weigh fare as the most essential attribute. This represents another segment
of travellers who request similar flight attributes, statistically represented by the low p-
values (p<0.01) and their close correlation on the scatter plot diagram. The passengers
represented in Figure 64 and Figure 65 below can easily switch from a full service
airline to a low cost carrier and visa versa. The data quantifies that almost one-third of
Ryanair and one-quarter of Aer Lingus leisure passengers require similar flight
products (primarily fare driven) and therefore have the opportunity to easily switch
from one airline to another airline. The full service airlines will find this market
segment particularly difficult to retain as low cost carriers further reduce their structural
costs enabling them to reduce fares, triggering more passengers to switch away from
travelling on an incumbent.
The situation changes when fare is raised by 30%, with a clear disparity between the
ranking of flight products required by leisure passengers who travel on a full service
airline and those taking a low cost carrier as shown by the different flight product
requirements on the scatter plot and statistically represented by the higher p-values
which are not correlated at either the 0.01 or 0.05 significance confidence level. Figure
66 below shows that the Aer Lingus passengers have identified that the following flight
products are the most important; schedule, reliability, fare and connections. The
ranking has entirely changed revealing a new set of leisure passengers whose product
requirements are not focused primarily on fare. Meanwhile Ryanair passengers still
regard fare as the most important attribute followed by schedule and quality. Figure 67
shows that a number of leisure passengers prefer to remain loyal customers and would
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not be tempted to switch to another carrier. The results infer that there is no similarity
whatsoever between the requirements of passengers who continue to use a full service
airline and those using the low-fare variant. Leisure passengers who remain resolute in
using Aer Lingus seek the following attributes in descending order: schedule,
reliability, connections and quality; while Ryanair counterparts rank: fare, schedule,
quality and reliability.
In concluding the analysis of leisure passengers, it was found that not all leisure
passengers who book a ticket on a full service airline regard fare as their primary
reason for selecting their airline of choice while all the passengers booking a ticket on
Ryanair did so because of the fare. In face to face interviews with the surveyed
passengers at Cork and Shannon, many expressed that Aer Lingus was ‘superior’ when
compared to Ryanair as they cited the latter with poor customer service and expressed
that it does not look after its customers. If management at Aer Lingus prevails in
strengthening its brand and retains a large part of its full service attributes while at the
same time continue to reduce its legacy costs, the incumbent will grow its market share
and may regain passengers who had switched to Ryanair.
Figure 64. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair leisure passengers at 10% sensitivity level
Preferences of Airlines Leisure passengers at 10%
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Figure 65. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair leisure passengers at 20% sensitivity level
Preferences of Airlines Leisure passengers at 20%
sensitivity
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Figure 66. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair leisure passengers at 30% sensitivity level
Preferences of Airlines Leisure passengers at 30%
sensitivity
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Figure 67. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair non-switch leisure passengers
8.4.9.2 Cross-price elasticity and its effect on the flight products of business
passengers for Aer Lingus and Ryanair
The analysis is then repeated for business class passengers. The questionnaire
introduced an additional flight attribute as many business passengers are obligated to
take a particular airline due to a corporate policy arrangement. No business class
passenger chose to switch airlines when fare was raised by 10%. Figure 68 shows the
median values that represent the product rankings by business passengers when the fare
was changed by 20%. This small group of business passengers are fare sensitive and
are largely self-employed or work for small companies. They have similar flight
product requirements and can easily switch between Ryanair and Aer Lingus as they
value fare as the most important criteria and similarly ranked the other flight products.
The corresponding scatter plot diagram illustrates the strong correlation that exists in
the ranking of product features between this group of business passengers who use
either a full service airline such as Aer Lingus or a low cost carrier such as Ryanair.
This is statistically represented by p<0.01 for Aer Lingus and Ryanair, which indicates
that the similarities did not occur by chance.
A large proportion of business passengers are attracted to full service airlines because
of their extended product offerings. An important reason for the survey was to
determine which flight products would continue to entice the business traveller when
fare was changed by 30%. Figure 69 shows that the business passenger travelling on
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Aer Lingus ranked in order of importance: schedule, reliability, Frequent Flyer
Program, connections and corporate policy, while business passengers on Ryanair
indicated fare, schedule, quality and reliability. The corresponding scatter plot diagram
illustrates that there is little correlation in the ranking of product features between both
sets of airlines, statistically represented by the associated high p-values. This clearly
illustrates that an entirely different type of business passenger is taking the low cost
carrier, with fare being the key-determining factor in carrier choice.
It is apparent that a certain proportion of business passengers would remain loyal
regardless of fare changes. Interestingly, a very large proportion of these loyal
passengers are largely affiliated to Aer Lingus, while only a very small proportion of
business passengers retain such patriotism to Ryanair. Figure 70 shows the rank
ordering of Aer Lingus and lists the following attributes as the principle reasons why
business passengers prefer to remain travelling with the incumbent. They consist of
corporate policy, schedule, frequent flyer program, reliability and connections.
Meanwhile Ryanair’s business class passengers rank fare, schedule, quality and
reliability as their preference in continuing to use the low cost carrier. Again there is no
similarity between this segment of business passengers who use a low cost carrier or a
full service airline.
Figure 68. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair business passengers at 20% sensitivity level
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Figure 69. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair business passengers at 30% sensitivity level
Figure 70. Analysis of the Aer Lingus and Ryanair non-switch business passengers
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8.4.9.3 Cross-price elasticity and its effect on the flight products of leisure
passengers for Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia
Figure 71 below shows the median values that represent the product rankings of
Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia leisure passengers if fare is raised by 10%. From the
histogram it is clear that this particular group of travellers have selected fare as the
singular most important reason for choosing to travel with their chosen airline,
regardless of whether it was a full service carrier or the low cost one. The
corresponding scatter plot diagram illustrates the strong correlation that exists between
the ranking of the flight products. Statistically the similarities did not occur by chance
as p<0.01 for Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines. Figure 72 shows a noticeable change in
the ranking of the flight products between the low cost and network carriers when the
fares are changed by 20%. Air Asia passengers continue to rank fare as the most
important reason for selecting the carrier while fare and schedule become more
important for the incumbent passenger. The correlation graph shows that overall the
passengers of both incumbent and no-frills carriers require similar flight products,
statistically represented by the low p-values (p<0.01) and their close correlation on the
scatter plot diagram. The data collected from the European and Asian surveys point out
that a large number of leisure passengers require similar flight characteristics who can
easily switch from a full service airline to a low cost carrier and visa versa. In the Asian
market the survey shows that around 20% of Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines leisure
passengers require similar flight products and therefore could easily switch between
carriers and it is this passenger segment that are most difficult to retain and present a
big challenge to network carriers.
The situation changes when fare is raised by 30%, with a clear disparity between the
ranking of flight products required by leisure passengers who travel on a full service
airline and those taking a low cost carrier as shown by the different flight product
requirements on the scatter plot and statistically represented by the higher p-values.
Figure 73 shows that the Malaysia Airline passengers have identified that the following
flight products are the most important; schedule, reliability, fare and quality. The
ranking has entirely changed revealing a new set of leisure passengers whose product
requirements are not focused primarily on fare. Meanwhile Air Asia passengers still
regard fare as the most important attribute followed by quality and schedule. Figure 74
shows that a number of leisure passengers prefer to remain loyal customers and would
not be tempted to switch to another carrier. Leisure passengers who would not consider
switching from Malaysia Airlines seek the following attributes in descending order:
schedule, reliability, frequent flyer program and connections; while Air Asia
counterparts rank: fare, quality, schedule and reliability.
In concluding the analysis of leisure passengers, it was again found that not all leisure
passengers who book a ticket on a full service airline regard fare as their primary
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reason for selecting their airline of choice while all the passengers booking a ticket on
Air Asia did so because of the fare. In face to face interviews with the surveyed
passengers at Kuala Lumpur, many expressed that the Malaysia Airlines fares were
high because they were the sole operator on some of the routes and rated the incumbent
as ‘excellent’ as passengers always had ‘good experiences’ when travelling on the
incumbent and had expressed reservations on the viability of an airline that offered
such low fares and indicated that the carrier could enter into liquidation at any time
thus leaving them stranded.
Figure 71 Analysis of Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia leisure passengers at 10% sensitivity
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Figure 72. Analysis of Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia leisure passengers at 20% sensitivity
Figure 73. Analysis of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia leisure passengers at 30% sensitivity
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Figure 74. Analysis of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia non-switch leisure passengers
8.4.9.4 Cross-price elasticity and its effect on the flight products of business
passengers for Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia
The analysis is then repeated for business class passengers. The questionnaire
reintroduces the corporate policy arrangement. No business class passenger chose to
switch airlines when fare was raised by 10%. Figure 75 shows the median values that
represent the product rankings by business passengers when the fare was changed by
20%. Again, this small group of business passengers are fare sensitive. They have
similar flight product requirements and can easily switch between Malaysia Airlines
and Air Asia as they value fare as the most important criteria and similarly ranked the
other flight products. The corresponding scatter plot diagram illustrates the strong
correlation that exists in the ranking of product features between this group of business
passenger, statistically represented by p<0.01 for Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia,
which indicates that the similarities did not occur by chance.
However the pattern of flight products changes between the passengers of Malaysia
Airlines and Air Asia when the fare was changed by 30%. Figure 76 shows that the
business passenger travelling on Malaysia Airlines ranked in order of importance:
schedule, reliability, Frequent Flyer Program, connections and corporate policy, while
business passengers on Air Asia indicated fare, quality, schedule and reliability. The
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corresponding scatter plot diagram illustrates that there is little correlation in the
ranking of product features between both sets of airlines, statistically represented by the
associated high p-values. This clearly illustrates that an entirely different type of
business passenger is taking the low cost carrier, with fare being the key-determining
factor in carrier choice.
The analysis clearly shows that business passengers (particularly those who fly
regularly) prefer to remain with incumbent airlines despite its higher fare. Figure 77
shows the rank ordering of Malaysia Airlines and lists the following attributes as the
principle reasons why business passengers prefer to remain travelling with the
incumbent. They consist of corporate policy, schedule, frequent flyer program,
reliability and connections. Meanwhile Air Asia’s business class passengers rank fare,
quality, schedule and reliability as their preference in continuing to use the low cost
carrier. Statistically the negative values of Pearson and Spearman coefficients, indicates
that there is almost no correlation at all between the rankings of the flight products
between the business passengers of both sets of airline types.
Figure 75. Analysis of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia business passengers at 20% sensitivity
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Figure 76. Analysis of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia business passengers at 30% sensitivity
Figure 77. Analysis of the Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia non-switch business passengers
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8.5 Concluding comments
Ryanair is now Europe’s third largest airline in terms of the number of passengers
carried after Air France/KLM and Lufthansa. Its relentless drive to reduce costs, lower
fares and strengthen its brand has enabled the carrier to increase its traffic substantially.
Approximately 125 B737-800s will enter into its fleet by 2012. Similarly Air Asia of
Malaysia’s 100 A20s order reflects the expected significant growth of Intra-Asian
traffic. This excess capacity will pose enormous problems for both European and Asian
incumbents in the short-haul market. It signals that these low cost carriers are expecting
to encroach further into the incumbent’s market share and an important part of the
survey investigates what would trigger passengers to switch airlines.
Network airlines by their character connect passengers at hubs and the survey found
that a large proportion of Aer Lingus passengers connected onwards with its alliance
member partners while many of Malaysia Airlines travellers transferred to other code
sharing flights, indicating the importance of such marketing agreements. Competition
ensures that consumers have a choice of airlines and the survey identified that more
than half of Aer Lingus passengers had used a low cost carrier in the last twelve months
while one-third of Ryanair passengers used an incumbent in the previous twelve
months. This clearly indicates that many passengers regularly switch between airlines.
The analysis confirms that passengers who travel on a low cost carrier will switch over
to a full service airline when the latter reduces its fare, for example when Aer Lingus
aligned its fare close to Ryanair’s level around 66% of the latter’s leisure passengers
and almost all of its business passengers would have considered switching to the
incumbent. It is therefore imperative that incumbents reduce their structural and
inherited legacy costs, so as to pass on the savings to its customers in the form of lower
fares. The survey also found that there are a distinct group of passengers who require
similar flight products regardless if they travel on a low cost carrier or on a full service
airline and there is also another distinct passenger segment who require a completely
different set of attributes. For example the research quantifies that almost one-third of
Ryanair and one-quarter of Aer Lingus leisure passengers require similar flight
products (primarily fare driven) and therefore have the opportunity to easily switch
from one airline to another airline and there is also a small proportion of business
passengers that also require the same flight products. Similar dynamics are also evident
in the Malaysia Airlines market. Overall this passenger segment more than likely
represents that portion of market share that the network carriers are losing to low cost
carriers.
The research confirms that a significant proportion of leisure passengers who travel on
full service airlines place flight products such as schedule and reliability above fare and
they are willing to pay a premium because they value time and airline dependability.
The link between business passengers and corporate policy program is very evident and
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it is the most principle reason why these travellers are unlikely to switch to another
airline. Corporate policy agreements are not an evident component of the low cost
carrier business model and network airlines should capitalise on this opportunity.
Therefore, the survey overall indicates that the ideal passenger perception of air travel
would be to have a combination of low fares that are generated by the low cost carriers
and the full service products offered by the incumbent airlines. Therefore the passenger
would like to see the gap between the two airline models close further and the
passengers vision for the future is the ability to travel on a carrier that is a full service
low cost airline which is the direction where some of today’s carriers are heading.
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9 Chapter 9: The passenger perception of low
cost airlines and full service carriers.
A case study of Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, Air Sahara and Air
Deccan
The chapter begins by examining the background of the carriers including traffic carried
and operating cost performance. The empirical study then concentrates primarily on the
survey that was conducted in Mumbai on passengers using the three network airlines,
namely Indian Airlines, Jet Airways and Air Sahara and those passengers using Air
Deccan, which was India’s only low cost carrier at the time when the survey was
conducted. The survey replicated earlier work by O’Connell and Williams (2005) on
network and low cost carriers in Asia and Europe. The survey highlights the key findings
such as passenger characteristics, journey purpose and fares. It then centres on an in-
depth study of the factors that influence carrier choice and the ranking order of flight
products for both leisure and business passengers. It concludes with an analysis of cross-
price elasticity which measures the sensitivity of passengers of passengers to a change in
fare and also its substitution effect on passengers’ flight products.
9.1 Introduction
India is a vast country with a land frontier of 15,200km and a coastline of 7500km that is
home to over 1 billion people, one-sixth of the world’s population. O’Connell (2005)
showed that the number of commercial aircraft operating in India has remained basically
the same since 1948, with only 170 aircraft currently registered. This compares to 7,000
in the United States. The country handles only a total of 600 commercial flights daily. By
comparison, Singapore’s Changi airport handles 3,200 flights daily. Between 1989 and
2000, China increased its airline seat capacity by almost 500%, while India’s grew by a
mere 40%. Less than one per cent of India's population flies each year, with 14 million
people relying daily on the cheaper, but outdated 150-year old railway system. Propensity
for air travel in India is currently 0.1 trips per person per year, a fraction of the global
average of 2.0. In 2003, Indian carriers carried 14.7 million domestic passengers, roughly
equal to five days demand in the United States. According to Gopinath (2005), there are
400 airports in India, nearly half of which have no service even including areas such as
national parks and world treasures, such as the Taj Mahal.
Considerable world aviation attention is now focussed on India, as evidenced by the 150
aircraft order by Indian carriers at the 2005 Paris air show, priced at US$13 billion.
According to the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (2005), Indian airlines have ordered a
total of 490 aircraft over the last 18 months. India is committed to a fleet growth of
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164%, compared to a world average of only 2.7%. The sudden surge is the result of three
factors: the easing of tight regulatory constraints, a booming economy and the 300
million middle class Indians that can now afford air travel. According to the Centre for
Asia Pacific Aviation up to 14 Low Cost Carriers are preparing to launch services in
India in 2005 and 2006, with another 5-6 in the planning stage. That is more than the total
complement of Low Cost Carriers operating in the whole of the Asia Pacific region and
the Middle East in 2004. These start-up carriers have commitments for over 130 aircraft.
Kaul (2005), head of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation in India, stated that there would
be 5 million new air travellers in India every year, taking the total number of air travellers
to around 50 million by 2010. India has now become the next milestone in global airline
development and aviation’s most dynamic market.
9.2 Background of the surveyed airlines
At the beginning of 2005, there were four principle airlines operating domestically within
India. They include three full service airlines, Indian Airlines157, Air Sahara and Jet
Airways, and one low cost carrier, Air Deccan. Air India primarily operates international
sectors, with its only domestic flights being part of its international services. It serves
only 11 domestic cities and holds just over 5% of the domestic market. Figure 78 shows
India’s domestic and international passenger growth over the period 1995-2004. The
domestic market performed relatively poorly up until 2002, but thereafter it soared with a
year-on-year compound growth rate of 10%, while international traffic expanded at a
compound annual growth rate of 8.5% between 1995 and 2004.
Figure 78. Passenger growth in India 1995 – 2004
Source: Airports Authori ty of India
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157 Indian Airlines also has a subsidiary called Alliance Air that operates a fleet of 12 Boeing 737-200s.
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9.2.1 Indian Airlines
Indian Airlines currently flies to 32 destinations with its ageing fleet of 47 aircraft. In
2004 it carried a total of 5.9 million passengers and over 97,000 tons of cargo, operating
94,000 flights (DGCA 2003/04). The airline made a net profit of $10 million in 2003/04,
as against a net loss of half a million dollars in the previous year. The Directorate General
of Civil Aviation158 (DGCA) estimates that Indian Airlines now has only around 43% of
the domestic market down from 67% in 1993. In recent years, Indian Airlines has been
paying increasing attention to its international operations, a strategy that is lowering the
competition barrier for low cost entry. The airline was allowed in the early 1990s to be
the second designated carrier on many routes to South East Asia and the Middle East. As
a result, the international network of the airline now extends to sixteen destinations. The
international passenger share of its total traffic has grown from 9% in 1994/95 to 17% in
2002/03 (DGCA 2002-03). Hanlon (2000) argued that a merger between Air India and
Indian Airlines would allow a thoroughfare between a readymade international network
and a vast domestic one and that this would generate extensive economies of scope.
According to Mayes (1996) only 20 of Indian Airlines’ 70 routes were profitable, with
the core of its business built on the golden quadrangle linking Bombay, New Delhi,
Madras and Calcutta. The loss making routes were linked to government legislation that
required the carrier to serve the Northeast region, even though it was greatly uneconomic
to do so. Although the state-owned carrier has a social responsibility to provide air
services to peripheral communities, the Indian Government does not provide support to
offset losses on these sectors. The carrier employs 19,500 staff, resulting in a ratio of
around 414 employees per aircraft (125 or fewer is a typical Western equivalent for a full
service carrier).
9.2.2 Jet Airways
Jet Airways has carried over 55 million passengers since the airline’s inception in May
1993. It reported a 140% growth in after-tax profit for the financial year ended 31 March
2004 on the back of healthy revenue growth and efficiency gains (ATI, May 2005). It
carried 7 million passengers in 2005 with a fleet of 41 aircraft. In 2005 the airline was
estimated to have a 43 per cent share of the domestic market, operating over 275 flights
to 42 destinations. Jet was the first Indian carrier to raise funds via an IPO and in 2005 it
sold a 20% stake raising $444 million. The stock market had valued the company at $2.2-
billion by January 2005 (ATI, February 2005). The productivity of Jet Airways is more
than twice that of Indian Airlines, with 168 employees per aircraft. The airline has had
the distinction of being repeatedly judged India’s ‘Best Domestic Airline’ and has won
several national and international awards. Deregulation has allowed the carrier to operate
158 http://dgca.nic.in/reports/stat-ind.htm
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to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region and now
serves the London market as well. Sheety (2004) expects Jet’s international routes to
account for 10-15 per cent of its turnover in 2005. It has interline agreements with 122
international airlines which allows passengers to use interline documents on Jet Airways
for their travel and it currently hosts the youngest fleet in Asia where the average age of
its aircraft is four years. To further its expansion strategy, the carrier placed a substantial
order for 30 aircraft at the 2005 Paris Air show.
9.2.3 Air Sahara
Sahara Airlines is part of the huge Sahara micro-banking empire that encompasses real
estate, consumer products, media, small-scale loans and saving accounts. A former
president of United Airlines, Rono Dutta, manages it. In 2003/04 it carried over 1.9
million passengers and 19,700 tons of cargo, operating 33,600 flights. It made a net profit
of just over $220,000 (DGCA 2003/04) after consecutive net losses of $8.5 million for
2002-03 and $36 million for 2001-02. The airline operated 20 short haul aircraft by 2006
which connected 24 destinations with 123 daily flights. Unlike Jet Airways, it does not
serve as a domestic feeder. Air Sahara has pioneered a number of innovative features for
the Indian traveller, including standby fares, extra baggage allowance, airport valet
services, etc. It also launched a significantly improved business class product and has
managed to entice many business travellers from its competitors, Indian Airlines and Jet
Airways (Ionides, 2003).
Its uniqueness is also reflected by the manner in which it sells tickets, as it auctions its
surplus capacity through the Internet and gives its customers the opportunity to pay for
tickets over 12 monthly instalments at no interest via a local linkup with ICICI Banks.
Kumar (2005) stated that Air Sahara’s strengths are: efficiency, maintenance outsourcing,
high fleet utilisation and backup aircraft which ensures schedule integrity. Air Sahara has
also been allowed recently to fly international routes and commenced flights to Colombo
in March 2004.
9.2.4 Air Deccan
Air Deccan, India’s first low cost carrier, began operations in August 2003 with four
turbo-prop ATR-42 aircraft. The carrier is forecast to fly four million passengers in 2005,
up fourfold from the previous year. Around 40% of its passengers are first time flyers. In
December 2004, the company sold a 26% shareholding to ICICI Venture Funds and US-
based Capital International (ATI, April 2005). In addition five leading international
banks, Calyon, Grindlays, Barclays, HSBC and StanChart, are also in the race to fund Air
Deccan’s fleet expansion plan (O’Connell and Williams 2006). However Air Deccan has
only posted a small profit in 2004 and ATI (September, 2006) stated that it suffered a net
loss of Rs3.4 billion ($74 million) for the 15-month period between April 2005 and June
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2006 and it does not expect to post profits until 2008 as a result of intense competition
following the launch of several new airlines.
By the end of 2004 Air Deccan had already captured 3.2% of the domestic market. This
however had grown to 9-10% by mid 2005 (Economic Times of India, June 2005). By
mid-2005 Air Deccan was serving 32 destinations and operating close to 100 flights daily
with a fleet of five Airbus A320, 13 ATR 42 and one ATR 72. The A320s each have 180
seats while the ATR-42 turbo-props are equipped with 48 seats. It has ordered a further
63 Airbus 320 and 27 ATR-72 aircraft, valued at $3.8 billion. Kuruvila (2004) states that
Air Deccan’s turnaround time for its ATR fleet is 15-20 minutes and 30 minutes for the
A320, compared to the one hour taken by Jet Airways, this allows it to complete six
sectors a day, thereby adding one additional sector, which equates to 20% more block
hours per day than the Indian full service airlines. Air Deccan achieves load factors of 80-
85% on the ATRs and 90-95% on the A320s. Rather unusually, pilot salaries are linked
to the load factor of the aircraft.
9.3 Performance indicators for India’s domestic carriers
Table 59 below lists the performance indicators for India’s domestic carriers, as well as
for Air India. The privately owned airlines show healthy performance indicators in
contrast to the poor results of the two state-owned carriers.
Table 59. Indian Carriers: Performance Indicators (2004 data)
Net
Profit
(US$M)
Passengers
(millions)
No of Pax/
No. of
Employees
Block
Hours
(per day)
Load
Factor
(%)
Passenger
Yield
(US cents)
Unit Cost
(US cents)
Air India 19.5 3.8 244 9.0 73.3 9.2 9.4
Indian
Airlines
10.0 6.9 369 8.8 60.5 12.7 12.3
Alliance Air 0.4 1.5 424 9.3 60.2 13.3 13.2
Jet Airways 37.0 8.1 1,213 9.5 63.0 13.1 11.7
Air Sahara 0.2 1.9 577 10.2 60.8 13.0 12.3
Air Deccan 0.1 1.4 4,895 13.1 61.9 7.1 5.6
Sources: DGCA, JP Morgan, ATI and Air Deccan
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9.4 Survey Methodology
Two questionnaires were used to gather information on passengers’ perceptions of
India’s full service airlines and its one low cost carrier. The Indian Airports Authority
(IAA) granted permission for a passenger survey to be carried out at Mumbai airport,
it being one of the country’s four major gateways that collectively handle over 50% of
passenger traffic. The airport operates on a 24-hour basis and according to the IAA
had a throughput of 13 million passengers in 2004–2005. It has two separate terminals
for domestic operations, with Indian Airlines located at Terminal 1-A, and Jet
Airways, Air Sahara and Air Deccan operating from Terminal 1-B. The survey was
carried out when particular waves of flights departed from each terminal in an effort
to maximize the response rate. A structured questionnaire was used to elicit responses
in face-to-face interviews with travellers. It was conducted by small teams of
personnel in the check-in and adjoining waiting areas prior to passengers boarding
their flights. A total number of 754 responses were obtained, representing around 23%
of total uplifted passengers during the specific hours that the survey was undertaken.
9.5 Survey Findings
9.5.1 Journey Purpose and Booking Profile
Hanlon (1986) stated that the split between business and non-business passengers was
around 75:25 for Indian Airlines. Some twenty years later however, Table 60 below
indicates that the current split is around 57:43, as fares have fallen considerably attracting
many more leisure passengers. The survey found that business passengers are still
predominantly using full service airlines and work for large companies. Indian Airlines,
with over fifty-two years of service had very strong relationships with India’s large
multinationals as almost 30% of their surveyed business customers worked for
organisations that employed over 5,000 employees. By comparison, 90% of business
passengers travelling on the low cost carrier were either self-employed or worked for
companies that employed less than 25 people. A cross tabulation of business passengers
surveyed and their primary reason of carrier choice reveals that the vast majority chose
the low cost carrier due to its fare. Table 60 also reveals that business passengers are
statistically more likely to take full service airlines for events such as meetings rather
than use a low cost carrier as these are often classified as important business trips. In fact
business travellers overall are more likely to take Indian Airlines or Jet Airways rather
than the low cost carrier. However, these passengers are more likely to use the low cost
carrier for trips to events such as training. As expected the low cost carrier attracted
proportionally more leisure traffic, including a traveller segment in the form of those
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attending sporting events that is generally absent from the other surveyed airlines. The
survey revealed that these travellers journeyed in small groups representing significant
revenue potential for Air Deccan. Indian nationals take almost 250 million trips annually
and the survey shows that travelling to meet up with friends and relatives represents an
average of around 23% of leisure trips.
Air Deccan has India’s largest e-commerce website, followed by Indian railways. The
number of people with credit cards and Internet access within India however, remains
very low in comparison to western countries. To help overcome this, the carrier has
implemented an agreement with HPCL, a large oil company with around 6000 outlets
across the country, in which its service stations will sell tickets via dispensing kiosks as
they are already wired with Internet connections and customers have the choice of using a
credit card or paying cash. The petrol station owners in return earn a five per cent
commission. In addition, ATMs at banks will also be wired for airline ticket sales
(Economic Times of India, March 2005). The survey indicated that Air Deccan attracted
46% of its passengers via its website, a further 20% was booked through travel agents
and 16% purchased their flights via its call centre. The remaining customers booked their
seats using dispensing kiosks, mobile phones or at airport sales offices. Travel agents add
an additional charge of $2.50 to the fare as a countermeasure for not recuperating any
commission from Air Deccan. Air Deccan’s emphasis of technology application is further
emphasised as it also sells tickets through a mobile phone SMS texting system.
Consequently Air Deccan’s distribution costs account for only 6% to 7%, while India’s
full service airlines are much higher at levels close to between 23% and 28%. The
websites of Jet Airways and Air Sahara netted 29% and 22% respectively of their total
sales. By comparison Indian Airlines, which still does not have a fully enabled website
where online tickets can be purchased, sold 84% of its tickets via travel agents.
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Table 60 Journey Purpose for Indian Incumbents and low cost carriers
Air Deccan-Indian Airlines Air Deccan-Jet Airways Air Deccan-Air SaharaJourney purpose AirDeccan
(n=167)
Indian
Airlines
(n=248) Z SD P-value
Jet Airways
(n=173) Z SD P-value
Air Sahara
(n=165) Z SD P-value
Business Reasons % % % %
Meeting 15.0 26.7 2.96928 0.03940 0.0029* 25.4 2.41225 0.04311 0.0158* 27.9 2.89714 0.04453 0.0037*
Conference 3.0 9.3 2.77779 0.02268 0.0054* 8.7 2.26485 0.02517 0.0235* 3.0 0.0 0.01872 1.0
Training 10.2 4.4 2.16440 0.02680 0.0304* 3.4 2.50256 0.02717 0.0123* 5.4 1.63862 0.02929 0.10129
Trade Fair - 0.3 - - - 0.7 - - - - - - -
Employment 3.0 2.4 0.36603 0.01639 0.7143 2.8 0.10984 0.01821 0.91254 3.6 0.30596 0.01961 0.75964
Total Business 31.2 43.1 2.49534 0.04769 0.0125* 41.0 1.89175 0.05180 0.0495* 39.9 1.66245 0.05233 0.09642
Non-Business
Reasons
Sports 7.6 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Shopping - - - - - - - - - - - - -
VFR 27.0 21.8 1.20325 0.04322 0.22888 21.7 1.13975 0.04650 0.25439 22.0 1.06113 0.04712 0.28863
Weekend Break 10.2 9.0 0.40481 0.02964 0.68561 9.1 0.34331 0.03204 0.73136 9.9 0.09091 0.033 0.92757
Holiday 17.2 20.3 0.79904 0.03880 0.42427 19.5 0.54822 0.04195 0.58354 22.8 1.27817 0.04381 0.20119
Cultural/Religious 3.2 2.9 0.17349 0.01729 0.86227 8.7 2.16625 0.02539 0.0302* 4.2 0.48261 0.02072 0.62937
Study 3.6 2.9 0.39049 0.01793 0.69618 - - - - 1.2 1.43514 0.01672 0.15125
Total Non business 68.8 56.9 2.49534 0.04769 0.0125* 59.0 1.89175 0.05180 0.05852 60.1 1.66245 0.05233 0.09642
* Statistically significant results (p< α) at the significance level α=0.05.
Z: A measure of the distance in standard deviation of a sample from the mean
SD: Statistical deviation between the incumbent airline and low cost carrier
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9.5.2 Fares
Studies by Hsu and Wen (2003), Dobsen and Lederer (1993), and Hansen (1990) all
indicate that frequency and fare constitute two of the most important attributes of an
airline’s flight products. Table 61 below gives details of the daily frequencies of each
carrier on routes served from Mumbai and the average fares paid by those questioned.
The survey reveals that the fares charged by the low cost carrier are around 30% lower
than the full service airlines. This fare differential is widely referred to in the Indian
media circles159. Perry (1995) concluded that when new entrant low cost carriers compete
against full service airlines average fares fall, thereby increasing overall traffic and
raising revenues for both types of carrier. India’s incumbent airlines are unable to match
the lower fares of Air Deccan and are responding by increasing frequency and offering a
multitude of additional marketing incentives, such as holiday packages (both domestic
and international), frequent flier programmes, e-auctions, in-flight auctions, and co-
branded cards (tie-up with corporates for special discounts). Competition on the major
trunk routes between Mumbai, New Delhi and Kolkata is very intense, with fares falling
by 20% in 2005 primarily due to Air Deccan’s increasing presence. Many authors, such
as Vowles (2000), argue that low fare carriers play a significant role in airfare
determination and this is confirmed as being the case in the domestic Indian market. Air
Deccan allocates its seat inventory at various price categories, with around 25% of its
seats in the Rs 500-3,000 range, these being purchased at least 90 days in advance. A
further 50% of seats are offered in the Rs 3,000-5,000 range, with the balance sold in the
Rs 5,000-7,000 range. The survey revealed that approximately 22% of Air Deccan’s
passengers booked three months in advance compared to an average of just 5% of the full
service airlines’ customers. Kuruvila (2004) explains that in order to drive awareness and
brand image of a low fares airline, the carrier sells 1000 tickets every month for one
Rupee. These special offers are frequently advertised by Air Deccan, while the full
service airlines concentrate on marketing international destinations, which tend to suggest
that the latter are not optimising their selling efforts in the domestic market and are thus
allowing Air Deccan to raise its market share.
159 http://www.domain-b.com/industry/aviation/20040805_airlines.htm
281
Table 61 Daily Flight Frequencies and average return fares (Indian Rupees) paid by surveyed passengers.
Air Deccan Indian Airlines Jet Airways Air Sahara
Freq Av. Fare Freq Av. Fare Freq Av. Fare Freq Av. Fare
Mumbai-Ahmedabad 2 3158 3 4206 4 4085 2 3874
Mumbai-Aurangabad 1 2210 1 2945 2 2685 ---- ----
Mumbai-Bangalore 2 5640 5 7410 8 7050 3 6192
Mumbai-Belgaum 1 6100 --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Mumbai-Bhavnagar 1 5150 1 6595 1 6245 ---- ----
Mumbai-Bhubaneshwar --- ---- 1 9110 ---- ---- ---- -----
Mumbai-Bhuj ---- ---- ---- ---- 1 8762 ---- ----
Mumbai-Chennai 1 5120 4 6672 6 6716 2 5922
Mumbai-Coimbatore 1 5085 1 6535 2 6653 1 6702
Mumbai-Delhi 4 5192 11 6464 11 6388 6 6220
Mumbai-Goa 2 4124 4 5026 4 4894 1 4710
Mumbai-Hyderabad 1 4298 3 5628 4 5350 2 5145
Mumbai-Indore* ---- ---- 2 6997 2 6348 ---- ----
Mumbai-Jaipur* ---- ---- 2 6600 2 6680 ---- ----
Mumbai-Jamnager* ---- ---- 1 9222 ---- ---- ---- ----
Mumbai-Kochi ---- ---- ---- ---- 2 8990 ---- ----
Mumbai-Kolhapur 1 6109 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Mumbai-Kolkata 2 4212 3 5470 5 5392 3 5368
Mumbai-Lucknow ---- ---- 1 7738 1 7600 3 7740
Mumbai-Manglore* 1 7220 1 6897 ---- ----
Mumbai-Nagpur 1 3980 2 5230 2 5102 ---- ----
Mumbai-Nashik 1 6122 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Mumbai-Patna ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 2 8590
Mumbai-Pune 1 2710 1 3212 2 3105 ---- ----
Mumbai-Raipur ---- ---- 1 7202 1 6470 ---- ----
Mumbai-Rajkot* 1 5740 ---- ---- 2 7330 ---- ----
Mumbai-Surat 1 6235 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Mumbai-Trivandrum ---- ---- 1 7690 1 6593 ---- ----
Mumbai-Udaipur* ---- ---- 1 6990 2 6920 ----- ----
Mumbai-Vadodara 1 3850 1 4720 3 5070 ---- ----
* Indian Airlines subsidiary Alliance Air operates on this route.
Note: 1 Rupee = $0.02 Natwest Bank, London October 28th 2005. The fare includes taxes, which constitute 422 Rupees per return journey.
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9.5.3 Other Influencing Factors
Passengers ultimately base their choice of airline on a variety of factors. While no-frills
carriers have capitalised on the branding of low fares with few additional product
features, network carriers have sought to differentiate themselves by offering a range of
product features. Table 62 below cites the principle reasons why each passenger
surveyed chose to travel on their particular airline. Airline managers clearly need to
know which features of their product offering are really influencing passengers’ choice.
The three product features that most influenced passengers travelling on India’s full
service airlines were flight schedule, service quality and reliability. Jet Airways and Air
Sahara however, were preferred over Indian Airlines because of their superior quality,
comfort and reliability.
Table 62 Breakdown of the principle reasons why passengers choose each airline
Flight Indian Airlines Jet Airways Air Sahara Air Deccan
Products (n=248) (n=173) (n=165) (n=168)
% % % %
Flight Schedule 18.5 17.0 15.8 10.1
Reliability 15.2 18.1 16.4 -----
Quality 15.0 18.7 17.6 2.4
Connections 14.8 10.8 11.5 -----
Fare 11.2 13.2 14.5 87.5
FFP 10.7 8.1 7.9 -----
Company Policy 7.3 6.2 6.0 -----
Safety 3.2 2.6 3.0 -----
Service 2.4 3.2 4.3 -----
Comfort 1.7 2.1 3.0 -----
9.5.4 Cross-price elasticity analysis
The 30% fare differential between the low cost carrier and the incumbents identified from
the survey was further analysed to assess the cross price elasticity of demand between the
two types of airline business models in an effort to understand the switching sensitivity of
passengers due to a change in fare. Figure 79 below shows the proportion of Air
Deccan’s leisure and business passengers that would switch over to an incumbent if the
full service airline reduced its fares by respectively 10%, 20% and 30% or would they
prefer not to switch. The results show that if incumbents reduce their fares by 10% then a
very small proportion of leisure passengers would switch, while a reduction of 20%
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would entice almost 15.1% of Air Deccan’s business passengers and 18.2% of its leisure
passengers to fly with a full service operator (at 20% level). However if incumbents
chose to match the low cost carrier’s fares, then the majority of the remaining Air Deccan
business travellers (75.4%) would change over to one of the full service airlines. A
further 26% of Air Deccan’s leisure passengers would switch to full service carriers if
their fares were reduced by 30%. However, almost half of Air Deccan’s leisure
passengers would prefer to remain travelling with the low cost carrier, indicating that the
carrier’s advertising campaigns have triggered brand loyalty.
Figure 79 Question posed to Air Deccan Passengers.
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Figure 80 below reveals that only a very small proportion of leisure passengers travelling
on the full service airlines would switch to Air Deccan if the fare were raised by 10%. A
fare increase of 20% would persuade an average of 18.7% of leisure passengers and
11.4% of business customers to switch. Thus, incumbent airlines would lose very little
business traffic by increasing fares by up to 20%. When fare is raised by 30% however,
it is again noticed that there is a substantial increase in the number of passengers willing
to switch airlines with an average of 45% of leisure passengers willing to substitute the
extensive flight products offered by the full service carriers for a lower fare. The survey
also revealed that an average of 41% of business passengers would look for alternative
travel options with a 30% fare increase. Overall, an average of 47.4% of business
passengers journeying with the full service airlines remained loyal. This high proportion
is very heavily influenced by corporate policy programs, with a sizable proportion of
these passengers ranking corporate policy as their number one reason for selecting the
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full service airlines. Empirical studies by Nako (1992), Proussaloglou and Koppelman
(1995), and Suzuki et al. (2003), for example, have shown that frequent flyer programs
significantly affect travellers’ choice of airlines. Palmer and Mayer (1996) argue that the
concept of FFPs is considered to be an excellent example of the use of relationship
marketing to build customer loyalty. The study identifies that an average of around
17.7% of business passengers travelling on India’s full service airlines will not switch to
other airlines because of the frequent flyer program. However, it is noticed that Indian
Airlines has potential problems, as a larger proportion of its passengers would prefer to
switch to another airline signalling widespread dissatisfaction among its customers. An
earlier study conducted by O’Connell and Williams (2005) revealed similar findings to
these survey results, with a large number of passengers (40%) willing to switch from low
cost carriers when an incumbent lowered its fare by 30%. The study also revealed that
some 34% of passengers would remain loyal to the full service carriers due to their wide
range of product attributes.
Figure 80 Question posed to Incumbents’ Passengers
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9.5.5 Other factors influencing cross-price elasticity
This section further investigates what flight products were deemed important by both
leisure and business class passengers when the fare was changed at specific increments
of 10%, 20% and 30%. This question was broken down by asking the low cost carrier
passengers at what point would they switch to incumbents because of a fare reduction of
10%, 20% and 30% or would they prefer not to switch (mutually exclusive), while the
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full service airline passengers were asked at what point would they switch to a low cost
carrier due to a fare increase by the full service airline or again would they prefer not to
switch. This was then cross referenced with the flight products that each passenger had
chosen at the specific sensitivity level that they had chosen i.e. 10%, 20%, 30% and not
switch. To date, pricing issues have been discussed intensively in the aviation literature.
Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999) conducted an econometric analysis to quantify the
tradeoffs travellers make when they choose among different carriers, flights and fare
classes. There has however, not been any study published analysing cross price elasticity
and the impact of a wide range of flight products in response to a range of fare level
changes. The analysis here, which has been carried out on both business and leisure
travellers using full service airlines and a low cost carrier, firstly, measures the
importance of each flight product by rank-ordering each attribute from most important to
least; secondly, determines the relationships between the product features of full service
airlines and Air Deccan at each fare increase increment; and thirdly, measures the degree
of these relationships.
Each passenger surveyed was asked to rank each flight product (see Table above) in
terms of importance. Business passengers travelling with the full service airlines were
given a list of ten product features, with one less feature listed for leisure passengers160;
while Air Deccan’s passengers were asked to rank from only eight161. The Hodges-
Lehmann162 estimator, the median value of Walsh pair wise averages, was chosen for the
ranking of these product features, as it is a more robust and stable estimator and is not
affected by high outlier numbers (Sprent, 1993; Gardner, 1989). Passengers’ preferences
for the flight products of various airlines are represented by scatter plots. Statistical
correlation between the stated preferences of the passengers from different air carriers is
measured using a variant of Pearson’s correlation coefficient that is used with rank data
called Spearman’s Rho (rs). The application of this analytical technique provides us with
a basis to predict traveller choice.
160 Leisure passengers travelling on a full service airline ranked each flight product from 1 to 9, as
corporate policy was not included.
161 Low cost carrier passengers ranked each flight product from 1 to 8, as Frequent Flyer Programs and
Corporate Policy are not included in the low cost airline’s business plan. The data associated with Air
Deccan is rescaled to account for this discrepancy.
162 The Hodges-Lehmann estimator is the natural measure of central tendency when using rank-order
tests, such as Wilcox or Mann-Whitney (Hettmansperger, 1984).
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9.5.6 Cross-price elasticity and its effect on the flight products of
leisure passengers
Figure 81 below shows the product feature rankings of leisure passengers if fare is raised
by 10%. From the histogram it is clear that this particular group of travellers selected
fare as the singular most important reason for choosing to travel with their chosen
airline, regardless of whether it was a full service carrier or the low cost one. The
corresponding scatter plot diagram illustrates the strong correlation that exists in the
ranking of product features regardless of which airline passengers choose, while the
associated table shows the Spearman Rho coefficient. It evidently quantifies that this
specific group of leisure passengers requested almost identical flight products and that
the similarities did not occur by chance as p<0.01 for Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, Air
Sahara and Air Deccan.
Figure 82 below shows a noticeable change in the ranking of fare and flight schedule by
leisure passengers when fares are changed by 20%. While the survey revealed that both
full service and low cost airline passengers’ product feature rankings are broadly similar,
it is apparent that the rankings are beginning to diverge as a higher proportion of low
cost carrier passengers’ weight fare as the most essential attribute. This represents
another segment of travellers who request similar flight attributes, statistically
represented by the low p-values (p<0.01) and their close correlation on the scatter plot
diagram. These passengers can easily switch from a full service airline to a low cost
carrier and visa versa. This is the group of passengers that have been leaving the network
airlines in favour of the budget carriers and incumbents need to target this market
segment and find ways to retain the loyalty of this passenger group, which will make
them more competitively advantaged. The data quantifies that an average of 26.2% of
the full service airline leisure travellers share the same ranking of flight products as 25%
of Air Deccan’s leisure passengers. This signals that an average of around one-quarter of
leisure passengers who travel on an incumbent may take a low cost carrier which also
fulfils their specific requirements. India’s low cost carrier capacity is increasing
exponentially and the potential to attract one-third of India’s incumbents’ passengers is a
very real threat.
The situation changes when fare is raised by 30%, with a clear disparity between the
ranking of flight products required by leisure passengers who travel on a full service
airline and those taking a low cost carrier, statistically represented by the higher p-
values. Figure 83 below shows that passengers travelling on a network carrier identify
schedule, reliability, fare and quality as important. The ranking has entirely changed
revealing a new set of leisure passengers whose product requirements are not focused
primarily on fare. The majority of passengers who use the low cost carrier still view fare
as the deciding factor in carrier selection. The main determinants of low cost carrier
287
choice are fare, quality and schedule. An interesting observation is that the p-values
between Indian Airlines and Air Sahara at 30% interval have stronger flight product
convergences than at the 20% interval and the rational behind this is that this particular
group of passengers travel very frequently (i.e. more than 8 times per year) and thus have
very similar requirements.
Figure 84 below customers and would not be tempted to switch to another carrier. The
results infer that there is no similarity whatsoever between the requirements of
passengers who continue to use a full service airline and those using the low-fare
variant. The requirements of the passengers using the full service airlines are very
similar as depicted statistically by the correlation of the low p-values. Leisure
passengers who remain resolute in using full service airlines seek the following
attributes in descending order: schedule, frequent flyer program, reliability, connections
and quality; while their low cost carrier counterparts rank: fare, quality, schedule and
reliability. In concluding the analysis of leisure passengers, it is reasonable to conjecture
that network airlines can regain a large market share of leisure passengers if
management can offer suitable departure timings coupled with high frequency and
consistently offer a dependable high quality service. In addition if management can
continue to reduce its legacy operating costs enough, it will enable fares to be aligned
close to low cost carrier levels thus stimulating passengers to consider switching
airlines.
Figure 81. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan leisure passengers at 10%
sensitivity
Note: IA, Indian Airlines; AS, Air Sahara; AD, Air Deccan; JA, Jet Airways.
Correlation coefficient, Leisure Travellers, FI=10%
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.798** 0.873** 0.932** 0.871** 0.895** 0.837**
p 0.009 0.002 <0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlation between Flight Products of
Leisure passengers when Air Fare is
changed by 10%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Deccan
In
cu
m
be
nt
s
Indian Sahara Jet
Product Features and Rankings of Leisure
passengers when Air Fare is changed by 10%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Re
liab
ility Fa
re
Fli
gh
t S
che
du
le
Co
nn
ect
ion
s FF
P
Qu
alit
y
Co
mf
ort
Se
rvi
ce
Sa
fet
y
Ra
nk
in
g
Indian Sahara Jet Deccan
288
Figure 82. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan leisure passengers at 20%
sensitivity
Figure 83. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan leisure passengers at 30%
sensitivity
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Indian Sahara Jet Deccan
Correlation coefficient, Leisure Travellers, FI=30%
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.955** 0.957** 0.604 0.965** 0.657 0.557
p <0.001 <0.001 0.085 <0.001 0.055 0.119
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlation coefficient, Leisure Travellers, FI=20%
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.878** 0.864** 0.803** 0.939** 0.930** 0.979**
p 0.002 0.003 0.009 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 84. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan non-switch leisure passengers
The analysis is repeated for business class passengers, with it being apparent that the
ranking of flight products becomes increasingly uncorrelated. The questionnaire
introduced an additional flight attribute as many business passengers are obligated to
take a particular airline due to a corporate policy arrangement. Because of the inelastic
demand nature of business passengers, none chose to switch airlines when fare was
raised by 10%. Figure 85 below shows the ranking of flight products by business
passengers when the fare was changed by 20%. Only a small proportion of business
passengers who were using the full service airlines were prepared to seek alternative
travel arrangements. They stated that fare and schedule were equally as important
followed by reliability. It is apparent that a small proportion of business passengers are
fare sensitive, with cross tabulation establishing that these customers are largely self-
employed or work for small companies. Business passengers flying with the low cost
carrier selected only fare as their principle reason of choice. There is no significant
correlation (high p-values) between Air Deccan and the full service carriers, which
confirms the contrasting flight product requirements of business passengers when
selecting between different types of airline.
A large proportion of business passengers are attracted to full service airlines because of
their extended product offerings. An important reason for the survey was to determine
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Correlation between Flight Products of Non
Switched Leisure passengers
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Correlation coefficient, Leisure Travellers, Non switched
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.894** 0.909** 0.272 0.962 0.328 0.410
p 0.001 0.001 0.478 <0.001 0.389 0.273
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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which flight products would continue to entice the business traveller when fare was
increased by 30%. Figure 86 below shows that the business passenger travelling on the
full service airlines ranked in order of importance: schedule, reliability, Frequent Flyer
Program, connections and quality, while business passengers on Air Deccan indicated
fare, quality and schedule. This again clearly indicates that an entirely different type of
business passenger is taking the low cost carrier, with fare the key-determining factor in
carrier choice.
It is apparent that a certain proportion of business passengers would remain loyal
regardless of fare changes. Interestingly, a very large proportion of these loyal
passengers are largely affiliated to full service carriers while only a very small
proportion of business passengers retain allegiance with a low cost carrier. O’Connell
(2005) researched that 80% of Jet Airways revenues comes from corporate customers,
where price was not the primary driver of airline choice. Figure 87 below shows the
characteristics that retain the loyalty of business passengers who travel on a network
airline (corporate policy, schedule, FFP, reliability and connections) and outlines the
diverse characteristics when compared to the choices made by low cost carrier business
passengers (fare, quality, schedule and reliability).
Incumbents worldwide are becoming increasingly concerned over losing business class
passengers to low cost carriers. In a hypercompetitive business such as the airline
industry customer retention and relationship management are becoming increasingly
important. This view is strongly supported by Kalakota and Robinson (2001) who
disclose that it costs five to ten times as much to obtain a new customer as to keep an
existing one. The survey clearly shows that relationship marketing is becoming an
important differentiator between network and no frills carriers. Generous frequent flyer
points are retaining the loyalty of both leisure and business passengers as accrued
mileage can be redeemed for free flights. Corporate policy contracts specifically target
the high yield business passenger who travels frequently and is an effective relationship
tool in retaining loyalty.
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Figure 85. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan business passengers at 20%
sensitivity
Figure 86. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan business passengers at 30%
sensitivity level
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Correlation coefficient, Business Travellers, FI=30%
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.985** 0.991 0.028 0.997** 0.142 0.018
p <0.001 <0.001 0.939 <0.001 0.695 0.961
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Correlation coefficient, Business Travellers, FI=20%
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.745* 0.931** 0.502 0.762* 0.659 0.567
p 0.013 <0.001 0.139 0.011 0.058 0.088
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 87. Analysis of the Indian incumbents and Air Deccan non-switch business passengers
9.6 Summary
Historically, aviation within India remained stagnant over many decades. Deep-rooted
bureaucratic policies and stagnated regulatory policies constrained its growth and
development. The Government strongly protected Air India and Indian Airlines by
limiting both domestic and international competition. However, the easing of tight
regulatory legislation, a strengthening economy coupled with an increasing number of
wealthy inhabitants, triggered change with demand for air transport outstripping
capacity. Subsequently there has been a three fold increase in the number of scheduled
airlines and a five fold increase in the number of aircraft operated. Up to 14 low cost
carriers are preparing to launch services and India has become the next milestone in
Aviation.
The survey captured the perceptions of passengers who are now travelling in this rapidly
changing environment of freer and more competitive markets. The analysis confirms that
passengers who travel on a low cost carrier will switch over to a full service airline when
the latter reduces its fare, for example when India’s incumbents came close to matching
the fare of Air Deccan, then over 50% of the low cost carrier’s leisure passengers and
almost all its business travellers would have considered switching to an incumbent. The
survey confirms that passengers want a mix of low fares and to avail of the full service
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Correlation coefficient, Business Travellers, Non switched
IA-AS IA-JA IA-AD AS-JA AS-AD JA-AD
Spearman’s rs 0.982** 0.994** -0.119 0.975 -0.074 -0.142
p <0.001 <.001 0.743 <0.001 0.840 0.696
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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products offered by the incumbent airlines. Surprisingly a large number of passengers
would not consider switching to another airline and low cost passengers were influenced
by the carrier’s nation-wide advertising campaigns of ‘low fares’ which have triggered
brand loyalty. It was noted that the full service airlines within India had heavily
advertised their flight products while Air Deccan only focused their advertising efforts
on fare awareness. The network airlines need to bundle fares into their advertising
package and show that low fares in association with a large selection of flight products
gives passengers greater benefits and value for money.
The survey also confirms the earlier hypothesis that there exists a distinct group of
passengers who require similar flight products regardless if they travel on a low cost
carrier or on a full service airline and there is also another distinct passenger segment
who require a completely different set of attributes. The research found that around one-
quarter of the leisure passengers of both full service airlines and low cost carriers wanted
similar flight products and therefore can easily interchange between airline types. These
incumbent leisure passengers could very well represent the market share that is being
lost to low cost carriers. An effective yield management strategy can safeguard losing
some of these passengers because it could assign a specific number of seats at fares
lower than that of the low cost carrier, which would entice these passengers to take the
full service airline. The research extrapolates that a significant proportion of leisure
passengers travelling on a full service airline have chosen the carrier because of its
superior schedule and reliability and such features are much more important than fare
because these passengers’ value time and dependability. It is also reasonable to assume
that network airlines can then retain a significant portion of the leisure market by
offering the following attributes; suitable departure times coupled with high frequency,
operating to primary airports, good on-time performance, backup aircraft163, provide
reward points for patronage and consistently offer a dependable high quality service. In
addition if management can continue to reduce its legacy operating costs enough, it will
enable fares to be aligned close to low cost carrier levels thus stimulating passengers to
consider switching airlines. Another worthwhile finding of the research was the
confirmation that a large number of business travellers used the network airlines because
they were tied to corporate policy programs. These are strategic weapons that hold the
loyalty of the business passenger and are not an evident component with low cost
carriers. Incumbents should continue to cement their business-to-business relationships
with companies and broker long-term deals that will bind corporate business travel to a
specific airline, thus capturing high yield traffic. The survey clearly shows that
relationship marketing will become an important differentiator between network and no
frills carriers.
163 A backup aircraft is an additional aircraft that is immediately available
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10 Chapter 10: Empirical Validation: Results of
the Airline Strategy Survey undertaken in
collaboration with IATA
10.1 Introduction
There is little doubt, that low cost carriers are changing the dynamics of the short-haul
market and they are severely impacting the full service carriers. Doganis (2005) stressed
that network airlines have not successfully challenged the budget carriers and they remain
a serious threat. Tretheway (2004) described the seriousness of this threat stating that the
US market share of full service airlines will be reduced to between 40-50% in the near
future, setting the precedence for what could also happen in Europe and Asia. In order to
access how network carriers can best respond to low cost carriers, a questionnaire was
designed from the marketing and strategy chapters. The questions were designed to
identify an incumbent’s capabilities in dealing with low cost carrier competition and also
to identify which strategies prove effective against the low cost carriers. The
questionnaire also includes a subsection on air travellers’ choice, which lists all the
reasons for choosing an incumbent, which were found through passenger surveys
conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India. The underlying rationale for including this
subsection is to determine if a correlation exists between an airlines’ view of the
requirements of passengers and the passenger survey results.
This chapter presents the survey results with the aim of empirically validating the
theoretical framework developed in the marketing and strategy chapters. Section two
provides some background information on the survey and section three discusses
methodological issues. Then sections 4-6 analyse the findings based on the responses of
the European, the Asian – Australasian and the Middle East – Indian – African carriers
respectively. Finally section 7 asks strategy directors to harness their collective wisdoms
of many years of airline experience and to think ‘outside the box’ and report strategies
that were not in the mainstream but could prove to be beneficial.
10.2 Background to the survey
10.2.1 Questionnaire development, Respondents, Data Collection
and Limitations
A survey entitled ‘Impact of Low Cost Carriers’ was conducted throughout the world
with full service airlines with the cooperation of IATA164 and is shown in Appendix VII.
164 IATA has over 270 members from more than 140 nations, whose main objective is to assist airlines to
achieve lawful competition and uniformity in prices. The author conducts regular short airline courses on
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The IATA link was pivotal as it ensured the participation of senior strategy directors and
a good response rate. It also ensured the relevance and credibility of the responses
harnessed the collective wisdom and experiences of the senior executives. The survey
itself contained the distinguished ‘IATA’ label and it was attached as a web-enabled
survey, whereby respondents would click on the link activating the questionnaire.
A combination of the literature review of marketing (Chapter 6), strategic management
(Chapter 7), Focus Groups, Case Studies and Interviews with Airline Staff structured
and calibrated the questionnaire for this research thesis. The questionnaire was developed
after intensive discussions165 and feedback between the author and IATA over a number
of months in 2005. The piloting of the survey was two-fold, firstly the focus group (i.e.
IATA) administered the questionnaire amoung its own employees and with three
undisclosed full service airlines in which the organisation closely works with. Secondly
the author piloted the survey with a group of airline strategy directors who undertook a 3-
day IATA airline strategy course in Singapore which was conducted by the author.
According to Oppenheim (1966, p26) some questions need as many as eight revisions
before producing satisfactory results. The strategy section of the survey incorporates a
total of 35 closed questions (displayed in questions 1 and 4 in Appendix VII). Question 1
in the survey probed the level of difficulty encountered by network airlines in trying to
restructure their internal processes to better compete with budget carriers; it also
examined the level of difficulty that the network airlines would have on influencing or
leveraging external interests (e.g. reducing airport landing charges, targeting customers,
etc). Question 4 in the survey investigated the level of importance that a network airline
placed on each particular strategy (e.g. frequent flyer program, travel policy agreements,
etc) that would assist it in competing more effectively with low cost carriers. Both these
parameters (i.e. level of importance of strategies and the level of difficulty in
implementing strategies) represent the overall strategic capability of an incumbent, which
will have a direct impact on its response to a low cost carrier and it is expressed as a
qualitative characteristic.
The air travellers choice part of the questionnaire is comprised of an additional 19 closed
statements (displayed in question 5 in appendix VII). IATA added their own questions
(2, 3, 6) whose results were confidential and were not released to the author. Some
questions (i.e. 7, 8 and 9) were open-ended which allowed airlines to describe what
particular strategies positively impacted revenues when competing with low cost carriers
and what particular strategy negatively affected their bottom line. The analysis on this
IATA’s behalf throughout the world and it was through this collaboration that IATA agreed to sanction this
survey.
165 Numerous round table discussions took place between the author and several IATA representatives via
telephone as well as one-to-one correspondence through email, and this continuous dialogue structured
the questionnaire. IATA allowed the author to include questions 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 while the remaining
questions were intelligence gathering data for IATA.
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section however found that airlines just reiterated their most important strategy and most
difficult competitive response and was subsequently excluded from the analysis in this
chapter. The last open-ended question in the survey allowed the strategy directors to
include other actions that they would consider revolutionary (i.e. outside the box
thinking). Given their vast experience and exposure to the industry some of these ideas
proved very useful. The results from open-ended questions cannot be statistically
analysed but will be qualitatively discussed in the concluding part of this chapter.
An important decision made as a result of the overall collaboration was to change the
structure of question five ‘Air Travellers Choice’, which was a closed question. In the
original passenger surveys conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India, passengers ranked
in ascending order (e.g. 1, 2, 3, etc.) the principle reasons why they choose to travel with
a particular airline. However the IATA survey sent to network airlines structured this
question as a five-point likert scale arrangement (i.e. not at all, not very, some, some-
what, extremely) in order that the results would yield a more precise and valid response
from each surveyed airline. The method of linking the passenger ranking to that of the
five-point likert scale is discussed later.
In the questionnaire, one flight product was preset by IATA to avoid data distortion. The
results from the passenger surveys that were conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India all
cited that ‘safety’ was one of the least considerations of passengers when choosing a
carrier. However, IATA was adamant that terrorist related activities such as: 9/11; plots
to place explosives on aircraft at British airports; Spanish bombings; and attempted
bombings at Glasgow airports would trigger airlines to place ‘Safety’ as a very important
attribute in the survey, which was not the case. IATA justified their decision to preset the
‘Safety’ attribute on the grounds of IATA’s Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), which is a
safety benchmark that all airlines must achieve if they are to retain their IATA
membership. IATA stated that the ‘safety question’ could be misinterpreted by airline
executives to be related to its safety audit or more alarmingly it could be misinterpreted
as a ‘loaded question’ to determine how important safety is to each surveyed airline.
IATA steadfastly insisted that this methodology had to be rigorously enforced. Salter
(2007) stated that IATA and ICAO are the industries experts on issues of safety and
security. Thus safety was enabled as a ‘not at all’ important attribute for both leisure and
business passengers. See Appendix VII.
IATA emailed the top 150 world airlines (in terms of revenues earned166) and the
respondents were given a two month window in which to complete the questionnaire and
were reminded by another email (sent with a high priority default) two weeks prior to the
set deadline. The survey had to be extended for a further six weeks because of the low
uptake and airlines were again reminded of the closing date one week prior to the
166 The airline that generated the highest revenue in 2005 was KLM/Air France, while Air Do (Japan)
ranked in 150th position.
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deadline. IATA controlled the data and then forwarded the author the responses from
questions 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, while IATA kept the responses from questions 2, 3 and 6 for
their own analysis. A total of 41 responses were received, giving the survey a 27.3%
response rate which is well above the response rate of IATA’s Corporate Air Travel
Survey (CATS) of 19.2% reply rate in 2004. The strategic management literature claims
that a survey with a ‘20%+’ penetration rate is enough to validate a strategy forming
process (Menon, Bharadwaj and Howell, 1996; Slater et al. 2006). Table 63 below shows
the airlines that responded to the questionnaire and they were divided into three primary
regions namely Europe; Asia including Australasia; and the Middle East, Africa, India,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh167. There was no response from any carrier in North
America168 and only AeroMexico from Central America replied. However, Aeromexico
had to be eliminated from the analysis as it could not be compared to any other carrier
from that region, which lowered the overall response rate to 26.6%.
Table 63. Airline respondents
European
carriers
Asian and Australasian
carriers
Middle East/Indian/African
carriers2
1 Aer Lingus Air China Air Sahara
2 Air France Air New Zealand Biman Bangladesh
3 Alitalia ANA Egyptair
4 British Airways China Southern Emirates
5 CSA Garuda Gulf Air
6 Finnair Korean Airlines Indian Airlines
7 Iberia Malaysia Airlines Jet Airways
8 LOT PAL Kuwait Airways
9 Lufthansa Qantas MEA
10 Malev Singapore Airlines Oman Air
11 Olympic Thai Airways Royal Jordanian Airlines
12 SAS Air China South African Airways
13 Spanair Air New Zealand Sri Lankan Airlines
14 TAP ANA Yemenia
15 Turkish1
1 Turkish Airlines was included in the European group because the carrier serves 96 European destinations and
approximately 74% of its short-haul revenues (excluding domestic operations) stem from its European operations
(Corekci, 2007). Since almost three-quarters of Turkish Airlines short-haul revenues stem from its European
operations, it was included under European carriers. In addition Turkey has had several accession talks with the
EU to allow it to become a European member.
2 The Middle East, Africa, India, Sri Lanka and Banglasdesh were ranked together because they are all within a 3
hour flight time of Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and there were not enough carriers in one particular
continent to justify separating them. In addition, the region has a similar regulatory process and some of the
airlines had similar profiles as the annual revenues and number of passengers uplifted by Biman Bangladesh for
example are close to that of Yemenia, which is an Arab based carrier.
167 From now on we will refer to India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as the Indian subcontinent.
168 IATA provided no suggestion for the low response from this region.
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Because of the commercial sensitivity of the data, IATA imposed a restriction on the
results and stated that they cannot be published in any format (i.e. conference papers,
journal papers, book chapter, etc) till January 1st 2009 and that the thesis must be
restricted from public viewing in the university library till that time. Any person who
wishes to make a reference to the survey data before this date must contact the author or
supervisor for approval. The results from each of the three regions; Europe; Asia; and the
Middle East, African and Indian subcontinent will each be discussed later in the chapter.
10.3 Methodology
This section describes the statistical analysis that was applied to the results of the
questionnaire. Firstly, it outlines how the strategic capability of each incumbent was
measured and secondly it calculates the correlation coefficients of the differences
between what passengers’ state they require and airlines’ views of the requirements of
passengers.
10.3.1 The strategic capabilities of incumbents
Johnson et al. (2005, p117) states that the strategic capability is the adequacy and
suitability of the resources and competences of an organisation for it to survive and
prosper. The strategic capability also depends on its organisational competencies, which
are ultimately driven by its management and different capabilities are likely to yield
different marginal benefits to the firms. Teece et al. (1997) states that strategic
capability is the ultimate driver of competitive advantage because when management
reconfigures its resources and operational routines, it can obtain maximum returns. A
number of researchers such as Henderson and Cockburn (1994), McGrath et al. (1995)
and Ethiraj et al. (2005) have used surveys to measure the strategic capability of
companies. The IATA questionnaire sent out to network airlines worldwide included 35
strategy question-statements comprised of two unique divisions. The first probed the
level of difficulty in implementing strategies, which could be viewed as constraining
elements when implementing strategies. Each question measured the dimensions of
each specific level of difficulty via a 5 point likert scale. The second investigated the
level of importance that a network airline placed on each particular strategy (e.g.
frequent flyer program, travel policy agreements, etc), the aim being to enable each
incumbent to compete more effectively with low cost carriers. Each question again
measured the dimensions of each specific level of importance via a five point likert scale.
Hence, the strategic capability of each airline is determined by the strategies that it
deems important in competing against the low cost carriers which is subtracted from
the difficulties (constraining elements) that each airline experiences in implementing its
strategies. The objective was to provide a methodology which measured the capability
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of how much each full service airline could respond to low cost carriers and compare
each airline’s response strategy.
There were a number of question-statements on the difficulty of implementing strategies
which were arranged as a Likert scale from ‘not at all’ through to ‘extremely’. The
incumbent with the lowest average score (least difficulty in implementing strategies) was
classified as the benchmark airline. Benchmarking is the process of comparing a firm’s
performance against the practices of other peer companies and it evaluates various
aspects of their business processes in relation to best practice. Mittelstaedt (1992) stated
that companies should replicate as many of these benchmarks as possible to enhance their
competitive advantage. According to Wallack (1990) there can be as much as a tenfold
difference in the quality, speed and cost performance of a world-class company versus an
average company. Francis et al. (2005) indicated that benchmarking was identified as the
most used performance improvement technique for airlines with 88% of the researcher’s
airline survey sample claiming to engage in some form of benchmarking activity.
The risk of respondent bias can distort the results and recently, researchers have been
urged to seek theoretical explanations for differences in patterns of response rather than
immediately conclude that such differences are a result of response bias (Fischer, 2004;
Smith, 2004). To determine the impact of informant bias in the study, t-tests were used to
examine differences in the degree of airline responses of a specific set of airlines that had
relatively strong operating margins (i.e. greater than 5.2%). While slight differences were
detected between the groups, this difference was not significant (t = 0.81, p > 0.1) and on
the basis of these tests, informant bias does not appear to be a concern in this study.
There were 14 question-statements on the difficulty of implementing strategies and the
difference between the benchmark carrier (least difficulty in implementing strategies) and
the other sampled airlines (experienced more difficulties in implementing strategies) is
statistically represented by the average deviance, which is calculated as follows:
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Where:
D )(x = Difficulty in implementing strategies
N = 14 (number of questions asked on Difficulty)
jx Ranking of j category in questionnaire (i.e. difficulties) for a given airline
jX Ranking of j category in questionnaire (i.e. difficulties) for a benchmark airline
Since xj >Xj for every airline (other than the benchmark one) on average, D(x) must be
positive. D(x) must be zero if this receives the lowest score in all questions.
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There were 21 questions on the various strategies that would prove effective in
competing against low cost carriers and these were called important strategies and were
also arranged as a likert scale from ‘not at all’ through to ‘extremely’. The incumbent
with the highest average score was again classified as the benchmark airline and the
difference between the benchmark carrier and the other sampled airlines is statistically
represented by the average deviance, which is calculated as follows:
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Where:
I = Important strategies for competing against low cost carriers
M = 21 (number of questions asked on Strategic Importance)
iy Ranking of i category in questionnaire (i.e. importance) for a given airline
iY Ranking of i category in questionnaire (i.e. difficulties) for a benchmark airline
Since yi <Yi for every airline (other than the benchmark one) on average, I(y) must be
negative. I(y) must be zero if this receives the highest score in all questions.
The strategic capability of each airline is the difference between the average deviance of
the strategies that each incumbent deemed important in responding to low cost carriers and
the average deviance of difficulty that each incumbent experienced in implementing such
strategies and is represented below.
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If the same airline is used as the benchmark for both D(x) and I(x) then S(x) is zero.
Otherwise, the incumbent with the least negative S(x) is the one with the strongest
strategic capability. This airline will represent the new benchmark that will be compared
to all other carriers. The incumbent with the strongest strategic capability will represent
the new benchmark airline that will be compared to all other airlines.
10.3.2 Incumbents’ abilities to meet customer requirements
Johnson et al. (2005, p125) state that a company can build competitive advantage if it
meets the needs and expectations of its customers. When applied to the airline industry,
academics such as Gilbert and Wong (2003) and Aaker et al. (2003) have also argued that
airlines must accurately perceive what passengers want and determine what they expect
from the service (Park et al., 2004; Aaker et al., 2003; Gilbert and Wong, 2003). The
McKinsey group also reiterated that airlines must gain a better understanding of their
customers (McKinsey Quarterly, 2005 p6).
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As mentioned previously, the IATA questionnaire sent out to airline incumbents
worldwide included a subsection on air traveller’s choice. It listed the principle reasons
why passengers choose to travel with an airline and this information was amassed from
passenger surveys that were conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India. The aim then was
to investigate if the airlines perception of passenger requirements is synchronised with
what passengers actually require. The passenger rankings of the flight products (e.g. fare,
schedule, frequent flyer program, etc.) from the three surveys conducted in Ireland,
Malaysia and India were grouped to represent one common passenger ranking. They
were integrated because travel today is highly international and interlining passengers via
alliances, code sharing and block space agreements are commonplace. Consequently
there is a large mix of nationalities on every flight as British citizens for example travel
on India’s airlines while United Arab Emirate citizens travel on Malaysia Airlines, etc.
and therefore airlines offer similar types of products to make the journey seamless. The
rankings of the leisure and business passengers amassed from the three passengers
surveys are listed below in Table 64.
Table 64. The rankings of leisure and business passengers that were derived from
the passenger surveys conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India.
Ranking of the leisure passengers1 Ranking of the business passengers
1 Fare 1 Schedule
2 Schedule 2 Reliability
3 Reliability 3 Frequent Flyer Programs
4 Quality 4 Quality
5 Connections 5 Connections
6 Frequent Flyer Programs 6 Corporate Policy
7 Service 7 Fare
8 Comfort 8 Service
9 Comfort9 Safety
10 Safety
1 There were 9 characteristics for Leisure passengers as Corporate Policy was not included as a flight product.
Note: The questions in the survey were mutually exclusive, i.e. if schedule for example is ranked number 1, then
it cannot be ranked number 2, 3 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9.
The same passenger ranking question that was administered to the airline passengers was
also posed to each incumbent through the IATA survey and was structured as a five-point
Likert scale question (i.e. not at all, not very, some, some-what, extremely) as mentioned
earlier.
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To correlate the responses of the passenger ranking survey outlined in Table 64 (above)
with the airline responses, the information provided by passengers on the array of flight
characteristics was rescaled to represent relative cohorts on a five-point Likert scale169.
The rank correlation of the flight products from the responses of the surveyed airlines and
the surveyed passengers are measured using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient170
and the results were rescaled accordingly171. This statistical approach was used because
for the following reasons:
 Spearman’s rank correlation is a nonparametric technique for evaluating the degree of
linear association or correlation between two independent variables;
 It is relatively insensitive to outliers and there is no requirement that the data is
collected over regularly spaced intervals;
 It can be used with small sample sizes.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is calculated according to the following
formula:
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where di is the difference between the rank for each of n xi and yi pairs.
The above formula is constructed so that it gives a range of values from +1 (perfect
positive172 correlation), through 0 (no correlation), to -1 (perfect negative173 correlation).
The calculated value of ρs, is then tested for the significance of the correlation against the
Table of Critical Values to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis. It
169 The array of flight characteristics were rescaled to represent relative cohorts for Leisure passengers as
follows: all values between 1-2.6 correspond to "extremely", between 2.61-4.2 to "somewhat", between
4.21-5.8 to "some", between 5.81-7.4 to "not very" and between 7.41-9 to "not at all". For Business
passengers the relative cohorts were as follows: all values between 1-2.8 correspond to "extremely",
between 2.81-4.6 to "somewhat", between 4.61-6.4 to "some", between 6.41-8.2 to "not very" and
between 8.21-10 to "not at all". Thus if a low ranked statement by a passenger (e.g. 9) matches with a low
rated airline answer (e.g. "not at all") the result is correlated.
170 The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is a measure of linear relationship between two sets of
ranked data.
171 The rescaling process is based on the implicit assumption that a lowly (highly) ranked statement (e.g.
number 9 (number 2)) is also valued as a lowly (highly) rated one (e.g. “not at all important” (“extremely
important”)) by the same passenger. Since ranking is mutually exclusive (and expressed in relative
terms) while rating is not, this is not necessarily the case, i.e. a lowly ranked statement could in theory be
highly rated and vice versa.
172 A positive correlation is one in which the ranks of both variables increase together.
173 A negative correlation is one in which the ranks of one variable increase as the ranks of the other
variable decrease.
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tests the probability that the ranking between the data pairs (i.e. response of the
requirements of passengers to the response of the airlines’ view of passenger
requirements) are correlated. The Table of Critical Values as outlined in Table 65 below
shows a number of data pairs or degrees of freedom (df = n-2; two tail test). There are 9
data pairs used for leisure passengers which include: Frequent Flyer Programme; Fare;
Quality; Connections; Reliability; Flight Schedule; Safety, Comfort and Service; while
there are 10 data pairs used for business passengers as corporate policy is an added
feature specific to these travellers. The table infers a value of 0.70 for the leisure
passenger and 0.648 for the business passengers at the 0.05 significance level (most usual
statistical level taken). These values are used as the reference points to depict the level of
statistically significant positive correlation between the ranking of the passengers’
preferences for flight products and airlines’ views of the passengers’ requirements for the
flight products. Any value above 0.70 infers that there is a very strong ranking correlation
between leisure passengers and airlines perception of the requirements of leisure
passengers. This analysis is conducted through the statistical software package SPSS.
Table 65 Table of critical values of Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficient
Level of significance (α) – two tailed testNumber of data pairs
.05 .01
5 1. -
6 0.886 1
7 0.786 0.943
8 0.738 0.893
9 0.700 0.783
10 0.648 0.745
12 0.587 0.671
… … …
30 0.364 0.478
10.4 General Findings in respect of the European carriers
European network airlines such as British Airways, Aer Lingus and British Midland have
been exposed to low cost carriers for over a decade, as around 46% of all seats from the
UK to intra-European destinations were on budget carriers in 2005, while Ryanair was
carrying 41% of Ireland’s intra-European seats; throughout Europe as a whole, low cost
carrier penetration had reached around 24% by the same date (See Chapter 4, section
4.2.1). This has occurred because of two primary reasons, namely new passengers who
have been attracted by the cheap fares and from passengers who have switched from
network airlines to budget carriers. Studies have indicated that between 37 – 40% of
passengers travelling on full service airlines have switched to low cost carriers (Hapag-
304
Lloyd Express 2004; ELFAA, 2002). Consequently, this has been partly responsible for
the underperforming financial results of the AEA member airlines, as they lost a total of
US$6.3 billion from 2000 to 2005 (Operating economy of AEA airlines, 2004, 2005;
AEA Market Research Quarterly, 2005). See Chapter 4 for a full account of the
problems that low cost carriers have created for full service airlines: it is apparent that
that this new generation of leaner and more agile airline business model was causing
major difficulties for the traditional full service carriers. One of the objectives of this
Thesis was to find out the principle difficulties that the European full service airlines
encounter when faced with the threat from low cost carriers and what strategies from
their perspective would prove effective in competing against them.
10.4.1 The level of difficulty for European carriers
The network carriers were asked to identify the level of difficulty that they had
encountered when responding to low cost carriers and the results are shown below in
Figure 88; the attributes that caused the most difficulties for the network carriers are
illustrated with the highest average scores. The data concluded that the greatest difficulty
facing Europe’s incumbents were their inability to increase yield in the short-haul market:
this is a well known problem but it does emphasise that incumbents are extremely
concerned about falling revenues: they need to find alternate sources of revenue such as
from dynamic packaging or carrying more cargo in order to offset further yield erosion.
The survey has uncovered that unions have significantly impacted the ability of European
incumbents to respond to the low cost carrier threat. Some of the unions are very
powerful hard-line organisations. Overstaffed airlines who wish to reduce their number of
employees or improve the productivity of their employees and aircraft are all subject to
union agreement. These talks may proceed for many months and may end up in gridlock,
which may eventually lead to strike action. A proposed one day strike at British Airways
in 2007 for example was estimated to cost the company £15 million and it would have
also caused serious damage to its reputation (The Telegraph, 2007). It was claimed that
Alitalia would have been profitable by 2006 if management at the airline had been able to
offset five sets of strikes in 2005 and numerous strikes in 2006, including a 6-day
stoppage in January (ATI, January 2007).
The survey also found that management does not find it particularly difficult to
implement changes and this was confirmed by its speedy ability to drop an unprofitable
route, which suggests that unions may be a key barrier in implementing strategies at
European incumbents. It is vital that unions understand that the competitive dynamics
between full service airlines and low cost carriers are completely different than rivalry
among network carriers. Unions need to be open to the idea that incumbent carriers need
to structurally change if they are to sustain financially successful operations in the short-
haul market. Management need to make unions and employees aware of the continuing
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growth and market penetration of budget carriers. Unions must also be made aware that
there is a large gap in the salaries, productivity, aircraft utilisation, etc., between a full
service airline and a low cost carrier.
Another major difficulty cited by the survey is high airport costs. The IATA Airline Cost
Performance report (March 2007) shows that this cost represents almost one-third of the
cost difference between European incumbents and Ryanair (see chapter 4 section 4.5.3).
Airlines serving primary airports have been subject to continuous hikes in airport
charges, despite the fact that the latter continually generate high annual profits174 and full
service carriers must protest more forcibly either through international organisations such
as ICAO, IATA, AACO, etc or by lobbying through their respective alliances (where a
number of airlines collude in order) to voice their opposition against the increased
charges and push airports to develop revenues from other sources such as shopping, car
rental and so forth. The Boston Consulting Group (2004) extensively studied airport
costs, revealing that these could be reduced by an average of 20-30% and passed on as
savings to airlines. Two other major difficulties facing incumbents are reducing their cost
base to within 30% of low cost carriers and matching their fares. Due to the poor
financial returns of the European network carriers, they have been unable to modernise
their fleets and data indicates that they had only ordered 26 narrow-body aircraft as of
March 2005 while the budget carriers ordered 332. This impacts their ability to compete
and the survey discovers that this is another immediate difficulty as future profits may
have to be set aside to procure aircraft,175 which reduces investments in other areas, such
as upgrading IT systems for example.
The results also conclude that European incumbents have little difficulty in increasing
sales through the internet, yet Pilling (2006) states that only one-third of British Airways
passengers booked tickets online by 2006 and 15% of Iberia’s passengers did so, in
contrast to the 97% of Ryanairs’ passengers who book online. This implies that
management needs to act faster and find innovative ways to encourage passengers to
book online rather than through traditional channels and could be done by promoting the
concept that an airline’s lowest fares are only available through its website. Finally to
conclude this section the survey reported that a network carrier has the least difficulty in
leveraging its brand, yet the media is flooded with advertisements from low cost carriers.
Incumbents are well established flag carriers and they should capitalise on their legacy of
trust, quality, customer service and dependability, with Mercer Consulting (2001) stating
that customers were four times more likely to choose the airline with the strongest brand
than the airline with the weakest.
174 The operating margins of airports such as BAA, Hong Kong and Atlanta were 31.2%, 60.2% and
65.5% respectively in 2005 (Airline Business, December 2006).
175 Aircraft prices are currently peaking as demand for aircraft far outstrips production capacity.
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Figure 88. The principle difficulties encountered by the European full service
airlines when responding to the low cost carriers.
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Speed to drop unprofitable route
Communication to each customer segment
Leverage brand strength
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10.4.2 Important strategies employed by European incumbents to
compete against low cost carriers
Another set of questions posed to the network carriers probed which strategies would
prove effective in competing against low cost carriers as shown below in Figure 89. The
survey revealed that the most important strategy for European network carriers is to serve
primary or hub airports and become market leaders at their home base. Hub airports
facilitate the interlining of passengers and the incumbents have indicated that this remains
an important part of their business plan, a 58% of KLM’s traffic for example transfers at
Schipol, while 65% of Lufthansa’s passengers transfer at Frankfurt (Fuhr and Beckers,
2006). Hubs are important transit points for passengers from alliance or code share flights
and the survey has highlighted that this is an important contributor to the revenues of an
incumbent and is a valuable differentiator between the business models of a network and
low cost carrier. European incumbents consider that practices common to low cost
carriers such as operating on a point-to-point basis or using secondary airports would be
unsustainable or weak strategies and prefer to remain serving primary airports, which
may be considered short-sighted as low cost carriers will remain unchallenged in these
markets.
Further analysis of the survey concluded that European full service airlines placed
‘satisfying the needs of the passenger’ as the second most important strategy in
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overcoming the low cost carrier threat. Evidence had suggested that a large number of
passengers travelling on incumbents were switching to low cost carriers and that network
carriers were not addressing the needs of their passengers. Aaker et al. (2003) has long
argued that airlines must perceive what passengers want and expect, while Holloway
(2002, p230) stated that airlines must bridge the gap between a passenger’s expectations
and actual delivery. However this survey has clearly demonstrated that there has been a
paradigm shift in the way that legacy carriers now wish to accommodate the needs of
their passengers and they have prioritised this requirement. Other strategies given high
priority by the network carriers include frequent flyer programs and product
differentiation, which are both aimed at passengers, proving that network carriers are
refocusing their efforts on satisfying the needs of passengers. Frequent flyer programs are
beneficial in two ways because firstly, they keep passengers loyal, as Kalakota et al.
(2001) have showed that the average company loses half of its customers every five
years, and secondly they generate additional revenues because service providers such as
car rental companies for example give mileage points to their customers and subsequently
pay the airline between 1-2 cents for each mile awarded. In addition, network carriers
believe that they can offset higher fares by offering differentiated products with Porter
(1979) stating that consumers tend to be more price sensitive if they are purchasing
products that are undifferentiated. The results of the questionnaire concluded that product
differentiation is paramount in offsetting the higher fares charged by incumbents as they
add significant value for the passenger. The survey outlines that network carriers are also
emphasising Customer Relationship Management (CRM) as a tool to identify the value
(profitability) of passengers and wish to establish long-term mutually beneficial
relationships. Earlier, unions were cited as being a major difficulty for network carriers
and they have indicated here that it is essential that management is fully open and
transparent with unions as this will reduce confrontation while implementing changes.
Interestingly, European full service airlines equally value the importance of travel policy
arrangements with corporations and dynamic packaging, as they are low cost methods to
secure additional revenues. Travel policy arrangements are unique to network airlines and
are a win-win strategy because corporate travellers get access to multiple flight products
at discounted prices, while airlines secure exclusive agreements with companies whose
executives travel extensively. Research by Carlson Wagonlit Travel (2006) found that
81% of travel managers from around the world had rarely booked corporate executives
on low cost carriers and corporate policy will remain an important differentiator between
airline business models and it is a strategy that network carriers should develop further.
European incumbents have also targeted dynamic packaging as an important strategy,
believing that it will become an important tool for generating revenues, which indicates
that they are closely analysing various components of the low cost model that add value
and that could be easily incorporated into the full service airline business model. Ryanair
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for example, generated 15% of its revenues through dynamic packaging in 2004/05 and
so the potential for incumbents to increase revenues by this method is apparent. British
Airways chief of IT Paul Dolby stated that ‘it will become a very useful channel for us’
(Pilling, 2006).
The questionnaire also found that certain strategies were not as effective and included;
maintaining business class, advertising and setting up low cost carriers. The general view
among the sampled European airlines is that the short-haul business passenger market is
in jeopardy as passengers can easily transition to an economy class seat for the short
journey or switch to a low cost carrier. However this strategy remains blurred because
they have travel policy contracts which ensure that executives travel in business class and
business travellers transferring from a flight offering business class (e.g. alliance, code
share or an airline’s own long haul flight) would prefer to conclude their journey in
business class and maintain a seamless journey. Clearly incumbents need to make a
permanent and decisive evaluation about short-haul business class and its implication if it
is removed from the cabin. European incumbents also do not consider that advertising is
an important strategy. Sentance (2004) stated that British Airways spends roughly 80 per
cent of its advertising budget in the London and New York markets; surely this
expenditure is misbalanced as one of the greatest competitive threats now facing BA is its
under performing intra-European routes where advertising could influence a passenger’s
decision on choosing a carrier. Both Ryanair and easyJet consistently promote their fares
in the UK, while the British incumbent has polarised its advertising budget elsewhere,
losing the opportunity to demonstrate to customers that it offers a whole range of value
adding products, such as low fares, primary airports, food and beverages, ability to
interline, comfortable seats, generous baggage allowance, frequent flyer points, etc., and
this is certainly an area of weakness for incumbents. Finally, the general conclusion of
Europe’s full service airlines is that setting up a low cost carrier subsidiary is not an
effective strategy, as witnessed by KLM and BA. Graf (2005) concluded that the failure
of Europe’s low cost carrier subsidiaries in the past was because they were not
independent from the incumbent. However, 4176 out of the 15 sampled European airlines
have introduced budget carrier offshoots, but as yet, they have not been as effective as
Qantas’ JetStar and the general consensus among European network carriers is that other
strategies can prove to be a more effective weapon against low cost carriers.
176 European incumbents sampled in the survey that have set up low cost carriers, which are still in
operation include: Lufthansa/Eurowings (Germanwings); LOT Polish Airlines (Centralwings); Iberia
(Click Air).
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Figure 89. Important strategies used by European network airlines to respond to
low cost carriers.
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10.4.3 The strategic capability of European incumbents and its
relationship to operating margin
The results of the survey concluded that Aer Lingus has the strongest strategic
capability177 of the European carriers in competing against the low cost carriers, followed
by British Airways. Aer Lingus has been widely acknowledged as a traditional carrier
that revamped itself in order to survive low cost competition. See Chapter 5 for a full
account of how Aer Lingus restructured itself in order to compete against the low cost
carriers. O’Toole (2004) pointed out that Aer Lingus benchmarked itself against Ryanair,
which showed the extent of change that was required if it were to challenge the budget
carrier; its subsequent reformation caused Ryanair’s profits on the Dublin-London city
pair to fall by 20% in 2003 (Aviation Strategy, May 2004). ABN AMRO (2005) also
concluded that Aer Lingus had been the most successful European carrier in responding
to the low cost carriers, followed by British Airways, which confirms the results of this
survey.
177 This was calculated by subtracting the ‘average deviance’ of strategies that were deemed important
from the ‘average deviance’ of difficulty experienced by each incumbent.
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Figure 90 below shows the strategic capability of each airline, which is represented by
the size of each circle, and Aer Lingus is positioned as the benchmark airline as the data
concluded that it had the strongest capability (based on aggregate terms of least difficulty
and importance placed on strategies), yet British Airways and Lufthansa placed more
emphasis on some strategies than Aer Lingus. The airlines are positioned relative to their
deviances from the benchmarked incumbent. It is interesting to note that all the Eastern
European airlines in the sample (i.e. LOT, Czech and Malev) have very weak strategic
capabilities to compete against the low cost carriers. This may be due to the fact that
airlines from Eastern Europe had previously operated on the traditional bilateral
arrangement, which had little competition from budget carriers. However, upon joining
the EU in May 2004 the Eastern European network carriers entered into an open skies
policy that instantly allowed multiple airlines to enter their markets and they were not
prepared for the sudden onslaught of competition that included budget carriers. The
survey revealed that these carriers found it difficult to implement strategic change, for
example they encountered enormous difficulty in being able to make speedy changes and
were unable to quickly drop an unprofitable route in contrast to their western
counterparts. However, their culture appears intolerant of slow progress as LOT Polish
Airlines for example had recently dismissed two CEO’s within twelve months while a
similar event transpired at Czech Airlines and this type of behaviour has a very disruptive
effect because when new management comes to the helm of an airline, they give it a
different direction, not allowing the existing strategies that are in-place time to reach their
objectives. They also found it difficult178 to increase sales through the internet and must
therefore continue selling a large part of their seat inventory through travel agents, which
significantly increases the cost of distribution.
The Eastern bloc carriers were the only airlines stating that satisfying the needs of
passengers was only ‘some what important’ while all the other airlines in the sample
were of the view that it was ‘extremely important’. Other underperforming airlines in this
sample were Olympic and Alitalia which comes as no surprise. Doganis (2006, p253)
gave a concise account of the bureaucratic on-goings at Olympic stating the carrier was
an appendage of the government who had not collected any taxes and refused to recover
payments of $212 million by late 2002, which were now classified as state aid. In
addition it had repeatedly changed management which led to further losses. The results
from the survey show both Olympic and Alitalia have found it ‘extremely difficult’ to
make changes, reduce the complexity, modernize their fleets and change to homogenous
fleets179. In contrast to other European network carriers, both Olympic and Alitalia did
178 Each of the Eastern European carriers had expressed that it was either ‘extremely difficult’ or
‘somewhat difficult’ to make speedy changes, be able to drop an unprofitable route quickly and sell
though the internet while most of the other European carriers had much less difficulty.
179 By early 2007, Olympic had 6 different types of aircraft operating in their fleet, while Alitalia had 5
different types.
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not consider that the following strategies were particularly effective against low cost
carriers; union transparency, dynamic packaging, travel policy arrangements with
corporations, cargo180, equity investments, advertising and building value through CRM,
while the majority of the other western European airlines rated them highly.
Figure 90. The strategic capability of the European incumbents
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The strategic capability of each carrier is measured against their 2005 operating margin
and the results are shown below in Figure 91. Aer Lingus was measured as the
benchmark airline as it had the strongest overall strategic capability181 and all the other
data points for the other incumbents were then rescaled accordingly. It is noticed that
there is a direct correlation between the operating margins and the strategic capability of
incumbents. Aer Lingus and British Airways for example had operating margins of 8.2%
and 8.3% respectively in 2005, which represented the highest for network airlines in
Europe and the survey revealed that they also had the strongest strategic capability. In
contrast, both Alitalia and Malev had operating margins of -1% and -3.6% respectively in
2005, which was reflected in their weak strategic capability. The correlation coefficient
180 Cargo contributed 10% to Alitalia’s revenues in 2005, yet the carrier rated cargo as only of ‘some’
importance in terms of strategy. Ryanair for example gets 15% of its revenues from dynamic packaging
and classifies it as revolutionary.
181 Aer Lingus’ aggregate of least difficulty and importance placed on strategy made it the incumbent with
the strongest overall strategic capability. The benchmark airline is set to 100% because otherwise all the
data points would become clustered to the centre of the diagram and would be impossible to decipher.
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between the operating margin and the strategic capability is 0.79 which is high (1.0 is
perfect correlation) and it implies that airlines with a strong strategic strength can expect
high operating margins and those with low strengths, low margins.
Figure 91. Comparison of the 2005 operating margins and strategic capability of
the European incumbents
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Note 1 : AF, Air France; AY, Finnair; AZ, Alitalia; BA, British Airways; EI, Aer Lngus; IB, Iberia; JK, Spanair;
LH, Lufthansa; LO, LOT Polish Airlines; MA, Malev; OK, Czech Airlines; TK, Turkish; TP, TAP; SK, SAS.
Note 2: OA, Olympic (operating margin not available)
10.4.4 European incumbents’ ability to meet the requirements of
their leisure passengers
The IATA sponsored questionnaire sent to incumbents asked each carrier to rank its
perception of what leisure passengers wanted when selecting a carrier, which was
statistically compared to the actual requirements of passengers, gathered from surveys
conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India. The data was statistically analysed in SPSS
using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which is a measure of the linear
relationship between two sets of ranked data, and the results are shown below in Table
66. It is clear that Aer Lingus, British Airways, Lufthansa, Spanair and TAP (shown in
bold) have very strong positive182 correlations in the ranking of flight products as those
expressed by leisure passengers. The results for these incumbents indicate that the
182 A positive correlation is one in which the rankings of both variables increase together.
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correlation is statistically significant as represented by the associated low p-values183 at
the 5% significance level. Another cluster of incumbents that include Air France, Iberia,
Finnair, SAS, LOT and Olympic reveals that these carriers have some correlation in the
ranking of product features as those expressed by leisure passengers, but this is much
weaker than the earlier group. Olympic and LOT shows the lowest positive correlation
and this indicates that there is a large gap between the airlines’ view of leisure passenger
demands and the actual requirements of passengers (as indicated by the low Spearman
rho values). Holloway (2002, p230) stated that airlines must bridge the gap between a
passenger’s expectations and actual delivery. There is a more alarming revelation
however, as Turkish, CSA, Malev and Alitalia have negative184 correlations in the
ranking of flight products required by leisure passengers, which implies that these airlines
are completely out of touch with what the leisure passenger wants. Passengers travelling
on these incumbents would quickly switch to low cost carriers as they do not deliver what
is wanted. This may explain why low cost carriers had captured over half of the 12
densest routes between London and Italy by 2005, causing Alitalia to retract and it now
only flies between two points in Italy (i.e. Rome and Milan) and London.
Table 66. Statistical analysis of
European leisure passengers using the
Spearman rank coefficient.
Figure 92. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of European airlines to match the
requirements of leisure passengers.
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Figure 92 above gives a graphical representation of each incumbent’s ability to match the
flight product preferences of leisure passengers using the Spearman rho correlation
183 P-values between the ranges of 0 - 0.05 are statistically significant. At the 1% significance level, there
is a 99% chance that the results are correlated and at the 5% significance level there is a 95% chance that
the results are correlated. P-values > 0.05 are not statistically significant.
184 Negative correlation is where the rankings of one variable increase as the rankings of the other
variable decrease.
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coefficient. Leisure passengers ranked 9 flight products185 and the Table of Critical
Values (Table 65 above) was used to test statistical significance of the ranking correlation
between the response of leisure passengers’ requirements and each airline’s view of
leisure passenger requirements. The Table of Critical Values shows that the 9 data pair
groupings were statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, measuring 0.700.
Therefore Aer Lingus, British Airways, Lufthansa, Spanair and TAP, which showed a
very strong positive correlation at the 5% significance level, are included in this group of
airlines as being the most closely aligned matching the requirements of leisure
passengers.
10.4.5 European incumbents’ ability to meet the requirements of
their business passengers
The results for the business passengers are shown below in Table 67. Incumbents such as
British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France, Iberia and TAP have a very strong positive
correlation in the ranking of product features as those expressed by business passengers.
The results for these incumbents indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at
the 5% significance level and the data shows that these airlines closely match the
requirements of business passengers, which would imply that many business passengers
will remain travelling with these airlines as their needs are fully satisfied. They are also
excellent airlines to collaborate with (i.e. through alliance or code share) as they can
assure passengers that the onward flight will maintain high standards. Lufthansa
Consulting (2004, p11) concluded that customer satisfaction was rated as one of the most
important objectives of airlines worldwide, while IATA (2006) strongly emphasised that
customer satisfaction is one of the keys to passenger retention and profitability in a
competitive marketplace. Other carriers such as Finnair, Alitalia and SAS have some
correlation in the ranking of product features as those expressed by business passengers
but fall short of being able to meet their entire demands. However, less than 50% of the
European incumbents do not match the demands of the business passenger and of
particular significance is Olympic Airlines, which operates a large part of its network
within Europe and subsequently are most at risk from low cost airlines. The data
indicates that these carriers have completely mismatched the requirements of business
passengers and these high yield, frequent travellers may already have shifted to other
carriers and this may also be partly responsible for their underperforming financial
results. The Aer Lingus example is noteworthy because it showed a very strong positive
correlation for leisure passengers but the opposite occurs for business passengers and this
is largely due to the fact that it has eliminated the business class product from all its
185 Flight products for leisure passengers included: Frequent Flyer Programme; Fare; Quality;
Connections; Reliability; Flight Schedule; Safety, Comfort and Service.
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short-haul flights and this is not appreciated by the business travellers. A business
traveller interlining onwards with Aer Lingus for example will not encounter a seamless
trip as they are forced to take this segment in economy class and may substitute for a
carrier who provides a business class and a business lounge.
Table 67. Statistical analysis of European
business passengers using the Spearman
rank coefficient
Figure 93. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of European airlines to match the
requirements of business passengers.
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Figure 93 above gives a graphical representation of each incumbent’s ability to match the
flight product preferences of leisure passengers using the Spearman rho correlation
coefficient. Business passengers ranked 10 flight products186 and the Table of Critical
Values (Table 65 above) was used to test statistical significance of the ranking correlation
between the response of business passengers’ requirements and each airline’s view of
business passenger requirements. The Table of Critical Values shows that the 10 data pair
groupings were statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, measuring 0.648.
British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France, Iberia and TAP show a very strong positive
correlation at the 5% significance level and are included in this group of airlines as being
the most closely aligned in matching the requirements of business passengers.
186 Flight products for business passengers included: Frequent Flyer Programme; Fare; Quality;
Connections; Reliability; Corporate Company Policy, Flight Schedule; Safety, Comfort and Service.
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10.4.6 Overview of the strategic capability and ability of European
incumbents to meet the requirements of their leisure and
business passengers
The strategic capability of each incumbent and its ability to meet passengers’ preferences
are plotted below in Figure 94 and Figure 95. Both Alitalia and Olympic have weak
strategic strength187 and are marred by management changes, strikes, inefficiencies and
high costs, while the survey reveals that they have mixed understandings of the
requirements of passengers which has impacted their declining passenger market share.
Alitalia for example has completely misjudged the demands of the leisure passenger,
while it has a weak understanding of the wants of business passengers, which contributes
to its continued poor performance. The Eastern European Airlines could also be facing a
similar fate as Alitalia and Olympic, as their ability to compete with low cost carriers is
diluted by their misjudgement of the requirements of their leisure and business
passengers and in addition top level management is regularly changed which disrupts the
implementation of previous strategies that have been set in place.
Other incumbents, such as Finnair, SAS and Spanair, could be classified as ‘stuck in the
middle’, as they have a medium strategic capability and are not synchronised with the
requirements of passengers, with business passengers in particular prefering to use other
competitors, including low cost carriers. Porter (1985) described that such companies
remain in this way because they may fail to differentiate themselves from competitors
and they may have failed to develop the capabilities or resources needed to be a
successful leader. TAP is unique as it has yet to encounter the full impact of budget
carriers and the associated problems of overcapacity, however it appears well structured
to defend itself.
The outright leaders in challenging the low cost carriers are British Airways and
Lufthansa, as they have a twin edged advantage over the other leading incumbents such
as Aer Lingus, Air France and Iberia because they have a strong strategic capability and
an excellent understanding of the requirements of both leisure and business passengers.
Sentance (2004) stated that British Airways had lost 11% of its UK market (i.e. inbound,
outbound and domestic) to Ryanair and easyJet from 1999 to 2004, but the British
incumbent may now be in a position to halt its declining market share and rebuild. The
market in France remains relatively protected from budget carriers, which helps Air
France, but Iberia is very close to becoming a ‘stuck in the middle’ full service airline
and it needs to carefully refocus its direction. Iberia has recently put forward that it
wishes to sell a large part of its equity and this might be an excellent time in which to
187 Strategic strength is classified as the following; Weak 0 – 0.33; Medium 0.34 – 0.66; Strong 0.67 – 1.00
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pursue such a strategy as it is not as competitively advantaged as the other premium
European full service carriers.
Figure 94. Relationship between strategic capability
and ability to meet leisure passenger requirements.
Figure 95. Relationship between strategic
capability and ability to meet business
passenger requirements.
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The five incumbents with the overall strongest strategic capability to compete effectively
with low cost carriers are Aer Lingus (EI), British airways (BA), Lufthansa (LH), Air
France (AF) and Iberia (IB), measured in terms of the strategies that have proved most
effective in competing against budget carriers and the constraining elements that these
incumbents faced when implementing these strategies. If other carriers that operate
within Europe can match or exceed these attributes, which are listed below in Table 68,
then they can mount a strategic counterattack on low cost carriers that should prove to be
effective in competing against them. British Airways emphasised the greatest number of
strategies that it deemed were most important in competing against low cost carriers from
the sampled European incumbents and listed 13 ‘extremely important’ and 3 ‘somewhat
important’ strategies. Its emphasis on e-commerce (60% of short-haul booking is now
online), brand and revenues from alliance/code share partners (including equity
investments in other carriers) however, sets it apart from the other European network
carriers and are vital components in assisting it to compete with budget carriers. It
identified that CRM and dynamic packaging were ‘extremely important’, while Iberia for
example considered CRM as ‘somewhat important’ and excluded dynamic packaging
altogether from its list of important strategies, which clearly disadvantages the Spanish
incumbent. In addition British Airways has not encountered that much difficulty in
persuading customers to use its website, while Iberia experienced a lot of difficulty.
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All the carriers noted that it was problematic to increase yield in the short-haul market,
yet they have failed to counterbalance this loss of revenue by not developing their e-
commerce platforms. European incumbents must urgently restructure their IT
departments and allocate funds in order for these laggards to leapfrog to the latest
technologies or else outsource IT departments to third parties that have the expertise to
position carriers on a similar technological platform as low cost carriers. British Airways
also believes that its brand is an important differentiator and is the only carrier that has
listed advertising as ‘extremely important’. Another characteristic proving valuable to
British Airways is revenues generated from alliance, code share and equity partners that
provide feed traffic at its home base and at international gateways. The recent speculation
in the media that it may be putting forward a bid for Iberia (valued at around $4.7 billion)
proves that British Airways may wish to strengthen its European and international
presence and the critical mass of two European incumbents may mount a stronger
challenge to budget carriers. The British and German incumbents also believe that the
following attributes: flexible tickets; interlining traffic; cargo; and corporate travel policy
arrangements give them a distinct competitive advantage over Aer Lingus, Air France
and Iberia when confronting low cost carriers. British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France
and Iberia all believe that regional airlines and cargo have greatly benefited their efforts
in competing against low cost carriers, as regional carriers challenge the dominance of
budget carriers at regional or secondary airports while at the same time providing feed to
international routes through hubs.
The world’s supply chain is becoming more dependent on ‘time’ as products need to get
to the market place faster and this provides an opportunity for network carriers to
capitalise on their longer turnaround times to load and unload freight, which improves
overall RTK yields. Aer Lingus encountered the least number of difficulties in
implementing their proposed strategies when compared to the other European incumbents
and this has enabled the carrier to post the strongest strategic capability among its peers.
If incumbents from this region can improve on their own difficulties and overcome the
major difficulties encountered by Aer Lingus as shown in Table 69, then they will
improve their overall capability in competing with budget carriers. Yield, complexity,
unions, high airport charges and inability to reduce costs are all major difficulties facing
European incumbents and are viewed by Ryanair and easyJet as weaknesses, which they
will exploit in order to gain further inroads into intra-European and domestic markets.
Furthermore, the majority of European carriers are unable to modernise their fleets but
have stressed that joint purchasing is a valuable strategy worth exploring and this could
be achieved by procuring aircraft through an alliance. This would enable individual
member airlines to obtain aircraft at reduced rates and challenge the low cost carriers
bulk ordering. Field (2003) stated that the Star alliance had plans to purchase around 200
aircraft in 2003, but this subsequently did not materialise.
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Table 68. Important strategies implemented by
British Airways, Lufthansa, Aer Lingus, Air France
and Iberia, which proved effective in competing
against low cost carriers.
Table 69. Difficulties encountered by Aer
Lingus, British Airways, Lufthansa, Air
France and Iberia in implementing their
strategies.
BA LH EI AF IB
FFP 5 5 5 5 5
Satisfying needs of passenger 5 5 5 5
Serving primary airport 5 5 5 5 5
Serving secondary airport
Maintain business class
Building value thru CRM 5 5 5 5 4
Diversification strategies 4
Product Differentiation 5 5 5 5 5
Ticket flexibility 5 5 4 4 4
Operate some routes on a
Point to point basis
Advertising 5 4
Dynamic Packaging 5
Interlining Traffic 4 4 5 4 4
Partnership/ownership of
regional carrier 5 4 4
Joint purchasing agreements 4 4 4 4
Cargo 5 5 4
Full transparency for Unions 5 5 5 5 5
Corporate travel policies 5 5 4 4 4
Equity investments in other airlines 4 4
Revenues generated from alliance/
code share partners 5 4 4 4 4
Setti 4 5ng up a low cost carrier
Airline considers ‘extremely important’
Airline considers ‘somewhat important’
Important Strategies EI BA LH AF IB
Matching the low cost pricing
model (i.e. fares, rules & regulations) 4 4 5
Ability and speed to drop
unprofitable route
Negotiate outsourcing 4 4 3 4
Ability to increase yield in
short -haul market 5 5 5 5 5
Building
Targeted communication to each
customer segment
Ability of management to
implement speedy changes overall 4
Ability to reduce operating costs to
within 30% of low cost carrier 4 4 5 5 5
Reduce overall complexity of 4 4
Change to homogenous fleet 4 4 4
Negotiate labour agreements
with unions 5 5 4 5 5
Negotiating lower airport charges 4 4 4 5 5
Modernise fleet 4 4
Increasing sales through website 4 4 4
strong brand
airline
Level of Difficulty
Airline considers ‘extremely Difficult’
Airline considers ‘somewhat Difficult
10.5 General Findings of the Asian and Australasian carriers
Asia has a population of 3.8 billion people and the flying time between most Asian cities
is within 3 to 4 hours. Consequently, it has been the fastest growing air travel market in
the world during the last two decades. Asia has a doubled edged regulatory system
whereby its long haul routes to the US have very liberal open skies agreements, but, for
intra-Asian services, there remains in place a restrictive, bilateral agreement. However,
OAG (April, 2006) showed that the region is beginning to liberalise and expand its
boundaries as it declared that there were nearly 95,000 more flights within the Asia-
Pacific region in April 2006 as compared to three years earlier. In the US and Europe,
low cost carriers have reached a mature platform as they have been competing against
incumbents for a long time, but in Asia they are regarded as a relatively new entrant.
However, the Centre of Asia Pacific Aviation (February 2006) indicated that the region’s
low cost carriers accounted for 10% of the region’s total capacity in 2006. This meteoric
growth in Asia shows how successful the low cost carrier model has become. Some
Asian nations have experienced a paradigm shift in their domestic markets as low cost
carriers captured 50%, 30% and 45% of the home markets of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Australia respectively by mid 2006. One of the objectives of the research was to find out
the principle difficulties facing the full service airlines in Asia when faced with the threat
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from low cost carriers, and what strategies from their perspective would prove effective
in competing against budget carriers.
10.5.1 The level of difficulty for Asian carriers
The network carriers were asked to identify the level of difficulty that each airline
encountered in responding to low cost carriers, and the results are shown below in Figure
96. The greatest difficulty facing Asian incumbents is their inability to reduce their costs
to within 30% of a low cost carrier, while O’Connell and Williams (2005) showed that
the unit cost difference between Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia, for example, was around
60% in 2004. Lawton and Solomko (2005) explained that Air Asia’s low unit costs are
primarily attributable to its low labour expenses and lean workforce. In comparison, the
Asian incumbents are overstaffed as exemplified by Malaysia Airlines complement of
228 employees per aircraft, while Air Asia had 72% less in 2005. The shortage of pilots
in the region is also exacerbating the high cost structure as the average pilot salary at
ANA, for example, is $182,700 per year (ICAO, 2002). The second biggest difficulty
facing incumbents is that they are unable to match the fares of the budget carriers. Air
Asia is now replicating Ryanair’s strategy of offering millions of seats at RM 1 (US$0.27),
while Ionides (2006) points out that Indonesia’s low cost carrier, Lion Air, regularly sells
two-hour flights for US$55 and one-hour flights for US$22 - this has triggered the Asian
incumbent to reduce fares thereby impacting the overall yield, which was cited as another
major difficulty. The high airport charges188 in Asia have been widely publicised and they
were again addressed in the survey. However, this may become even more problematic
for the Asian network carriers as airports have been accommodating the growth of low
cost carriers by building low cost terminals. Kuala Lumpur and Changi in Singapore, for
example, have already established such terminals, while other airports in Jakarta and
Bangkok have also announced similar construction projects. These terminals will charge
rates that are 60% lower than those charged at the main terminal and they will not
accommodate the transfer of passengers or baggage, thereby forcing network carriers to
continue using the more expensive main terminal (ATI, April 2006). The questionnaire
confirmed the difficulty that Asian network carriers had in persuading customers to use
the airline’s website. The annual Airline Business IT trends survey confirmed the
difficulty that Asian carriers encountered in selling tickets online as it found that only
7.6% of total sales in 2003/04 were in fact online, while a survey by Mastercard at around
the same time concluded that around 90% of bookings in Asia are still conducted via
travel agents, which significantly impacts distributions costs (O’Toole and Pilling, 2004;
Mastercard Asian Lifestyles Survey, 2003). In parallel, the Asian incumbents also find it
difficult to build up a relationship with their customers as most purchase through
intermediaries, thus making it increasingly arduous to retain passengers and get a
188 The aeronautical charges for 737-800 turnaround at the following Asian airports are as follows; Hong
Kong €2,300; Singapore €2,460; Seoul €2,660; Kansai €6,200 (Graham, 2003 p105).
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complete understanding of their requirements. It is clear that Asian incumbents must
focus their advertising campaigns to encourage customers to book through the airlines
website whose users get exclusive access to the lowest fares. Asian incumbents also find
it more difficult than their European counterparts to make speedy changes as many are
still government influenced and are top heavy with management. In contrast to Europe,
unions in Asia appear to be less of a barrier and this was evident when Air New Zealand
found that it could save NZ$48 million by outsourcing its heavy maintenance division -
the unions involved did not launch an objection because it was beneficial to the long-term
prospects of the airline (Airline Business, February 2006). Asian incumbents believe,
however, that their brands are very strong and have little difficulty in leveraging their
strengths, but Lawton and Solomko (2005) described that Air Asia’s brand emphasises
customer service and people, which sends strong signals to the network carriers that
budget carriers can challenge their legacy of ‘renowned hospitability’, while at the same
time offer significantly reduced fares, which will dilute the strength of their brands.
Figure 96. The principle difficulties encountered by the Asian full service airlines when
responding to the low cost carriers.
Reduce costs to within 30% of LCC
Matching fares of low cost carrier
Increase yield in short-haul market
Negotiating lower airport charges
Increasing sales through the airline website
Implement speedy changes
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Reduce overall complexity
Negotiate outsourcing
Modernise fleet
Change to homogenous fleet
Speed to drop unprofitable route
Leverage brand strength
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10.5.2 Important strategies used by Asian network airlines to
respond to low cost carriers.
The responses of the Asian incumbents concerning which strategies they would deem
important in competing against low cost carriers is listed below in Figure 97. The Asian
carriers listed that satisfying the needs of their passengers was of paramount importance.
Noted academics have specifically stated that customer satisfaction is becoming the key
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factor in attracting and retaining customers (Kotler and Keller, 2006; Johnson et al.,
2005). Satisfied customers tend to be loyal and willing to pay higher prices (Reichheld
and Sasser, 1990; Finkelman 1993, Johnson et al. 2005.). Asian based airlines have
traditionally prided themselves on delivering ‘service excellence’ to passengers, and they
have repeatedly outperformed other airlines in global survey rankings. Skytrax, a leading
research group on airline products and services, for example, has listed 7 Asian carriers in
their top 10 world airline rankings for best airlines for 2006, while Air Transport World
ranked Cathay Pacific and All Nippon Airways as their choice for airline of the year for
2005 and 2006 respectively (Skytrax, 2007). A surprise finding from the survey data is
that Asian carriers considered cargo to be their second most important component in
competing against low cost carriers, and is a key revenue differentiator between both
carriers, which is in contrast to the European incumbents. Air cargo is growing at the rate
of 8.6% per annum and, in 2006, it contributed $13.1 billion, representing 17.8% to the
total revenues of the AAPA member airlines, of which around 60% is carried in the
bellyholds of network airlines, so its potential is evident. The region is unique because it
has a number of airlines that have dedicated freighter divisions, such as Korean Airlines
that operates 19 747 freighters, but its entire freight division (including dedicated
freighters and bellyhold capacity) contributes 30% to Korean Airlines group revenues
every year, while other incumbents, such as Malaysia Airlines for example, carry the bulk
of their cargo in the bellyhold of their passenger aircraft - yet this contributed 18% to its
overall revenues in 2005 (Airline Business, November 2006; Conway, 2006; Herdman,
2007). Other important strategies used by Asian incumbents that were also highly ranked
by European carriers include: serving primary airports, product differentiation, frequent
flyer programs, interlining traffic, code sharing and alliance membership. A noteworthy
distinguishing feature found among Asian carriers is their vehemence in setting up low
cost carrier subsidiaries. Their enthusiasm may have been ignited by the success of
Qantas’ Jetstar, which has been very effective in competing against Virgin Blue in the
Australian domestic market because, within 18 months after introducing the subsidiary, it
clawed back 14% of the market and held Virgin Blue’s market share to 34% (ATI,
November 2006). Low cost carriers are a new phenomenon in Asia, yet incumbents have
been extremely fast to set up their own low budget carriers189. They have had the time to
observe the primary failures of the low cost carrier subsidiaries in the US and Europe,
and have accordingly readjusted the business model so that it incorporates the earlier
failings. They strongly believe that this will prove to be an effective strategy in
counteracting the low cost carrier threat. Another interesting revelation is that Asian
carriers consider that business class in short-haul markets is an important attribute and is
a strong reflection of the region’s culture and that maintaining business class will remain
an important differentiator. Skytrax noted in its 2004 global survey that the Asian
189 The following Asian incumbents have set up their own low cost carrier subsidiaries and include: Air
New Zealand (Freedom Air), Singapore Airlines (Tiger Airways) and Thai Airways (Nok Air), while All
Nippon and Korean Airlines have also plans to develop low cost carrier offshoots.
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passenger is the most satisfied with their home carriers when compared to passengers
from other regions, and if the carriers eliminated business class in the short-haul market,
it would up-heave the status quo, inducing major disruption and potential loss of
passenger loyalty (Skytrax, 2004). In contrast to Europe, governments in Asia have the
authority to override strike action190 which makes it easier to implement strategies, and
consequently, unions appear to be more manageable than their counterparts in Europe
and the US.
Figure 97. Important strategies used by Asian network airlines to respond to low cost
carriers.
Satisfying the needs of the passenger
Driving profitability through Cargo operations
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Frequent Flyer Programs
Interlining traffic
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Ticket flexibility & refund ability
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Another interesting finding from the survey illustrates that the majority of Asian network
carriers do not consider CRM to be an important attribute, which is alarming as Kotler
and Keller (2006) explained that the new paradigm shift in marketing is towards
relationship marketing. This is primarily linked to their weak e-commerce platform as
travel agents191 remain the dominant force in booking passengers in Asia. Because of the
high-touch service culture, the relationship subsequently is between the passenger and
190 In 2006, pilots at Korean Airlines for example went on strike demanding a 6.5% pay increase as well as
a 50% increase in bonus pay, while management offered a 2.5% pay increase plus the 50% increase in
bonus pay. Subsequently the Korean Government sided with management stating that the offer was fair and
ordered the pilots to accept the offer and return to work immediately (ATI, January 2006).
191 There are 20,000 travel agents in Asia (O’Toole and Ionides, 2005)
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travel agent, and not between the passenger and the airline. The low numbers of
customers booking tickets through the websites of Asian incumbents have spurred them
to rank dynamic packaging as a relatively unimportant strategy; however, Qantas rated it
as extremely important since it has already experienced its benefits through its low cost
subsidiary, Jetstar, and this may yet prove to be a very important strategy for the Asian
incumbents in time.
10.5.3 The strategic capability of Asian incumbents and its
relationship to operating margin
The results of the survey concluded that Singapore Airlines had the strongest strategic
capability192 of the Asian carriers in competing against the low cost carriers, while Qantas
gained second position. Singapore Airlines was not subject to competition from low cost
carriers when they started to flourish in Asia and carefully observed the demise of
Malaysia Airline’s domestic traffic and the response of Qantas to Virgin Blue in
Australia. At the time, Asia’s fastest growing airline, notably Air Asia, was prohibited
from operating from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore because of a restrictive bilateral, while
Jetstar’s operations concentrated in Australia. This gave the Singaporean incumbent time
to develop strategies to counterattack budget carriers. By the time Valuair, Jetstar Asia
and franchises of Air Asia had arrived at Singapore, the incumbent had already set up a
subsidiary called Tiger Airways, which was able to take advantage of Changi’s new low
cost terminal. Tiger has subsequently repeated the strategies of Air Asia and Jetstar by
setting up bases in Australia and in the Philippines.
Singapore Airlines was one of the few Asian incumbents that strongly recommended
CRM as an extremely important tool for developing life-long relationships with its
frequent flyer members. The incumbent paid particular reference to the success of its
corporate travel policy in question 7, which was an open-ended section of the survey that
allowed executives to expand on the various attributes that had positively contributed to
threat posed by low cost carriers and that impacted its financial position. Singapore
Airlines stated that the corporate agreements had retained the high yield business traveller
in the short-haul market, and this was an important differentiator between the two airline
business models. Singapore Airlines’ other strategies that pushed it into pole position
included: a superior in-flight differentiated product, strong brand, generous frequent flyer
program and alliance membership that allowed its patrons access to 841 destinations in
157 countries through its 17 member carriers. It also places a strong emphasis on
continuous advertising and it has remained focused on promoting the icon, ‘Singapore
Girl’, which has proved to be a successful strategy as it has won the award for 'World's
Best Cabin Crew Service' by the Business Traveller Asia-Pacific Awards for 17
192 This was calculated by subtracting the ‘average deviance’ of strategies that were deemed important
from the ‘average deviance’ of difficulty experienced by each incumbent.
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consecutive years (Singapore Airlines achievements 2007). Singapore Airlines has
diversified from its core business of flying and it stated (analysis from question 7) that
this had positively impacted its revenues and spread its risk. It has heavily invested in
over 50 subsidiaries, which generate substantial revenues for the overall group.
The survey has found that Singapore Airlines did not experience as many difficulties in
implementing its strategies as observers might infer. The closed regulatory system in
Asia had protected the intra-Asian market, as many regions still require bilateral
agreements which constrains the growth of low cost carriers. Air Asia Indonesia (Air
Asia franchise), for example, was forced to cancel its planned inaugural international
service between Jakarta and Singapore after it failed to secure final regulatory approval,
however, this is set to change rapidly in the coming years (ATI, January 2005). Singapore
Airlines has been able to compete on a similar unit cost platform as other budget carriers
through Tiger Airways, while it has also kept the unit costs of its mainline fleet low by
having a young fleet with an average age of just 6 years. The greatest difficulty cited by
Singapore airlines were airport charges, yet Changi Airport only charged US$542 to
turnaround a B737-800 and US$2,607 for B747-400 in 2007, which are some of the
lowest charges in the Asia-pacific region - this gives the incumbent a strong competitive
advantage (Changi Airport, 2007). The survey found that the strategic capability of
Qantas was close to that of Singapore Airlines but it experienced more difficulties in
implementing the following: increasing yield, making speedy changes, targeted
communication to passengers and unions. Qantas also pointed out that certain strategies
were less important than those cited by Singapore Airlines, and it believed that regional
airlines were not an effective strategy to compete against low cost carriers as well as
advertising, CRM and diversifying from its core airline operation. Other Asian
incumbents, such as ANA, Korean, Air New Zealand and Thai, all placed similar levels
of importance on their strategies but all differed in the levels of difficulties that they
encountered in implementing their strategies - thus each experienced a larger deviation
from that of Singapore Airlines. There is a distinct cluster of airlines, namely China
Southern, Air China and Malaysian, that had similar levels of strategic strength and the
positioning of this group, as shown in Figure 98, illustrates that they have placed less
emphasis on implementing strategies when compared to the earlier group of carriers.
These poorly developed strategies are partly due to the influence of their respective
governments who partake in commercial decision making because the government has
retained a large controlling interest193 in each of these incumbents. Each of these carriers
has encountered a lot of problems in each of the following areas: ability to drop a route,
make speedy changes, reduce the complexity of the carrier - which are all characteristics
of bureaucratic governments that interfere with commercial decisions. However,
Philippine Airline and Garuda in particular are two carriers which are completely isolated
from the other incumbents and face the greatest threat from low cost carriers. If the
region becomes fully deregulated, these incumbents do not have the strategic capability
193 Government owns 100% of Air China; 68.1% of China Southern; 69.3% of Malaysian
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to compete and may dissolve or would be prime candidates for merging with another
carrier. They are not members of any alliance nor do they operate any regional feeders
and are heavily reliant on code share partners. They have indicated that many of the core
marketing strategies, such as online selling, CRM, ticket flexibility, dynamic packaging,
advertising and corporate travel policy arrangements, are not very important. They also
encountered a lot of difficulty in implementing a large number of strategies, including
leveraging their brand strength, which indicates that these incumbents realise that their
brands within Asia are weak. They also inferred that it was extremely difficult to reduce
the complexity of their business model, which exasperates their ability to reform.
Figure 98. The strategic capability of the Asian incumbents
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The strategic capability of each carrier was then measured against their 2005 operating
margins and the results are shown below in Figure 99. Singapore Airlines was measured
as the benchmark airline and all the other data points for the other incumbents were
rescaled accordingly. Similar to Europe, there is also a direct correlation (trend line)
between the operating margins and the strategic capability of Asian incumbents.
However, Philippine Airlines and Air China (circled in Figure 99 below) are the
exceptions as the survey pointed out that they had weak strategic capability but that they
had strong financial results as represented by their high operating margins. These
countries have retained tight regulatory controls which have protected their markets,
which may have added to the enhanced margins. In addition, Air China remains heavily
subsidised by its government, and ATI (January, 2007) reported that it received $385
million in 2007 and these payments have distorted its operating margins, as seen in the
figure below. Malaysia Airlines’ (MH) weak position is particularly concerning and its
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future is unclear - it has already retracted from its domestic market because it was unable
to compete with Air Asia and it is also probable that it may also withdraw from intra-
Asian markets as low cost carriers begin infiltrating this market (See section 4.4.1). The
correlation coefficient between the operating margin and the strategic capability is 0.36
which is low and it implies that Asian based airlines with strong strategic capabilities
does not necessarily extract high operating margins unlike their European counterparts.
Figure 99. Comparison of the 2005 operating margins and strategic capability of
the Asian incumbents
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Korean (KE), Malaysia (MH), PAL (PR), Qantas (QF), Singapore (SQ) and Thai (TG).
10.5.4 Asian incumbents’ ability to meet the requirements of their
leisure passenger
The Asian incumbents were asked to rank their perception of what leisure passengers
required and this was then statistically compared to the actual requirements of passengers
which were gathered from surveys conducted in Ireland, Malaysia and India. Table 70
(below) shows the statistical results of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient as
calculated by SPSS. It shows that Singapore Airlines, Qantas, ANA, Korean, Air New
Zealand and Thai have a very strong positive correlation in the ranking of product
features as those expressed by leisure passengers. However, Qantas, Singapore and Air
New Zealand are more strongly correlated because they are statistically significant at the
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1% confidence level. It is interesting to note that Qantas is more correlated than
Singapore Airlines, which perhaps may be due to the fact that Qantas conducted a lot of
research on the leisure passenger market prior to setting up its low cost affiliate, Jetstar.
Malaysia Airlines shows that is has some familiarity with the requirements of leisure
passengers, but clearly it has not grasped the full concept of what leisure passengers are
searching for when choosing an incumbent. It is very possible that the Malaysian
incumbent has not taken account of the changing requirements of passengers since Air
Asia entered the market, and is retaining its outdated perceptions of the requirements of
leisure passengers. However, China Southern, Air China, Philippine Airlines and Garuda
all have negative correlations in the flight products that are required by leisure
passengers, which implies that they are completely unsynchronised with leisure
passengers. The passenger surveys were conducted in a Western cultural environment
and this may have impacted the results of the Chinese incumbents as there is an evident
culture clash between the east and the west - but China is quickly developing into a very
strong global economy and it needs to re-examine the requirements of its leisure
passengers. Philippine Airlines and Garuda have also reported a negative correlation and
these incumbents now need to urgently address this problem as low cost carriers are
increasingly entering into these markets, enticing passengers to switch to the low cost
carriers because they offer flight products that correspond more agreeably with leisure
passengers. The threat to these carriers is already apparent, as Air Asia has already
franchised its operation in Indonesia under a brand called ‘Indonesia AirAsia’ which
operates six 737-300s, while Tiger Airways announced in January 2007 that it will set up
a base in the Philippines. Figure 100 (below) shows the graphical representation using
data from the Table of Critical Values as outlined in the previous section.
Table 70. Statistical analysis of Asian
leisure passengers using the Spearman
rank coefficient.
Figure 100. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of Asian based airlines to match the
requirements of leisure passengers.
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10.5.5 Asian incumbent’s ability to meet the requirements of their
business passenger
The results of the business passengers are shown below in Table 71 and Figure 101. They
show that Singapore Airlines, All Nippon, Air New Zealand, Thai and Malaysia Airlines
all have a strong positive correlation with the requirements of the business passengers,
while Qantas and Korean have expressed different opinions than those of the previous
group. The data suggests that Qantas is neglecting the requirements of its business class
passengers as it is increasingly focusing on its leisure market through its Jetstar
operations194, and that the carrier should urge caution as Arabian Gulf based carriers who
are noted for their superior business class service are obtaining additional traffic rights to
Australia - which may entice passengers to switch because Qantas has failed to address
the needs of its business passengers. Korean Airlines has also been disregarding the
requirements of its business passengers. The literature suggests that Korean Airlines is
very focused on its freight, as this division accounts for almost one-third of its revenues,
and that it has inadvertently neglected its business travellers. Another group of Asian
airlines, notably China Southern, Air China, Philippine Airlines and Garuda, have
reported a negative correlation with respect to their business passengers, and the
Indonesian incumbent in particular has completely misjudged its perception of the
requirements of business passengers. Garuda’s debt is extremely crippling as it owed
US$794 million in 2006 (down from US$1.2 billion in 2001) and it is financially
incapable of investing capital into its flight products, which makes it competitively
disadvantaged when compared to other Asian incumbents (ATI, March 2006). Garuda is
very vulnerable and its best possible outcome may be to merge with another carrier.
Table 71. Statistical analysis of Asian
business passengers using the Spearman
rank coefficient.
Figure 101. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of Asian based airlines to match the
requirements of business passengers.
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194 Jetstar has now expanded its operations to include a Singapore franchise and a newly proposed low
cost long-haul carrier that will serve markets such as Sydney-Honolulu.
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10.5.6 Overview of the strategic capability and ability of Asian
incumbents to meet the requirements of their leisure and
business passengers
The strategic capability of each Asian incumbent and its ability to meet passengers’
preferences (Spearman coefficient) are plotted below. Figure 102 and Figure 103 below
show that there is a link between Asian incumbents that have a weak strategic
capability195 and the poor understanding of passenger requirements, and this is evident
with Philippine Airlines, Garuda and the two Chinese incumbents. These carriers are
struggling financially and government interference adds to their difficulties. Low cost
carriers are now beginning to mount additional challenges for Philippine Airlines and
Garuda, and the evidence shows that they are not prepared and could quickly lose a large
portion of their market share unless they restructure their strategic capability and realign
their marketing focus to incorporate the present day requirements of two distinct
passenger segments, notably leisure and business. Asian incumbents with a medium
strategic strength appear to have a correlation with the demands of both leisure and
business passengers. Malaysia Airlines, however, shows a two sided view of its
understanding of passengers as it excels in its ability to fully meet the expectations of its
business passengers but falls far short when leisure travellers are considered - and this
may have been in part responsible for its withdrawal from the Malaysian domestic
market. It may also face problems in its intra-Asian leisure markets as Air Asia is
increasingly penetrating this market, triggering passengers to switch from the incumbent
which will impact its ability to feed short haul traffic to its long haul operations via its
hub at Kuala Lumpur. Clearly, the Malaysian incumbent urgently needs to amend and
transform its outdated perception of leisure passengers. Many of the Asian incumbents,
such as Thai, All Nippon Airlines, Air New Zealand and Singapore Airlines, have
correctly identified the principle characteristics that satisfy both leisure and business
passengers regardless of their strategic capability. Asian carriers are noted for their
outstanding hospitality and service, which is a cultural trait of these nations, and
numerous incumbents have repeatedly won multiple accolades relating to such service
standards. Skytrax (2007) for example has rated Thai Airways, Malaysia Airlines, ANA
and Singapore Airlines as the first, third, fourth and fifth best cabin crew in the world
respectively for 2006, which shows the emphasis that these incumbents place on
hospitality, and this is reflected in the survey, particularly with regard to the business
passengers.
195 The strategic capability is divided into three sections; low, 0-0.33; medium, 0.34-0.66; and high, 0.67-1.
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Figure 102. Relationship between strategic
capability and ability to meet leisure passenger
requirements.
Figure 103. Relationship between strategic
capability and ability to meet business
passenger requirements.
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The two incumbents with the strongest strategic capability to compete effectively with
low cost carriers are Singapore Airlines (SQ) and Qantas (QF) - this was measured by
investigating the strategies that proved most effective in competing against budget
carriers, but also factored the constraining elements that these incumbents faced when
implementing these strategies. If other carriers that operate within Asia can match or
exceed these attributes, which are listed below in Table 72, then they can mount a
strategic counterattack on low cost carriers that should prove to be effective in competing
against them. Singapore Airlines and Qantas encountered the least number of difficulties
in implementing their proposed strategies when compared to the other Asian incumbents.
If incumbents from this region can improve on their own difficulties and overcome the
major difficulties encountered by Singapore Airlines and Qantas, as shown in Table 73,
then it will improve their overall capabilities in competing with budget carriers.
Singapore Airlines emphasis on partnering with other airlines is especially striking
because it has indicated that the following attributes were very effective: interlining with
other carriers, partnership/ownership with regional carriers, equity in other airlines,
revenues generated from alliance or code share partners and setting up a low cost
subsidiary. It believes that partnering with other carriers can provide a stronger defense
from the advancements of budget carriers than acting alone, as collectively they act as a
more powerful defence mechanism. The partners also provide a mechanism that reaches
out to multiple passenger segments, which poses as a counter-threat to budget carriers.
Singapore Airlines difficulties overall are viewed by Air Asia and Jetstar Asia as
weaknesses that could be exploited in order to gain further inroads into the intra-Asian
markets of the Singaporean incumbent. Interestingly, many incumbents found it difficult
to increase yield in the short-haul market, but Singapore Airlines was not as concerned
because its differentiated and superior in-flight products allowed it to charge a fare
premium and thus retain its yield, which indicates that the Asian market requires airlines
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that can offer such products. Management at Singapore Airlines and Qantas appears to be
well organised and structured as the incumbent has had little difficulty in implementing
certain strategies that were extremely difficult at other Asian carriers - these included:
reducing the complexity, implement speedy changes and matching the low cost pricing
structure. This shows that different departments are working as a cohesive unit to quickly
overcome problems under the close guidance of management. Both incumbents are
making provisions against future low cost carrier entrants and management has a clear
understanding of the impending threats posed by existing and future budget carriers.
Management have set out well structured plans that will protect their home markets and
expand into others. The employees appear willing and motivated to assist in the
restructuring of the airline, and they are interested in its long-term future and success.
Qantas has been highly innovative by setting up a long-haul low cost carrier, while
Singapore Airlines has been more conservative and cautious in expanding its markets
than the Australian incumbent and has been replicating the earlier strategies of Air Asia
and Jetstar by setting up low cost carrier bases in other countries. Singapore Airlines may
have problems in the future with operating its three airline divisions196 as it may dilute its
brand and confuse passengers. However, Singapore Airlines and Qantas have carved out
solid strategies that have made them leaders in reprieving budget carriers within Asia.
Table 72. Important strategies implemented by
Singapore Airlines and Qantas, which proved
effective in competing against low cost carriers.
Table 73. Difficulties encountered by
Singapore Airlines and Qantas in
implementing their strategies.
SQ Q F
FFP 5 5
Satisfying needs of passenger 5 5
Serving prim ary airport 5 5
Serving secondary airport
M aintain business class 5 4
B uilding value thru CR M 5 4
D iversification strategies 5 4
Product D ifferentiation 5 5
T icket flexibility 4
O perate som e routes on a
point to point basis
Advertising 4
D ynam ic Packaging 5
Interlining Traffic 5 5
Partnership/ownership of a
regional carrier 5
Jo int purchasing agreem ents
Cargo 5 4
Full transparency for U nions 4 4
Corporate travel policie s 5
Equity investm ents in other airlines 5 4
Revenues generated from alliance/
code share partners 5 5
Setting up low cost carrier 5 5
Important Strategies
Airline considers ‘extremely important’
Airline considers ‘somewhat important’
SQ QF
Matching the low cost pricing
model (i.e. fares, rules & regulations) 4 4
Ability and speed to drop unprofitable
route
Negotiate outsourcing 4 4
Ability to increase yield in
short-haul market 4 5
Building strong brand
Targeted communicat ion to each
customer segment
Ability of management to implement
speedy changes overall
Ability to reduce operating costs to
within 30% of low cost carrier 5 4
Reduce overall complexity of airline
Change to homogenous fleet 4
Negotiate labour agreements
with unions 4 4
Negotiating lower airport charges 5 5
Modernise fleet 4
Increasing sales through website
Airline considers ‘extremely difficult’
Airline considers ‘somewhat difficult’
Diff iculty
196 Singapore Airlines also operates two other airline subsidiaries which include Silkair and Tiger Airways
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10.6General Findings of the Middle East/Indian/African carriers
The Middle East is leading the world in aircraft orders as $60 billion has been invested by
just three airlines with $27 billion ordered in 2005 alone. Governments have also
committed a further $30 billion for aeronautical infrastructural developments that will
enable the region to become a global competitor within the next decade and equal its
peers in the USA, Asia and Europe (O’Connell, 2006). There are already two established
low cost carriers operating in this region, Air Arabia and Jazeera Airways, while Saudi
Arabia, a country well known for its closed regulatory environment, has allowed two low
cost carriers, Sama and NAS, to begin operations from the Kingdom, which has set a new
momentum of change for the region. Another dynamic market that is witnessing a
meteoric rise in low cost seat capacity is India, which has completely metamorphosed its
outdated regulatory policy, resulting in a three-fold increase in the number of scheduled
airlines and a five-fold increase in the number of aircraft operated. O’Connell and
Williams (2006) stated that there were 14 low cost carriers that were preparing to launch
services in India in 2005 and 2006, with another 5–6 in the planning stage, which is more
than the total complement of such airlines operating in the whole of the Asia Pacific
region and the Middle East in 2004. By November 2006, the four low-cost airlines - Air
Deccan, SpiceJet, Indigo Airline and Go Air - had ammased 27.1% of India’s domestic
market, which severely threatens the home market of the incumbents (The Hindu
Businessline 2006). Africa experienced the second highest passenger growth rate in the
world after the Middle East at 10.1% in 2005 and it is a slowly developing continent
where low cost carriers could thrive. In South Africa for example, low-cost carriers
accounted for a quarter of South Africa’s domestic traffic in 2006 and double-digit
annual growth is expected to continue through to 2010 (Sobie, 2007). South African
Airways set up its own low cost carrier subsidiary, called Mango, in November 2006 to
counteract losing additional domestic passengers to budget carriers such as Kulula and
1Time. Other markets from this region that were included in the study include Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh. The Sri Lanka government has restructured its regulatory framework to
allow Air Deccan to establish a franchise at Colombo, while Air Asia is planning to take
a 49% stake in Sri Lanka’s Holiday Air and rename it AirAsia Lanka (ATI, August
2006). In response, the Sri Lankan incumbent is setting up its own low cost carrier
subsidiary, which shows the urgency and potential dangers envisioned by the incumbent.
Air Asia is planning another franchise in Bangladesh, which is the world’s most densely
populated country, with the Bangladeshi conglomerate, Orion Group, who will retain
51% of the ownership rights.
10.6.1 The level of difficulty for Middle East/Indian/African carriers
The network carriers were asked to identify the level of difficulty that each airline
experienced in being able to respond to low cost carriers and the results are shown below
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in Figure 104. This group of airlines ranked reducing costs to within 30% of a low cost
carrier, matching fares and increasing yield in the short haul market as the three primary
difficulties, which is exactly similar to the views expressed by Asian incumbents.
According to an equity research report for Air Arabia’s pre IPO offering, its unit costs are
50.4% lower than that of Emirates, and its four primary cost advantages stem from the
following: fuel and oil, 20%; labour, 18.4%; sales and marketing, 16.4% and catering
9.3%. These cost savings allow Air Arabia to offer fares that are on average 27% lower
than other competing incumbents in the Middle East (Shuaa Capital, 2007). In India,
O’Connell and Williams (2006) found that Air Deccan had an average unit cost
advantage of 51.7% over the full service carriers of Indian Airlines, Jet Airways and Air
Sahara, and its fares were 30% lower than the incumbents. Consequently, it was
extremely difficult for network carriers in this region to increase yields in the short haul
market, which was the third most difficult task facing the incumbents, as shown below in
Figure 104. These airlines also found that it was very difficult to increase sales through
the internet and are still heavily reliant on the travel agent. The annual Airline Business
IT survey found that only 7% of passengers in the Middle East and Africa were using e-
tickets in 2006 while the online sales through its websites were even lower (Baker, 2006).
In India, O’Connell and Williams (2006) pointed out that the state owned incumbent,
Indian Airlines, did not have a fully enabled website where online tickets could be
purchased in 2005 and subsequently it had to sell 84% of its tickets through travel agents.
Similarly, South African Airways, which is a financially strong carrier with annual
revenues of US$3.3 billion, also relies on intermediaries to sell tickets and its IT platform
is outdated as it is unable to read frequent flyer cards at check-in and award points
accordingly (Sobie and Yazbek, 2007). Overall, this inadequate IT infrastructure, which
is evident in all the carriers in the Middle East/Indian/African region, makes it very
difficult for these airlines to communicate directly with their customers.
Many authors argue that the relationship between the customer and the company is
deemed to be one of its most important assets as it is an effective tool in retaining the
loyalty of existing passengers and impressing those passengers that have recently joined
(Peppers and Rogers 1994 and 1997; Flouris and Oswald, 2006 p69). Interestingly, the
survey detects that airports and airlines have a cooperative type relationship, unlike their
counterparts in Europe and Asia, where airport authorities are more prepared to offer
incentive packages to carriers that are mutually beneficial to both parties. In the UAE for
example, the airline, airport and the region’s aviation policy are all governed by the same
department and this partnership pressurises airports to act in the commercial interests of
airlines. O’Connell (2006) showed that Emirates airport and ATC charges were 70%
lower than British Airways in 2006. In addition, all the airports in the Middle East, Africa
and India operate on a 24-hour basis which allows airlines to smooth out the schedule so
that there is reduced congestion and fewer delays. The survey further uncovered that
unions in this region are not an obstacle in implementing strategies as they are forbidden
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in the Arab states, including the North African Arab states, but they remain problematic
for carriers in the Indian subcontinent and in South Africa. However, all the airlines in
this region find it somewhat difficult to outsource business functions, such as ground
handling, catering, maintenance, etc., because they prefer to retain these divisions in-
house as part of the core competency of the incumbent, and it is also a cultural etiquette
of these nations to provide employment for their citizens. In conclusion to this section,
the majority of these incumbents believe that their brands are very strong, but they should
be cautious as Air Arabia, for example, was awarded the ‘Low Cost Airline of the Year,
2006’ by the Centre of Asia Pacific Aviation, outperforming Southwest, Ryanair, etc.,
and it may become a formidable challenger in the near future, as seen by developments in
the US and Europe.
Figure 104. The principle difficulties encountered by the Middle East /Indian/
African airlines when responding to low cost carriers.
Reduce costs to within 30% of LCC
Matching fares of low cost carrier
Increase yield in short-haul market
Increasing sales through the airline website
Communication to each customer segment
Reduce overall complexity
Negotiating lower airport charges
Implement speedy changes
Change to homogenous fleet
Modernise fleet
Negotiate outsourcing
Speed to drop unprofitable route
Negotiate labour agreements with unions
Leverage brand strength
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10.6.2 Important strategies employed by Middle East/Indian/African
incumbents to compete against low cost carriers.
The responses of the Middle East/Indian/African incumbents on various strategies that
would prove effective in competing with low cost carriers are outlined below in Figure
105. These carriers have expressed that product differentiation and innovation sets them
apart from low cost carrier competition. Holloway (2002, p.395) and Shaw (2004, p.103)
both agreed that the success of the Emirates was partially attributed to its superior in-
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flight products and its innovative characteristics. Its in-flight entertainment system, which
is equipped with E-mail and SMS messaging service, for example, won SkyTrax’s award
for the world’s best in-flight entertainment for the fourth consecutive year. It also
introduced a revolutionary mood-lighting that adjusts the cabin lighting to reflect the time
of day and reduces the effects of jetlag. In India for example, research by O’Connell and
Williams (2006) showed that Air Sahara has pioneered a number of innovative features
for the Indian traveller, including standby fares, extra baggage allowance, airport valet
services, etc. Its uniqueness is also reflected by the manner in which it sells tickets, as it
auctions its surplus capacity through the Internet and gives its customers the opportunity
to pay for tickets over 12 monthly instalments at no interest via a linkup with ICICI
Banks. Royal Jordanian and Egyptair are now some of the few remaining carriers that
give gifts to their business passengers, while South African Airways offers 24-hour
customer service to passengers. The welfare of passengers has now become paramount
for the carriers in this region as the IATA Corporate Travel Survey (2004, p46) identified
that 60% of the most frequently encountered problems experienced by Middle East
residents were in-flight service and crew, but this survey has identified that this weakness
is being addressed by management - because the airlines polled that satisfying the needs
of their passengers is now the second most important strategy among these airlines. In
contrast to Europe and Asia, the survey reveals that network carriers in the Middle East-
India-Africa find that interlining is an extremely important strategy. Doganis (2006,
p.290) emphasises that the business plans of Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad and Gulf
Air are largely focused on transferring long-haul traffic between Europe, Asia, India and
Australasia via an operating hub. Taneja (2003, p.88; 2004, p.181; 2005, p.28) shows that
part of the success of Emirates is attributable to the hub and spoke system that it created
in Dubai. Clark (2007) described that more than 50% of Emirates passengers make a
connection at Dubai airport. Similarly in India, O’Connell and Williams (2006) pointed
out that Jet airways has interline agreements with 122 international airlines which allows
passengers to travel onwards from the international gateways of Jet Airways’ hubs.
Interlining is in fact one of the principle reasons for the merger between Indian Airlines
and Air India as it would bind the vast domestic networks of Indian Airlines to the
readymade international network of Air India. South African Airways also reiterated that
interlining agreements through its code share and alliance partners was its most important
strategy (Sobie, 2007). Advertising is also a very important strategy among these
surveyed airlines, which is unique as the European and Asian carriers had not considered
it as an effective strategic tool. O’Connell (2006) reported that Emirates, for example,
spends around 4% of its income on corporate communications each year. In addition to
its own advertising department (comprised of 250 full time staff), it also uses around 100
advertising agencies which altogether are accountable for around 1,200 campaigns. This
will strengthen the perceived image of the airline in the mindset of the public who may
consider switching from their regular carrier in order to ‘try it out’ and discover if the
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experience is reflective of the advertisements. Research conducted by Mercer Research
(2002) showed that prolonged advertising campaigns significantly impact the decisions of
passengers and that they were four times more likely to choose the airline with the
strongest brand than the airline with the weakest. Another differentiating feature of
airlines in this region is that they still consider business class in short-haul markets to be
an important consideration. The IATA Corporate Travel Survey (2004, p27) confirmed
that 50% and 60% of the business passengers in the Middle East and South Africa,
respectively, found that business and first class offered value for money. The earlier
difficulty cited by these carriers in attracting passengers to book through the website has
significantly impacted their ability to develop strong relationships with their passengers
and subsequently they have rated CRM as an ineffective tool. Similarly, dynamic
packaging was considered as the least important strategy because it is a web enabled tool.
Clearly these incumbents must focus part of their advertising budget on encouraging
passengers to use the website.
Figure 105. Important strategies used by the Middle East /Indian/ African
airlines to respond to low cost carriers
Product differentiation & innovation
Satisfying the needs of the passenger
Interlining traffic
Importance of advertising
Serving primary or hub airport
Maintaining business class in short-haul
Frequent Flyer Programs
Diversification strategies
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Ticket flexibility & refund ability
Travel policy arrangements with corporations
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Operating to secondary airport
Full union transparency
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10.6.3 The strategic capability of Middle East/Indian/African
incumbents and its relationship to operating margin
Similar to Asia, the region has been unexposed to the consequences of deregulation and
subsequently the majority of the Middle East/Indian/African markets are protected from
the onslaught of full open competition. However, changes are infiltrating through the
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region as the UAE and Lebanon have signed up for an open skies policy - but the survey
shows that Emirates is best positioned to take on the low cost carriers as it had the
strongest strategic capability, while South African Airways had the next strongest
capability, as outlined below in Figure 106. Emirates was one of the few carriers that
found the following strategies ‘somewhat difficult’ to implement, while the majority of
the other incumbents found these tasks ‘extremely difficult’. The strategies include:
matching the fares of low cost carriers; increasing the yield in the short-haul market;
communicating with passengers; reducing the complexity; and increasing sales through
the internet. O’Connell (2006) gave an insight into the strategies that have allowed
Emirates to become competitively advantaged, which has positively impacted its strategic
capability. He stated that Emirates’ labour costs constituted only 18% of its operating
costs as labour intensive tasks, such as ground handling, maintenance, catering, call
centres etc., are sourced from the cheap labour markets of India and Pakistan, while the
majority of its revenue accounting and IT requirements are outsourced to India. The
airline’s fuel costs are lower than other carriers because of its proximity to oil production
and refining facilities, which have ultimately reduced its supply chain costs - and it also
hedges its fuel requirements, which saved it $189 million in 2005. Bureaucratic
complexities are reduced because the airline, airport and UAE aviation policy are all
governed by the same administration department. A study by Cranfield University on the
landing charges at 24 airports from around the world for B737-800 aircraft in 2002
established that Dubai had the cheapest landing fee at less than $300, while Paris’
Charles de Gaulle airport was close to $3,300 (including taxes). Emirates shows a pattern
of acquiring large blocks of production capacity from both Boeing and Airbus, and this
was an effective strategy to leverage the list price of the aircraft as well as securing large
volume discounts. In addition, its long-term loans are underwritten by the country’s
proven oil reserves, a measure that secures favourable interest charges on borrowings. Its
operating expenses are paid in US dollars, while the majority of its income comes from
other currencies in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. However, its UAE Dirham
currency is pegged to the US dollar, whose recent weakness has accentuated the carrier’s
cost advantage (O’Connell, 2006). Oman Air placed a higher level of importance on
particular strategies than Emirates had emphasised, and particularly stressed that its code
share partners were a valuable revenue generator and allowed it to offer multiple
frequencies on dense routes, especially to India. In addition, it was the only carrier
declaring that serving secondary airports was an ‘extremely important’ strategy in
competing head-to-head with budget carriers. The carrier however, has been very slow to
make changes to its organisation, as its online booking engine, for example, was
implemented in mid 2006 and the carrier has never dropped a route, indicating that it will
remain with the destination until it becomes profitable, ultimately diluting its
profitability. The survey shows that MEA, Egyptair, Jet Airways, Air Sahara and Gulf
Air have all placed similar weight on the importance of strategies that would be effective
in competing with low cost carriers but have a lot of difficulty in implementing them.
Gulf Air, for example, is headquartered in Bahrain and the survey uncovered that it was
unable to implement speedy changes, reduce the complexity, modernise its fleet, target
passengers and increase sales through the internet. It is jointly owned by two
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governments (Bahrain and Oman) and subsequently operates on a complex two-tier hub
system and changes are slow to occur because they must be approved by both
governments. Gulf Air only launched its first e-ticket in late 2005, which shows the tardy
nature that this carrier has placed on IT development - this has had a cascading effect on
its weak CRM strategy (ATI, November 2005). Another group of incumbents that are
clustered together include Sri Lankan and Indian Airlines, each of which have
experienced similar difficulties as the earlier group, but they have also experienced
additional problems because of unions. However, the group placed a weak emphasis on
certain strategies, which include flexible tickets, product differentiation, travel policy
agreements, cargo, joint purchasing, frequent flyer programs, code sharing, satisfying the
needs of the passenger and advertising, which has negatively impacted their positioning
in Figure 106 below. The Indian incumbents in particular have been experiencing
excessive competition from low cost carriers and they must strengthen these strategies if
they are to gain back market share and become competitively advantaged. Biman
Bangladesh had the lowest strategic capability of all the airlines surveyed and face
multiple problems. The BBC News (2006) reported that the average age of its aircraft is
almost 20 years and that the airline is close to bankruptcy because it has been unable to
pay for fuel at many of the airports that it serves, while it has also been prohibited from
operating to the US because of its poor maintenance standards. The report also states that
the carrier suffers from chronic delays, to the extent that its pays an average of $20 to
each passenger in compensation for the poor on-time performance. The survey found that
Biman Bangladesh had ‘extreme difficulty’ with all the questions and the fact that it has
only one code share partner (Qatar Airways code shares from Doha to Dhaka - Qatar
Airways operates) gives an indication of its poor situation. This incumbent clearly faces
an unclear future.
Figure 106. The strategic capability of the Middle East/Indian/African incumbents.
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Figure 107 (below) compares the operating margins of the Middle East /Indian/African
incumbents to that of its strategic strength. The operating margin of India’s Jet Airways
(9W) is particularly impressive but it was achieved by measures outside of its strategic
capability because the carrier initiated a sale-and-leaseback on five of its Boeing 737
aircraft, which contributed to its enhanced profit margin. However, the weak strategic
capability encountered by Air Sahara, Gulf Air, Indian Airlines, Royal Jordanian and Sri
Lankan (see above) has impacted the ability of these carriers to produce strong operating
margins. Kuwait Airways is another problematic carrier as it produced a 12.8% negative
operating margin for 2005. Its government invested around $1 billion in 2005 in order to
keep the flag carrier solvent and these handouts have been continuously mismanaged as
the carrier is overstaffed and the government interferes in commercial decisions (Shaar,
2006). The correlation coefficient between the operating margin and the strategic
capability is 0.32 which is low and it implies that Middle East/Indian/African based
airlines with strong strategic capabilities does not necessarily extract high operating
margins and is similar to that noted with the Asian based carriers.
Figure 107. Comparison of the 2005 operating margins and strategic capability
of the Middle East /Indian/ African incumbents.
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Note 1: Emirates (EK), South African (SA), Jet Airways (9W), Gulf Air (GF), Royal Jordanian (RJ), MEA (ME),
Air Sahara (S2), Indian Airlines (IC), Sri Lankan (UL), Kuwait Airways (KU), Yemenia (IY)
Note 2: There were no operating margins available for Biman Bangladesh (BG); Egyptair (MS); Oman Air (WY).
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10.6.4 Middle East /Indian/African incumbents’ ability to meet the
requirements of their leisure passenger
The airlines that best matched the ranking of flight products of leisure passengers are
shown statistically in Table 74 and diagrammatically in Figure 108 below. They show
that Emirates, Jet Airways and Oman Air have an excellent understanding of their leisure
passenger requirements, as indicated by the results produced through SPSS. Statistically,
these carriers have very high values for the spearman rank correlation coefficient and are
significant at the 0.01 confidence level, while Emirates registered that strongest
correlation. O’Connell (2006) stated that Emirates has received more than 270 accolades
and awards globally, and one of the most notable of these accolades has been the Skytrax
Airline of the Year award, which is the global barometer of passenger opinions about
airlines around the world - the research company has consistently placed Emirates in the
top five world rankings from 2001 to the present day. Similarly in India, O’Connell and
Williams (2006) noted that Jet Airways had the distinction of being repeatedly judged
India’s ‘Best Domestic Airline’ and has won several national and international awards.
Oman Air operates a small fleet of 9 short-haul aircraft with 1,100 employees and this
small operation with its high aircraft/employee ratio allows the carrier to focus
specifically on its passengers. South African Airways and Gulf Air are very close to
understanding their leisure passengers but statistically they are not significant. Egyptair,
MEA and Air Sahara have a much weaker understanding of their leisure passengers’
requirements and may lose passengers to other competitors. However, six incumbents
from the Middle East/Indian/ African region, which represents 42% of the sampled
airlines, have negative correlations in the ranking of flight products, which is alarming -
these include Royal Jordanian, Indian Airlines, Sri Lankan Airlines, Kuwait Airways,
Yemenia and Biman Bangladesh. O’Connell and Williams (2006) pointed out that Indian
Airlines’ domestic market share fell from 67% in 1993 to 43% by 2005 and this
misunderstanding of passenger’s requirements may be partly responsible for the decline.
Yemenia and Biman Bangladesh have completely misjudged their leisure passengers and
urgently need to readdress this issue. It is surprising to note that there is no low cost
carrier yet serving these two markets but they will certainly experience a rapid decline in
their market share when budget carriers begin to invade their markets.
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Table 74. Statistical analysis of Middle
East/Indian/African leisure passengers
using the Spearman rank coefficient.
Figure 108. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of Middle East/Indian/African airlines to
match the requirements of leisure passengers.
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level
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10.6.5 Middle East /Indian/ African incumbents’ ability to meet
the requirements of their business passenger
The analysis is repeated for business passengers, shown below in Table 75 and Figure
109, and again Emirates emerges as the clear leader. They show that the incumbent has
successfully shaped its business class product to reflect the needs of business class
passengers and that it pays close attention to the changing demands of its customers.
Other carriers, such as Jet Airways, Gulf Air and Oman Air, have also closely aligned
their flight products to match the requirements of their business passengers and could
challenge Emirates on this front. However, South African Airlines, MEA and Air Sahara
have again misjudged the needs of passengers and they need to restructure their
marketing approach as they have miscalculated the expectations of both leisure and
business passengers. In fact, 50% of the surveyed incumbents have completely
misaligned the requirements of business passengers (negative correlation) and this may
explain why Emirates has become a strong incumbent in the Middle East/Indian/African
region - because it meets the expectations of business passengers. The danger facing
carriers such as Royal Jordanian, Egyptair, Indian Airlines, Sri Lankan, Kuwait Airways,
Yemenia and Biman Bangladesh is that their business passengers may switch to Emirates
and compare services, which may persuade them to permanently switch carriers, further
impacting these weak carriers.
.
343
Table 75. Statistical analysis of Middle
East/Indian/African business passengers
using the Spearman rank coefficient.
Figure 109. Descriptive analysis showing the
ability of Middle East/Indian/African airlines to
match the requirements of business passengers.
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10.6.6 Overview of the strategic capability and ability of Middle East
/Indian/ African incumbents to meet the requirements of their
leisure and business passengers.
The strategic capability of each incumbent and its ability to meet passengers’ preferences
(Spearman coefficient) for both leisure and business passengers are plotted below in
Figure 110 and Figure 111. These incumbents are unique because they have almost
similar understandings of the needs of both leisure and business passengers, regardless of
their strategic capability. Kuwait Airways, MEA and South African Airways, for
example, have low, medium and high strategic capabilities197, yet they have each equally
miscalculated the requirements of both leisure and business passengers. Analysis of the
diagrams below shows that incumbents with a medium strategic capability can have an
excellent understanding of their passengers, as seen with Oman Air, Gulf Air and Jet
Airways. Oman Air is the smallest incumbent from the entire survey in terms of
passengers carried and fleet size, yet it has managed to have a full comprehension of the
requirements of both its leisure and business class passengers, and the survey shows that
this airline could easily increase the size of its passenger base at a far faster rate than
larger incumbents such as Egyptair or Indian Airlines. Oman Air is now expanding its
short haul fleet to include widebody A330s and it may become the Gulf’s new leading
carrier and present other competitors with a formidable challenge. The proposed merger
197 The strategic capabilities are rated from the following; 0 – 0.33, low; 0.34 – 0.66, medium; 0.67 – 1,
high.
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between Jet Airways and Air Sahara may be very successful as both carriers have a
medium strategic capability and Jet Airways could restructure Air Sahara’s weaker
marketing perspective on its passengers by incorporating its own enhanced understanding
of passenger requirements, which would challenge the recent market share gains of Air
Deccan. The underperforming carriers of Biman Bangladesh, Yemenia and Kuwait
Airways, together with their complete misinterpretation of both leisure and business
passengers, will compound their ability to compete in the market place and the revenues
of these incumbents may continue to fall, triggering increased losses and forcing their
respective governments to offset the losses by injecting additional subsidies. However,
the dominant leader from this group is Emirates as it has the strongest strategic capability
and has an excellent perception of passengers - this analysis shows that this incumbent
should not encounter a lot of difficulty in filling the seats of its 120 aircraft that it has on
order, which will intensify the competition between budget carriers and the network
incumbents alike. Emirates is unique as it operates a fleet of all widebody aircraft, which
are deployed in the short haul markets and consequently accrue higher unit operating
costs compared to airlines that operate short haul narrowbody equipment, but its
increased seat and freight capacity will offset some of the higher costs. Once this region
is fully deregulated, then the true effect of low cost carriers will emerge, but Air Arabia
has the first mover advantage and will be well positioned in the marketplace to be a
formidable competitor to Emirates. The two incumbents with the strongest strategic
capability to compete effectively with the low cost carriers are Emirates (EK) and South
African Airlines (SA) - this was measured by investigating the strategies that these
incumbents found most effective in competing against budget carriers but also factored
the constraining elements that these incumbents had in implementing their strategies.
Figure 110. Relationship between strategic
capability and ability to meet leisure passenger
requirements.
Figure 111. Relationship between strategic
capability and ability to meet business
passenger requirements.
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If other carriers that operate within the Middle East, India and Africa can match or
exceed these attributes, which are listed below in Table 76, then they can mount a
strategic counterattack on low cost carriers that should prove to be effective. If
incumbents from this region can improve on their own difficulties and overcome the
major difficulties encountered by Emirates or South African Airlines, as shown in Table
77, then they will improve their capabilities in competing with budget carriers and it
should halt the decline in their market share. Emirates for example, has listed 12
‘extremely important’ and 1 ‘somewhat important’ strategies that they consider to be
efficacious and hard hitting. Emirates emphasis on passengers, however, sets it apart
from other carriers in the region and is a vital component in assisting it to compete with
low cost carriers. It has listed that satisfying the needs of the passenger, frequent flyer
programs, CRM, ticket flexibility and corporate travel policy are ‘extremely important’,
while Jet Airways and MEA, for example, listed all these as less important and South
African Airways had completely disregarded the importance of CRM and ticket
flexibility. Emirates paid particular reference to satisfying the needs of its passenger in
the open-ended question 7 of the survey. This quartion asked each carrier to list its most
important attribute that positively impacted its financial position when competing with
budget carriers - Emirates strongly believed that passengers would be willing to pay a
price premium for superior flight products and that its strong customer service presence
gives the passenger reassurance that any obstacle endured with the service will be quickly
resolved. The Middle East region is also unique because it has little difficulty in
implementing strategies - there is no resistance from employees as the region’s
commercial climate forbids strikes and there are no unions allowed. It can be clearly seen
from Table 77 that Emirates has no difficulty in implementing speedy changes,
negotiating labour agreements and negotiating outsourcing, while the Indian incumbents
and South African Airways experienced major problems with unions and outsourcing. As
the Middle East/Indian/African region becomes deregulated, there will be an exponential
growth in low cost carriers as more entrants will emerge and existing carriers will expand
their operations. Emirates is clearly poised to mount a strong challenge against budget
carriers and the evidence suggests that it should continue to be a leader in the region.
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Table 76. Important strategies implemented by
Emirates and South African Airlines which proved
effective in competing against low cost carriers.
Table 77 Difficulties encountered by
Emirates and South African Airlines in
implementing their strategies.
EK SA
M atching the low cost pricing
model (i.e. fares, rules & regulations)
Ability and speed to drop
unprofitable route
Negotiate outsourcing 4
Ability to increase yield in
short -haul market 5 5
Building strong brand
Targeted communication to each
customer segment
Ability of management to implement
speedy changes overall
Ability to reduce operating costs to
within 30% of low cost carrier 4 4
Reduce overall complexity of airline
Change to homogenous fleet 4
Negotiate labour agre ements
with unions 5 5
Negotiating lower airport charges 4 4
M odernise fleet
Increasing sales through website
Airline considers ‘extremely Difficult’
Airline considers ‘somewhat Difficult
EK SA
FFP
Satisfying needs of passenger
Serving primary airport
Serving secondary airport
Maintain business class
Building value thru CRM
Diversification strategies
Product Differentiation
Ticket flexibility
Operate some routes on a point
to point basis
Advertising
Dynamic Packaging
Interlining Traffic
Partnership/ownership of a
regional carrier
Joint purchasing agreements
Cargo
Full transparency for Unions
Corporate travel policies
Equity investments in other airlines
Revenues generated from alliance/
code share partners
Setting up low cost carrier
Airline considers ‘extremely Important’
Airline considers ‘somewhat Important’
Important Strategies Difficulty
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10.7 Strategies that are effective in competing with low cost carriers.
The last question in the survey asked each strategy director to ‘think outside the box’ and
report strategies that were not in the mainstream, but could prove to be beneficial in
competing with low cost carriers and the responses are listed below.
 Divide the cabin into three sections: business class, premium economy and economy
 Install a premium economy (more leg room) on all short-haul aircraft and charge a
premium to use it
 Schedule flights at peak times (i.e. early morning and late afternoon) from secondary
airports to provide more competition for low cost carriers
 Show the true statistics on how many passengers were left stranded by low cost carriers
 The cost of food, beverages and newspapers can be offset by accompanying
advertisements
 Charge passengers for the privilege to connect to other carriers
 Joint purchasing has enormous potential in reducing costs
 IATA should collaborate and invest in the Global New Entrants (GNEs) technology
and bypass the GDSs altogether as their fees are exorbitant
 Remunerate passengers financially through the frequent flyer program when they reach
a particular number of miles
 Airlines should take the email address and mobile number of all its passengers at check-
in and incorporate them into its e-commerce platform
 Triple the frequent flyer points on all short-haul flights
 On every short-haul flight give every passenger a discount voucher to use on future flights
 Increase the baggage allowance for both carry-on and check-in and install RFID
technology to reduce the risk of losing luggage
 Train all staff to be friendly, courteous, hospitable and sincere
 Have more staff at important customer contact points such as check-in, boarding, on-
board and at disembarkation
 Cross train all service related personnel to perform multiple tasks i.e. cabin crew,
check-in, call centre, etc
 Bring back the style, glamour and class that was once associated with network airlines
 Install entertainment pods at every seat, which are free to customers and use advertising
revenues to offset the expense
 Educate passengers on board to use the airline’s website via an IFE system
 Replace all seat covers, carpets and impregnate all interior cabin panels with perfumes to
replicate the interior of a new aircraft.
 Reduce the weight of all aircraft furnishings through composites
 Maintain an aircraft on standby at all times, as this ensures reliability
 It should be mandatory that all pilots perform training duties in the simulators as part of
their work function and this will not impact their flight hours
 Cargo must be considered as a critical element and carriers should become subcontractors
for express freight operators such as FedEx, DHL, etc.
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10.8 Concluding comments
This chapter discusses the results of the IATA survey undertaken as part of the empirical
validation of this Thesis. Major network airlines across the continents participated in the
survey, which aimed at highlighting the strategic capabilities of incumbents to face the
challenges posed by low cost carriers. Emphasis was also put on the ability of traditional
airlines to meet customer requirements; the most efficient carrier in each geographical
group was used as the benchmark against which the relative position of all other airlines
was assessed. The results were derived from structured questions using Likert opinion
scales. A recurring theme was the major problems that were listed by all the incumbents,
namely: reducing costs to within 30% of the low cost carrier, matching low cost carrier
fares and increasing yield in the short-haul markets. The operating cost gap has been
closing over recent years between the two airline business models, but the survey
indicates that network carriers now firmly believe that they will not be able to achieve the
same unit costs as low cost carriers and must find other ways to offset this disparity, such
as finding alternate revenue streams that will improve the overall margin between
revenues and costs. The high cost structure of the network carriers significantly impacts
their ability to offer fares comparable to low cost carriers, and they also believe that
differentiated flight products allows them to offer a fare premium - but this method has
not triggered mass volumes of passengers to travel, unlike with the budget carriers.
Network airlines worldwide have considerably lowered fares and, consequently, they are
extremely concerned about the continuous decline of yields, which has now become a
permanent problem in short-haul markets. In Europe, unions remain a difficult obstacle to
overcome as they disrupt the restructuring process of airlines and have strongly resisted
change. The inadequate e-commerce platform is another strongly echoed difficulty facing
network carriers worldwide: travel agents still appear to be in control and the network
carriers have not capitalised on the potential of Customer Relationship Management
processing which would allow them to communicate directly to passengers and harness
knowledge on the value (low, medium, high) of the passengers. This has also impacted
on their opportunity to generate additional revenues from dynamic packaging - Ryanair,
for example, currently generates 15% of its turnover from this activity.
The recurring message of the most important strategies gathered from the network
airlines worldwide were as follows: satisfying the needs of the customer, serving primary
airports, product differentiation and innovation, and frequent flyer programs. The high
growth of low cost carriers worldwide has triggered network carriers to re-evaluate why
so many passengers have been switching, and they have made satisfying the needs of
passengers a priority – this has now become the most important objective of the network
carriers. Serving primary airports will remain a core part of the overall strategy of
network carriers, despite their high charges, as they allow carriers to interline their own
traffic (short-haul to long-haul) as well as being profit centres that accommodate the
interlining of traffic from code share and alliance partners. Product differentiation and
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innovation remain paramount in the armoury of network carriers when confronting
budget carriers and they are trying to widen the gap between the two airline business
models in this area in order to further delineate the different products that network
carriers offer passengers. Frequent flyer points are an important trait, synonymous with
the legacy of network carriers, and provide a bolt-on incentive for passengers to reuse a
particular carrier while also generating revenues from other service providers, such as
hotels who buy mileage from airlines and give it to customers as a loyalty gesture. Cargo
is an important attribute of Asian carriers in particular, and one that should be considered
by other incumbents, as they have developed long term relationships with freight
forwarders over the last few decades – the other incumbents should capitalise on this
market as the operational constraints at primary airports make it difficult anyhow to
pursue fast turnarounds. In the Middle East/Indian/African market, advertising was
considered as a core feature - while the media in Europe and Asia is flooded with
advertisements from low cost carriers, the full service airlines have not informed the
general public of the value-adding differentiated products that they have deemed so
important.
Incumbents with a strong strategic capability of competing with low cost carriers
generally have a good perception of the requirements of both leisure and business
passengers, while the network carriers with weak strategic capabilities generally have a
poor perception of the requirements of passengers, and it is these carriers that are most at
risk from the no-frills carriers as they could lose market share very quickly. However,
there are a large number of incumbents that have a medium strategic capability: they have
a mixed perception of the demands of both leisure and business passengers and could be
classed as ‘stuck in the middle’ airlines - these carriers need to refocus their overall
direction and re-assess the requirements of their passengers. The incumbents with a
medium strategic capability and poor understanding of the requirements of passengers are
also at most risk from budget carriers, while similar airlines with a good understanding of
the demands of passengers are in an excellent position to defend their market share and
counterattack the advancements of low cost carriers. Overall, there remains a large
number of different characteristics between the network and low cost carrier models,
such as: corporate business passengers, business class, cargo, alliances, joint purchasing
opportunities, interlining, regional airline affiliates, equity investments, diversified sub-
industries (e.g. maintenance, catering, etc), frequent flyer programs (however this is now
becoming an integral part of many low cost carriers), as well as their brands that portray
the legacy of trust, quality, dependability and unparalleled customer service. Network
carriers must capitalise on these strengths.
The survey concluded by asking management to ‘think outside the box’ and report unique
strategies that might prove beneficial, and it seems that the airline sector is neither short
of ideas nor innovation. What matters, however, is efficient implementation in a thought-
provoking manner. After all, restructuring is deemed successful only if it manages to
deliver concrete results and raise profitability.
350
11 Chapter 11: Conclusion and Recommendations
11.1 Introduction
The reason for endeavouring on this research path was because there had been little
academic discourse on the response of network airlines to low cost carriers and what
they could do or, more to the point, their capability in being able to respond, which will
ultimately become the main drivers to challenge the budget carriers. The voice from
industry is loud and clear: the short-haul operations of network carriers are in trouble
and there is a real need to identify worthwhile strategies and take note of actions of
carriers that have been successful in their attempts to counter budget carriers. By
March 2006 for example, low cost carriers had secured 8% of the intra-Asian market
and 23% and 27% of the intra-European and US domestic markets respectively. In
other parts of the world low cost carriers have also being growing quickly: Gol gained
25% of the Brazilian market, Air Deccan claimed 10% in India, Virgin Blue acquired
30% in Australia, while Air Arabia had taken 6% of the Intra Gulf market by 2006.
OAG (December, 2006) calculated that the total number of low cost carrier seats
worldwide was up by 16% over the year 2005/06 and there appears to be no stopping
the continuous growth, year after year, of these budget carriers, which are increasingly
impacting the network airlines.
The impetus for this research centred on finding successful strategies that are within the
capability of the full service airlines to compete effectively against low cost carriers
which are now becoming a major threat. The aims of the research given in chapter 1
were:
 To uncover the key factors which have been responsible for the continued growth and
success of low cost carriers, and to assess their impact on the full service airline
business model.
 To obtain insights into the perceptions of passengers to a change in fare between low
cost carriers and full service airlines, while determining which flight products are
most important to passengers travelling on each type of carrier.
 To measure the strategic capability of full service airlines in responding to low cost
carriers and to ascertain the former’s understanding of the requirements of
passengers.
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11.2 Discussion
11.2.1 To uncover the main drivers that have contributed to the
success of low cost carriers and to assess their impact on full
service airlines.
 Deregulation allowed airlines the freedom to enter markets and to launch routes
where they identified a market opportunity, and the freedom to set fares at whatever
level they deemed appropriate. Low cost carriers in the US and EU flourished after
deregulation and they have unambiguously increased the level of competition in the
industry. They have done this in three main ways: firstly, by reducing the level and
changing the structure of fares; secondly, by offering new destinations or operating to
alternative airports that serve the same ultimate destination already served by existing
carriers; and thirdly (a later development), by offering high levels of frequency on the
denser routes. However, Europe’s incumbents have been short-sighted because they
have not taken full advantage of the liberalised conditions that prevailed after
deregulation and consequently, they remained entrenched in their respective markets
while the low cost carriers took full advantage by developing multiple hubs across the
continent. In Asia, liberalisation is creeping across the region as its domestic markets
are now almost all deregulated and the budget carriers are already circumnavigating
the remaining intra-Asian restrictive bi-laterals by developing franchises, which are
likely to accelerate the move towards the dismantling of regulatory barriers as
respective governments recognise that they are becoming ineffective and that low
cost carriers will economically benefit the region. This is certain to become the
world’s next biggest market for low cost carriers.
 Network airlines are saddled with both legacy and high operating costs which are
limiting their ability to compete. Academics have proclaimed that 60-80% of the cost
gap can be closed, yet Aer Lingus is one of the few incumbents that have achieved
such a radical transformation. Legacy costs, such as pension payments, overstaffing,
labour inefficiencies, old generation aircraft, etc., have now become a major legacy
cost issue. Low cost carriers, such as Southwest, Ryanair and Air Asia, have been
prospering by exploiting a huge cost of operations advantage, outlined below, which
is subsequently passed to consumers as lower fares.
o Simplified fleet structure which reduces maintenance and pilot costs, and makes
scheduling aircraft easier.
o Fast turnaround times, which increases aircraft utilisation and therefore the
productive flying time of the aircraft.
o Use of secondary airports, which are generally cheaper, and also emptier,
allowing quicker operations than the main hub airports.
o Low cost carriers focus on shorter routes, allowing them to maximise the
number of trips made by each aircraft.
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o Ticket sales are carried out directly by the airline, reducing the costs of sales.
o Single class allowing for a dense seating configuration.
o Flights are normally only available on a point-to-point basis, with the carriers
not providing for connecting services (European and Asian low cost carriers).
 Low cost carriers have also devised alternative ways to increase revenues by such
methods as selling on-board and through dynamic packaging whereby the consumer
combines individual travel components online to create a customized package - it is
quickly replacing both online and offline purchases of traditional vacation packages.
Ryanair, for example, secured additional revenues of $9.80 per passenger in 2006,
which accounted for 18% of its overall revenues.
 The impact of low cost carriers on full service airlines has been very significant
indeed. By 2005 around 35 low cost carriers were operating in Europe but the
alarming statistic was that over 50% of all low cost carrier routes had been started in
the previous two years, signalling major problems ahead for incumbents. Losses of
US$6.3 billion were accumulated by the members of the Association of European
Airlines on their intra-European routes during 2000 – 2005, which indicates that low
cost carriers are significantly impacting the losses. In the UK, for example, up to 46%
of the intra-European market and around half of the domestic market is now under
threat from budget carriers, and this sends a strong signal to other European
incumbents who have not yet been threatened significantly by budget carriers.
Similarly, in the US more than 60% of all passengers had the option of taking either a
low cost carrier or one of the Major network airlines by 2005, which again has
impacted the latter’s ability to generate revenues in the domestic market. United
Airlines, for example, had lost over $7 billion from its North American operation
over the five year period 2001-2005. Subsequently, the US Majors began transferring
domestic capacity to international operations, which is escaping from the problem at
hand. In Asia, where low cost carriers have been in operation for a short period,
substantial change has already taken place. Malaysia Airlines, for example, became
the regions’ first causality as it could not compete on the domestic sectors with Air
Asia. Low cost carriers such as Jetstar, Tiger Airways and Air Asia, are beginning to
develop multiple bases across Asia and the pace of low cost carrier growth in the
region is reaching significant levels.
 Another major threat that will have a significant impact on the future of network
carriers is the number of aircraft ordered by low cost carriers. They have secured the
majority of the short-haul narrow body aircraft production slots for the next few
years, which will provide the necessary capacity for these carriers to continue to
expand. Europe’s four leading budget carriers had firm orders for over 330 aircraft by
mid 2005 while the combined backlog of the traditional network carriers was only 26
narrowbody aircraft. Similarly in the US, Southwest, Jetblue and Air Tran had
collectively ordered 323 aircraft, while very few orders were placed by Majors, and
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the same type of story also unfolds in Asia. However, this forces network airlines to
order later into the economic cycle, as aircraft prices soar and move ever closer to an
economic downturn. Management at full service airlines inadvertently failed to
capitalise and take advantage of the lower aircraft prices after 9/11 events - generally
they are not as visionary as their low cost carrier counterparts.
11.2.2 Insights into the perceptions of passengers to a change in
fare between network and low cost airlines while determining
which flight products are most important to passengers.
The results from the three passenger surveys conducted in India, Ireland and Malaysia are
aggregated to reflect an overall worldwide picture of the passengers travelling both full
service airlines and low cost carriers worldwide. The literature heavily inferred that fare
was the primary constituent of why passengers had chosen to journey with low cost
carriers. The passenger surveys all supported this theory, that fare was in fact the primary
reason for selecting low cost carriers. Fares were collected for low cost carriers and full
service airlines from Australia, Ireland, Malaysia, UK and US over a three month period
in 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05, and the general view was that network airlines were
closing the gap in fares between the two groups of airlines. Fare data collected for
2004/05 indicated that the average fare difference (weekend return) between network and
budget carriers had reduced to around 30%.
The analysis of the passenger surveys comprises two elements. The first investigates how
many of passengers travelling on low cost carriers would switch, or not switch, to full
service airlines if the fare of the latter was reduced by increments of 10%, 20%, 30%.
The following represents the aggregated average responses of passengers travelling on
Ryanair, Air Asia and Air Deccan, which are regarded as the low cost airline leaders in
Europe, Asia and India respectively. The results give an overall representation of the
passenger dynamics that researchers should expect to find in any passenger market
worldwide, but particularly in Europe and Asia.
 If the fare was reduced by 10%, then a very small proportion of leisure passengers
travelling on low cost carriers would switch to a network airline as it would not
constitute enough of an incentive.
 If the fare was reduced by 20%, it would trigger an average of around 18.6% of
leisure passengers and almost 13% of the business passengers to switch to the
competing network carriers.
 If the fare was reduced by 30%, then there would be a significant shift in the
competition between network and budget carriers, as an average of 32.5% of leisure
passengers travelling on low cost carriers would to switch to network carriers,
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including almost 71% of their business passengers. The latter become increasingly
attracted to the network airlines because of their range of additional flight products
such as use of primary airports, reliability, connections, stronger schedule, frequent
flyer points, increased levels of service and comfort, etc.
 Overall, this indicates that the incumbents can significantly influence passengers who
travel today on low cost carriers. If the network carriers can align fares close to that
of low cost carriers then they will entice on average of around 60% of the latter’s
leisure passengers and a staggering 84% of their business passengers, which will then
significantly threaten the low cost airlines and reverse the competitive dynamics
between both carrier types. Therefore, it is critical that network carriers reduce costs
and find alternative solutions to generating revenues which will cross subsidise lower
fares and thus mount an aggressive counterassault on low cost carriers.
 However, many passengers travelling on low cost carriers would like to remain loyal
and would not be persuaded to travel with a full service airline. Budget carriers
worldwide now regularly offer promotions whereby they sell millions of seats at very
low prices and sometimes give away free seats, which stimulate many passengers to
book tickets with the underlying perception that the flight will be cheap. An apparent
marketing weakness associated with the full service airline model is that they have
not advertised their extensive portfolio of airline products (including low fares) on
their short-haul routes and this has not aroused the attention of the general public to
consider network carriers when booking. An average of around 40% of leisure
passengers who travel on low cost carriers would prefer not to switch to a full service
airline and 16% of the business passengers.
The second element of the passenger survey investigated the requirements of passengers
who travel on full service airlines and low cost carriers. As mentioned earlier, low cost
carrier passengers are primarily influenced by fare, but there are particular segments of
full service airline passengers that require different flight products. The following
represents the average aggregate response of the passengers who travelled on full service
airlines including Aer Lingus, Air Sahara, Indian Airlines, Jet Airways and Malaysia
Airlines. These airlines are operating in a very difficult environment as they face
excessive competition from respectively Ryanair, Air Deccan and Air Asia. The survey
captures the requirements of these passengers and gives an overall representation of the
dynamics that researchers should expect to find in any passenger market worldwide, but
especially in Europe and Asia.
 The surveys concluded that on average 26% of passengers travelling on low cost
airlines and 23.7% of leisure passengers journeying on full service airlines require the
same primary flight product, as they have selected fare as the most important
characteristic for choosing each carrier. Therefore, it can be inferred that almost one-
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quarter of leisure passengers travelling on full service airlines (worldwide) could very
easily have chosen a low cost carrier to take their trip. However, the study indicated
that these travellers are low value passengers as they take infrequent trips - but
incumbents still need to target this passenger segment. An effective yield
management strategy can safeguard losing some of these passengers because it could
assign a specific number of seats at fares lower than those of the low cost carrier,
which would entice these passengers to take the full service airline.
 The analysis also found that there is another distinct group of leisure passengers who
travel on full service airlines that require a different set of flight products than the
group mentioned above. The study found that just over three-quarters of leisure
passengers place less emphasis on fare because they have a higher value other flight
products such as schedule and reliability - this segment clearly values time and
dependability. Many leisure passengers today are ‘cash rich but time poor’ or want to
reduce inconvenience (e.g. secondary airports) by as much as possible. This suggests
that network carriers can retain a large portion of leisure passengers if they offer good
schedules that have suitable departure timings, serve primary airports and offer high
frequency on the route, while at the same time keeping the service highly
differentiated from low cost carriers by offering dependable high quality service.
However, fare is still an important characteristic to these passengers and network
airlines must also keep fares relatively close to those being offered by low cost
carriers. Other characteristics, such as quality, connections and frequent flyer
programs, also have an influence on the decision to book with the full service airlines.
Network airlines also should build long-term mutually beneficial relationships by
using tools such as Customer Relationship Management (CRM) which analyse the
demand patterns of passengers and can target their specific needs on a one-to-one
basis. Generous bonus points should also be awarded to this specific group of
passengers as it allows airlines to develop a deeper relationship.
 The business passenger market however, was more segmented than the leisure
market. The aggregated surveys concluded that an average of around 12% of the
business passengers who travel on either a full service airline or a low cost carrier
(Europe and Asia) share the same flight product requirements, as they valued fare as
the most important criteria for selecting both carriers - this group of business
passengers represents those people that can easily switch between airlines. Most of
these passengers are either self employed or work for small companies and are
infrequent travellers and thus are classified as low value business passengers.
Incumbents should not ignore small businesses and forge relationships with them by
offering value-building incentives such as ticket flexibility, because many small
businesses later develop into powerful and leading enterprises, and they may retain
the services of companies that assisted them during their growth years.
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 Business passengers taking low cost carriers remain steadfast in pointing out that fare
is the principle motivator for choosing the carrier. However, a different type of
business passenger travels on full service airlines as they offer an extended range of
flight products that specifically targets the business passengers’ needs. The study
indicates that an average of 40% of business passengers required a specific set of
flight products that were ranked in order of importance as follows: schedule,
reliability, frequent flyer program, connections and corporate policy/quality. These
passengers are generally travelling to events such as meetings or conferences, which
would be considered to be more important in nature than other business trips, while
the majority work for very large companies that employ over 100 people, with a
substantial number working for companies that employ over 1,000 workers. This
group are frequent travellers and consequently they generate a lot of revenue for
incumbents and are classified as high value - high yield passengers. Network airlines
must target this specific group and build a long-term mutually beneficial relationship
through corporate travel policies (see below), CRM and frequent flyer programs.
Many of these passengers will be members of the ‘top tier’ of a frequent flyer
program and their status should be instantly acknowledged and given priority at every
opportunity. If these passengers are travelling for leisure purposes, then every
advantage should be given to them by awarding upgrades, priority boarding, priority
waitlist, invitation to business lounges, etc.
 On average, 48.2% of business passengers who were travelling on the full service
airlines would remain loyal and would not be persuaded to switch to another airline,
regardless of fare changes. This passenger segment is tied to a corporate travel policy
agreement between their company and the airline. They tend to work for very large
organisations that predominantly employ over 1,000 people, and they are high yield -
high value, least price sensitive passengers. Airlines should have dedicated marketing
teams that go onsite to these corporations brokering long term deals, and their
requirements should be prioritised when travelling. In addition, any problems
encountered by this passenger group should be prioritised and resolved immediately.
Tools, such as CRM and frequent flyer mileage points, will further deepen the
relationship between the business executive and the airline, while they also will
reduce the risk of dissatisfying the customer. The airline should also provide extra
incentives to deepen the relationship between the airline and corporation by providing
a number of free holidays, for example, that can subsequently be offered as prizes.
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11.2.3 To measure the strategic capability of full service airlines and
to ascertain their understanding of the requirements of
passengers.
A survey, entitled ‘Impact of Low Cost Carriers’, was conducted throughout the world
with full service airlines and with the cooperation of IATA. A brief outline of the results
are shown below in Table 78, which identify the major difficulties that were encountered
by European, Asian and Middle East/African/Indian incumbents as well as the strategies
that they deemed important while competing against low cost carriers. The recurring
major difficulties encountered by the incumbent airlines across all three regions is their
inability to reduce costs to within 30% of a budget carrier, matching the fares of low cost
carriers and increasing yield in the short-haul market. It appears likely that network
carriers will not be able to bridge the cost gap between themselves and low cost carriers,
which will significantly impact on their ability to offer low fares. This problem needs to
be urgently addressed as it is of paramount importance. The key will be to lower the
operating costs of the legacy airlines to within 30% of budget carriers and to retain their
full set of flight products which will justify the carrier charging a fare premium. Network
carriers must look for alternative sources of revenue generating opportunities (e.g.
dynamic packaging, cargo, ancillary businesses, etc) whereby they can cross-subsidise
lower fares. The recurring message of the most important strategies gathered from the
network airlines worldwide were as follows: satisfying the needs of the customer, serving
primary airports and product differentiation. The high growth of low cost carriers
worldwide has triggered network carriers to re-evaluate why so many passengers have
been switching, and they have made satisfying the needs of passengers a priority – this
has now become the most important objective of the network carriers. Serving primary
airports will remain a core part of the overall strategy of network carriers, despite their
high charges, as they allow carriers to interline their own traffic (short-haul to long-haul)
as well as being profit centres that accommodate the interlining of traffic from code share
and alliance partners. Product differentiation also remains paramount as network airlines
must continue to widen the differences between the two airline business models.
Generally the incumbents who have a better understanding of the requirements of
passengers also have a strong strategic capability. Understanding the needs of passengers
will enable the network carrier to retain the existing ones and encourage new passengers
to try out the service which will result in higher load factors, higher yields and overall
revenues. The higher revenues would then allow the carrier to ‘try out’ more strategies
and to imitate the successful strategies (e.g. differentiated products) of other carriers.
However, there are many network airlines that have a medium strategic strength and have
a mixed perception of the demands of both leisure and business passengers, and these
carriers are so called ‘stuck in the middle’ airlines that have potential but need to
restructure internally. An examination of their internal weaknesses (e.g. uninspired
products, recalcitrant work force, etc.) should spur initiatives to design long-term
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strategies to address those shortcomings. In addition, they should look at the strategies
adopted by more successful incumbents as well as re-assess the requirements of their
passengers. However, there are a specific group of network airlines, such as Air China,
Alitalia, Biman Bangladesh, China Southern, Garuda, Kuwait Airways, Olympic,
Philippine Airlines, and Yemenia, that have a weak strategic strength coupled with a poor
perception of the requirements of passengers. These carriers are marred in a combination
of high costs, inefficiencies, frequent management changes, strikes, bureaucracy,
government influence, unproductive workforce, overstaffing, unclear direction, etc.
These incumbents with an unclear future are most at risk from low cost carriers and it
may be a wise strategy for these to merge with stronger incumbents as they (in their
present form) are unable to compete with budget carriers and it also appears that they are
unlikely to change.
Table 78 Difficulties and capabilities of European, Asian and Middle East/African/
Indian incumbents.
European incumbents Asian incumbents Middle East/African/Indian
incumbents
M
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s  Increasing yield
 Unions
 Reducing Costs
 Matching fares of LCC
 Airport charges
 Reducing costs
 Matching fares of LCC
 Increasing yield
 Airport charges
 Sales through website
 Reducing costs
 Matching fares of LCC
 Increasing yield
 Sales through website
 Communicate to customer
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 Serving primary airport
 Satisfying passengers
 Frequent Flyer Programs
 Product differentiation
 Union transparency
 Revenues from alliance
/code share partners
 Satisfying passengers
 Cargo
 Serving primary airport
 Product differentiation
 Frequent Flyer Program
 Interlining traffic
 Product differentiation
 Satisfying passenger needs
 Interlining traffic
 Advertising
 Serving primary airport
 Business class
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)  Aer Lingus
 British Airways
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 Qantas
 Emirates
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s)  British Airways
 Lufthansa
 Air France
 Iberia
 Singapore Airlines  Emirates
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11.3 Research limitations and recommendations for future
research
11.3.1 Research limitations
 Gaining authorisation to conduct passenger surveys from airlines generally was a
difficult process - it took 3 months of negotiation with Ryanair, for example, before
they allowed the researcher to proceed. This type of limitation prohibited other
passenger surveys from being undertaken as a more aggregate collection of passenger
surveys from around the world would have provided a truer reflection of the
perception of passengers who travel on low cost and full service airlines. In addition,
no data was collected from the North American market, which narrowed the scope of
the research.
 The preferred solution to reducing or minimising interpretation errors would have
been to personally interview senior airline management as this process would have
allowed the researcher to obtain greater insights into the dynamics of the competition
between low cost and network airlines. This was not possible as the research was self
funded. However, the second best solution of interpreting the results from the written
completed questionnaires was to have ‘brainstorming sessions’ with IATA staff
members by telephone and email, but this was limited as they were not specialists in
airline strategy or competition and therefore were somewhat detached from the
subject area.
 IATA imposed a restriction on the survey by requiring that the results cannot be
published in any format (i.e. conference papers, journal papers, book chapter, etc)
until January 1st 2009 - subsequently the thesis must be restricted from public viewing
in the university library until that time.
11.3.2 Recommendations for future research
 The response of regional airlines to low cost carriers is another area where there is a
gap in the academic literature. These regional airlines comprise of either full service
airline subsidiaries or independent standalone airlines where the latter are often
contracted by network carriers to provide feed traffic from secondary markets and
therefore compete more vigorously with low cost carriers. There are many areas to
explore, such as: what strategies are proving to be effective against budget carriers?;
are they impacting the market share of low cost carriers?; to operate turboprop or jet
services?; the benefit of regional carriers to full service airlines?; and which type of
regional airline (e.g. stand alone enterprises like Aer Arran, Flybe or regional feeders
like Augsburg Airways, Contact Air) is in a better position to compete with low cost
carriers?
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 Along the same lines, there is also a gap in the research to determine how the Charter
airlines are responding to the low cost carriers and to assess the future of this niche
group.
 Another interesting area that has not been researched recently is the re-emergence of
low cost carrier subsidiaries and their impact on challenging low cost carriers. History
has indicated that this was not an effective strategy as they were all dissolved, but in
recent years there has been a notable increase in the number of low cost carrier
subsidiary start-ups, indicating that incumbents have seriously reconsidered it as a
feasible, worthwhile strategy to pursue. Qantas’ Jetstar, for example, has been very
successful - it quickly clawed back 14% of the Australian domestic market within 18
months of starting operations, which shows the potential for such activity.
 Another very important area that urgently needs research is the impact of long-haul
low cost carriers (e.g. Oasis Hong Kong, Jetstar and Air Asia X) and all-business
class carriers (e.g. MaxJet and EOS) on network airlines. This will be the next
extension of the air transport industry and they could pose enormous problems to the
full service airlines as their economy-class and business-class sections are being
threatened at the same time. However, the long-haul low cost carriers in particular are
very dangerous, as research has already formulated that they have a 20% cost
advantage over a traditional network carrier, which will trigger fares to fall
significantly and result in huge fare wars between the carriers. The study would
endeavour to seek answers on how the network carriers could respond to this threat.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I. Top 25 Airlines by Operating Profitability
(Fiscal Year, 2005)
Total Operating Profit Operating Profit Margin
Rank Airline US$m Rank Airline %
1 Fedex* 1,414 1 GOL Airlines 23.3
2 British Airways 1,330 2 Ryanair 21.8
3 Air France-KLM 1,200 3 Air Asia 18.9
4 Lufthansa 877 4 COPA 17.3
5 Southwest 820 5 Kenya Airlines 15.6
6 Emirates 786 6 Phillipine Airlines 13.7
7 All Nippon 776 7 DHL International* 12.5
8 Qantas* 775 8 Kalitta Air 12.3
9 Singapore Airlines 590 9 Emirates 11.9
10 Cathay Pacific 533 10 Mesa Airlines 11.7
11 Ryanair 459 11 American Eagle 11.3
12 Air China 458 12 SkyWest 11.2
13 Iberia 457 13 Southwest 10.8
14 Air Canada 388 14 Jet Airways* 10.3
15 UPS 293 15 Air China 9.6
16 Thai Airways 269 16 Virgin Blue 9.6
17 GOL Airlines 266 17 TAM 9.5
18 TAM 232 18 Singapore Airlines 9.1
19 American Eagle 225 19 Royal Jordanian 9.0
20 SkyWest 220 20 Qantas* 8.9
21 Korean Airlines 207 21 Atlantic Southeast 8.5
22 Virgin Blue 184 22 British Airways 8.3
23 China Eastern* 179 23 Aer Lingus 8.2
24 Lan Chile 142 24 Cathay Pacific 8.1
25 Asiana 136 25 Fedex* 7.2
Note 1: *Fiscal Year 2004
Note 2: Low cost carriers are in Italics
Source: Airclaims Financial Database
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Appendix II. Fare collection data
Table 1. Fares for London Gatwick to Dublin: 3 month booking profile for a return trip, leaving on Friday (evening time) and returning
on Sunday (evening time) for Ryanair and Aer Lingus: (all prices are in £ Sterling and excludes taxes)
Week 1
Dec 13
Week 2
Dec 20
Week 3
Dec 27
Week 4
Jan 3
Week 5
Jan 10
Week 6
Jan 17
Week 7
Jan 24
Week 8
Jan 31
Week 9
Feb 7
Week 10
Feb 14
Week 11
Feb 21
Week 12
Feb 28*
Ryanair1 55.98 55.98 50.98 50.98 54.98 54.98 59.98 65.98 69.99 69.98 99.98 119.98
20
02
/0
3
Aer Lingus2 76.00 76.00 76.00 79.50 79.50 85.50 85.50 85.50 89.00 93.00 152.00 178.50
Week 1
Dec 12
Week 2
Dec 19
Week 3
Dec 26
Week 4
Jan 2
Week 5
Jan 9
Week 6
Jan 16
Week 7
Jan 23
Week 8
Jan 30
Week 9
Feb 6
Week 10
Feb 13
Week 11
Feb 20
Week 12
Feb 27*
Ryanair3 39.98 39.98 39.98 39.98 46.98 46.98 46.98 49.98 52.46 57.98 79.00 86.00
20
03
/0
4
Aer Lingus4 45.50 45.50 45.50 49.50 54.00 58.00 62.00 62.00 68.00 68.00 88.00 110.00
Week 1
Dec 10
Week 2
Dec 17
Week 3
Dec 24
Week 4
Dec 31
Week 5
Jan 7
Week 6
Jan 14
Week 7
Jan 21
Week 8
Jan 28
Week 9
Feb 4
Week 10
Feb 11
Week 11
Feb 18
Week 12
Feb 25*
Ryanair5 65.80 65.80 65.80 79.80 79.80 79.80 79.80 79.80 79.80 99.90 115.00 125.00
20
04
/0
5
Aer Lingus Cancelled all Flights from Gatwick to Dublin
* Booking on day of departure
1 Ryanair had 4 flights a day in 2002/03 using B737s 3 Ryanair had 5 flights a day in 2003/04 using B737s 5 Ryanair had 6 flights a day in 2004/05
2 Aer Lingus had 6 daily flights in 2002/03 using BAe146 4 Aer Lingus had 4 flights a day in 2003/04 using A320s
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Table 2. Fares for London Gatwick to Barcelona: 3 month booking profile for a week-end return trip, leaving on Friday (evening time)
and returning on Sunday (evening time) for easyJet and British Airways: (all prices are in £ Sterling, excludes taxes)
Week 1
Dec 13
Week 2
Dec 20
Week 3
Dec 27
Week 4
Jan 3
Week 5
Jan 10
Week 6
Jan 17
Week 7
Jan 24
Week 8
Jan 31
Week 9
Feb 7
Week 10
Feb 14
Week 11
Feb 21
Week 12
Feb 28*
easyJet1 62.54 62.55 62.54 72.54 92.54 92.50 112.50 140.50 140.50 165.50 165.50 210.00
20
02
/0
3
BA2 86.00 86.00 86.00 98.00 130.00 136.00 148.0 184.00 198.00 234.00 296.00 404.00
Week 1
Dec 12
Week 2
Dec 19
Week 3
Dec 26
Week 4
Jan 2
Week 5
Jan 9
Week 6
Jan 16
Week 7
Jan 23
Week 8
Jan 30
Week 9
Feb 6
Week 10
Feb 13
Week 11
Feb 20
Week 12
Feb 27*
easyJet1 64.98 64.98 66.98 66. 98 66.98 66.58 90.58 118.58 135.98 135.98 160.98 188.98
20
03
/0
4
BA2 88.00 88.00 98.00 98.00 108.00 108.00 136.00 156.00 175.00 175.00 198.00 310.00
Week 1
Dec 10
Week 2
Dec 17
Week 3
Dec 24
Week 4
Dec 31
Week 5
Jan 7
Week 6
Jan 14
Week 7
Jan 21
Week 8
Jan 28
Week 9
Feb 4
Week 10
Feb 11
Week 11
Feb 18
Week 12
Feb 25*
easyJet1 45.92 45.92 52.98 63.98 63.98 63.98 76.98 92.98 92.98 115.75 127.5 167.98
20
04
/0
5
BA2 59 59 59 59 69 69 94 119 130 144 168 224
* Booking on day of departure
1easyJet had 3 flights a day in 2002/03/04/05 operating B737s
2BA had 3 flights a day in 2002/03/04/05 operating B737s
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Table 3. Fares from London airports to Glasgow: Analysis conducted for a one-day return trip leaving on Monday in mid March (first
flight out) and returning on the same day (between 18:00 – 19:00) for Ryanair, easyJet, BA and BMI. (All prices are in £ Sterling, excludes
taxes)
Week 1
Jan 26
Week 2
Feb 2
Week 3
Feb 9
Week 4
Feb 16
Week5
Feb 23
Week 6
Mar 2
Week7
Mar 9
Week 8
Mar 16*
Ryanair1 9.98 9.98 9.98 9.98 9.98 39.98 79.98 92.98
easyJet2 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 27.50 37.50 57.50 112.40
BMI3 50.00 50.00 65.00 65.00 82.50 145.00 195.00 365.00
BA4 56.00 56.00 56.00 85.00 95.00 142.00 230.00 390.002
00
3
BA5 45.00 45.00 45.00 65.00 65.00 95.00 155.00 380.00
Week 1
Jan 25
Week 2
Feb 1
Week 3
Feb 8
Week 4
Feb 15
Week 5
Feb 22
Week 6
Feb 29
Week 7
Mar 7
Week 8
Mar 14*
Ryanair1 4.48 4.48 4.48 9.98 9.98 38.98 69.98 94.98
easyJet2 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 45.48 113.48 145.48
BMI3 36.00 36.00 36.00 54.00 62.00 96.00 190.00 336.00
BA4 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 64.00 110.00 188.00 360.002
00
4
BA5 40.00 40.00 40.00 44.00 52.00 66.00 180.00 320.00
Week 1
Jan 30
Week 2
Feb 6
Week 3
Feb 13
Week 4
Feb 20
Week 5
Feb 27
Week 6
Mar 6
Week 7
Mar 13
Week 8
Mar 20*
Ryanair1 1.38 1.38 10.68 10.68 32.68 32.98 49.98 69.98
easyJet2 25.98 25.98 25.98 39.98 56.98 56.98 65.98 95.98
BMI3 18.00 18.00 35.00 35.00 70.00 89.00 122.00 290.00
BA4 44.00 44.00 44.00 79.00 99.00 120.00 190.00 320.002
00
5
BA5 27.00 27.00 72.00 96.00 146.00 146.00 208.00 288.00
* Booking day before departure
1 Ryanair flies from London Stansted to Glasgow (Preswick). It had 10 flights a day in 2003, 8 flights a day in 2004 and 5 flights a day in 2005.
2 easyJet flies from London Luton to Glasgow International. It had 7 flights a day in 2003, 5 flights a day in 2004 and also 5 flights a day in 2005.
3 BMI flies from London Heathrow to Glasgow International. It had 8 flights a day in 2003/04/05
4 BA flies from London Heathrow to Glasgow International. It had 9 flights a day in 2003/04/05
5 BA flies from London Gatwick to Glasgow International. It had 4 flights a day in 200304/05
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Table 4. Fares for Oakland to Los Angeles: 3 month booking profile for a return trip, leaving on the last Friday in February (evening
time) and returning on the first Sunday in March (evening time) for Southwest and United Airlines (all prices are shown in US Dollars,
excludes taxes)
Week 1
Dec 13
Week 2
Dec 20
Week 3
Dec 27
Week 4
Jan 3
Week 5
Jan 10
Week 6
Jan 17
Week 7
Jan 24
Week 8
Jan 31
Week 9
Feb 7
Week 10
Feb 14
Week 11
Feb 21
Week 12
Feb 28*
Southwest1 79.0 76.0 85.0 92.0 92.0 92.0 92.0 109.0 109.0 115.0 140.0 165.0
20
02
/0
3
United
Airlines2 108.4 108.4 108.4 108.4 112.8 112.8 119.8 129.8 129.8 149.8 189.8 247.4
Week 1
Dec 12
Week 2
Dec 19
Week 3
Dec 26
Week 4
Jan 2
Week 5
Jan 9
Week 6
Jan 16
Week 7
Jan 23
Week 8
Jan 30
Week 9
Feb 6
Week 10
Feb 13
Week 11
Feb 20
Week 12
Feb 27*
Southwest1 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.0 84.0 86.0 94.0 94.0 109.0 124.0 154.0
20
03
/0
4
United
Airlines2 99.0 99.6 99.6 105.6 105.2 105.2 114.8 114.8 114.4 121.8 159.2 199.8
Week 1
Dec 10
Week 2
Dec 17
Week 3
Dec 24
Week 4
Dec 31
Week 5
Jan 7
Week 6
Jan 14
Week 7
Jan 21
Week 8
Jan 28
Week 9
Feb 4
Week 10
Feb 11
Week 11
Feb 18
Week 12
Feb 25*
Southwest1 72.0 72.0 72.0 76.0 76.0 76.0 84.0 92.0 92.0 103.0 121.0 145.0
20
04
/0
5
United
Airlines2 90.4 90.4 94.4 94.6 94.6 101.8 101.4 109.8 116.8 116.8 148.2 172.4
* Booking on day of departure
1 Southwest operated 22 flights a day in 2002/03/04/05 using 737s.
2 United operated 6 flights a day using A319s and 320s and used Skywest which is a regional feeder to United who operated CRJ 700s
in 2002/03/04. By 2005 United was using Skywest for all their flights between Oakland and Los Angeles
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Table 5. Fares for Sydney to Brisbane: 3 month booking profile for a return trip, leaving on the last Friday in February (evening time)
and returning on the first Sunday in March (evening time) for Virgin Blue and Qantas (all prices are in Australian Dollars, excluding tax)
Week 1
Dec 13
Week 2
Dec 20
Week 3
Dec 27
Week 4
Jan 3
Week 5
Jan 10
Week 6
Jan 17
Week 7
Jan 24
Week 8
Jan 31
Week 9
Feb 7
Week 10
Feb 14
Week 11
Feb 21
Week 12
Feb 28*
Virgin
Blue1 207 207 207 236 236 236 266 266 296 296 356 398
20
02
/0
3
Qantas2 458. 42 448. 79 448.79 448.79 449.21 449.21 449.21 449.21 449.21 513.01 583.91 770.41
Week 1
Dec 12
Week 2
Dec 19
Week 3
Dec 26
Week 4
Jan 2
Week 5
Jan 9
Week 6
Jan 16
Week 7
Jan 23
Week 8
Jan 30
Week 9
Feb 6
Week 10
Feb 13
Week 11
Feb 20
Week 12
Feb 27*
Virgin
Blue1 232 234 234 258 292 292 348 312 312 354 388 410
20
03
/0
4
Qantas2 319.39 319.39 332.79 332.79 348.69 348.69 348.69 378.79 378.79 402.80 498.64 604.08
Week 1
Dec 10
Week 2
Dec 17
Week 3
Dec 24
Week 4
Dec 31
Week 5
Jan 7
Week 6
Jan 14
Week 7
Jan 21
Week 8
Jan 28
Week 9
Feb 4
Week 10
Feb 11
Week 11
Feb 18
Week 12
Feb 25*
Virgin
Blue1 198 1998 198 240 268 268 272 278 278 302 322 318
20
04
/0
5
Qantas2 279.42 279.42 279.42 284.56 284.56 294.69 294.69 300.05 300.05 308.79 352.83 410.26
* Booking on day of departure
1 Virgin Blue had 16 flights a day in 2002/03/04/05 operating 737s
2 Qantas had 26 flights a day in 2002/03 using a combination of 737s and 767s. In 2003/04/05 Qantas operated 20 flights a day with
A330s, 767s and 737s.
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Table 6. Fares for Kuala Lumpur to Kuching: 3 month booking profile for a return trip, leaving on the last Friday in February (evening
time) and returning on the first Sunday in March (evening time) for Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines (all prices are shown in Malaysian
Rinngits)
Week 1
Dec 13
Week 2
Dec 20
Week 3
Dec 27
Week 4
Jan 3
Week 5
Jan 10
Week 6
Jan 17
Week 7
Jan 24
Week 8
Jan 31
Week 9
Feb 7
Week 10
Feb 14
Week 11
Feb 21
Week 12
Feb 28*
Air Asia1 184.98 184.98 184.98 184.98 184.98 184.98 214.98 214.98 254.98 254.98 274.98 299.98
20
02
/0
3
Malaysia
Airlines2 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524
Week 1
Dec 12
Week 2
Dec 19
Week 3
Dec 26
Week 4
Jan 2
Week 5
Jan 9
Week 6
Jan 16
Week 7
Jan 23
Week 8
Jan 30
Week 9
Feb 6
Week 10
Feb 13
Week 11
Feb 20
Week 12
Feb 27*
Air Asia1 192.98 192.98 192.98 199.98 236.98 236.98 236.98 236.98 248.98 248.98 294.98 308.98
20
03
/0
4
Malaysia
Airlines2 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524
Week 1
Dec 10
Week 2
Dec 17
Week 3
Dec 24
Week 4
Dec 31
Week 5
Jan 7
Week 6
Jan 14
Week 7
Jan 21
Week 8
Jan 28
Week 9
Feb 4
Week 10
Feb 11
Week 11
Feb 18
Week 12
Feb 25*
Air Asia1 219.98 219.98 229.98 229.98 265.98 265.98 285.98 285.98 308.98 308.98 335.98 365.98
20
04
/0
5
Malaysia
Airlines3 294 294 294 342 342 386 386 386 395 395 440 526
* Booking on day of departure
1 Air Asia operated 6 flights a day in 2002/03 using 737s
2 Malaysia Airlines operated 10 flights a day in 2002/03/04 using a combination of 737s and A330s.
3 In 2004/05 Malaysia Airlines initiated their own booking engine and operated 12 flights a day using 737s.
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Appendix III. Impact of Airline Alliances
Traffic Increase
 Iatrou (2004) researched from an econometric model that global traffic increased by
9.7% as a result of airline alliances, which creates an additional 1.5 million
passengers.
 Oum et al. (2000) indicated that traffic could increase by 6.8% for allied partners
and by up to 66.8% for non-allied partners.
 Park (1997) indicated from econometric modeling that alliances increased traffic at
the expense of rival airlines.
 A report published by the US General Accounting Office (1995) study based on
interviews with key airline and government officials. This study found that the
carriers in the five alliances studied (Northwest/KLM; USAir/British Airways;
United Airlines/Lufthansa; United Airlines/Ansett Australia and United
Airlines/British Midland) all experienced increased traffic and revenues, which were
directly attributed to the alliance.
 Northwest and KLM each generated an extra 200,000 and 150,000 passengers
respectively per year from their alliance partnership (Doganis, 2001, p75).
 Transatlantic passengers at Austrian Airlines jumped from 150,000 in 1995 to
265,000 in 1998 as a result of joining the Star alliance (Flint, 1998).
 The average number of passengers on United Airline’s Chicago-Frankfurt flights
increased from 110 passengers to 212 passengers as a result of its linkup with
Lufthansa. Consequently, Lufthansa’s average boardings per flight increased from
134 passengers to 186 in 1998 (Air Transport Week, April 1999).
Revenue Enhancement
 Oum et al. (2004) found that strategic alliances made a significant contributions to
partner firms’ overall productivity gains and positively contributed to profitability
 Park et al. (2001) found that airlines who belong to an alliance, positively
contributes to its revenue.
 Oum and Zhang (2001) researched that alliances enabled partner airlines to increase
total productivity by an average of 5%
 Oum et al. (2000) conducted an empirical study of 22 international carriers. Using
data from eight North American carriers, seven from the Asia-Pacific region and
seven from Europe, they found that airline alliances reported significant positive
effects on economic performance.
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 Holloway (2003, p384) reported that $500 million of Delta’s $16 billion in revenues
in 2000 was attributed to the alliance
 Gellman Research Associates (1994) conducted an econometric model on the
profitability of the alliance between BA/USAir and KLM/Northwest and found that
each produced substantial profits as a result of their hookup
 Based on data from the first quarter of 1994, the study adopted an econometric
model that attempted to reflect the way consumers select an airline using a discrete
choice framework. It found increases in profitability for all parties to the alliance
although BA and Northwest gained more than their partners. BA was found to have
gained almost five times more than USAir, while Northwest gained just over 50%
more than KLM in terms of net profit.
 Aeroflot has estimated that on joining SkyTeam it could earn an extra $200 million
a year from its membership (Field and Pilling, 2004).
 Air France’s association with the SkyTeam alliance could net the carrier $100
million in additional revenues from the scheduling, marketing and sales departments
from 2002 to 2005 (Sparaco, 2003).
 The Delta and Air France led alliance brought Delta $400 million in extra revenues
in
2000 (ATI, April 2000).
 Air France and Delta stated that the alliance improved profits to each group by
around $165 million in 1999 (Sparaco, 2003).
 All Nippon Airways estimated that it benefited by $100 million in additional
revenues by its membership in the Star Alliance (Aviation Economist, 1999).
 United Airlines stated that the Star alliance added around $250 million to its bottom
line each year (Field and Pilling, 2004)
 United, Lufthansa and Air Canada estimated that the Star Alliance accounted for
10% of the airlines’ profits in 1998 (Zehle, 1999).
 US Airways claimed that Star alliance increased its revenues by $75 million in
incremental revenue each year (Baker and Field, 2003)
 The Oneworld Alliance has stated that it has added around $2 billion in value over
the lifetime of the alliance (Field and Pilling, 2004).
 The cooperation between SkyTeam members is expected to save around $100m per
year on the transatlantic market from 2003 to 2006 (Baker and Field, 2003).
 Doganis (2001, p75) stated that Lufthansa was producing benefits of DM 250-270
million a year because of its marketing alliance with United, SAS, Thai, South
African Airways and Varig in the late 1990s.
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Cost Reduction
 Iatrou (2004) surveyed all the airlines that participated in the three alliances and
concluded that 80% of them found that their costs were reduced as a result of the
alliance.
 Li (2001) stated that cost reductions become very apparent as the alliance matures
 The cooperation between SkyTeam members was expected to save around $100m
per year on the transatlantic market from 2003 to 2006 (Baker and Field, 2003).
 Baker and Field (2003) indicated that the Oneworld member airlines saved around
$300 million through joint purchasing schemes from 2000 to 2003.
 Kleymann and Seristo (2001) stated that significant cost savings can be accrued
when airlines pool their resources in marketing, maintenance, ground handling and
flight operations.
 Alitalia and KLM cut their combined annual operating costs by $400 million in
1999 (Sparaco, 1999).
 Lufthansa estimated that the cost reduction program within the Star alliance saved
the carrier $200 million in 1998. (Sparco, 1999)
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Appendix IV Regional Airline
Table 1. Details of US regional airline (2005 data)
Regional
Airline
Provides service for
the following incumbents
% Equity/
Independent
Passengers
carried
(millions)
Comair Delta 100% equity (Delta) 11.1
Atlantic Southeast Delta Independent 12.0
SkyWest Delta, United Independent 20.3
Chautauqua Delta, United,
American, US Airways
Independent 7.8
American Eagle Delta, American 100% equity
(American Airlines)
17.5
Shuttle America Delta, United Independent 1.2
Air Wisconsin United, US Airways Independent 6.8
Colgan Air United, US Airways Independent 1.0
Piedmont US Airways 100% equity
(US Airways)
3.3
Executive American Independent 2.6
Mesa Airlines United, Delta,
America West
Independent 13.0
PSA US Airways Independent 4.1
Trans States US Airways Independent 4.0
Air Midwest US Airways Independent 0.3
ExpressJet Continental 8.6% equity
(Continental)
15.9
Mesaba Airlines Northwest Independent 5.7
Pinnacle Northwest Independent 8.1
Horizon Air Alaska Airlines 100% equity
(Alaska Airlines)
6.4
Air Canada Jazz 100% equity
(Air Canada)
6.0
Source: Company reports, ATI, Airline Business
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Table 2. Details of regional airline in Europe, Asia, rest of world (2005 data)
Incumbent Regional Affiliate % Equity/ Independent Passengers
carried
(millions)
Lufthansa Cityline 100% equity (Lufthansa) 5.9
Eurowings 49% equity (Lufthansa) 7.6
Air Dolomiti 100% equity (Lufthansa) 1.3
Augsburg Independent 0.7
Contact Air Independent 0.4
Air France Regional 100% equity (Air France) 3.7
Brit Air 100% equity (Air France) 3.5
CityJet 100% equity (Air France) 1.5
CCM Airlines 11.9% equity (Air France) 1.5
SAS Wideroe 100% equity (SAS) 1.8
Blue 1 100% equity (SAS) 1.4
Air Baltic 47.2% equity (SAS) 1.0
Skyways 25% equity (SAS) 0.9
BA BA Connect 100% equity (BA) 3.4
Iberia Air Nostrum Independent 4.6
KLM Citihopper 100% equity (KLM) 2.9
Austrian Austrian Arrows 100% equity (Austrian) 4.1
Alitalia Alitalia Express 100% equity (Alitalia) 2.1
JAL J-Air 100% equity (JAL) 0.5
Ryukyu Air Commuter 70.3% equity (JAL) 0.3
Japan Air Commuter 60% equity (JAL) 1.3
Hokkaido Air System 51% equity (JAL) 0.2
Qantas Airlink 100% equity (Qantas) 0.7
Eastern Australia 100% equity (Qantas) 1.5
Sunstate Airlines 100% equity (Qantas) 0.8
Air New Zealand Mount Cook Airlines 100% equity (ANZ) 1.5
Air Nelson 100% equity (ANZ) 1.2
Eagle Airways 100% equity (ANZ) 0.8
China Airlines Mandarin Airlines 93.9% equity (China Airlines) 1.8
South African
Airways
South African Airlink 10% equity (SAA) 0.6
SA Express Airways Independent 1.1
Source: Company reports, ATI, Airline Business
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Appendix V. Low Cost Carrier Subsidiaries
Dissolved operations: (by January 1, 2007)
Low cost carrier Entrepreneurial system
Buzz KLM
GO BA
Shuttle by United United Airlines
Delta Express Delta
MetroJet US Airways
Continental Lite Continental Airlines
Lufthansa Express Lufthansa
People Express Frontier
Basiq Air KLM
Zip Air Canada
Tango Air Canada
Song Delta
Snowflake SAS
Active Operations (January 1, 2007)
Low cost carrier Entrepreneurial system
Germanwings Lufthansa/Eurowings
SAS Braathens SAS
Bmibaby BMI
Freedom Air Air New Zealand
Australian Airlines Qantas
JetStar Qantas
JetStar Asia Qantas
Nok Air Thai Airways
Tiger Airways Singapore Airlines
Ted United Airlines
Atlas Blue Royal Air Maroc
Hapag Lloyd Express TUI/Hapag Llyod
Air India Express Air India
Centralwings LOT Polish Airlines
Click Air Iberia
Gulf Traveler Gulf Air
Click Mexicana Mexicana
Mango South African Airways
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Planned Operations (as at January 2007)
Low cost carrier Entrepreneurial system
Turkish Express Turkish
Nordic Airlink Finnair
Transavia Air France
Austrian Bratislava Austrian Airlines
Travel Service CSA
Unknown ANA
Unknown Sri Lanka
Unknown Egyptair
Unknown All Nippon Airways
Source: Analysis from Air Transport Intelligence news
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Appendix VI. Passenger questionnaire (Full service airlines)
1. Where is your final destination? _________________
2. Is your journey Return One way
3. If you are connecting to another airline, please name it __________________
4. Where will you/did you stay on your trip? (Please tick one)
Hotel Bed & Breakfast Hostel Family/Friends
5. How did you travel to the airport today? (Please tick one)
Aircraft Car Taxi Bus Train + Bus
How many miles have you traveled today to reach the airport? ______________
6. How many people are travelling in your group ______
7. What is the main purpose of your visit (Please tick one)
Business Leisure
Meeting Sports
Conference Shopping
Training Visit Friends and Family
Trade fair Weekend break
Employment Holiday
Other Studying
Cultural/Religious
Other
8. How many short haul flights did you take last year? (please circle)
Short haul flights (up to 3 hours) 1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
How many of these short haul flights were on a Full Service
Airline such as Jet Airways?
1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
9. a) If you sometimes travel for Business purposes (please circle)
How many business trips did you take last year? 1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
How many business trips did you take last year on a low
cost carrier such as Air Deccan?
1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
b) If you are travelling for Business Purposes
How many people work in your Organisation (Please Tick)
Self Employed 1-24 25-99 100- 999 1000-5000 5000+
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10. Please identify your top 10 reasons for choosing this airline today? (rank First = 1,
Second = 2, etc)
Frequent Flyer Programme Safety
Fare Comfort
Quality Service
Connections Company Policy
Reliability Other
______________________________
Flight Schedule
11. If Jet Airways for example increased its fare
At what interval would you consider switching to a low cost carrier (Please tick one)
10% Fare Increase 20% Fare Increase 30% Fare Increase Not Switch
12. How did you book your airline ticket (Please tick one).
Travel agent Airline website
Purchased today Other travel website
Telephoned airline Call Centre Office booked ticket
Friend/family member booked my ticket Other
13. How long ago did you book your ticket? ________________
14. How much did you pay for your ticket? ________________
15. Was your trip influenced by the fare? Yes No
16. Who paid for the ticket?
Self Work Gift Parent Other
17. Are you: Male Female
Are you aged
between
0-18 19-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
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Appendix VI. Passenger questionnaire (Low cost airlines)
1. Where is your final destination? _________________
2. Is your journey Return One way
3. If you are connecting to another airline, please name it __________________
4. Where will you/did you stay on your trip? (Please tick one)
Hotel Bed & Breakfast Hostel Family/Friends
5. How did you travel to the airport today? (Please tick one)
Aircraft Car Taxi Bus Train + Bus
How many miles have you travelled today to reach the airport? ______________
6. How many people are travelling in your group ______
7. What is the main purpose of your visit (Please tick one)
Business Leisure
Meeting Sports
Conference Shopping
Training Visit Friends and Family
Trade fair Weekend break
Employment Holiday
Other Studying
Cultural/Religious
Other
8. How many short haul flights did you take last year? (please circle)
Short haul flights (up to 3 hours) 1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
How many of these short haul flights were on a Full Service
Airline such as Jet Airways?
1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
9. a) If you sometimes travel for Business purposes (please circle)
How many business trips did you take last year? 1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
How many business trips did you take last year on
a full service airline such as Jet Airways?
1-2 3-4 5-7 > 8
b) If you are travelling for Business Purposes
How many people work in your Organisation (Please Tick)
Self Employed 1-24 25-99 100- 999 1000-5000 5000+
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10. Please identify your top 8 reasons for choosing this airline today? (rank First = 1,
Second = 2, etc)
Reliability Safety
Fare Comfort
Quality Service
Connections
Flight Schedule
Other
______________________________
11. If Jet Airways for example reduced its fare
At what interval would you consider switching to this full service airline (Please tick one)
10% Fare Reduction 20% Fare Reduction 30% Fare Reduction Not Switch
12. How did you book your airline ticket (Please tick one).
Travel agent Airline website
Purchased today Other travel website
Telephoned airline Call Centre Office booked ticket
Friend/family member booked my ticket Other
13. How long ago did you book your ticket? ________________
14. How much did you pay for your ticket? ________________
15. Was your trip influenced by the fare? Yes No
16. Who paid for the ticket? Self Work Gift Parent Other
17. Are you: Male Female
Are you aged
between
0-18 19-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
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Appendix VII. Airline questionnaire
417
418
419
